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The short fiction of Djuna Barnes (1892–1982) and Jean Rhys (1890–
1979) conveys intense moments of human characters interacting with 
material things. Clothes and furniture along with other material items, 
both human-made and of the natural world, have central roles in how 
the stories invite both interpretation and affective response. This is 
part of the way the two writers draw upon and develop modernist 
ideas and aesthetics, focus on lived experience and challenge the 
borders between the individual and the world, the human and the 
nonhuman. The form of short fiction allows for especially intense 
depictions of fleeting moments of experience. This study analyzes 
the way material things are present in such moments, and discusses 
their roles in the evocation of spatiality and temporality, their fictional 
agency and their part in literary affectivity and meaning-making.
Barnes’s and Rhys’s stories invite sociocultural interpretations 
related to issues such as commodification and consumerism, 
marginality and belonging, and gendered power relations. This 
study explores the ways in which such interpretations are produced 
by narrative experientiality, especially the evocation of embodied, 
affective experiences of material things. With the help of theoretical 
insights into embodied cognitive narratology and new materialist 
thinking, the analyses investigate the ways in which cultural values 
suggested by the texts are entangled with basic, embodied experi-
ences of being in the material world, and the ways such experiences 
can be evoked in the reader.
The study shows how paying attention to the entanglements of the 
material and the cultural, humans and things, open new possibili-
ties of interpretation and shift readers’ understanding of modernist 
fiction and the experientiality of stories, and how the stories in turn 
can shed light on the real-world relations between the human and 
the nonhuman. The analyses suggest a broader inclusion of mate-
riality and worldly experience within the interpretation of Barnes’s 
and Rhys’s work and within canonized modernism. The attention 
to experienced materialities offers additional support especially for 
readings that focus on the stories’ reparative potential as regards their 
point of view on agency and subjecthood and their evocation of posi-
tive affect, yet it also allows for the pairing of these affirmative tones 
with the recognition of the critical potential of the works. The analyses 
contribute to the discussion of narrative experientiality by high-
lighting it as an embodied phenomenon rooted in the material world.
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A woman from Martinique stands in the middle of a room in a 
shabby London flat, holding her best dress in her arms and crying. 
A commandant is going through the cabinets in the Paris flat of her 
deceased young lover to take some of her possessions to her mother, 
when a big block of white marble crashes down out of nowhere in 
the adjacent room. A man, dressed in an evening suit and a top hat 
is crawling through the undergrowth around a country house. A 
child is lying in the middle of a large bed, making a buzzing noise, 
surrounded by a disorder involving an enormous stove and book-
shelves, and a painting of a war scene with charging horses.
These are all scenes in short stories written by Jean Rhys (1890–
1979) and Djuna Barnes (1892–1982). They are not necessarily the most 
important turning points, or the only defining moments in the stories, 
yet they all convey a powerful sense of meaningful experience that 
might stick with a reader as an image or a feeling, after leaving the 
story behind, and even after forgetting the names of characters or the 
general plotline. All these moments feature human characters inter-
acting with things, that is, material, inanimate objects: clothes, inte-
rior fabrics, bookshelves, a painting, and a mysterious block of marble 
reminiscent of a tombstone. The initial motivation behind this study is 
the insight that things have an important role to play in such affective 
moments in Barnes’s and Rhys’s fiction, so much so that to view them 
merely as background and props for the action of the stories is to over-
look their possible importance. Sometimes even the idea that things 
surround characters might be a product of habitual human-centered 
thinking: it could equally well be said that characters surround or 
gather around things. Material things help to shape characters’ iden-
tities, provide indirect symbolic allusions, and convey information 
about historical time, for instance. However, pointing out these tasks, 
which are the ones usually allotted to things in the study of literature, 
does not completely account for their importance in these stories. 
Firstly, material things can equally well be seen as agents in their 
own right, changing the course of the narratives, and affecting their 
characters as well as their readers; secondly, human beings interact 
with the world of things through the senses, and it is this fictional-
ly-evoked sense experience that is often strongly connected to the 
memorable instances of the stories.
Human lives, especially in the industrialized world, are populated 
by material things of various kinds; for this simple reason, their pres-
ence cannot be escaped in fiction about such lives. The clothes people 
wear, the chairs, tables, tools and machines that surrounded them 
daily constantly affect their bodies through the senses, and affect 
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the ways they act in the world. Experiences of happiness, belonging, 
anxiety, and fear are accompanied by things whose presence, like 
these feelings, are felt in the body. Human beings are bound not only 
to what phenomenologist call the ‘lived body’, but also to the material 
world in which this subjectively felt, acting body is situated, among 
other, nonhuman bodies. Therefore, the title of this study suggests that 
the experience of being-in-the-world as a lived body is accompanied 
and partly defined by lived things occupying the space of living, and 
that this aspect of material things becomes highlighted in the short 
fiction of Djuna Barnes and Jean Rhys.
Why do material things appear so central for conveying lived 
experience in these particular stories, and how, exactly, are they 
used to this effect? The aim of this study is to investigate how 
material things, as part of experiences evoked in a fictional world, 
contribute to the possibilities of readerly experience of Rhys and 
Barnes’s short fiction. How do readers get a “feel” for the materialities, 
and how does this affect their interpretations and understanding of 
the texts and their meanings and values? The subtitle, Materialities of 
Agency, Affect, and Meaning, points toward the more detailed ques-
tions and approaches that determine the course of the study. What 
kind of agency do material things have in the stories, and how do 
they participate in the activities of human agents? What is their role 
in affective encounters and relations in the fictional world, and how 
do they contribute to the potential evocation of readerly feelings and 
emotions? How do material things participate in the production of 
meaning in the stories and the processes of sense-making and inter-
pretation involved in reading them?
While human experience remains essential, especially for the 
discussion of reading in this study, a general aim is also to give as 
much room as possible to the things themselves, without conflating 
them functionally with characters and other human elements. 
Experientiality, agency, affectivity, and meaning-making will prove to 
be phenomena and practices that involve both human and nonhuman 
agents. To provide the attention that the things in Rhys’s and Barnes’s 
work seem to demand for themselves, phenomenologically and 
cognitively motivated approaches to literature and reading are 
combined with “new materialist” thinking in philosophy and cultural 
studies that investigates the ways human culture and experience are 
entangled in different nonhuman materialities. These approaches are 
in line with the feminist interest of this study, recognizing that the 
experience of materialities is always already a gendered phenomenon, 
and that attention to such experience also reveals how the writers 
depict what it is like to be in the material world as a woman. Another 
important aim of the study is to remain close to the original material, 
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Rhys’s and Barnes’s stories, and appreciate the insights they provide 
while recognizing the value of these insights for an understanding 
of modernist literature, and fiction more generally. The remainder of 
this introductory chapter will briefly chart the texts studied and their 
historical and geographical context, and provide equally brief over-
views of the theoretical approaches to materiality and experientiality 
that are most central to the study.
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1.1 The Material World of  
Modernist Short Fiction
Historically considered, modernist fiction is an intriguing arena for 
studying material things and human engagement with them. The first 
decades of the 20th century especially in the Western world mark the 
intensification of mass production of goods of all kinds, meaning an 
increase in both the number and variety of things owned, used and 
desired by people. The 1920s, the decade during which the majority 
of texts studied here were written, was a period of relative economic 
stability after the First World War and before the Great Depression, 
which meant an increase in the number of people identifiable as 
consumers. Consumerism brought with it a new kind of relation to 
things, highlighting many of them as purchasable and perishable 
commodities en masse, and created a difference between things 
of this kind and more singular art objects or things on display in a 
museum, such as those that Walter Benjamin described as being in 
possession of an “aura” of authenticity (Benjamin 1936).1 According 
to Georg Lukács, commodification conceals the thing in its actual or 
authentic materiality: “things as things” (Lukács 1971a, 92; Brown 2013, 
282). Consumership was also a new mode of subjectivity available 
especially to women (see Wilson 2007, 77–79). 
This consumer culture can be seen especially in Rhys’s writing, 
which deals predominantly with commodities, while Barnes’s work 
often presents things as residues of an ambiguous past era, or as 
otherwise singular items like museum objects or theatre props. For 
the discussion of both writers’ texts, the tension between commodi-
ties and authentic objects is relevant, but their employment of things, 
especially the lived things of interest in this study, is not reducible to 
these distinctions. Researchers have also pointed out a “heightened 
sensitivity to sensation” as central to modern experience, brought 
about by developments in science and technology, in addition to a 
new understanding of the senses and new ways to interact with them 
1  The beginnings of mass production are already present in the 19th century, which Bill 
Brown (2003, 5) calls the “age of things.”
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(Armstrong 2005, 90). This phenomenon is parallel to the advent of 
commodity and consumer culture and the new encounters of lived 
experience of rapid change and material stuff (see Boscagli 2014, 270). 
It shows in modernist artists’ interest in subjectivity and experience, 
as well as the material world as the object and product of sense expe-
rience, even though these two might at first seem quite opposite. In 
“Modern Fiction,” Virginia Woolf famously writes against “materi-
alist” authors of the preceding generation, obsessing over the credible 
detailing of their fictional worlds, while praising the looser “spiritu-
ality” of the likes of Joyce (Woolf 1948, 190), and she was by no means 
the only one looking for alternatives to well-rounded characters and 
decorated worlds (Matz 2006, 216). This contradiction, however, is not 
as absolute as it seems; as David Herman (2011a) has shown, even the 
modernism of Woolf, and her interest in the world as it is experienced, 
actually foregrounds the lived world of the individual experiencer at 
least as much as her “interiority.”
Paris, the place of composition and the milieu of the fictional 
events for many of Rhys’s and Barnes’s stories was, especially during 
the 1920s, a dynamic locus considering the world of things, being 
recognized as the capital of fashion and subject to imitation all over 
the Western world. It was also a hub for international, especially 
Anglophone modernism, where such writers as Gertrude Stein, 
James Joyce, and Ernest Hemingway along with visual artists of the 
cubist, expressionist and surrealist strands lived, worked and were 
inclined toward the world of things in one way or another. In the 
history of ideas, things as both commodities and experienced materi-
alities were present especially in the directions of thought inspired by 
Karl Marx’s materialist investigations of the production and consump-
tion of commodities, including, in addition to Benjamin and Lukács, 
thinkers such as Theodor Adorno and Siegfried Kracauer. A central 
worry for Marxist thinkers was the commodification of human indi-
viduals for economic profit, and the “reification” or “thingification” of 
social relationships. Another vein of thinking arising from Freudian 
psychoanalysis introduced new ways of discussing material things 
as symbolic and affective objects of desire, especially as fetishes; 
this was a central notion to both Marx’s critical theory and Freud’s 
psychoanalysis.
Writers and artists were involved in and inspired by the advent 
of things in consumer culture and the philosophical and psychoan-
alytical discussions of materiality and things. Bill Brown (2013, 282) 
puts it quite drastically, finding modernist artists to be “obsessed” 
by things. The surrealists displayed “found objects” and produced 
literary mystifications of banal detail for instance in Louis Aragon’s 
Le Paysan de Paris (1926) and André Breton’s Nadja (1928). Italian 
futurist and British vorticist pictorial art displayed a different fascina-
tion with human-thing relations powered by advances in technology. 
A special interest in things and materialities can already be seen in 
Gertrude Stein’s work, especially her “cubist” prose poems in Tender 
Buttons (1914); further, in the American context in the work of such 
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poets as William Carlos Williams and Wallace Stevens, there is a 
focus on things “as they are” (Stevens 1937). This is a phenomenolog-
ical endeavor more than a Kantian attempt to grasp the thing before 
the perceiving subject: to see things not as necessarily symbolically 
loaded, but as they appear to individuals in experience.
In prose fiction, Virginia Woolf ’s character, visual artist Lily 
Briscoe in To the Lighthouse (1927) voices a similar desire: to get 
hold of “the thing itself before it has been made anything” (Woolf 
1927, 163). Formal experiments in the depiction of consciousness 
and experience also lead to special attention to the material world 
and its particular things, sometimes amounting to their animation 
or personification: a lemon-scented soap travelling in Leopold 
Bloom’s pocket keeps reminding him of its very material existence 
throughout the day as depicted in James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), and 
finally, fantastically, begins to speak (see Majumdar 2006); in a 
section of To the Lighthouse, the passage of time is represented, as it 
were, from the point of view of the furnishings of an empty summer 
house (see Nishimura 2015). Thus, as David Herman among others 
has pointed out, beside the alleged inward turn of modernism, there 
is a turn toward the lived world to investigate the material reality as 
it is experienced (see Herman 2011a; Nykänen 2015, 2). Why, then, 
when so many other writers have also reflected these concerns, does 
this study focus specifically on Jean Rhys and Djuna Barnes?
Firstly, these singular texts are what gave rise to the questions 
that initially motivated the study. Their fiction highlights the pres-
ence of material things in multiple ways, some of which are shared, 
while others are unique to the particular text. Barnes’s interiors are 
filled with curious bric-à-brac, which at times seems to overrun 
the human characters, and the characters are conversely presented 
as thing-like; her narration favors a multisensory experience of the 
material world, bringing forth its things and textures as not only seen, 
but also touched, heard, smelled, and tasted. Rhys’s humans also 
sometimes resemble things in how they are perceived by others in 
the fictional world, and some of her characters seem more capable of 
sympathizing with a thing than with a person. They frequent public 
rather than private places; they live in hotels and spend time in cafés, 
dream of new, transformative dresses or just shoes with no holes in 
them, and sometimes experience fleeting moments of happiness 
and belonging that are mediated by such things. Degrees of dehu-
manization of characters, a focus on multisensory experience, and 
the use of material things in depicting feelings, dreams and desires 
are characteristics present in other modernist writers’ texts, and in 
Anglophone short fiction. Barnes and Rhys share many features 
with the work of Katherine Mansfield, Virginia Woolf and James 
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Joyce, but by pointing to the singular qualities of Barnes’s and Rhys’s 
writing and investigating them in the modernist context, this study 
will broaden the conception of modernist fiction. A narrow corpus 
enables an in-depth discussion of textual features in the stories, but 
these discussions also prove enlightening in relation to the study of 
both modernism and materialities in literary fiction.
Rhys and Barnes are an intriguing pair; both are nowadays crit-
ically recognized and widely researched writers, although their 
work remains surprisingly little known outside academia. Both led 
cosmopolitan lives, with geographical overlaps. Djuna Barnes was 
born in upstate New York, and she had an early career as a student 
and writer in New York City, where she returned in the 1940s, after 
living in Europe, to stay until her death. Jean Rhys, on the other 
hand, had her origins in the British West Indies. She studied theatre 
and worked as an actress in Great Britain; furthermore, she lived and 
wrote in several European cities before returning to Southwestern 
England, where she spent the final decades of her life. Both writers 
lived and worked in Paris during the 1920s and 1930s, which was the 
heyday of the modernist expatriate community. However, they were 
both closer to the margins than the center of this community. Barnes 
was recognized as a writer, but chiefly by a small number of dedi-
cated followers, and she moved mostly in the lesbian circles around 
writer and philanthropist Natalie Barney; her work never achieved 
wide publicity, but rather gained a cult following. Rhys remained even 
more unknown; her Paris years were colored by financial and health 
problems. As late as 1966, her stories and novels had received no wider 
acclaim before the publication of Wide Sargasso Sea. Barnes and 
Rhys share a temporal and geographical context interesting from the 
point of view of both modernism and material things, to which they 
were both outsiders; however, they did not apparently interact with 
one another, as they belonged to separate cultural microcosms.
Barnes’s varied oeuvre consists of early pieces of journalism and 
stories she wrote when she was living in New York and already a 
well-known figure in the bohemian center of Greenwich Village; 
she also wrote poetry, plays, and two novels: Ryder (1928), and her 
best known work, Nightwood (1936). Her work was mostly composed 
and published during the three first decades of the 20th century. The 
majority of her short stories were first published in magazines; later, 
some of them were compiled and revised into A Book (1923) and A 
Night among the Horses (1929) before the posthumous publication of 
her Collected Stories (1997). She often returned to work on the same 
stories, not only producing new versions but also recycling themes 
and motifs across texts. 
Across the pond, Jean Rhys’s first publication was a collection of 
short fiction The Left Bank and Other Stories in 1927. In the following 
years between the two wars, she wrote four novels, to be followed 
by a silence of almost thirty years before her late breakthrough into 
wider popular and critical acclaim with the novel, Wide Sargasso 
Sea (1966). During her later years, two collections of short stories were 
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also published: Tigers Are Better-Looking in 1968 and Sleep It off Lady 
in 1976, which was her final publication except for the posthumously 
published, unfinished autobiography, Smile Please (1979). 
The focus of this study will be on short fiction that both writers 
composed during the first decades of the 20th century, while other 
stories and fiction is also mentioned. The term ‘short fiction’ is used 
here to do justice to the plurality of texts included among the shorter 
prose written by the two authors. While Barnes mostly wrote what 
can conveniently be called ‘stories’, some of the texts in Rhys’s Left 
Bank are very short, impressionistic sketches or vignettes depicting a 
situation; in fact, ‘story’ with its implication of a progression of events 
is not the best term to describe them although it is included in the 
collection’s title.2 In the course of this study, most texts will be referred 
to as ‘(short) stories’, but the umbrella term better suited to refer to the 
totality of the corpus is ‘short fiction’.
Why the focus on short fiction in the first place? Firstly, these texts 
have been studied far less than longer prose work by both writers, 
which has become a rather popular topic of research and teaching. 
The short fiction has many thematic and stylistic qualities in common 
with the other writings by both authors, but even though many of the 
short stories and sketches predate the longer prose, they cannot be 
regarded as mere early finger exercises in contrast to more serious 
writing. Instead, they deserve to be studied as independent singular 
entities, tightly interwoven in the work of their writers but presenting 
unique means of expression because of their formal qualities. 
modernist short stories themselves are often described as intricate 
items of artifice made by the skilled hands of the writer. Lorna Sage, 
in her introduction to Katherine Mansfield’s The Garden Party and 
Other Stories, calls them “intensely crafted and evocative objects-on-
the-page” (Sage 1997, vii). Secondly, these very qualities make short 
fiction a case of special interest when looking at material things. It can 
be presumed that the short form invites special attention on the part 
of the reader to all material detail that is presented, with less general 
description of settings, for instance. Some stories can be characterized 
as “spatial” or “anecdotal,” focusing on the descriptive rendering of 
a situation rather than a temporal progression (Harrington 2007, 5). 
Ellen Burton Harrington (2007, 1), calls short fiction an “outlaw” form 
especially fit for experimentation, and points out its importance for 
women writers, while Clare Hanson (1985, 89) sees feminist potential 
2  Curiously, though, there is no one story called “The Left Bank” in the collection. One 
possible reading of the title is that it parallelizes “story” and place: the stories and sketches set 
on the Left Bank, the then-bohemian area in Paris south of the river Seine, make up a totality 
that could be the “story called the Left Bank,” while others set in the South of France, around 
Europe and in the Caribbean islands would make up the “other stories” of other places.
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in the nonlinearity of many modern short stories. For the modernist 
short story, the focus is often on a singular experience, a “moment of 
being”3 and a visual effect, at the expense of a well-constructed plot 
(Hanson 1985, 5–6, 55; Harrington 2007, 4). This is a fitting description 
especially of Rhys’s fiction, while Barnes seems to alternate between 
celebrating, parodying, and distancing herself from the tradition of 
well-plotted stories.
Specific things in stories can also have importance as leitmotifs, 
devices used to maintain the cohesion of the text and assist in a crit-
ical moment which may lead to an “epiphany,” a moment of revelation 
identified as typical of short stories (Harrington 2007, 6). Barnes’s 
and Rhys’s short fiction does not always provide such moments, and 
neither does the majority of modern short fiction, which is often 
characterized by ambiguity and openness instead of cohesion and 
a single moment of enlightenment of meaning, that were the ideal 
characteristics of short fiction as famously suggested by Edgar Allan 
Poe’s “single effect” doctrine (Poe 1984, 571; Head 1992, 2; Harrington 
2007, 5). What is typical for the short texts studied here is the focus on 
specific moments conveying not only “intense and significant experi-
ence” (Hanson 1985, 55), but also an aesthetic vision and a descriptive 
attitude that draws attention to the material world. 
The following chapters will show the multiple ways in which things 
are used to convey such moments of experience and to construct 
aesthetic effect within multiple kinds of stories and sketches. Thereby, 
this study will also provide insight on the means of expression of 
modernist short fiction, still a relatively under-researched topic. In 
previous research on things and materialities in modernist fiction, 
the thematic fields of commodity fetishism and psychoanalysis have 
generally been dominant. More recently, studies taking an interest 
in the agency of things as well as their felt materiality in fiction, 
including modernist texts, have emerged (see for instance, Bernaerts 
et al. 2014; Majumdar 2006; Nishimura 2015). Earlier studies of Barnes 
and Rhys have taken the material world into account in different ways; 
many of them find parallels between modernist fiction and different 
modern phenomena from consumer culture to colonialism. Studies 
have shown that Rhys’s characters negotiate their identities and basic 
survival in the urban consumer jungle, and that her work is linked 
to contemporary fashion (Joannou 2012, Oliver 2016), politics of space 
and movement (Parsons 2000, Thacker 2009, Johnson 2015), and the 
culture of exhibitions (Britzolakis 2007). In the recent collection, Jean 
Rhys: Twenty-First-Century Approaches edited by Erica L. Johnson 
and Patricia Moran, several articles take a materialist, ecocritical or 
posthumanist perspective on specific questions related especially to 
Rhys’s use of postcolonial settings and motifs (Emery 2015; Savory 
2015; Johnson 2015).
3  Following the title of Virginia Woolf ’s posthumously published collection of autobi-
ographical writing (1985). 
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Several researchers have explored Barnes’s relationship to 
commodities and fashion (Goody 1999; Warburton 2007; Oliver 2014), 
as well as the relationship of her work to the politics of space (Wilson 
2011), and to nonhuman animals (Rohman 2009, 2007), all of which 
are of interest in this study. Julie Taylor’s (2012) monograph on affec-
tivity in Barnes’s work provides an important background for my 
study, although it does not specifically focus on things, materialities or 
experientiality. Other studies are referred to because of their focus on 
short fiction by either Rhys or Barnes (Allen 1991; Parsons 2003; Plumb 
1986; Savory 2009). Importantly, all these studies, like the research on 
Barnes’s and Rhys’s texts in general, is oriented more toward cultural 
questions than narrative structures, means and devices, or a theoret-
ical interest in the readerly position. While I draw on their substantial 
insights into the cultural dynamics, values, and influence of the texts, 
I aim to devote some more attention to the narrative, and specifically 
experiential means by which such dynamics, values and effects 
are produced and conveyed to their readers. Thus, the study will to 
discuss how the cultural work that the texts undoubtedly achieve as 
textual agents in the world is made into a felt, “lived” reader experi-
ence, and how this affects the culturally sensitive interpretations. 
To pursue this aim, I draw on a variety of theoretical approaches, to 
give adequate conceptual support to the themes of each chapter and 
section. The main theoretical threads running throughout the study, 
however, are new materialist thinking on things and materialities, 
and embodied cognitive approaches on reading.
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1.2 Things, Objects, and Materialities
“Things” might be the topic of the broadest study imaginable, as the 
word can refer to almost anything one is unable or unwilling to name 
more precisely although it rarely denotes a person.4 However, this 
research is not about anything, but relies on a more specific meaning 
of ‘things’, suggested by the addition of “materialities” in the title. The 
things in the scenes referred to at the very beginning of this intro-
duction all share certain qualities: they are material, inanimate items 
that can be used by human beings, even if they were not specifically 
used by a character in all these fictional moments. Their materiality is 
something readers can be assumed to be familiar with experientially. 
We carry clothes about our person, and they can be so close that we 
may not always experience them as “things,” but rather as extensions 
of our lived bodies; we attach certain meanings to a block of white 
marble based on the contexts where we have seen such things used; 
we have learned to hold books and look at paintings in a specific 
way. All these things also have more or less recognizable borders, 
according to which readers engaging with these imaginary things 
will separate them from the environment, as they have learned to do 
with the things encountered in everyday life. These things are also 
recognizable as commodities, objects endowed with economic value 
and intended for exchange, although in the texts they are not reduc-
ible to this role (cf. Appadurai 1986, 3).
The Oxford English Dictionary adequately gives ‘thing’ a wide 
variety of definitions, out of which the following are most relevant 
for the study at hand: “[a] material object, an article, an item; a being 
or entity consisting of matter, or occupying space,” “an inanimate 
object,” or “[a]n actual being or entity as distinguished from a word, 
symbol, or idea by which it is symbolized or represented; that which 
is signified.” Already within these definitions, there is a range of 
meanings from the very general, “something as opposed to nothing” 
to the particular and concrete (see Brown 2016, 17). My choice to 
discuss primarily ‘things’, not, for instance, ‘objects’, reflects the way 
this study aims to highlight both the very materiality and the poten-
tial agency of things. Both words have a wide semantic field, but they 
nonetheless point toward different directions of thought. ‘Object’, 
like ‘thing’, can denote not only inanimate material items, but also 
4  Rather, the two usually form a binary opposition (Brown 2016, 9).
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anything “placed before or presented to the eyes or other senses” or, 
considered as a grammatical category, “a person or thing to which 
something is done” (OED). Thereby the presence of an object also 
implies the presence of a subject, a seer to whom the object presents 
itself or a doer whose actions are directed at the object. It is the aim 
of this study to repeatedly question the binary opposition of subject⁄
object, because it does not adequately describe the complex relations 
of people and things in the stories discussed. The material things in 
the texts may be objects of sentences, which imply a grammatical 
subject, but these linguistic relations do not completely define what 
the things do in the fictional world, and what they do to the readers of 
the fiction. Therefore, the use of ‘object’ is reserved for specific cases 
where this kind of dichotomy needs to be discussed, and often chal-
lenged. Things, on the other hand, exist and occupy space with their 
materiality, regardless of who is looking at them or doing something 
to them, and regardless of the meanings that encircle them.
In addition, other materialities that do not so easily fit under the 
definition of a thing with clear borders separating them from the envi-
ronment, are also present in the stories, like the undergrowth through 
which the man in a top hat is crawling, or other environments that 
we are invited to imagine, however vaguely, to make up the spaces of 
the rented room or the luxurious bedchambers, although we have the 
capacity, and perhaps the tendency, to see the world as composed of 
things. The bodies of the fictional characters are among the material 
existents in the stories, and as the analyses will show, the borderline 
between a human and a thing-body is not always clear-cut.
First, there are some problems inherent in discussing such “mate-
rial” entities in literature, where they, after all, are fictional, indicated 
by words and imagined by the reader, and only occupy space in the 
form of the medium in which they are read. However, as I will briefly 
suggest, the way in which we encounter material things in fictional 
stories draws on our experiences of the actual material world. The 
focus of interest here is very much on this level of experienced mate-
riality, not much in what lies behind the things referred to by words, 
as in their symbolic meanings or ideological implications. These 
meanings are not ignored, but this study suggests that a shift of focus 
is needed to be able to discern what the stories’ evocations of material 
things in their imagined “thingness” do to the reading and interpreta-
tion of the stories.
“Thing theory,” an approach that promotes the importance of 
the very “thingness” of things, has influenced the basic framing of 
this study. The initiator of this approach, Bill Brown, suggests that 
researchers pay attention to things and our relations to them as they 
appear in art and literature (Brown 2003, 2004, 2016). One point of 
22 23
departure for Brown’s thinking is in Martin Heidegger’s writings about 
the thing (das Ding) as a part of the lifeworld, whose being always 
remains unattainable for humans when they approach their world by 
way of objects and tools, yet is somehow graspable in moments when 
an object refuses to work (a broken tool, a dirty window) (Heidegger 
1984, 73; Brown 2016, 28).5 Brown also draws on the “actor-network 
theory,” sociologist Bruno Latour’s seminal attempt to recognize the 
diversity of agencies (or “actants,” a term borrowed from structuralist 
literary studies; see Greimas 1987) taking part in societies, including 
nonhuman ones (Latour 2005). Brown strives to step beyond a general 
tendency to view the literary world of things as a passive background 
to events, and to allow for more space for things in their different 
roles and relationships, from collectors’ prized possessions in Henry 
James’s fiction to the vividness of a metal object telling a story in 
Homer’s ekphrastic description of Achilles’ shield (Brown 2003, 
162–175; 2016, 1–15). His thinking rests on the recognition that literature 
can provide a sensitive account of the relationships between people 
and things that often go unnoticed in our everyday lives.6 It has led 
literary scholars to discuss, for instance, the narrative and political 
impact of 18th century stories narrated by things such as clothes, coins 
and coaches (Lamb 2011), and the recalcitrance and obsolescence of 
things in American fiction (Tischleder 2014).
This study shares thing theory’s sense of distinction between 
objects and things and the general project of paying attention to 
the world of things, yet this is not a sufficient background support 
for studying the way humans and things are intermingled in terms 
of agency, affectivity and meaning in Barnes’s and Rhys’s writing. 
The notion of ‘thing’ is useful for this study because it reflects the 
human tendency to see the world as divided into individual things, as 
opposed to the crude physical level of general materiality. The inclu-
sion of “materialities,” as well as the definition of things as “lived” in 
the study title points to a slightly different direction: instead of only 
looking for the essence of things or thingness an sich as disclosed by 
the fictional work, the aim is to grasp more flexible and fluid relation-
ships, in which the common denominator of materiality encompasses 
people, things and environments alike. Instead of emphasizing the 
otherness of things, or their withdrawal into themselves (cf. Harman 
2002, 4), the literary texts at the heart of this research point toward a 
need to study how a human being-in-the-world is entangled in and 
defined by the presence of materiality and things. The plural form of 
materialities introduces a further complexity, suggesting that there 
5  Heidegger’s thinking about “the thing” is much more complex than this, and develops 
throughout his writings, as Brown himself demonstrates (2016, 24–32). However, the tension 
between things as unattainable and obstinate or resisting, and the human attempt to under-
stand something of their ways of being, is crucial for Brown’s use of the concept of ‘thing’.
6  However, Brown (2016, 7) also warns against putting too much weight on the value of 
reading literature as an experience that “teaches” us about things, as reading experiences 
vary greatly.
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are materialities different in kind and effect. These will be approached 
with the help of “new materialist” thinking, which will also provide 
ways to challenge the initial tendency toward anthropocentrism 
implied by the phenomenological interest in experience that this 
study takes.
New materialisms have emerged as part of a “material turn” in the 
humanities, a reaction to directions in postmodern thought resting on 
the primacy of language and social forms in constructing meanings, 
identities and even bodies. While exposing the multiple ways in which 
the world we think of as “real” is constructed by language and culture, 
such thinking leaves little room for understanding the materiality of 
either human beings or the world (see Boscagli 2014, 1–2). This is also 
where the “new” materialisms differ from “old” materialism, whose 
origins can be attributed to Marx and which implies a focus on modes 
of production and economic systems, keeping the human at its center 
and the subject⁄object divide more or less intact, while new material-
ists work to challenge it. From this perspective, however, language and 
culture should not be disregarded completely. Rather, the attention to 
nonhuman materialities, and the material makings of the human, can 
complement the study of culture, language, and human experience, 
and vice versa; new materialist thinking builds on the insight that “our 
material lives are always culturally mediated, but they are not only 
cultural” (Coole & Frost 2010, 27). Nor is it necessary to turn toward 
biological determinism when it comes to human bodies and gender, 
for instance. The “material” of new materialism is not a lifeless lump 
of unattainable reality on which meanings are inscribed by linguistic 
and cultural practices: matter and bodies, too, produce meanings and 
actions (Coole & Frost 2010, 6; Bennett 2010, 1–4).
New materialist approaches are helpful for thinking about things 
and materialities in this study because of the way they challenge the 
divide into human subjects and the “objective,” inanimate material 
world that haunts the tradition of humanist studies. Much thinking 
rests on this divide, but it remains inadequate when trying to grasp 
the human-thing relations in Rhys’s and Barnes’s work. An alterna-
tive way of thinking means reaching beyond the “life-matter binary” 
in which matter is seen as a stable and fixed entity, and materialities 
are recognized as having power, vitality, or “vibrancy” of their own 
(cf. Coole & Frost 2010, 7; Bennett 2010). New materialisms tend to 
be more radical in visions of distributed agency than thing theory, 
even though Brown’s more recent writings have also moved toward 
recognizing the potential “vitality” things have beyond their poten-
tial for stagnant recalcitrance (Brown 2016, 2–6). Material things may 
resist our actions when they cease to work for us as tools and objects 
of doing, or as symbolic entities to guide the interpretation of a story. 
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However, things also take active part in human lives, from the ways 
our bodies interact with and are permeated by chemical matter of the 
“environment” to the way appliances, means of transportation, and 
furniture direct our movements, postures and relationships.
Phenomenological and cognitively oriented studies also note the 
“distributed” nature of thinking and other cognitive activities, which 
is why they do not always appear that distant from new material-
isms: the clay is a mode of thinking for the potter (Malafouris 2008), 
and material things are incorporated in the human lived body and 
affective experience (Colombetti 2016). Furthermore, following the 
seminal “ecological psychology” of James J. Gibson, the environment 
offers affordances that invite certain kinds of action on the part of the 
organism living in it: according to Gibson, “[…] we were created by the 
world we live in” (1979, 130). As will become clear during this study, 
such phenomenologically oriented studies of cognition as Gibson’s are 
not far from new materialisms, yet the phenomenological approaches 
applied in this study benefit from the addition of explicit discussion of 
the dynamics between the material and the cultural that new materi-
alisms offer.
Fictional things need not be personified or magically animated to 
appear as lively and active, and to have an effect on us. Their seem-
ingly mute and unattainable being is already permeated by life and 
agency of its own kind, which we often simply fail to notice or lack 
the words to describe. To find such words, this study looks at cultural 
meanings and materialities as intertwined. One central new materi-
alist interest in the study is the view of agency as distributed between 
human and material things, in the fictional world as well as in reading 
and interpretation. In this vein, I follow the work of Jane Bennett 
(2010) and Karen Barad (2007), both of whom have argued, through 
slightly different routes, that agency emerges when things and bodies 
come together: humans and nonhuman entities become agents only 
by way of each other. There is no bicycle rider without a bicycle and 
a ground on which it can be ridden; these are features we add, in our 
interpretive imagination, to even fictional evocations of the event of 
bicycling. Equally, there is no reader without the nonhuman agen-
cies of the text and the book, other environmental contributors of the 
event of reading, or the influence of its cultural and linguistic context.
Another linked concern is the affective potential of things and 
materialities that is also linked to things’ potential for agency. In 
the Spinozist-Deleuzean account of affectivity that has also been 
influential to new materialist studies, affectivity is conceptualized 
as something occurring in between bodies—human and nonhuman 
(Seigworth & Gregg 2010, 2). In the fictional worlds of the texts 
discussed, emotions, feelings and moods are all created in encounters 
involving not only human characters, but also nonhuman agents. For 
the narrative evocation of a feeling, a mood or an ambience, it is not 
insignificant that the stories referred to at the beginning of this intro-
duction show their characters holding a dress or crawling through 
a thicket. In concrete terms, the affectivity that can be ascribed to 
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materialities relies on the senses, perhaps especially the sense of 
touch. Physically feeling the surfaces of things is used to evoke other 
forms of feeling and emotion that are not entirely attributable to the 
senses. The focus on things as sensed materials shows how they 
necessarily take on other meanings besides their potential symbolic 
associations and commodity values: the power of things to affect 
us is one facet of their potential agency (see Boscagli 2014, 4). The 
affectivity of things is thus present in all the following analyses, even 
though only Chapter 4 is dedicated to feelings, emotions and moods. 
All the following discussions deal with encounters between 
people and things, human and nonhuman agents and bodies, in 
which the sensed materiality always plays a role, and in which both 
the human and thing act and are acted upon, affect and become 
affected. The event of reading, too, is here conceived of as such an 
encounter. Importantly, the new materialist approach needs to be 
combined with an analysis of literary devices, and not remain on a 
merely thematic level of pointing out things, but showing how it is 
that materialities are evoked in fiction, and how they participate in 
the experience of reading; such notions have been marginal in new 
materialist studies so far, with the exception of Marlene Karlsson 
Marcussen’s important study (2016).7 Here, to analyze encounters 
that occur between reading minds and bodies, the fictional bodies 
of characters and things, and the body of the book, new materi-
alist approaches are complemented with cognitive literary studies’ 
insights into reading as an embodied activity.
7  Further on the problems of recent literary applications of new materialisms, see 
Marcussen 2016, 18.
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1.3 Reading and Experience
When focusing attention on lived experience in relation to literary 
fiction, we need to ask how fictional works manage to convey a sense 
of livedness; in the field of narratology this is known by the term 
‘experientiality’, which was introduced by Monika Fludernik (1996). 
According to Fludernik’s take on “natural narratology,” all narratives 
imply a human experiencer, if not in their explicit content, then in the 
way they are received in the process of reading. Experientiality can 
be defined by the ability of a work of fiction to convey experiences in 
a dynamic where readers’ real-life experiences of engagement with 
the real world meet evocations of fictional experience in a fictional 
world (Fludernik 1996, 30, 35; Caracciolo 2014a). Thus stories, when 
they function experientially, are capable of giving their reader not 
only a sense of “what happened,” but “what it was like.”8 The features 
of a narrative that contribute to experientiality are not limited to the 
representation of characters as experiencing beings, but can involve 
description without a character focalizer, or devices such as rhythm 
and temporality, which may evoke lived experience (Caracciolo 
2014b, 73–82). The “material” things we encounter in literary fiction 
are made of words, readable with the assistance of the materialities 
of ink and paper, or an electric reading device. However, these words 
can evoke the sense of various materialities in the fictional world. 
Fictional, nonhuman things, even when they display signs of inde-
pendent agency and unruliness, always come to readers by way of 
an evocation of human experience, at least in the form of the reader’s 
real-world memories of interacting with things, in light of which the 
fictional content is felt and understood.
What happens to readers, when they encounter one of Rhys’s 
scenes of affective encounters between a dress and a character, or one 
of Barnes’s rooms full of peculiar things? Readers and readings are 
different, of course, which is why no one answers this question can 
be given; yet it is not a case of complete subjectivism either. The focus 
here is on the text and the positions it invites its reader to take. This 
study does not gather empirical data of “real” readers’ actual experi-
ences when reading the texts, except for my first-person experience 
as a reader. This is not sufficient in itself to base a reading on, but 
8  This qualitative, felt dimension that some take to be a fitting definition of narrative itself 
(Herman 2009; Caracciolo 2014a).
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neither can it be avoided: some of my observations are unavoidably 
directed by my own reading experience and intuition; this is what 
ignites the initial questions, while their further discussion requires 
a comparison with other points of view. However, the analyses are 
supported by theoretical discussions of reading that are based on 
empirical evidence in cognitive psychology and linguistics, as well as 
narratological models of what occurs in the act of reading.
Recent cognitively oriented literary studies have called attention to 
the reader of narrative fiction as an embodied being. Drawing on the 
embodied and enactive paradigm in cognitive sciences and philos-
ophy of mind, researchers such as Karin Kukkonen, Marco Caracciolo 
and Yanna Popova suggest that the cognitive activities involved in 
reading are dependent on the kind of body we have and how it can 
interact with the world. This is backed by a range of approaches in 
phenomenology, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind; there 
is not one unified approach, but rather an umbrella for different 
ones nevertheless sharing a focus on embodiment and interaction 
with the world as constitutive of cognition. These involve the theses 
of consciousness as essentially embodied (Johnson 1987) and of the 
mind and the world as enacted, that is, co-created in the interaction 
between an organism and its surroundings (Varela, Thompson & 
Rosch 1991), as well as influential explorations of the phenomenolog-
ical implications of such mind (Gallagher & Zahavi 2012), and of the 
cognitive functions as extended into external instruments (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998).
It is important to note that all these approaches have some of their 
roots in 20th century phenomenology, especially in Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s introduction of the lived body at the center of phenomeno-
logical investigation, and verbalization of the intricacies of livedness 
between the body and the world, which again challenge the Cartesian 
dualism of the subjective and the objective: “The world is not an object 
such that I have in my possession the law of its making […] Truth 
does not ‘inhabit’ only the ‘inner man’, or more accurately, there is no 
inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know 
himself ” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, xii). The masculine in the quotation 
reflects the universalizing tendency of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. 
For instance, Sara Ahmed (2006) has pointed out that there is no 
universal, shared bodily experience, and the ways the world offers 
itself are not the same for everyone but influenced by factors such as 
gender, sexuality, and ethnicity.
In literary studies, enactive and embodied approaches allow us 
to see a continuity in the way meaning is made from the simplest 
cognitive engagement with the world to more complex activities 
such as reading, and base this view on empirical cognitive studies in 
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contrast to reader-response criticism, for instance (Popova 2016; 2015, 
80). Our being-in-the-world is defined by a continuing process of 
sense-making, in which the world appears in a certain way, involving 
certain affordances, which are significant to us (Gibson 1979) and 
therefore always also evaluated, that is, affectively colored (Colombetti 
2013). This kind of interaction and evaluation is necessarily also 
involved in our engagement with fictional texts and worlds.9 An 
embodied model reader is less fixed by the alleged properties of the 
text than Wolfgang Iser’s “implied reader” (1978), but does not lend 
itself to complete reader-centered relativism either, as the processes 
of sense-making are always grounded in the very material makings 
of both the text and the reader (cf. Eco 1992). According to Karin 
Kukkonen (2014), the focus on the embodiment of the reader adds 
to the “implied reader” by accounting for the ways making sense of 
fiction relies on how the body functions in the material world: how it 
uses predictive processing and the affordances of the world in senso-
rimotor actions.
As suggested by cognitive research, readers respond to stories 
by embodied enactments induced by so-called mirror neurons 
(Kukkonen & Caracciolo 2014, 264–265; cf. Gallese 2009), or, to provide 
a more nuanced explanation, by way of our “experiential traces” 
(unconscious) memories of past embodied activity and experience 
that the textual design of a piece of fiction activates (Zwaan 2008). 
Marco Caracciolo (2014b, 55–71) suggests that narratives tap into a 
reader’s “experiential background,” and readers engage with narra-
tives by re-enacting these past experiences, involving basic senso-
rimotor perception as well as more complex results of sociocultural 
interaction. We recall what it is like to wear clothes or to feel the 
surface of marble, leather or wood with our hands, and the text’s 
suggestion of a character’s encounter with material things invites us 
to re-enact these memories imaginatively, while enacting the new 
experience produced by our engagement with the story. We know, 
on a preconscious level, what it is like to catch a ball or grasp a door 
handle, and the presentation of such things in a story invites a cogni-
tive enactment of the sensorimotor actions invited by the thing, even 
if our reading body remains still (Ibid.; Gibbs 2017; Caracciolo 2016, 143; 
Zwaan & Taylor 2006). Instead of our minds being somehow disem-
bodied and transported to storyworlds, our remaining embodied 
being enables our being immersed in and affected by stories.
Importantly, this does not mean that the readings would be reduc-
ible to, or must remain on, the level of basic embodied responses. 
Researchers suggest an interaction between bodily experience and 
cultural practices, where both affect one another and can help make 
sense of a work of fiction, while the work of fiction may also feed back 
into both the simply embodied and more sociocultural mediated 
9  In what Yanna Popova (2015, 3) calls “participatory sense-making,” readers enact fictional 
worlds, events and existents in communication with the text, like they continuously enact 
their being in the real world and their understanding of this world.
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parts of the experiential background (Kukkonen & Caracciolo 2014, 
267; Caracciolo 2014b, 49–50). In the following analyses of Barnes’s 
and Rhys’s stories, the cultural meanings attached to things are seen 
as colored by the affective, bodily responses to things as material, 
experienced bodies-in-space, yet these experiences, too, are shaped 
partly by our embeddedness in sociocultural practices. Furthermore, 
as Merja Polvinen (2017, 143) points out, embodied and enactive 
engagement with fiction does not mean that our narrative experi-
ences would be exactly like “natural” ones, or that we would unwit-
tingly lose ourselves in the story. What is enacted are not only char-
acters’ experiences or experiences suggested by the introduction of a 
thing, for instance, but also the linguistic and communicative features 
of the work, which make up the special characteristics of experiences 
induced by fiction (Ibid.). We may simultaneously go through paths 
of embodied affectivity, led by the textual design of a story, and be 
detached enough to understand this to be an experience of engaging 
with a work of fiction, and therefore able to use also other faculties 
of interpretation. These interactions and tensions between levels of 
experience and interpretation (the embodied and the cultural, the 
immersed and the detached) need to be taken into account when 
studying the ways fictional things contribute to experiential under-
standings of stories.
Conceptualized thus, the experientiality of fiction is not a property 
of the text per se, nor is it completely dependent on the subjective 
experiences of an individual reader, but rather a sense of livedness 
that emerges between these two, requiring the material, formal 
constraints and affordances provided by the text (its language and the 
material form in which it is read, as well as the references to material 
entities in the fictional world), and the actual experience of the reader 
(see also, Levine 2015, Cave 2016). Therefore, new materialist views 
on agency, affectivity, and embodied approaches into the experien-
tiality of fiction resemble one another in foregrounding the way life 
and meaning are not “interior” properties, but something constantly 
created between bodies in the world. In fact, both avenues are useful 
to discuss the central questions of this study, namely how fictional 
accounts of material things transfer into readerly experience, affec-
tive engagement and interpretation of the stories’ meaning, values and 
ideologies, and how important a part material things actually play in 
the reading of these particular texts.
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1.4 From Lived Space and Time to 
Agency, Affect, and Meaning
For the first step in analyzing lived things in relation to bodily 
responses and cultural values, the second chapter of this study 
focuses on the ways material things are used to construct narrative 
space and time: what kind of things are included in descriptions of 
fictional spaces, and how do they contribute to the evocation of the 
fictional space as lived and sensed; how are they used in referring 
to specific places, or a specific moment of history; how is the lived 
experience of time conveyed with the help of material things? This 
chapter serves as a practical introduction to the approach to narrative 
experientiality applied in this study. Experiences of time as a pursuer 
passing by or catching up on one, as a material substance that can 
“run out,” or as different levels of experience existing simultaneously, 
are built on bodily metaphors based on our interaction with the mate-
rial world, on the culturally coded meanings suggested by the context 
of the stories, and on the conventions of the literary form. Time is seen 
and felt in the decay of things and heard in a ticking clock, while these 
material anchors also resonate with culturally shared understandings 
of war and depression, the gendered ideas related to ageing, and with 
the readers’ familiarity with narrative plot and suspense.
Similarly, the chapter examines the co-construction of cultural 
and embodied meanings of space in the stories; this coincides with 
the discussion of time, since the two are deeply intermingled. Both 
Barnes and Rhys present domestic space as profoundly ambiguous 
and even hostile, while showing a preference for liminal and public 
spaces that allow the free movement of their characters. The chapter 
reviews how these sociocultural meanings, which have been pointed 
out by several researchers, are built on the experience of lived space 
and things, created in the particular textual space of the short story. 
The refocusing of attention on lived experience and materiality 
reveals original nuances of sociocultural significance: the defining 
ambiguity of domestic space and its implications for the construction 
of subjectivity, the intermingledness of the experiences of time and 
space, the potential of stories to evoke experiences of liminal spaces, 
heterotopias and nonlinear temporality.
The third chapter focuses on questions of agency. It, too, departs 
from concerns expressed by earlier research, considering first the 
ways of granting (fictional) things agency which have been in the 
focus of multiple studies on modernist art and literature, namely 
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different forms animism and fetishism. Magical thinking and animist 
religious practices, as well as Marxist, psychoanalytical and anthro-
pological accounts of the fetish were present in the thought climate 
especially in the 1920s and 1930s, and echoes of them can be heard in 
the writing of Barnes and Rhys. Discussions related to these historical 
and cultural tendencies are again combined with a focus on the mate-
riality and experientiality of fetishizing and animating things. How 
does a fetish object appeal to the senses and how does this sensed 
materiality affect the way it can be “used” to serve its purpose? 
Both Rhys and Barnes seem to turn toward a talismanic version of 
fetishism, as their characters use things to enhance their potential for 
acting in the world; they do not, as Freud and Marx perhaps would 
have it, do so to fill a void or disguise a lack. How is this interpreta-
tion of fetishism encouraged by references to the lived materiality 
of things? This question leads to a broadening of the idea of agency 
in general, and the recognition that action in many of the stories is 
arranged around combinations of characters and things. Things 
define the brief moments of belonging, which my reading suggests are 
crucial for Jean Rhys’s fiction: not only do people collect and desire 
things, but things also bring people together; they can even serve as 
meaningful companions. In Djuna Barnes’s stories, events subside to 
descriptions of assemblages of people and things, in which all parties 
affect and are affected by one another. The analysis shows, that a new 
materialist conception of distributed agency can shed light on the 
thing-like people and lively things populating these compositions.
Affectivity is an important part of the discussion of distributed 
agency already, but it is taken up as the main interest in Chapter 4. 
Emotions as culturally understood phenomena are brought together 
with vaguer, embodied forms of affect and mood induced by the 
sensed materiality of things. Clothes have a particular significance 
here, as they are frequently used by both writers as effective means 
of expressing affective states, especially in the short fiction, perhaps 
because of their ready proximity to the body; the significant gesture 
of a mother pulling on a glove, and another carrying her child in 
equally gloved hands are examples in two of Barnes’s stories; the way 
a cabinet full of unworn dresses induces empathy in one of Rhys’s 
characters, and the feeling of happiness another character expe-
riences when wearing beautiful clothes of her own also reflect the 
author’s preoccupation with clothing as affective things. A focus on 
things and materialities leads to an added affirmative emphasis on 
“positive” feelings of belonging, pleasure, happiness, and empathy, 
which are sometimes overlooked in the analyses of Barnes’s and 
Rhys’s work.
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The fifth and final chapter focuses on the domain of meaning, once 
again suggesting the ways culturally-coded, symbolic, metaphor-
ical and metonymical meanings interact with more basic forms of 
embodied sense-making. The first part of the chapter discusses the 
ways in which Rhys’s stories repeatedly refer to masses of things as 
well as people and take a “decorative” stance toward both. These 
strategies are investigated as simultaneously inviting embodied 
sense-making, aesthetic experience and consideration, and ethical 
conclusions. The second part focuses on Barnes’s ways of mixing 
metonymical and symbolic meanings with invitations to embodied 
sense-making by way of things and materialities. This chapter also 
raises the question of interpretation, referring to a recent tension 
between ways of reading that look for hidden symbols or ideolo-
gies, and alternative forms that focus on the surface of the text or its 
affirmative, affective potential. The point of view taken in this study 
acknowledges the importance of surfaces, especially the felt surfaces 
of things, and the authors’ use of things and materialities as well as 
embodiment not only as resisting or restricting, but also as poten-
tially creating and liberating. This focus produces readings that are 
on the “reparative” or affirmative side, compared to some earlier 
research, while also acknowledging the complexity and ambiguity 
of meaning suggested by the texts. Consequently, the ways of reading 
“lived things” presented in this study may change conceptions of the 
singular texts by Rhys and Barnes and the phenomenon of modernist 
short fiction, while the texts do their part to add to an understanding 
of narrative experientiality and the ways in which life in the real 
world is shared with material things.
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We live in spacious times. 
— Ford Madox Ford, The Soul of London10 
Time and space are my enemies.
— Djuna Barnes, “Madame Grows Older:  
      A Journal at the Dangerous Age”11 
Ford Madox Ford’s characterization of the beginning of the 20th 
century as “spacious times” can be read as an optimistic reflection on 
the spaciousness of the world enabling more movement than before 
(see Ford 1995). Modernity and modernism did indeed mean changes 
in the ways of experiencing both time and space, and in their artistic 
processing (Thacker 2009, 1–2; Jameson 1991). Many descriptions 
suggest that the division into private and public space became less 
clear-cut than before, and new forms of public or semi-public space, 
available for a greater number of people—even women—emerged in 
urban cafés, hotels and department stores. Lived time is often hard 
to distinguish from lived space, and new means of conquering space 
affected the experience of time, too, as Andrew Thacker suggests: 
“Modern time and space now felt different, because, for example, one 
could travel by train at hitherto unimagined speeds, converting vast 
stretches of space into mere blips on the clock” (Thacker 2009, 47).
A sense of spaciousness and movement also permeates Djuna 
Barnes’s and Jean Rhys’s fiction, yet they have an ambivalent rela-
tionship to both time and space. Some of the writers’ short stories are 
set in spaces defined by heaviness and confinement, and in some, the 
sense of openness created by a particular space may attach itself not 
only to meanings of freedom and opportunity, but also to rootlessness 
and dizziness. Space can be “difficult to live in,” as one of Barnes’s 
characters describes her home in the short story “Cassation” (1925,12 
Barnes 1997=CS, 384). Time, often conceived in a basic metaphorical 
way either as a linear path or as a consumable substance, can appear 
10  1905; Ford 1995, 41.
11  Under the pseudonym Lydia Steptoe, 1924; Collected Stories, 357. 
12  Originally published as “A Little Girl Tells a Story to a Lady,” revised version with the 
new title published in Spillway (1962). Collected Stories, p. 357.
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as hostile, as it does to Barnes’s “Madame” above: “Time and space are 
my enemies” (CS, 357). Several studies have pointed out the prefer-
ence both writers seem to have for liminal and threshold spaces, and 
the way a stable sense of belonging to a place is absent in their work 
(Emery 2015; Mulholland 2002; Wilson 2011; Zimmerman 2015). These 
studies show the notions of space and time as historically and cultur-
ally defined constructs. Rhys’s and Barnes’s spaces are observed from 
female, queer and postcolonial perspectives, which often result in 
tensions that may even conclude in conceptualizing the abstract yet 
felt entities of space and time as “enemies.”
This chapter builds on these insights, but its aim is to shed light 
on the experientiality of space, meaning the “creation of ‘story-
driven’ experiences in narrative audiences” (Caracciolo 2014a): the 
feeling induced in a reader of having gone through an experience 
with the narrative and its characters. Thus, the present chapter sets 
the embodied cognitive approach to experientiality in the context 
of modernist fiction and the cultural problematics readable in Rhys’s 
and Barnes’s fiction. It is useful for this study to discuss experienti-
ality in cases of narration and description in which a human body is 
presented in relation to space and the thing-bodies populating that 
space, to provide an idea of the ways to approach lived human-thing 
relations in fiction. The experience of temporality tends to be part of 
such cases, and attention to the relationship between space and time 
also means attention to the relationship between things and time. 
Thereby, the historical and ideological context of the texts is brought 
together with lived experience, also following the feminist suggestion 
made by Iris Marion Young, for instance, of bringing “body experi-
ence” back to gender studies, in accordance with a new materialist 
recognition of materiality as productive of sociocultural phenomena 
(Young 2005, 12–26; Coole & Frost 2010, 6; Caracciolo 2014b, 158). How 
is the feeling of space and time, both of which seem to have changed 
in modernity, produced with the help of material things? How is the 
felt dimension of materiality related to culturally informed consider-
ations of time, space, and experience as gendered phenomena?
A sense of space is sometimes seen as necessary for the imag-
ining of the events and existents in a narrative (see Scarry 1999, 14; 
Brosch 2015, 99), and its importance has been emphasized lately, even 
though most definitions of narrative foreground time instead of space 
(Ryan 2014). As Renate Brosch (2015, 99) observes, “Space is central 
for every experience in real life,” so much so that it affects language 
as well as the understanding of fiction. Stories are not only about 
the temporal rendering of events, but also about worlds and spaces 
in which these events occur; some short stories with a descriptive 
focus can appear as predominantly spatial (Harrington 2007, 5). In 
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description or in narration, the two often are difficult to distinguish 
(Fludernik & Keen 2014, 454–457).
 Space can be observed through different strategies, such as the 
“map” and the “tour” (Linde & Labov  1975). A map-like description 
presents space panoramically, often a bird’s eye view, while a tour-
like account takes a limiter perspective that moves around to explore 
the fictional world. According to David Herman, large expanses of 
space can also be experienced in more dynamic ways as what he calls 
the “gaze tour,” which would be a more accurate way of describing 
the experience by applying virtue of the natural, embodied means 
of perception available to readers (Herman 2002, 280–281). Some of 
the stories studied here use such strategies, but they are more likely 
to have what Herman calls the “body tour,” using a fictional body 
to explore the space as if moving in it (Ibid.). The cognitive result of 
narrative presentation of space can be something akin to a map (Ryan 
2003), but it can also be a vaguer set of images or sensations. Not all 
stories result in a comprehensive cognitive mapping of the fictional 
world (Schneider 2001). Rather, stories make use of the multisensory 
ways in which we experience space, not only providing visual tours 
and maps but also involving sounds, odors and especially tactile 
sensations (Warhol 2014, 612). Material things have key roles in 
phenomena such as the construction of “haptic space” based on the 
imagined sense of touch (Stanica 2014, 519), and individual material 
things may arise from the text as more experientially vivid than a 
map-like sense of space (Thacker 2009, 30).
Time is intermingled with space, especially in its experienced, 
lived sense. As the two influence one another in fiction, “time […] 
thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible,” and “space 
becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and 
history,” as Mikhail Bakhtin (1990, 84) observes when introducing the 
concept of the chronotope. For Bakhtin, time is present in the “plot” 
or the narrative, and its relations to historical and biographical time 
(that pertaining to the life of an individual). Material things have 
their roles in references to extra fictional history and the life-span of 
an individual, as well as in the narrative means of emplotment and 
play with temporal sequentiality on the “discourse time” level of the 
story (see Genette 1980). A certain repertoire of things suggests a 
specific period of historical time: the material detail in Rhys’s stories 
set during the Second World War differs slightly from those set in the 
1920s, for instance. 
Authors can experiment with connections of things and time by 
using, as Barnes did, antiquarian, decayed and vaguely timed objects 
accompanied by equally archaistic word choices. The decay of things 
is an index of personal experience of time passing. Time seems to be 
experienced as movement in space, either of oneself or of an invisible 
entity that “passes,” “lingers,” or “runs out.” Such movements can be 
made visible by changes in the material world, or with the help of 
things such as clocks and calendars. There is no long-term character 
development or biographical focus in Rhys’s and Barnes’s stories; 
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rather, they focus on the experience of a moment, a “slice of life,” or, 
in some of Barnes’s “well-plotted” stories, a comedy of misunder-
standings that occur in a narrow time-frame (Head 1992, 14, 16). The 
compressed narrative time of a short story leads to more emphasis 
on the paradigmatic combinations of elements than the syntagmatic, 
causal connections of a plot (Ibid., 7, 10-11, 22). Rhys’s impressionistic 
sketches and Barnes’s late stories might actually be seen as spatial 
rather than temporal forms as they have more description than narra-
tion in contrast to Fredric Jameson’s (2003) suggestion that modernist 
fiction is predominantly temporal, while postmodernism moves 
toward spatiality (cf. Frank 1991).
Time and space also intersect with place. There is overlapping 
in the use of the terms ‘space’ and ‘place’; here I reserve ‘space’ for 
general references to three-dimensional space as well as the lived 
space inhabited by a lived body, while ‘place’ is used to refer to more 
clearly defined, particular geographical locations (see de Certeau 
1984; Thacker 2009, 1–9) although the distinction between the two is 
often arbitrary. Some recognizable places coincide in Barnes’s and 
Rhys’s work. Place is taken note of here, as far as it supports the more 
central notion of lived, experienced space, which can be affected 
by but is not reducible to its location on the map and the surface of 
the earth (cf. Thacker 2009, 30, Ryan 2003, 138). As Marlene Karlsson 
Marcussen observes, modernist texts especially by Virginia Woolf, 
demonstrate ways of describing space as an event that is active in 
itself, in spite of its being made of material things (Marcussen 2016, 
153–156). In the following, the material things in the interior spaces of 
Rhys’s and Barnes’s fiction are shown to be equally vibrant with both 
agency and meaning.
The following analyses of short stories are organized around types 
of spaces, which are often but not always realized in places. Within 
these fictional spaces, the relationship among space, things, and time 
is discussed. A distinction is made between private and public space, 
another division central in Bahktin’s discussion of the chronotope. 
It is clear from the outset that this dichotomy is not absolute in the 
stories discussed, yet the tensions it creates are often deeply signifi-
cant. Firstly, I examine how Rhys and Barnes employ the space of 
the house, and domestic space in general, and how the preference for 
liminality that researchers have identified in their work is realized 
within the domain of experientiality with the help of material things. 
Secondly, the discussion moves to the public spaces of the modern 
city: through the quasi-domestic spaces of hotels, boarding houses, 
prisons, and hospitals, to cafés and streets, to shed light on the oscil-
lation between stagnation and mobility, lightness and heaviness, that 
permeates both writers’ work and becomes embodied and culturally 
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significant. Finally, the spatial metaphor of containment as a further 
way to complicate domesticity is inspected in relation to spaces even 
less domestic ranging from the shop and the museum, in Barnes’s 
work, to the miniature spaces of suitcases, boxes and clothes which 
are central to Rhys’s fiction. These three topics raise questions related 
to the use of material things as means of literary experientiality, 
producing the “feel” of space and time. This chapter discusses a wide 
range of short stories from both writers, thus providing an overview 
of their short prose work that the following chapters will continue to 
investigate with a narrower focus.
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2.1 The House and the Other Space
There is not so much as a draught between the 
frames of the windows, or a crack in the boards. 
And yet—if life should refuse to live there?
— Virginia Woolf: “Modern Fiction”13 
A successful work of “modern fiction,” in Virginia Woolf ’s terms, 
allows for some “draught” and “cracks,” meaning irregularities and 
ambiguities in story structure and ideology alike, if they lead to a true 
depiction of “life itself”;  this is a new kind of realism, perhaps arguing 
against Henry James’s famous analogy between the novel and a 
house in the preface of The Portrait of a Lady (James 1936; Woolf 1948, 
186).14 Researchers have characterized the textual space of a short 
story as inhabited by similar ambiguities, dissonances, unresolved 
events, and openness of interpretation (Brosch 2015, 98).15 
Interior spaces in fiction are easily thought to equal domestic 
spaces (Stanica 2014, 513). Early phenomenological research ascribable 
to the “spatial turn” in the humanities also focused on Bachelardian 
and Heideggerian ideas of dwelling and home as the basis of spatial 
experience (Thacker 2009, 14). Feminist scholars, however, have 
pointed out the problems inherent in the insistence of house and the 
home as the spatial center for human being-in-the-world, and that 
the home is a deeply ambivalent place for women (Young 2005, 123). 
Furthermore, the intention of this study, motivated by the character-
istics of Barnes’s and Rhys’s texts and the phenomenological and new 
materialist approaches taken to them, is to find ways of reading the 
texts beyond a Cartesian assumption of interior subjectivity versus 
exterior world of objects. If we accept there is no “inner (wo)man,” in 
the sense of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas mentioned earlier, do we also need 
to read fictional interiors differently?
13  1921; Woolf 1948, 186.
14  The explicit targets of Woolf ’s critique are Edwardian popular writers such as Arnold 
Bennett, H. G. Wells and John Galsworthy.
15  In fact, one of the “positive” examples Woolf uses is a short story by Anton Chekhov.
42 43
There are domestic locations in Jean Rhys’s and Djuna Barnes’s 
stories, but their domesticity is disturbed in one way or another. The 
house interiors described from the point of view of focalizers or char-
acter narrators tend to be someone else’s homes, where the focalizer 
is only a visitor. The places of dwelling for the focal characters, if they 
appear in the stories, do not come across as home-like, often on the 
verge of public space. Houses and other private interior spaces that 
are not domestic in the sense of being the focalizer’s “own” can still 
figure strongly as felt, lived spaces, and spaces for experiencing time 
as well, by virtue of the multisensory engagement with materialities 
that the stories invite, and the focalizer’s point of view they lend for 
it. Furthermore, the houses of Barnes and Rhys are rarely closed 
spaces, clearly separate from the world outside; rather, the exterior 
world seems to be on the verge of invading many of the interiors, and 
different liminal spaces, like verandas and terraces, are constructed 
between inside and outside. This complicates the way interiors can 
be seen to construct the subjectivity of characters, for instance. The 
short story form itself has been seen as a liminal space, beyond social 
constraints and between traditions such as allegorical and realist, oral 
and literary, and between identification and detachment (Achilles & 
Bergmann 2015; Brosch 2015, 92). The potential for inconclusiveness in 
the short story form may also leave readers in liminal spaces of their 
own (Brosch 2015, 98).
Questioning ideas and ideologies related to houses, homes, inte-
riors and dwelling is not a unique feature in Rhys and Barnes; espe-
cially modernist women writers have challenged and reimagined 
domesticity in various ways (see Foster 2002; Wilson 2011, 434). 
According to Miruna Stanica, the whole concept of the ‘interior’ is a 
modern phenomenon, arising along with the 19th century bourgeois 
phenomena of increasing privacy, private property and leisure for 
many (Stanica 2014, 514), something that was, again, beginning to be 
challenged at the beginning of the 20th century. Earlier research has 
linked both Rhys and Barnes with the modern challenges to domes-
ticity, focusing especially on their use of “liminal” or “threshold” 
spaces (used more or less synonymously): spaces of transition and 
transformation located between concrete spaces, usually interior and 
its outside, as well as metaphorical spaces and stages in what Bahktin 
would call biographical time (Johnson 2015; Mulholland 2012; Wilson 
2011). In the following, these studies are considered, while the focus is 
on the lived materiality of the concrete domestic-liminal spaces and 
their temporal connections evoked in the stories. I suggest that the 
stories’ experiential evocations of the nonhuman, material contents of 
spaces, play an important role in the ways Rhys and Barnes challenge 
and reimagine domesticity. The first subsection discusses Rhys’s 
houses as gendered spaces and the ways this space is made unstable 
by practices described recently by Erica L. Johnson and Patricia 
Moran (2015, 6, 8) as “haunting.” I argue that the sense of haunting 
is produced largely by way of the manipulation of embodied rela-
tions with the material world. The second subsection discusses the 
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liminality of Barnes’s domestic spaces, which are likened to those of 
the theater, and whose boundaries are challenged by focalizing solu-
tions that blend characters and their physical locations with a wider 
expanse of space.
2.1.1. Solid and Shaky Houses
The most intense presence of a single house is Jean Rhys’s short 
fiction is in the appropriately named story “A Solid House” (1963).16 
Part of Rhys’s later work, published after Wide Sargasso Sea, it is set 
in an unspecified city in England at the time of the Second World 
War, during an air raid and some days after it. Narrated in third 
person, the story is focalized by Teresa, who shares an apartment 
with Miss Spearman, an older woman. It is implied that her housing 
is temporary, and she has just moved in. The story begins with the 
two characters hiding in the cellar during the raid, and continues 
in numbered sections, each taking place in a different room. 
Pressed flat against the cellar wall, they listened to the 
inexorable throbbing of the planes. And above them the 
house waited, its long, gloomy passages full of echoes, 
shadows, creakings—rats, perhaps. But the square 
outside was calm and indifferent, the trees cleaner than 
in a London square, not smelling the same, either. 
“Anything?” Miss Spearman asked.
“Gone, I think,” Teresa said, and made signs.
She remembered playing hide-and-seek in a cellar very 
like this one long ago. Curious, hide-and-seek. You picked 
your side (I pick you, I pick you), then suddenly, in the 
middle, something happened. Everything changed and 
became horrible and meaningless. But still it went on […]. 
(Rhys 1972=TBL, 113) 
Teresa and Miss Spearman are huddled in the cellar, using their 
ears to determine the situation, waiting for the moment when silence 
followed by an “All Clear” signal will tell them that the danger is past. 
The space leads to an experience of several layers of both time and 
space in the form of Teresa’s memory and imagination. That the house 
16  First published in the magazine Voices (1963), then in the collection Tigers Are Better-
Looking (1968).
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is also described as waiting creates a sense of projection of mental 
states to an inanimate entity as a point of departure for personifica-
tion, which takes part in the sense of slowed time induced by waiting 
and fear, while the square outside is equally personified but expresses 
an indifferent mood.
The beginning of this passage strongly evokes the fictional bodies 
of the characters, pressed against the wall, listening, communi-
cating with one another and being transported to memories. If we 
view mental processes as embedded in and possibly extending into 
the world, enactive and embodied, the location of a body in space 
is central to the cognitive processing of a work of fiction as experi-
ential (Brosch 2015, 99). It can be argued that the experientiality 
of Rhys’s passage is anchored in them and in their embeddedness 
in the material environment. Marco Caracciolo (2011; 2014b, 160), 
discusses readers’ interaction with narrative space as an embodied 
projection into the storyworld, and suggests that by virtue of the 
similar embodied structure of perception and imagination (Noë 2004; 
Kosslyn, Ganis & Thompson 2001), readers experience the storyworld 
by way of a “virtual body” (Caracciolo 2014b, 161). Texts invite readers 
to imagine actions and experiences, drawing from their “experiential 
background” combining sensorimotor and perceptual experience 
with more complex forms of cognitive and intersubjective experience 
to enact experience while attributing it to a character or another lived 
body in the fictional world (Caracciolo 2014b, 159).17
According to cognitive scientists and philosophers, “virtuality” is 
actually an essential part of everyday perception: we experience the 
world as a detailed whole, even if we only perceive fragments of it at 
a time, because the world is constantly “there” for us to perceive, and 
moving our body will result in seeing a different aspect of it (Noë 2004, 
75–79, 192, 215). The way things in the world, as three-dimensional 
entities, are present to us, is therefore virtual. It can be suggested that 
fictional space appears to us in the same manner, with the capacity 
for sensing virtual presence applied to making sense of the fictional 
world, its spatiality and temporality. If we accept the presence of a 
virtual component in all perception, we do not necessarily refer to the 
immersion into a fictional space, like the cellar in which Teresa and 
Miss Spearman are hiding, as “projection” (cf. Caracciolo 2014b, 162). 
The space the story offers becomes one feature of the bodily experi-
ence of a reader engaging with the story and imaginatively enacting 
its space. Encountering fictional things in this space, readers draw 
on the resources of virtual perception they are accustomed to use in 
their everyday dealings with the lived, material world.
17  Caracciolo (2014b, 173) sketches a “scale of fictionalization,” arguing that “strict,” (Jahn 
1996), character-bound focalization and so-called deputy focalizers (alleged subjects other 
than characters exploring the fictional world) afford a higher degree of fictionalization 
and enhance the effect of transportation, while readers struggle to experientially enact the 
fictional space of texts where focalization is not so clearly bound to a fictional body. I will 
argue that we cannot always equate the potential feeling of being transported with the pres-
ence of the body of a character or a deputy focalizer.
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In the passage at the beginning of “A Solid House,” Teresa’s (and 
also, arguably, Miss Spearman’s) fictional body clearly offers itself as 
a site of bodily experience. The evocation of the characters’ bodies 
“pressed flat against the cellar wall” creates a strong cue for the 
reader’s “sensory imagination” (Caracciolo 2014b, 93–94), and invites 
an enactment on the part of the reader who will have sensorimotor 
experience of being pressed “flat” against something. The “throb-
bing” of the planes refers to an aural sensation that suggests a pres-
ence of the source of the sound outside the immediately perceived 
space. The aural is mixed with the proprioception and tactility of 
pressing against the wall, as throbbing is usually something felt 
in the body rather than heard. This is an instance of conceptual 
blending, metaphorical use of language that refers to one domain of 
(sensory) experience to create an impression of another experience 
(Lakoff & Turner 2002; Lakoff & Johnson 2003, 3; Caracciolo 2014b, 
106), still intensely embodied.
After having introduced the situation in an experientially effective 
way, the text itself evokes the virtual potential of everyday percep-
tion and imagination. Firstly, the house above cannot be directly 
perceived by the characters, but the passage suggests that its presence 
can still be felt, by virtue of the detailed references to sounds and 
shadows and the speculation of there being rats that Teresa appears to 
be going through, presented in free indirect discourse. Teresa could 
have felt the gloomy ambience of the passages of the house  earlier; on 
the other hand, rats are introduced as their potential inhabitants and 
experiencers. Secondly, the same goes for the square outside, which 
evokes a highly personalized experience of its sights, ambience, and 
smell, compared to another imaginary place in London, equally 
virtually present. Interestingly, the text blends the experience of the 
focal character with the independent material being of the house and 
the square, while both are also portrayed as personified agents: the 
house “wait[s]” and the square is “indifferent.” There is a fictionally 
actual body inviting readerly projection, but the experiences offered 
by it extend beyond its boundaries, attributing independent being and 
agency to material entities outside the immediate reach of the fictional 
experiencer, thereby bringing them within the reach of the embodied 
reader. Finally, Teresa’s memory of playing hide-and-seek appears 
to be evoked by the lived space of the cellar, and the “horrible” char-
acteristics of this remembered experience are set as parallel to the 
“fictionally actual” experience of hiding in the cellar.
The perspective could be said to shift between Teresa’s “strict” 
focalization and broader “zero” focalization (Genette 1980, 188–189), 
but everything described could also be ascribed to Teresa’s memory 
and imagination. This ambiguity colors the house and the square 
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with affective significance as spaces experienced by the focal char-
acter, and potentially by the reader by way of enactment, as making 
certain sounds, smelling a certain way and having a certain ambi-
ence. The recollection of hide-and-seek is not set in a specific space, 
but the ambience of fear that defines the cellar as a lived space for 
Teresa seems to be present in the memory as well; the lived space 
“affords” the memory, while the memory could be seen to make part 
of the set of previous experiences with which Teresa encounters 
the space and constructs it as affording certain actions and moods 
(Herman 2011a, 259). Thereby, the point of view is certainly Teresa’s, 
but simultaneously the perspective shifts from the stuffy, experien-
tially evoked cellar to other spaces and times. This is a central tech-
nique in Rhys’s work, often showing remembered or imagined spaces 
as overlapping with the actual locations of the narrative. A reader of 
fiction is most likely used to such shifts in time and space, and recog-
nizes them as textual devices, while also perhaps recognizing them 
experientially as something encountered in lived experience. In the 
situation of reading, the feeling of being in another time and place is 
bound to intersect with “higher” cognitive capacities such as memory 
and imagination, ultimately leading to sociocultural meanings in 
the interpretation: hide-and-seek, which is described by Teresa as a 
rather sinister pastime, is compared with the war-time situation and 
Teresa’s mental state in the story.
The technique of juxtaposing levels of time and space in “A 
Solid House” works to destabilize the sense of the interior space 
by constantly introducing the “other space” of memory, dream, or 
imagination; Michel Foucault has called this heterotopia. Foucault’s 
concept combines the material and metaphorical space. It can refer 
to a concrete space or mental space experienced in a moment in 
time, which is defined by otherness in relation to some hegemonic 
order. A heterotopia is not an imaginary place set in the future or 
the past, like a utopia or dystopia, but a “real” space that introduces 
something virtual or unreal: “The heterotopia is capable of juxta-
posing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in 
themselves incompatible” (Foucault 1986, 25). It also implies a break 
in the experience of time (Ibid., 26). The notion of heterotopia is a 
fitting denominator especially for the movements of the narrating 
voice between real and imagined or remembered spaces and tempo-
ralities, and the way a reader can virtually participate in such move-
ments.18 This order, in Rhys’s case, seems to be that of dwelling and 
domesticity, and the gendered power-relations it implies at a certain 
historical moment. This is never voiced straightforwardly in the 
text, but implied subtly by Teresa’s depressed thoughts and behavior 
and their pairing with her experience of the space, and the hetero-
topias afforded by it. One of the rooms leads Teresa to imagine the 
hereafter, to which the norms of the world seem to have followed 
18  It could be argued that literature itself is constantly constructing heterotopias for its readers.
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her in the form of fantasy images of sinister, idealized personages 
blended with the flowers and the cellar she has actually perceived: 
No, if I slept here I’d dream. I’d dream of monstrous 
humming birds, cellars, flowers under glass, gentlemen 
with china-blue eyes, ladies with smooth shoulders who 
will never lack the still pastures and the green waters, the 
peaceful death, the honoured grave—all this, and Heaven 
too—who will never, never lack the sense of superiority 
nor the disciplined reaction nor the proper way to snub 
nor the heart like a rock nor the wrist surprisingly thick. 
Nor the flower of the flock to be sacrificed. (TBL, 126–127) 
In this indirect manner, the reader gets an idea of Teresa’s expe-
rience of the social reality of her actual life. Often, the story merely 
points out a general depressed mood, expressed by her relation to 
some detail in the interior. Teresa pictures a beyond with ladies and 
gentlemen gracefully adhering to norms of beauty and honor, and 
imagines them snubbing and sacrificing, and, arguably, herself as the 
object of these actions. These associations manifest in her relation-
ship to the lived space of the room as a pattern of avoidance, some-
thing Thomas Fuchs (2012, 74–75) has called “gravitational effects” 
of avoidance: the affordances of the space and thereby the actions 
taken by Teresa are changed by virtue of traumatic experience or 
other form of distress. The reader does not learn much about Teresa’s 
distress, and the text does not invite a specific psychiatric diagnosis; 
rather, it seems to point to the distress as a problem of society rather 
than of an individual.
Between the air raid and the passage quoted above, in the second 
numbered section of the story, the women are having tea in the 
living room, and a descriptive list of what it contains is produced: 
“There were two red plush armchairs near the fire, a patchwork rug, 
a calendar with a picture of cats, a round table with a wool mat in the 
middle, a large black cupboard and, on the walls, some old prints of 
soldiers in full dress […]” (TBL, 105). Even in safety, Teresa is shown to 
suffer from anxiety or depression related to time, which she addresses 
as a symbolic “other clock,” evoked in her mind by an actual clock: 
“She put her hand over her eyes, which felt sore, and listening to the 
noisy clock, thought about that other clock ticking so slowly, the 
watch on the table ticking so fast. But the same seconds, or they said 
the same seconds” (TBL, 119). The noisy clock and the watch on the 
table, the material markers of passing time in the scene in addition to 
the calendar, are contrasted with Teresa’s personal experience of time. 
The imaginary and actual clocks are shown to be irreconcilable, even 
48 49
if the units they measure are the same. The material anchors of clocks 
and calendars present time as something that can be included in the 
sensory enactment of the story, while the other items listed variously 
point to domestic comfort and the extra domestic reality of war.
Teresa’s lived body and experience seem to transcend the bound-
aries of time and space. In the third section, Teresa nearly moves to 
another space and time entirely, as she overdoses on sleeping pills 
and whiskey in an episode narrated briefly, in a very matter-of-fact 
manner. It is followed by an equally plain passage of her waking up 
after all and returning to the space of the house, while Miss Spearman 
has not noticed anything out of the ordinary. In the fourth section, 
Miss Spearman opens the door of another room for Teresa, who has 
never before visited it. This room contains even more things than 
the living room, again elaborately listed: gold brocade curtains, 
stuffed birds, pictures, “a mirror in a silver-green frame, and glass 
paperweights through which could be seen roses, carnations and 
violets […] jade vases, and the Woolworth’s glass mats” (TBL, 125). 
Teresa wonders, thinking about the other contents of the room, 
whether there is also a “musical box.” The room provides different 
paths of association instead: “there was no musical box, but there 
were Japanese wind-glasses, again from Woolworth’s, hanging over 
the door into the garden” (TBL, 126), which are again a reminder of 
the actuality of the war and the conemporary age as bought from 
an affordable department store, while the other things in the room 
point toward an earlier, perhaps turn-of-the-century reality. She also 
wonders about the purpose of the birds and their connection with 
a nearby note: “I believe in the Resurrection of the Dead” (TBL, 125), 
which is later revealed to be connected with the spiritualist séances 
Miss Spearman has a habit of organizing: another way of bringing 
forth a different reality within the domestic space.
Teresa’s visit to the room begins with a highly perspectival obser-
vation of the space as “a long, narrow, pathetic room” (TBL, 125) and 
ends with her walking restlessly in the room, having her vision of 
the hereafter with its supercilious inhabitants as quoted above. The 
room and its contents appear as potential openings to a dream space, 
which Teresa finds frightening. Sleep and death are intermingled in 
this space, with the allusions to spiritualism combined with Teresa’s 
memories of the suicide attempt and a longing to sleep, and perhaps 
die. Teresa approaches some of the things as clues that she tries to 
piece together, but quickly the narrative replaces this interest with 
sleepy reverie, during which the things become gateways to another 
space. The dream space is equally unhome-like as the actual space 
she inhabits. It is peopled by the dismissive, comically presented 
honorable ladies and cold-eyed gentlemen who expect to do as well in 
the afterworld as they have in this one. The vivid and specific descrip-
tion of the things inside the “solid house” opens the fictional experi-
ence toward heterotopias and uncanny external dream spaces. Teresa 
as the proxy-experiencer of the story does not linger on the interior 
objects. None of the contents of the “long, narrow, pathetic room,” 
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is described from the point of view of Teresa’s sensory experience, 
while her dreamy associations come to seem more vivid. The mate-
rial things are listed and serve as anchors in the fictional world, while 
the experience of the character wanders from actual to virtual space 
and invites the reader to follow. The presence of the stuffed birds and 
armchairs, wind-glasses and timepieces invites an embodied enact-
ment simply by virtue of being recognizable objects whose readiness 
for the reader’s virtual sense experience has a weight of “actuality,” 
even though the character is not shown interacting with them. This 
sense of actuality, then, is contrasted with the fleeting lightness of the 
virtual spaces of Teresa’s imagination.
The tension between heaviness and lightness, solidity and shaki-
ness is cultivated throughout the story. The two women discuss the 
house: “’It’s a lovely old house’, Miss Spearman said. ‘Solid’ ⁄ ‘Yes, 
lovely and solid’, Teresa said” (TBL, 121); their comments reflect a 
concretely relevant concern, during the time of air raids. Teresa, 
however, continues in her mind: “But how can you tell? The other 
one was solid, too” (TBL, 121–122). This mention of the “other house,” 
comparable to the earlier “other clock,” leads to a dreamy description 
of a house, which she has seen in her sleep during the suicide attempt. 
In this heterotopia, clearly located outside the hegemonic solidity of 
the house, Teresa’s body and its senses seem to be far more involved 
than in the actual fictional space. She describes paddling on a river 
(“[t]he paddle did not make any sound, the dead leaves slowed the punt 
down,” TBL, 122), the visual details of the house, a statue of a woman 
holding a cloth around her body (inviting mimetic empathy of sensa-
tion), and the green smoothness of a lawn. This, too, is ultimately an 
unhome-like dream, as Teresa is not admitted, although she thinks: “I 
knew that if I could pass the statues and touch the tree and walk into 
the house, I should be well again” (TBL, 122). Her not being well seems 
to manifest as being “out of touch,” a conceptual metaphor literalized 
in the sense of the distance of her body from concrete material things 
in the actual and dream worlds of the narrative.
After her suicide attempt, Teresa thinks: “Shall I tell her what it feels 
like to be dead?” (TBL, 122). The dream passages in the story indeed 
attempt something like this, creating a mixture of intense embodied 
feeling and uncanny unreality of time and space. Things in the dreams, 
even if unaccommodating, still become closer to vividness and affec-
tive value than the ones inside the “solid house.” The story ends with 
Teresa drifting to sleep in yet another room, her imagination conjuring 
up a woman “in the front garden of Number Seven,” a neighboring 
house, pushing her hair off her forehead, stretching and yawning, and a 
ginger cat dancing. These specific images of other spaces evoke tactile 
and sensorimotor experiences that become more real than those of 
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the actual surroundings. Teresa’s description of the dream spaces gives 
more vivid cues for imagining them in a bodily manner. The experien-
tial rendering of both physical and ontological instability within solid 
material frames gives notions like heterotopia and transcendence, as 
well as social anxieties related to the insecurity of the future and the 
relations between the two women (of which more will be said in the 
final part of this chapter), a lived dimension. A reader of the story can 
consciously infer the sociocultural meanings, but they are colored and 
supported by a more basic form of making sense of the lived space and 
time in the story; this may render some of the ambiguities of space even 
more inscrutable. The way Teresa’s experience of the actual interior 
is “diluted” as opposed to her vivid recollections exemplifies mental 
distress, but also locates it in the social sphere. There is no need to diag-
nose Teresa to understand the distress. Portraying the heterotopias as 
more experientially vivid than the actual narrative setting also suggests 
the potential experiential strength of imagination and hallucination as 
a means of exit from an unhomely space.
The solid house is an ambivalent interior, like many others in 
Rhys’s fiction. Luce Irigaray criticizes the phenomenological focus 
on dwelling and the home as “man’s” mode of being, stating that for 
woman, the envelope of a home can be “visibly limiting or sheltering, 
but at the risk of being prison-like or murderous if the threshold 
is not left open” (Irigaray 1993, 11). As Iris Marion Young (2005, 131) 
points out, Irigaray’s comment presupposes a bourgeois order of 
living and gender relations that does not apply universally; the 
presupposition of a binary order of gender can be added to the list. 
These spaces may indeed be “lovely” or “solid,” but they still evoke a 
sense of repulsion, in a concrete manner pushing the focal character 
away toward other, imaginary spaces. “Kikimora” in Sleep It off Lady 
(1976) experiements with the thematic of the bourgeois interior in 
all its “murderous” potential, following Irigaray’s dramatic expres-
sion. A man called Baron Mumtael visits Elsa’s home to wait for her 
husband, and makes barely masked rude comments (interpreted 
so by Elsa, the focalizer), moving from her clothes to the interior: 
“What a very elegant dinner suit you are 
wearing,” said Baron Mumtael mockingly. 
“Yes, isn’t it … oh, I don’t think it is really,” said Elsa 
distractedly. “I hate myself in suits,” she went on, 
plunging deep into the scorn of his pale blue eyes.
“The large armchair is of course your husband’s and 
the smaller one yours,” said the baron quirking his mouth 
upwards. “What a typical interior! Where shall I sit?”
“Sit wherever you like,” said Elsa. “The interior is all 
yours. Choose your favourite bit.” (Rhys 1976=SIOL, 95) 
The Baron seems to be imposing a gender-based order on both 
the room and Elsa, who at first offers the sarcastic answer above, 
then begins contesting him on the topics of whether a painting is 
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by a woman (it is by a man), and whether their cat, Kikimora, is a 
“she-cat” (it is a “he-cat”). The details of the interior in this story are 
only transmitted to the reader through the Baron’s comments and 
Elsa’s responses. From them, the reader senses the constrained social 
norms involving “typical interiors” (apparently referring to British⁄
English ones) and “feminine charm,” and a somewhat futile attempt to 
challenge them. After the visit (which ends with the cat scratching the 
Baron), Elsa takes revenge on the material world, namely her “elegant 
dinner suit,” which she cuts up with scissors, telling her husband: 
“I’m destroying my feminine charm” (SIOL, 99). The rules by which 
the Baron interprets the interior, its things, and its inhabitants, make it 
a repulsive space for Elsa, who distances herself from it (“the interior 
is all yours”). She, however, seems to attempt liberation by destroying 
a piece of apparel.
From the point of view of the experiential “feel” associated with 
the whole story, not only Elsa’s experience, this makes the most 
sense. While the sociocultural norms that the Baron introduces 
can be interpreted by the reader using higher-order understanding, 
they are accompanied with a sense of constraint. This sense, I argue, 
is produced by the interior setting, the rhythm of the dialogue of 
repeated misclassifications and attempted retorts, the two characters’ 
uncomfortable closeness (“plunging deep into…”), and the invitation 
for the reader to “blend” their virtual body with Elsa’s fictional one 
(Caracciolo 2014b, 167), which we know to be clad in a “dinner suit.” As 
Caracciolo (Ibid., 168) suggests, “the leveraging of readers’ experien-
tial traces in embodied imaginings can encourage their engagement 
with the text at the level of sociocultural meanings.” In “Kikimora,” 
the suit is introduced immediately. Both Baron Mumtael’s comment 
and Elsa’s reply (“I hate myself in suits”) construct it as an uncomfort-
able expression of normative ideas of gender and nationality, but the 
reader is also invited to enact the feeling of discomfort and self-con-
tempt as accompanied by a clinging tightness around Elsa’s body: a 
“suit” suggests a relatively thick, rigid fabric and a demure cut.19 From 
this constraint she releases herself not only by undressing, but also 
by definitively destroying the constraining fabric. The embodied 
metaphor of the suit can produce a vivid understanding of the socio-
cultural meanings. It can also feed back into the reader’s experiential 
background, possibly creating new understanding of the tightness 
of a bourgeois gender order. As can be seen in the analyses to come, 
19  ‘Dinner suit’ is also, interestingly, a term used principally for men’s attire, whereby gender 
in the story comes forth even more strongly as a performance or masquerade involving 
deceptive facades and arbitrary norms.
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clothes and especially dresses are central to Rhys’s writing both 
as material things and metaphorical entities. In this light, it is quite 
logical that an emotional drama is acted out by way of violent inter-
action with a suit.
In some of the houses that Rhys describes, the sense of repulsion 
an interior elicits is even more obvious. In “Till September Petronella” 
(1960), a vague sense of being shut overwhelms Petronella, the narrator 
in her Bloomsbury bed-sit. In the story, she escapes upon invitation 
to a male friend’s country cottage, but she eventually escapes from 
there, too. Objects in her room are personified, “tormenting” her as 
recollections even in the pleasant countryside bedroom: “[…] the way 
the sun shone on the black iron bedstead in my room in Torrington 
Square on fine days. The bars of the bedstead grin at me. Sometimes 
I count the knobs on the chest of drawers three times over” (TBL, 16). 
A fine day does not keep the bedstead and the room from appearing 
hostile. The image of the iron bars is repeated after Petronella’s friend 
tries to console her: “The world is big. There’s hope.” “Not for me,” 
she thinks, after imagining the bars of her bedstead (TBL, 28). For 
Petronella, the world is the size of a Bloomsbury bed-sit, whose iron 
bars remind her of a prison.20
As George Lakoff and Mark Turner (1989, 34–46) suggest, time can 
be metaphorically conceived of as “thief,” “devourer,” or “destroyer,” 
a moving entity that may pursue one on the metaphorical “journey 
of life,” as well as a physical substance. When Petronella leaves her 
room for the countryside, the landlord21 remarks good-naturedly, 
quoting a music-hall song: “So there’s a good time coming for the 
ladies, is there?—a good time coming for the girls? About time too” 
(TBL, 10–11). The final comment suggests that there has not been 
much “good time” before, which based on the context of the sentence 
means being invited out, meeting men. The statement appears 
ironic, however, as the “good time” at the cottage turns out to mean 
Petronella getting in the middle of drunken dramas of jealousy, and as 
the story continually points toward time itself as a lived experience of 
a substance that runs out and escapes.
Having left the cottage after a row, Petronella gets a lift from a man 
who leaves her waiting at a pub, where she encounters a material 
anchor of time:
 
Tea and cakes were laid in a small, dark, stuffy room. 
There were three pictures of Lady Hamilton, Johnny 
Walker advertisements, china bulldogs wearing 
sailor caps and two calendars. One said January 9th, 
but the other was right—July 28th, 1914. (TBL, 25)
20  Later, when Petronella is escorted home by a new male acquaintance, he comments on 
her front-door key as being “like the key of a prison” (TBL, 35).
21  A staple character in Rhys’s fiction, usually one positioned on the side of normativity her 
focal characters or narrators are shown to fight against or suffer from.
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The explicit dating of the story events, following the array of trivial 
pub decorations, appears as highlighted, striking information. For 
a reader at a later point in time, this may mean the realization of a 
distance in time, but in the narrative present, it might equally be a 
realization of how much time has passed since January 9th, and since, 
perhaps, the “good time for the ladies,” if it ever existed. In retrospect, 
the end of July 1914 carries a sinister foreboding: Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand has been killed exactly a month before, and the First World 
War will begin in just four days. This context adds further irony to 
the prospect of “good times,” and even suggests associations of the 
bric-a-brac to national heroes and the marines. The encounter with 
the calendar has some effect on Petronella, for when the man comes 
back and asks what she was thinking about, she “nearly jump[s] out 
of [her] skin” and answers, “I was thinking about the time” (Ibid.). The 
man has a ready answer: “About the time? Oh, don’t worry about that. 
There’s plenty of time” (Ibid.). Material things, however, are telling 
her the opposite. At the end of the story she is back in her room, in 
the early morning hours: “‘What’s the time?’ I thought, and because 
I wasn’t sleepy any longer I sat down in the chair by the window, 
waiting for the clock outside to strike” (TBL, 36); earlier it has been 
mentioned that it chimes “every quarter-hour” (TBL, 31). The clock 
and the calendar point to time as a perishable entity, and direct the 
mental activities of the characters toward remembrance or waiting. 
The title of the story suggests another, longer wait: September is 
when Petronella agrees to meet both her cottage-owning friend and 
the new acquaintance in London for the next time—something that 
would probably be identified by the landlord as another “good time 
coming for the ladies,” while the story rather suggests this as a sinister 
form of eternal return.22
How can the abstract notion of time be conveyed to an embodied 
experience in the reader, or can it? My suggestion is that stories like 
“Till September Petronella” achieve this by way of embodied meta-
phors. According to Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s seminal work (1999), 
what they call “conceptual metaphors” in each language have their 
roots in our embodied being and sensorimotor interaction with the 
world, whereby our abstract thinking is largely based on the way 
we experience the material reality as things and substances with 
surfaces and dimensions that we can feel and move. Their approach 
uses the concept of metaphor in a considerably broader sense than 
22  The notion of eternal return has been also connected with fashion and modernity by 
Walter Benjamin (1999, 4–5, 544) and Sophie Oliver (2016) has shown its effect specifically 
through fashion in Rhys’s fiction. Andrew Thacker (2009, 202) links a similar instance of a 
chiming church bell in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie paradoxically to a sense that time has 
stood still while the main character has been out of hearing distance of the familiar bell.
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most literary studies, but for its main argument the theory of concep-
tual metaphor can also contribute to discussions of literary metaphor. 
Rhys plays with the basic, frozen metaphorical expressions used in the 
English language for time (“a good time”; “about time”; “there’s plenty 
of time”; “what’s the time?”). At the same time, these customary meta-
phors of understanding time as a substance or an agent are connected 
with focal characters’ bodily experiences of being constrained within 
“small, dark, stuffy” interior spaces or constantly moving from one 
space and place to another.
According to Mary Lou Emery (2015, 59–60), Rhys’s use of liminal 
spaces such as verandas and terraces is parallel with the mixed 
area of dreaming and being awake, transformations of power, and 
potential violence (Ibid., 63); interestingly, the row in “Till September 
Petronella,” also takes place on a veranda. Emery discusses espe-
cially the novels and stories set in a colonial context, and explores 
the cultural and historical meanings involved in such short stories 
as “Mixing Cocktails,” “Again the Antilles” (1927) and “Pioneers, Oh, 
Pioneers” (1976). However, the same dynamic of liminality or mixing 
inside and outside also seems to be an important feature in two late 
short stories set mostly in rural England. Sleep It off Lady can be seen 
as an auto fictional collection in that its different temporal and spatial 
settings resemble those in Rhys’s biography, from childhood in the 
Caribbean Antilles to school and a brief theatre career in England 
to life in Paris of the 1920s; wartime in English cities and old age in 
the English countryside are the subjects of two stories, “Who Knows 
What’s up in the Attic?” and “Sleep It off Lady,” which precede the 
final story of the collection.
Both these stories, unlike Rhys’s other work, feature protagonists 
who live in a house alone. The anonymous focalizer of “Who Knows 
What’s Up in the Attic” is met in the liminal space of the passage 
leading to her front door by Jan, a young Dutch writer whom she has 
invited to come to visit earlier (it is implied that the elderly, female 
focalizer is also a writer). Before Jan’s arrival, she has been “sitting in 
the kitchen of her cottage looking out of the window at the dismal sky 
and listening to the silence” (SIOL, 148). The sky and the weather of 
Southwest England become part of the inner space of the cottage as 
they contribute to a sense of confinement, hints of which are given 
throughout the story. Jan’s arrival, on the other hand, marks a change 
in the weather:
She sat so often in this chair looking at the eternal 
drizzle, listening to the wind. All night it whistled 
and whined and moaned, rattled the doors and 
windows till she had to get up and wedge them 
with newspapers before she could sleep […].
But today the sun was real sun and the light 
gold. The grass was yellow, not green. No wonder 
she felt as if she were in another time, another 
place, another country. (SIOL, 152–153)
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The outdoors affects the indoors of this not-so-solid cottage as the 
wind with all its sounds blows in and disturbs the material bound-
aries of the house, appearing entirely hostile (“the bullying treach-
erous wind,” Ibid.). The wind makes the whole place disagreeable; 
once again it induces longing for “another time, another place, another 
country,” a taste of which enters the fictional space with the visitor.
Jan extends the feeling of spaciousness and possibility by 
inviting the writer to stay in a summer house in Italy. She, however, 
refuses. After Jan has left, she wonders about her decision: 
 “Why shouldn’t I walk out of this place, so dependent 
on the weather, so meanly built, for poor people. Just 
four small rooms and an attic. Like my life.” She put her 
hand to her head and laughed. “And who knows what’s 
up in the attic? Not I for one. I wouldn’t dare look.”
A small house—it was suffocating. She went to the door 
and propped it open. Why not? Why not? (SIOL, 155) 
The house and the body of the focalizer are used as metaphors for 
her life and consciousness, where the attic stands for something 
repressed.23 With a technique similar to “A Solid House,” “Kikimora,” 
and “Till September Petronella,” the sense of being shut within a too 
tight and stuffy space (and time) and its sociocultural meanings (here, 
for instance, the writer’s contempt for a house that is fit “for poor 
people”), are paired with a metaphor that invites bodily enactment on 
the part of the reader. Thereby, in addition to playing with the meta-
phorical meanings of the house as an image of the self, the text invites 
its readers to go through an embodied experience of what it is like to 
be in a suffocating space; this is another experience that most readers 
can be assumed to have experiential traces of, in one form or another. 
Propping the door open is then a simultaneously material and meta-
phorical action. Even if the house has from the beginning seemed to 
be “open” to visitors and the wind, it does seem capable of shutting in 
its inhabitant. However, with irony typical of Rhys, opening the door 
does not lead to her leaving, but to the intrusion of another character, 
who brings a further ambiguous dimension to the story, the discus-
sion of which will be resumed in the final part of this chapter.
The setting of “Sleep It off Lady” resembles the preceding story. 
Narrated in third person, it is also focalized by Miss Verney, another 
elderly woman. The troubling space in this story is comparable to 
23  The topos of the attic with a metaphorical dimension of hiding something repressed in 
Rhys figures most famously in Wide Sargasso Sea, the rewritten life of the “madwoman in the 
attic,” Jane Eyre’s Bertha Mason, whose final moments are narrated in another liminal space, 
the battlements of the country house (see Emery 2015, 75).
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the attic of the previous one, only its presence is more concrete. Miss 
Verney is frightened by a shed in her yard, and unsuccessfully tries to 
get a builder to tear it down. Her fear becomes worse when she sees, 
or thinks she sees, an enormous rat. She becomes obsessed by a sense 
of threat which materializes in both the rat and the shed. She is also 
feeling ill and is prescribed medication by a slightly worried doctor. 
Once again, a change of weather brings about temporary change of 
emotion. On a beautiful day (“[t]he sky was pale blue. There was no 
wind.” SIOL 169), Miss Verney feels better, but after lifting some heavy 
objects in her rush of energy, she collapses by the shed. A neighbor’s 
child refuses to help her because of her reputation as a drunk; she 
spends the night outside, is finally taken to the hospital but dies “of 
shock and cold” (SIOL, 172), probably affected by a heart condition for 
which the medication has been prescribed.
The shed is a space outside the house, but it is also one that invades 
the domestic one. It is at the mercy of time and weather like the cottage 
in the previous story: “Most of the paint had worn off the once-black 
galvanized iron. Now it was a greenish colour. Part of the roof was 
loose and flapped noisily in windy weather” (SIOL, 160). Inside, the 
shed is “astonishingly large” (Ibid.), and full of material things char-
acterized by decay, dirt, and disuse. It is through these things that the 
disturbing ambience of the space is first constructed:
Nails festooned with rags protruded from the only 
wooden rafter. There was a tin bucket with a hole, a huge 
dustbin. Nettles flourished in one corner but it was the 
opposite corner which disturbed her. Here was piled 
a rusty lawnmower, an old chair with a carpet draped 
over it, several sacks, and the remains of what had once 
been a bundle of hay. She found herself imagining that a 
fierce and dangerous animal lived there […]. (SIOL, 160)
The dirty, rusty, decayed things and the presence of nettles flour-
ishing indoors are another way of destabilizing the interior, and 
showing how time and the forces of nature work on its surfaces. The 
body of Miss Verney is identified with the things in the shed, as she is 
shown to be depressed by ageing (“Left alone, Miss Verney felt so old, 
lonely and helpless that she began to cry,” SIOL, 161). Her preoccupa-
tion with the shed seems to run parallel in time with the worsening 
of her condition.24
Miss Verney tries to protect herself by cleaning inside her house 
and dragging furniture away from the walls, to gain visibility of 
anything that might be lurking in the corners; she also shuts and bolts 
the windows in the direction of the shed and piles heavy stones on the 
24  The imaginary beast of the passage, which appears in the fictional world the form of 
the large black rat, also becomes a metaphorical entity, a bad omen or a messenger of death 
comparable to a raven or a black cat.
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dustbin. Ironically, however, it is moving objects around that brings 
about her death, combined with the prejudice and indifference of 
neighbors. The story uses the liminal space of the shed, and the paral-
lels between the shed and the house, to mix invitations to imagine 
something heavy, solid and closed (the shut windows, the furniture, 
dustbins with stones on them), with evocations of airiness, crumbling 
and openness (wind blowing through the shed, its decayed collection 
of things, the opening between the shed and the yard and the open 
dustbins). Both are felt qualities of the lived space, and both are expe-
rienced as menacing by Miss Verney. Unlike Barnes’s Madame’s, her 
enemies seem to be time and loneliness, but they become manifest in 
the felt enmity of the space.
Readers of this story can use the livedness of the space evoked in 
the narrative in combination with their cultural knowledge to inter-
pret what is read. The introduction of the lived spaces of the shed and 
the house, and the material things in them, involve the reader in Miss 
Verney’s experiences, which appear as though they were real even 
though they may be partly hallucinatory also in the fictional world; 
her experience, in any case, is real. A reader may doubt whether the 
rat is “actually” there and wonder why the shed should be so terri-
fying, but the story nevertheless makes its readers live through some 
version of the fear and disgust attributed to its protagonist. These 
they can combine to culturally understood meanings of ageing and 
death, and the symbolism that points to them, with the added themes 
of alcoholism and social prejudice. Similarly, the previous story 
connects the experiential ambience of the house with cultural paral-
lels between house, the human body and mind.
The collection Sleep It off Lady is built around a quasi-biographical 
“plot,” but it does not end with this death, however. In the last story, 
“I Used to Live Here Once,” the space around a house becomes the 
meeting place of different levels of time, reminiscent of the “other 
house” in “A Solid House,” in the earlier collection. It is a very short, 
third-person descriptive account of a woman, on a “fine day, a blue 
day,” walking toward a familiar house, which she has not seen for 
a long time (SIOL, 175). The setting a Caribbean island, which is the 
same as that of the first stories of the collection. She recognizes step-
ping stones and has detailed recollections of which one used to be 
safe and which one unsteady. The garden has changed due to lack of 
maintenance, and the road is wider than before; the house has been 
“added to and painted white” (Ibid.). Feeling her heart beating, she 
stands in front of the steps, but as in “A Solid House,” this is as far as 
she gets: she attempts to greet two children playing in the garden, but 
they do not hear or see her, only wonder if it has “gone cold all of a 
sudden” (SIOL, 176). “That was the first time she knew,” is the final 
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line of the story (Ibid.). This suggests that the story is focalized by a 
ghost who does not at first realize she is one. It adds another level of 
heterotopical juxtaposition in time and space, beyond the narrative 
present, dreams, and past memories, appearing as a more developed 
rendering of the house seen in the deathlike dream by Teresa in “A 
Solid House.” The story is in an intriguing relation with autobi-
ographical writing, which Paul de Man (1979) likens to epitaph and 
prosopopoeia, words from beyond the grave. As Johnson and Moran 
(2015) suggest, haunting and ghosts are key topoi in many of Rhys’s 
fictions, and add to the understanding of the ambiguous spatiality of 
the stories. In their depictions of space and time with invitations to 
quite intense bodily feelings and emotions, her stories combine an 
experiential dimension with something readers are not supposed to 
be able to experience, demonstrating the power of fiction: “Shall I tell 
her what it feels like to be dead?”
The destabilized domestic spaces of Rhys’s stories provide several 
openings in time and space, tentatively shaking the material and 
cultural meanings of fictional “solid houses.” The stories themselves 
refuse to be textual houses without a draft between window-frames 
and cracks in the boards, as Woolf put it in the citation that begun 
this chapter. The fictional houses of the stories show not only the 
cracks split in them by time, but also their inherent and ideological, 
socially manifest instability, to do with gendered meanings of space 
and the narrative form of the story alike. For Rhys’s characters, 
houses may be more vividly depicted in dreams, hallucinations, or 
an imaginary after-life than “real” houses. Yet both actual and imag-
inary details of the storyworld are used to invite the reader’s sensory 
imagination and enactment, and the virtual bodily experience of 
fictional spaces. Rhys’s work is often seen as characterized by a sense 
of rootlessness and alienation, or constantly belonging elsewhere. As 
I suggest in subsequent chapters, it could also be argued that many of 
the stories are actually about belonging, but this belonging is never 
commensurable with the house as a domestic space. The preceding 
analyses have shown that the inherent ambiguity of belonging to and 
inhabiting spaces and experiencing time is created by subtle meta-
phors and irony, but that their meaningfulness also rests on experi-
entiality, which is constructed largely by references to “lived things,” 
material entities in the interior that are present in the characters’ 
fictional bodily actions and experiences. Rhys’s readers might feel 
“confined and shut in” in a “bright yet narrow room,” as Woolf fears 
readers of some fiction might feel, instead of “enlarged and set free” 
(Woolf 1948, 191), but this seems to be an intentional choice aiming 
to reveal how sociocultural constraints affect the lived experience of 
time and space.
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2.1.2. Disregarded and Decaying Houses
 
“[W]hat are you going to be when you grow up into a 
fine strapping woman, and have a house to yourself, 
with curtains to every window, a new calico gown 
with tucks all over it, and six eggs in the cupboard?”
“I shall run away,” said Elsie sweetly. 
—  Djuna Barnes: Ryder25
 
Djuna Barnes’s stories feature more actual houses than Rhys’s, but 
they are not homelike either. Mary Wilson has discussed this at length 
in relation to Nightwood; she suggests that “[h]ome in Nightwood, like 
the characters in the novel, exists in a site of liminality, on social and 
spatial margins” (Wilson 2011, 431). Wilson points out that Nightwood 
“calls the possibility of feeling at home into question, revealing it to 
be an illusion of possession and belonging that is either a perfor-
mance or a trap” (Ibid.). Nightwood portrays losses and longings that 
sometimes have a stable space and a stable (gender) identity as their 
object, but ultimately show the impossibility of either. The following 
analyses suggest that Barnes’s short stories, not only by their content, 
but also their form, fit the description of “unhoused fictions” as used 
by Wilson at least as well as her only novel. Here, too, the attention is 
on the way the lived experience of the material things encountered in 
them interact with cultural dynamics and interpretations.
The beginnings of an unstable feeling related to houses and other 
domestic spaces in Barnes’s works are found in their functional 
features: the spaces often seem to be there mainly for characters to 
promptly enter and exit. Thus, most of the stories are like theatrical 
performances. Often at the beginning of a story, upon arrival, there 
is a sequence of more deliberate description of a house or another 
space where the central events take place, while in the rest of the 
story description is scarcer. Stories, such as “Aller et Retour” (1924) 
and “Spillway” (1919), are both discussed at length in the later chapters 
of this study as they begin with depictions of characters travelling 
toward a house that has been but no longer is their home, but still is 
the milieu of the climax of the story. In “Aller et Retour,” Madame von 
Bartmann comes to see her daughter after the death of the father; in 
“Spillway,” Julie Anspacher arrives from a sanatorium, terminally ill 
25  1928; Barnes 2010, 161.
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with tuberculosis, bringing with her a child of whom her husband 
knows nothing. There is a sense of temporary narrowing when 
arriving at the old home, only to stop by and then leave again. This 
dynamic is also suggested by the title of “Aller et Retour.”
Other stories, such as “Cassation” (whose title suggests a stop, 
cancellation and annulment), “Dusie” (1927) and “A Boy Asks a 
Question” (1923),26 are structured around the arrival of the narrators 
and⁄or focal characters at a house as guests, and their departure at 
the end of the story; thus, the story forms a brief static moment in 
the mobile life of the main characters. The structures of these stories, 
their use of linguistic archaisms and antiquarian material things, and 
suggestions of a decayed state of the house and possibly its inhabi-
tants recall a decadent and gothic style. When not leaving or arriving, 
Barnes’s characters seem to frequent threshold spaces that are not 
quite indoors or outdoors; if they are left within an interior space, at 
least there tends to be one window open somewhere. The interiors 
themselves are at times heavy and oppressive, but at the same time not 
quite contained within themselves. The characters of “Aller et Retour,” 
for instance, move between a garden and the house, often remaining 
between them, while the house is described as a “heavy house with 
heavy furniture” (Barnes 1996 = CS, 367). Furthermore, stories, such as 
“A Sprinkle of Comedy” and “The Diary of a Dangerous Child” (1922)27 
feature plots of young boys and girls running away from home. These 
stories, most of them among Barnes’s earlier writings first published 
in magazines such as Vanity Fair, highlight the role of the house as a 
theatrical space where exact timings are important. They are struc-
tured around plots with elements of slapstick comedy and adventure, 
dependent upon certain people and certain things being in the same 
place at the same time (see Bahktin 1990, 91–92). 
In “A Sprinkle of Comedy” (1917), Roger finds a note revealing 
that his beloved son is going to run away with a prizefighter named 
Charlie. The escape, however, will only take place if it does not rain: 
“Don’t exactly like starting an adventure that is likely to alter my life, 
in the rain,” the son writes in the note, which recalls some earlier 
witticisms reported in the story, portraying the boy as intelligent and 
delicate but difficult (CS, 104).28 Roger summons his friends, armed 
with sticks, to surprise and frighten the son. Roger repeatedly puts his 
hand out the cellar window to check if it is raining; finally, his hand 
gets wet, and the ambush is dismissed. The water, however, turns 
out to have come from his wife watering pansies through an upper 
window, while at the same moment, the son has left. 
26  Originally published as “A Boy Asks a Question of a Lady” in A Book; revised version 
under new title published in Spillway (1962)
27  Published in Vanity Fair under the pseudonym Lydia Steptoe.
28  The delicate and eccentric character of the boy is also discussed through references to 
materiality on a metaphorical level. The worried mother sighs that “the lad is growing strange 
and of an odd material,” to which her husband replies: “If he were material he would be silk.” 
(CS, 101)
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In “The Diary of a Dangerous Child,” a fourteen-year-old girl falls 
in love and makes an elaborate plan to run away with her imagined 
future lover (called Don Pasos Dilemma). However, the figure waiting 
for her, clad in the coat of Don Pasos, is revealed to be her mother. 
However, the girl is not discouraged; her next plan is to “run away 
and become a boy” (CS, 334). In these stories, gendered identities are 
everything but stable and solid, and the house, even if it is a “solid” 
space, appears as one to be left behind. Thus, like Rhys’s stories, these 
accounts do similar cultural work in challenging the connections 
of woman, home, and family, and question the possibility of stable 
human subjectivity at the center of the space.  In these early stories 
domestic space is most clearly characterized as scenographically 
functional space needed for the unfolding of coincidences and plots, 
where the placing of things (a box of pansies on the window, a Spanish 
cloak) is key. The reader is not primarily invited to enact these things 
as something experienced, although they will probably evoke expe-
riential memory. This can be seen as another way of making the inte-
rior unstable, as its theatrical connotations make it appear more as a 
set piece than a three-dimensional space.
Nevertheless, some of Barnes’s focalizing techniques also invite 
experiential responses in readers. In “The Diary of a Dangerous 
Child,” on her night of planned escape, the girl is waiting to jump 
from the liminal space of the balcony onto horseback. She evokes a 
theatrical role-model in the Italian actress, Eleonora Duse (1858–1924):
I thought thoughts of Duse and how she had 
suffered on balconies a good deal, at least I 
gathered that she did from most of her pictures.
I too stood on the balcony and suffered side-
face. The silver light glided over the smooth 
balustrade and swam in the pool of gold fishes.
In one hand I held the silver mounted whip. 
On my head was a modish, glazed riding hat 
with a single loose feather, falling sideways. 
I could hear the tiny enamel clock on my ivory 
mantle ticking away the minutes. (CS, 332)
The narrator of the diary presents herself as an actress accom-
panied by carefully selected props, and her suffering disposition 
carefully arranged “side-face,” to a comic effect but also composing 
a tableau vivant, a typical means of expression in Barnes’s stories. 
As Michaela Grobbel (2004, 37) observes, “these tableaus frequently 
signal a caesura or turning point in the narration, and offer a moment 
of reflection,” a moment in which several levels of time coalesce. The 
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balcony becomes a mixed space between the home and the garden, 
and, functionally, the home and a stage. The sound of the clock 
crosses the boundary from the inside and acts as a reminder of the 
crucial element of passing time, which in this scene equals timing 
the actions according to it. Home is needed for the drama to unfold 
as a place from which to escape, but the only material aid required 
is the balcony. This is also the only setting where lighting and mate-
rial detail, most of it related to the girl, are described. The descriptive 
attention highlights its importance and downplays that of the house. 
Knowledge of the contents of the house are not essential to produce 
virtual, bodily experiences in readers.
The girl’s body may function as an anchor for readerly experience, 
but at the same time the story offers another possibility of virtual 
perception: the silver of the whip the girl says she is holding blends 
with the light “gliding over” the balcony structures and toward a pool 
in the yard. Researchers have suggested ways in which light can be 
used by authors to direct the reader’s attention as a proxy for the 
focalizer of a story (Fludernik 1996, 198; Caracciolo 2014b, 169). Here 
a reader can align his or her experiential enactments with a human 
body on the balcony, but the experientiality can also expand beyond 
the borders of this body, and further away from the house, as the light 
becomes “a stand-in for human vision” (Caracciolo 2014b, 169; cf. 
Scarry 1999, 11–12). The liminality of the setting is brought to the expe-
riential level by the tension between two simultaneously possible 
strategies of focalization.
Similarly, Barnes’s early stories set in New York City barely 
mention interiors and their things, while what is important and inter-
esting happens somewhere between the house and the street and 
the other public spaces in the vicinity of the house containing the 
interior. “Paprika Johnson” (1915) and “Prize Ticket 177” (1917) share a 
similar setting and similar comic plots centered on two women, their 
conflicting love interests, and bad timing. “Paprika Johnson,” set in 
lower Manhattan, builds a plot of surprise and misunderstanding on 
and around a fire-escape, a balcony-like space typical of New York 
City buildings. Paprika is a young woman sharing an apartment 
with a friend, who spends her evenings playing the banjo on the 
eighth-floor fire-escape. Her friend’s blind lover has fallen in love 
with Paprika’s voice, thinking it belongs to the friend, while a neigh-
borhood boy has also fallen in love with her after seeing and hearing 
her from the street below. In addition, her playing has attracted the 
attention of patrons of the neighborhood beer garden.
The fire escape offers a sense of spaciousness because of its views: 
“Across the cliff she looked and watched the moon grope its way up 
the sky and over condensed milk signs and climb to the top of the 
Woolworth Building” (CS, 45). Again, a source of light directs the 
“gaze tour” of the story away from the house, toward even further 
locations. When playing her banjo on the fire escape, Paprika is 
almost at home, almost somewhere “in the city,” becoming part of a 
much larger space away from home. This is how she is seen by the 
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boy, too: “[h]e had seen Paprika from the beer garden, but Paprika 
was eight floors distant […] a silhouette against Manhattan, enhanced 
as she was by the whole of the left side of the Hudson he came to the 
conclusion that she was fit for a flat off Bleecker Street with eggs for 
breakfast” (CS, 48). Paprika is enlarged by her surroundings, but the 
boy thinks he could fit her into his version of a domestic idyll. Due 
to misunderstandings, Paprika loses the boy, but gains a contract 
to play for the clients of the beer garden as “the first cabaret artist,” 
and decides to keep her “stage” on the fire-escape (CS, 55). A missed 
chance for domestic happiness, which might have taken place in an 
apartment on a lower floor, about which she has been dreaming, is 
compensated in a fairy tale-like manner by a profession and life in 
a space which is a mixture of the home (she dries her handkerchiefs 
on the fire escape while playing), the street, the restaurant, and the 
stage. Paprika appears more as an object viewed by others than as the 
focal subject of the story; what is most significant experientially is the 
shifting of attention from the confined interior space to the expanse of 
the Manhattan silhouette, between which Paprika’s body is balanced 
on the fire-escape.
Even when Barnes does not show her characters on balconies or 
fire-escapes, she depicts them leaning on windows29 with the sounds, 
odors and sights streaming in from outside, usually from a garden. 
This resembles a potential heterotopia as cited by Foucault because of 
of the superimposed layers of history and geography (1986, 25–26).30 In 
such passages, the feeling of the inner and outer spaces do not appear 
as separate outside it. 
Some of the mixing of indoors and outdoors takes place through 
the blending of different textures, in another story, “Smoke” (1917) as 
Little Lief reacts to the impoverishment of her family:
Her heart broke, but she opened the windows oftener 
because she needed some kind of beauty. She made the 
mistake of loving tapestries best and nature second best. 
Somehow she had gotten the two mixed 
29  Barnes uses the word “casement,” which implies a type of window opening to the side, 
and bears associations to earlier, especially gothic literature and its even more archaic spaces, 
in which there often is no glass in the windows and therefore the contact with the outer world 
is more direct. Casements appear as places of reflection: In “The Jest of Jests,” the narrator 
remarks, “[S]udden ideas always take us to the casement” (CS, 79).
30  Foucault grounds this on a view of Persian garden tradition which he connects rather 
ambiguously with the “modern zoological gardens,” yet the function of a garden as a micro-
cosm of different geographies is plausible, and their links to tradition ally well with the notion 
of ‘heterochrony’, a break in temporality that Foucault introduces in the same connection 
(Foucault 1986, 26).
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— of course, it was due to her bringing up. “If you are 
poor, you live out-of-doors; but if you are rich, you live 
in a lovely house.” So to her the greatest of calamities 
had befallen the house. It was beginning to go away 
by those imperceptible means that at first leave a 
house looking unfamiliar and then bare. (CS, 149)
 
In this passage, the cultural understandings of wealth and poverty, 
caricatured in Little Lief ’s ideas of where the “poor” and the “rich” live, 
are mixed with the sensory experience of the “beauty” of textures 
inside and outside the window. This house, too, loses its solidity, 
both in its bourgeois function of sheltering private property, and as a 
concrete, lived-in space and thing, in the way its windows are opened 
more often and in the way it is felt to be “going away” (perhaps in the 
form of giving up some of the beautiful objects inside it) and becoming 
bare. For Little Lief, the textures of nature replace those of tapestries, 
which is a decadent paradox showing the preference for the artifi-
cial over the natural. Natural and artificial seem to be purposefully 
mixed in the story. Instead of a description, the reader is provided 
with a general suggestion of “texture.” This is a rather vague cue 
for embodied enactments, but still might act as one, by suggesting a 
sensory imagining of what a texture found in a tapestry equally as in 
nature might be like and, more importantly, what it would be like to 
“love” it and find it beautiful.
In “Aller et Retour,” Madame von Bartmann approaches the house 
by a garden lane, where scent, sight and sound form a “tangle of 
singing textures” (CS, 365). The word ‘tangle’ is used in other stories 
as well in connection with a natural texture of bushes, branches and 
grass located in a liminal zone. It expresses an entanglement of arti-
fice and nature, inner and outer (Plumb 1986, 57). Madame first meets 
Richter in the garden, and even in the evening as she plays the piano, 
Richter stands in the dark garden, “listen[ing] to Schubert streaming 
down the light from the open casement” (CS, 368); here is another 
instance of the use of light traversing the boundaries between spaces, 
and an echo of the synesthesia of “a tangle of singing textures.” As the 
description of the arrival has offered the tangle of textures to the read-
er’s experience, Barnes’s way of insisting on the house opening to the 
garden also brings the feel of those textures inside the house. There, as 
a comparison, we have interior textures of textiles carefully pointed 
out: at night, when it is Madame’s turn to listen to and comment on 
Richter’s playing, she does so through the curtains of her bed, “with a 
canopy of linen roses, frilled and smelling of lavender” (CS, 371). Thus, 
the illustrations in the textiles bring the sensory properties, the scents, 
of the garden indoors. 
The garden with its textures is only one of the heterotopias looming 
within and beyond the domestic interior in Barnes’s stories. The 
places where characters come from, and through which they pass 
are also present, as the stories are often built around rhythms of 
arrival and departure: “Aller et Retour” begins with a materially 
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specific description of Madame coming from Paris, passing through 
Marseilles (see Section 4.2). Combined with the openness and poten-
tial set-piece qualities of the houses and their inseparability from the 
surrounding gardens, we see that even though some of the means 
are different from Rhys, a destabilization of the domestic interior 
also takes place in Barnes’s work. Barnes’s writing seems to work 
especially forcefully to challenge symbolic links between the house 
and the family. In terms of Freudian psychoanalysis, making the 
home unhomely is associated with das Unheimliche, the uncanny: a 
symptom of a repressed dread of the maternal body and longing for its 
imaginary, phallic version. In the Freudian framework, a house might 
be viewed as a symbol for the maternal body (see Freud 1985). This is 
echoed in humanist geography by for instance Yi Fu Tuan, for whom 
“the mother is the child’s primary place,” and “the first enduring and 
independent object in the infant’s world of fleeting impression,” which 
a child needs to leave little by little (Tuan 2001, 29, cf. Young 2005, 124).
Maternity and the family are certainly one central issue of the 
stories (Spillway is even dedicated to “Mother”); in “Aller et Retour,” 
“Spillway,” and “Cassation,” as well as in most of the later stories, some 
parodic and controversial version of an Oedipal family comes together 
briefly under the roof of a house, which does not seem quite strong 
enough to contain it. Thus, Barnes’s stories make the maternal house 
itself a fleeting entity. Leaving it is easy though always slightly violent, 
never gradual. Barnes’s houses also appear more as “paternal” sites; 
the father remains in the house while the mother is in the process of 
returning and leaving again. The heavy but decaying houses enact 
a decay of patriarchy, as the stories strive to reimagine normative 
versions of matrimony (cf. Wilson 2011, 446). As Jane Marcus observes 
(1989, 174), in Barnes it is not only a question of bringing the uncanny 
into the house, but of rendering the house unreal, so that it barely 
seems to exist at all, as in the quotation above from “Smoke,” in which 
the house is “going away” by “imperceptible means.”
The preceding analyses show that the depiction of a multisensory 
experience of light, sound, smell and the visual and haptic perception 
of textures passing the borders of the house, as well as the mixing 
of natural and artificial textures, and the simple preference for 
threshold spaces instead of the depths of the interior all contribute to 
the production of this as an unreality that Wilson’s “unhoused,” and 
the general term ‘unhomely’ might describe better than the Freudian 
Unheimliche, even if psychoanalysis certainly is in an intertextual 
relation with Barnes’s work. Similarly, the scenographic descriptions 
and locations not only bring the house close to the street and the 
garden, but to the heterotopia of the theatre. What is implied to be left 
in the “interior” of the fictional set-pieces is not without significance, 
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of course, even if it is unmentioned and left to the reader’s imagina-
tion, but the feel of space is dominated by what is described, as that 
helps the readers’ imagination the most. Often, there seems to be no 
invitation to even imagine the inside as a virtual presence in the way 
that was identified in Rhys’s stories. This may also be due to Barnes’s 
use of the form of the short story, which creates a need to focus on 
a significant detail and omit the inessential; however, Barnes’s stories 
do not quite fall within the scope of the “single-effect doctrine”: their 
material detail rarely points toward a single interpretation.
Barnes’s stories demonstrate the gendered ambiguity of space 
and time, as do those of Rhys, but they also take performative action 
against these “enemies,” as they challenge the confines of houses by 
means of the placement of characters in liminal spaces. In both cases, 
the narration⁄focalization traverses spatial boundaries, and shows 
the decay of oppressive environments in something of a positive light 
of cheerful comedy, which does not necessarily hide anything sinis-
ter.31 Like Rhys’s, Barnes’s characters also transgress the boundaries 
of biographical time with the help of the narrative form, and thereby 
challenge stable ideas of subjectivity. The Madame of “Madame Grows 
Older” cited at the very beginning of this chapter escapes from her 
house to the garden. She writes in her diary about her plan to drown 
herself in a garden pond, after first having fallen in love, also in the 
garden, with the young man she had intended for her daughter. The 
last line of her diary and the story is as follows: “September nineteenth. 
I have killed myself !” (CS, 361). The fictionalized diary form, used in a 
counterfactual manner, enables Madame to speak of her own death 
in the past tense and bend time beyond normative conceptions.32 just 
as Rhys ends the autobiographically organized Sleep It off Lady with 
a story narrated by a ghost. Haunting is a fitting analogy for the way 
both writers deal with houses, in that they almost allow characters 
to walk through their walls like ghosts, and to reside in different 
layers of time simultaneously. Even if such spatiality and temporality 
are at times close to the fantastic, the way the sensory experience 
of textures, surfaces and material things is attended to and invited 
in the reader brings the ghostly paradoxically to life, and creates an 
embodied understanding of how these haunting stories challenge 
norms of domesticity.
31  The complex relationship of positive and negative affect in Barnes is discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.2. See also, Taylor 2012.
32  The parallel story “The Diary of a Dangerous Child” also plays with the themes of time 
and growing old. The narrator describes her mind going back to her childhood, like when one 
is “between life and death,” only her mind goes back and forth because of “the distance being 
so short”—she being so young. She exclaims: “How old one becomes, and how suddenly! I 
grew old on horseback, between twelve and twelve one” (CS, 333).
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2.2 Public Spaces, Mobility,  
and Traces of Experience
Rhys’s and Barnes’s stories destabilize the house as an emblem of 
domesticity, but the spaces especially Rhys’s characters most frequent 
are outside of this sphere (see Zimmerman 2015, 74). Many of these 
spaces are liminal by default, in their ambiguous location between 
private and public, like hotel rooms, in which Rhys’s characters spend 
extended periods of time, making them little different from rented 
rooms. These spaces, as well as cafés and bars, shops, and streets, 
have been studied especially in relation to Rhys’s work as means of 
discussing problems of modernity related to the cultural space avail-
able in which women may move (Mulholland 2002; Thacker 2009; 
Zimmerman 2015). As Terri Mulholland (2002, 448) observes, “[p]
lacing her characters in these liminal spaces allows Rhys to reflect 
the spatial, economic and sexual constraints placed on women living 
alone in the city.” There are indeed spaces of constraint in public 
space, as well as in the home, yet, in both Rhys’s and Barnes’s stories, 
the public spaces also appear as places of opportunity: they afford a 
different, broader variety of action and mobility than the domestic 
space, even though they may also come with restrictions (see Herman 
2011a, 259). Like the liminal space of a balcony or a veranda, hotels and 
hospitals, streets and cafés are also zones of transition, transforma-
tion, and mixing, and can be seen as potential heterotopias allowing 
for alternative futures or the continuous presence of the past.
This section focuses on the experiential renderings of such public 
spaces with the help of their materialities. Texts by Djuna Barnes and 
Jean Rhys are here discussed side by side, as their use of various loca-
tions places their texts in a fruitful dialogue with one another. The 
focus is especially on urban spaces and movement, which are also 
seen as constitutive of some narrative forms in modernism (Williams 
1989, 78). Some of the short stories are specifically crafted to accom-
modate an urban space in an impressionistic way. The discussion 
moves from the quasi-domestic spaces of hotel, hospital, and prison, 
to the more public cafés and streets. How are the “spacious times” of 
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modernity enacted or challenged in Rhys’s and Barnes’s writing in 
these spaces, and how is the lived-ness of these fictional spaces and 
the possibilities they afford constitutive of the gendered, culturally 
coded meanings attached to them?
2.2.1. The Hotel, the Hospital, and the Prison
 
A room is, after all, a place where you hide 
from the wolves. That’s all any room is.
— Jean Rhys, interview by Elizabeth Vreeland33
 
In Jean Rhys’s work, hotels figure most in the interwar novels, often 
serving as the only dwelling place of the protagonist both in the 
narrative present and their remembrances.34 Hotels are contrasted 
with the solid, domestic space of houses. In Quartet, Marya Zelli 
muses on her life in hotels: “It lacked the necessary background. A 
bedroom, balcony and cabinet de toilette in a cheap Montmartre hotel 
cannot possibly be called a solid background” (Rhys 1985, 121). In The 
Left Bank, two stories, “La Grosse Fifi” and “Vienne” (1927) mostly 
take place in hotels. “La Grosse Fifi” is set on the French Riviera, 
where Roseau, the focalizer, is staying in a hotel about which she feels 
ambivalent. Her English friends disapprove of it as a “dreadful place” 
with a “vile reputation” for deeds of violence (LB, 165). They urge 
Roseau to move out, but she is reluctant to do so. The public spaces 
of the hotel are not described, except for a person, who is treated 
almost like a piece of furniture: Fifi, a spectacularly dressed, large, 
ageing lady staying at the hotel with a young gigolo. This, for Roseau’s 
friends, gives even more reason to flee the hotel, but for Roseau, 
who has made friends with Fifi, she seems to be the reason to stay, 
providing security and controversial visual pleasure. The hotel space 
becomes merged with the character of Fifi, and not only visually: her 
weight makes the beds creak and her row and reconciliation with the 
gigolo is heard through wall of Roseau’s room. At the latter instance, 
Roseau thinks: “I must get out of this place,” pulling a “friendly sheet” 
over her head (LB, 178). 
Sheets, things that are closest to the sense of touch in the particular 
situation, come to the fore in the narration, while the rest of the room 
is not described in detail; here we might recall Barnes’s preference for 
33  Vreeland 1979, 221. Rhys writes almost the same words in Good Morning, Midnight (Rhys 
1985, 366).
34  Both Zimmerman (2015) and Mulholland (2002) explore the hotel in Good Morning, 
Midnight (1939) as a liminal or threshold space; the former focuses on its relations to the 
uncanny, the latter on the themes of exile and the search for identity.
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fabrics and flat surfaces at the expense of three-dimensional space. 
Another night, the electric lights go off, and Roseau sees Fifi enter-
taining a table of guests in candlelight. The change of lighting makes 
Fifi suddenly look sinister to Roseau. She tells her companion: “It’s 
just been sheer laziness to make the move and my room is rather 
charming. There’s a big mimosa tree just outside the window. But 
I will leave” (LB, 184–185). The sinister forebodings are realized as 
a final row ends with the gigolo stabbing Fifi to death. Roseau cries 
for Fifi, looking at the mimosa tree she already thinks she will miss, 
but is left at the end of the story determined, and packing her bags. 
She no longer has a reason to stay in the ambiguous space of the 
hotel. As we have seen above, arrival to and departure from a place 
that becomes briefly evoked as lived space, are movements through 
which both Rhys and Barnes construct many of their stories. This 
pattern is supported by the new means available to women for 
movement and temporary residence in commercial spaces such as 
hotels. Importantly, however, in stories such as “La Grosse Fifi,” the 
movement and lack of “solidity” associated with such spaces is not 
depicted as the opposite of hominess or belonging: it does not lead to 
a dehumanized, clean anonymity in urban spaces that would befit a 
futurist conception of modernity (cf. Zimmerman 2015, 90). Rather, 
hotel spaces, in spite of their impermanence, become momentarily 
intimate for their dwellers, whom we are led to imagine leaving traces 
of their experience in the spaces, and leave the hotel with traces of the 
space with them.
Readers are invited to become carriers of these traces: in enacting 
the descriptions of spaces, readers draw from the “traces” of past expe-
riences in their embodied memory. On the other hand, going through 
the experience of reading, say, “La Grosse Fifi,” readers’ experiential 
background is bound to shift if only slightly, because the story-driven 
experiences leave behind “traces” of their own. Readers’ experiences 
of the story are never completely independent of the textual material 
and merely a subjective product of their own past experiences, but an 
interaction, or, rather, tension between the two (Caracciolo 2014b, 49). 
In the fictional world, Roseau has been moved; her physical sensa-
tions and emotions have been affected by the hotel and by Fifi, and 
her moving to the next hotel is not a pure beginning, but something 
colored by the earlier events and encounters. Readers, too, have most 
likely been moved at least a tiny bit, perhaps to add some embodied 
sensitivity to the elements that make up the positive connotations of 
domesticity even to a seedy hotel (the feel of the “friendly sheet,” the 
felt presence of another person, flowers and other beautiful things 
that are shown in connection with Fifi). There might even be some 
sociocultural understanding of the norms placed on female bodies 
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and conduct, the transgression of which in Fifi’s character is regarded 
sympathetically from Roseau’s point of view.35 The story seems to be 
asking, whether readers can find some of the positive values asso-
ciated with a home, as defined by Iris Marion Young (2005, 151–153): 
safety, individuation, privacy and preservation—in a place that is so 
clearly not a home in its normative, bourgeois sense, and in a fleeting 
moment of time.
The same question arises in connection with other stories and other 
semi-public spaces. Foucault calls hospitals and prisons “heterotopias 
of deviation”: places for “individuals whose behavior is deviant in 
relation to the required mean or norm” (Foucault 1986, 25). Many of 
Rhys’s stories are set in such places, and Rhys herself spent some time 
in both. They are spaces of involuntary, temporary habitation, and 
left behind as soon as possible, but this, paradoxically, likens them to 
the repulsive domestic spaces as described in the previous section. 
However, unlike houses and hotels, which seem to retain a wish of 
making their inhabitants remain within, the hospital and the prison 
appear as efficient institutions to deal with their “deviant” human 
contents and get rid of them. In “Let Them Call It Jazz” (1962), Selina, 
a Caribbean immigrant in London, lands in prison after having 
allegedly disturbed her neighbors. In a moment when her body is 
involved in the controlled practices of standing and walking in line, 
the space displays a gravitational effect that only seems to afford 
suicide, the only means of escape possible: “As we are going down I 
notice the railing very low on one side, very easy to jump, and a long 
way below there’s the grey stone passage like it’s waiting for you” 
(TBL, 58). The limitations of the prison space also offer a paradoxical 
sense of safety, one of the features commonly attached to domesticity: 
“When they clang the door on me I think, ‘You shut me in, but you 
shut all those other dam’ devils out. They can’t reach me now” (TBL, 
59). Nevertheless, she begins to long for liberty as she hears an inmate 
singing a prison song, and fantasizes: “One day I hear that song on 
trumpets and these walls will fall and rest” (TBL, 61).36
As Selina is let out to the “normal” world and begins to do better in 
life, she, too, seems to be carrying residue of the prison space at least 
in the form of the song, which she continues to sing and finally sells it 
to a music producer. Going through the story with Selina, the reader 
gains one perspective on what it is like to be in prison. Whether 
she is familiar with prisons or not, she will be able to imaginatively 
enact some of the feelings of being shut in, safely or suffocatingly, 
being controlled and supervised (walking in line), and the vertigo 
induced by the material features of the environment (a high place and 
a low railing). Selina’s Martinique dialect marks her as an “other” in 
35  Whether this will make readers more sympathetic is another question (see Section 4.1).
36  This is another recurring trope in Rhys: in the Paris Review interview, she is thinking of a 
title for her upcoming autobiography, and would like to call it “And the Walls Came Tumbling 
Down,” but her publisher resists; the unfinished autobiography was published posthumously 
as Smile Please  in 1979 (Vreeland 1979, 233). 
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relation to the narrators⁄focalizers of many of Rhys’s stories. Rhys 
mixes experiences that can be attributed to her biographical self 
(moving from the Caribbean islands to England, being imprisoned 
for disturbing neighbors, living precariously on the verge of pros-
titution) in the fictional body of a non-white woman. This might be 
seen as a problematic move, but it is based on the same dynamics 
as the enacted experientiality in reading: the interplay of “new” and 
“old” experiences produces another layer of narrative experience, and 
momentarily it is not so easy to say which are “my” experiences and 
which are the fictional “other’s.” The other affects or even “invades” 
the reading “I,” if we follow Georges Poulet (1969, 59); the reader may, 
again, leave the story with a slightly altered experiential background.
Djuna Barnes takes the meanings of the prison as a safe space even 
further: she creates a character for whom prison means freedom. In 
“A Night in the Woods” (1917), Trenchard, a French immigrant in the 
United States, works with his wife as a baker and feels locked “in his 
little cellar” (CS, 221). He longs for “freedom of the out-of-doors,” and a 
“communal freedom,” which materializes paradoxically in a fantasy 
of the town jail (CS, 221). Trenchard’s wish is granted when they are 
suspected of causing a death by poisoned bread. The prison cell they 
end up in is emphasized as “ordinary” rather than as “other”: “like an 
ordinary room with a few rusty bars up at the windows” (CS, 224). 
Trenchard rejoices in the “freedom and the holiday we have been 
talking about” (Ibid.). The cell space even displays the characteristic 
openness of Barnes’s houses in a bodily effect, as “a little puff of fresh 
air” blows against Trenchard’s cheek from the window (CS, 226). After 
the couple realize that they are in danger of capital punishment, they 
manage, in another miraculous turn of events, to open the prison door 
and flee into the woods. They are slowed down by old age and ulti-
mately betrayed by their dog, but before that, they enjoy “freedom,” 
which materializes in the sensory description of the woods as they 
rest lying down, sensations that are described acutely in the present 
tense: “The smell of fresh sod and moss comes to their nostrils, the 
odor of a crushed flower, of a few bleeding berries. The sound in the 
air of leaves and wind seems good” (CS, 228). This is another example 
of Barnes’s fiction that uses juxtapositions of indoor and outdoor 
perceptions and textures.
This story can be looked at along with “A Night among the Horses” 
(1918,37 another story discussed at length later, (see Section 3.2.2), as 
a parallelization is suggested by the names of the two stories. In “A 
Night among the Horses,” an “ostler” invited to join an upper-class 
37  Revised version in Spillway (1962).
72 73
party in the house he works for, escapes and crawls through nearby 
undergrowth only to be stamped on by his horses. Both stories 
seem to suggest an opposition of natural and artificial, and the grim 
impossibility of combining freedom with either; it seems only to add 
an extra layer of irony and curiosity that the space from which they 
flee in “A Night in the Woods” is a prison. Both stories invite readers 
to go through in an embodied sense glimpses of a sense of freedom, 
even if they ironically posit it as doomed to failure. This tension is 
typical of the stories analyzed in this study. A reader of “A Night in the 
Woods” is left with multiple sensory imaginings: of the confinement 
of a prison cell and a gust of wind, the heat of a chase, the odors of 
“a crushed flower,” “a few bleeding berries,” and the “good” sound of 
“leaves and wind.” Consequently, the story has potential for shifting 
the meanings of “freedom” and “confinement” in the reader’s bodily 
and socio culturally constructed experience. Thus, the prison stories 
of both Rhys and Barnes destabilize the meanings connected with 
captivity and freedom, an effect enhanced in the connection with the 
domestic stories discussed in Section 2.1. A prison can be a place of 
light breeze, safety and freedom, whereas a home, recalling Irigaray’s 
expression, can be “murderous” and suffocating, or open, unsafe 
and alienating. It also has its own temporality, a sense of time being 
slowed down by waiting, but perhaps also sped up by the fear of one’s 
life going past while one is incarcerated. In Rhys’s “Tigers Are Better-
Looking” (1962), another story partly set in a jail, a writing on a cell 
wall says, “I died waiting” (TBL, 73).
A sense of time slowing down, waiting, efficiency and the color 
grey as combined with depression, death, and an occasional feeling of 
safety, are present in Rhys’s hospital stories. The hospital in “Outside 
the Machine” (1960) shares characteristics with the prison, but also 
with the hotel of “La Grosse Fifi.” It mixes the proximity of death and 
suicide with a longing for homey safety, experientially realized in the 
feel of the materiality of the space. A hospital room with fifteen beds 
is focalized by Inez: “The walls were painted grey. The windows were 
long but high up, so that you could see only the topmost branches of 
the trees in the grounds outside. Through the glass the sky had no 
colour” (TBL, 78). This is very different from the view of the Mimosa 
tree outside the hotel on the Riviera, but not that different from trees 
in the two later stories set in the English countryside discussed above. 
“The Machine” comes to signify both the grey and efficient hospital 
and the normativity reigning outside this heterotopia.
Time in the ward seems to pass slowly and cyclically, anchored in 
entrances and exits of doctors and nurses, periods of feeling better and 
feeling worse, turning slowly toward the better. Inez, too, is planning 
her exit, but it becomes clear that she has no place to go and no money. 
For her, the hospital is actually a safe haven, which she does not want 
to leave unless perhaps leaving the whole of the “machine” at the same 
time: she identifies with a suicidal patient judged by others. Finally, 
she is helped by an older lady who discreetly gives her a generous sum 
of money. Another exit follows, but this time the narrative makes clear 
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how the hospital time and space have left their mark on Inez. In the 
taxi, another liminal heterotopia, she finds herself wishing she was 
back in the hospital, “with the sheets drawn over her head” (recalling 
“La Grosse Fifi”38), “Because you can’t die and come to life again for a 
few hundred francs” (TBL, 100). She feels like a ghost, like Teresa in “A 
Solid House,” having been made so by both her time in the “hetero-
topia of deviation” and the machine of the “normal” world.39
The tactile sensations evoked by the mention of the sheets are a 
fitting parallel to these traces. The aural and the olfactory also enter 
the description in another story of giving birth, “Learning to Be a 
Mother,” in The Left Bank (1927), in which the arrival of the narrator 
at the clinic, by way of “interminable” stairs, is marked by a “turmoil” 
consisting of “mewing of babies, a warm smell of blankets, a woman 
moaning” (LB, 123). In this passage, as typical of Rhys’s work, things 
appear more comforting than people. The loud noises coming from 
the human elements in the space appear as alarming, while the 
smell of blankets is “warm,” promising a future warmth which the 
characters rarely expect from other people. If there is warmth and 
hominess in a hospital, it is to be found in the micro-space between 
the bedsheets.40 A hospital has the potential to cater to some of the 
same human needs as a house; when one does not need the stability 
of identity, which according to Mulholland (2012) Rhys’s characters 
would require, a combination of free movement complemented by 
moments of calm and safety could be found there. Young suggests that 
feminist scholars should not give up the concept of home, but instead 
study how safety, a support for identity, privacy and preservation, a 
caring relation to things could be attainable for more people outside 
the reach of a bourgeois dream home (Young 2005, 150–154). Rhys’s 
stories show that ambiguities and instability are inherent in these 
values as well, but they also suggest that especially safety can be a 
lived reality even in a liminal, semi-public location as conventionally 
unhomely as a prison. As Thacker (2009, 193) observes, “Rhys’s char-
acters feel most at home in places of fleeting location on the borders of 
inside and outside spaces.” Here it is important to note the formulation 
38  In the Paris Review interview cited at the beginning of this section, Jean Rhys talks 
about a desire to let fate make one’s decisions, manifest in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie by the 
protagonist’s lying in bed and pulling the “covers” over her head; Rhys remembers that she 
used to do that as a child, because she was afraid of insects (Vreeland 1979, 228).
39  The motif of transforming hospital space is also present in Good Morning, Midnight, 
where Sasha recalls giving birth at a clinic in Paris, where she is wrapped tightly in bandages 
to allow her to leave with “no trace, no mark, nothing” (Rhys 1985, 380), which is echoed in her 
mind as her baby dies and she sees its little body tightly wrapped.
40  Interestingly, hospitals are also the only surroundings where Rhys’s focal characters 
come close to family life including children: they are never portrayed with children older than 
babies, and never outside the situation of giving birth.
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“feel at home”: it is not only that Rhys’s characters frequent these 
spaces, but they also, momentarily, feel safe and belong to them; they 
do not constantly grieve for a more stable place or identity. Mobility 
and instability support a kind of identity not bound to a single place 
and its preserved objects (cf. Young 2005, 151–153).
2.2.2. The Street and the Café
 
Four walls make an argument, a tragedy; the street 
makes it only a momentary trouble. Here you can 
come and go. If you meet friends and disagree, you 
pay your bill and leave; if you “get on,” you go from 
there to any harmony. At a café you can knit up the 
raveled sleave [sic] of time, or be as bitter as you like 
and owe it only to yourself. No house can claim so 
much. The house holds bitterness, the street does not. 
—  Djuna Barnes: “Lament for the Left Bank”41 
 
Djuna Barnes’s “Lament” is a “miniature memoir” written upon 
commission in 1941 for Town & Country, a New York society maga-
zine, and only recently republished. In it, Barnes reminisces about 
other expatriate writers and artists such as Gertrude Stein, Jean 
Cocteau, and James Joyce. However, the piece begins on a more 
personal level, as she eulogizes the street and the café (or the “bistro”), 
at the expense of “the house,” which seems to insist on remaining a 
point of comparison even when the discussion moves toward increas-
ingly public spaces. The beginning motivates the transportation to 
the space and time of memory, evoking the notion of the experiential 
trace left by the past: “Personally I would give all I have, except what 
I got from it, to be back in Paris again as it was, sitting at a bistro table 
with its iron legs in the sawdust from the escargot baskets, the cheap, 
badly-pressed cotton napkin coming off all over my best cloak […].” 
(Barnes 2015, 113). The description of the imagined visit goes on, rich 
in material detail, all the way to the more generalized homage to the 
spaces of the café and the street quoted above.
The “Lament” is in line with Wilson’s observations on the 
“unhoused” characteristics of Barnes’s fiction. The house appears 
as an unpleasantly sealed space; its four walls are capable of holding 
bitterness, argument and tragedy. This solidity of space and the 
permanence of time (conservation of bitterness), is contrasted with 
41  1941; Barnes 2015, 112.
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the “momentary” embodied by the café and the street, the prog-
ress of “raveling” and the futurity of the moment of “getting on” and 
going “from there to any harmony” that it affords. This seems to be 
another fitting summary of the reserve that both Barnes and Rhys 
carry for houses and dwelling spaces in general, including the more 
liminal spaces of hotels, prisons and hospitals discussed above. It 
also explains why they favor the very modern locations of cafés and 
streets; nevertheless, they are  not without their own ambiguity.
In “Paprika Johnson,” the liminal space between the domestic 
space of an apartment and the public space of the city allowed the 
character to extend her existence to the whole metropolis. In “Prize 
Ticket 177,” this dynamic is further highlighted. Clochette Brin, a 
woman of thirty, lives with a disabled mother, who is only mentioned 
briefly as one element of the interior of her apartment. Rather than in 
the interior, the focus of interest and narration lies on the street. Below 
Clochette lives a younger woman, and a triangle drama ensues with 
the entrance of Doik, which is announced, significantly, as follows: 
“There had come to the street a young man” (CS, 87). Clochette 
becomes a guide for the newcomer, whose interests are also expressed 
by way of streets:
He also aspired to a better knowledge of The Avenue 
and of fragile tea-cups and the well-waxed mustache. 
He had heard that on The Avenue love and life were 
ripe for the picking, and he had seen the bus framed in 
the cut running south of Twenty-third street. (CS, 88)
This passage situates the story geographically in lower Manhattan 
(more specific remarks locate it on Baxter Street in Little Italy). 
Meanwhile, the Avenue is a fantastical version of the street as it 
appears in Barnes’s “Lament”: you can “come and go” with the light-
ness of commercial transactions over fragile tea-cups and under 
well-waxed “mustaches” (whose location in any specific interior is 
of no importance).
The Avenue means a future of social mobility (Doik is hoping to 
move uptown), while the yearly big events on Baxter Street seem to 
have their roots in a different age in the past, in the carnival on the 
public square. There is a man coming from London to do tricks on 
stilts, and a lottery arranged for unmarried women, who are also 
paired with the streets by being called “the unattached women of the 
streets of the modern Babylon,” (CS, 89). The focalization of this story, 
moves freely in the buildings and on the street, while the omniscient 
narrator remarks; Clochette is not the focalizer. After proceeding 
through characters leaning out of windows, having encounters in 
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the hallway, accompanied by the lights and sounds of Baxter Street, 
the story is finished with a characteristic twist of the plot as Clochette 
loses the single women’s lottery to her downstairs neighbor, with 
Doik as the unexpected prize. She is, like Paprika Johnson, denied 
the possibility of domestic idyll, but the way the story has insisted 
on her and everyone else’s life taking place on the street, the place of 
vivid impressions and futurity, the ending lacks a sense of tragedy. 
It is implied, as in the case of Paprika Johnson, that Clochette will 
lead a meaningful existence even without winning a husband in the 
lottery, and that the twist has been there more as an aesthetic source 
of amusement than as a tragic turn of events.
In Barnes’ story, there is a playfulness to the streets, while in the 
fictional worlds of Rhys’s stories that lightness is not always present. 
They highlight the power relations of the encounters, transactions, 
and transformations taking place in the street space. In “The Insect 
World” (1976), another wartime story, the insecurity of the street 
appears as a concrete problem and provides a sense of haunting, 
accompanied by a similar experience of modern transportation. In 
the London “Tube,” Audrey, the focalizer, imagines people as large 
insects that “[get] in under your skin,” inspired by a book she has 
been reading. She also has to walk along a stretch of street she detests, 
because of its recent history intermingled in its present ambience:
It was one of those streets which are nearly always 
empty. It had been badly blitzed and Audrey was sure 
that it was haunted. Weeds and wild-looking flowers 
were growing over the skeleton houses, over the piles 
of rubble. There were front footsteps which looked as 
though they were hanging by a thread […]. (SIOL, 133)
If Barnes constructs fantastic heterotopias of the street doubling as 
a mediaeval public square at the time of the carnival, where trouble is 
at worst momentary and light and the hegemonic order of the world is 
temporarily turned topsy-turvy, and uses her stories performatively 
as textual spaces with the same aim, Rhys could be seen as a propo-
nent of a different realism. However, she also creates an embodiment 
of a fantasy taken to its extreme, namely one in which “the street 
becomes the room and the room becomes the street”, a phenomenon 
ascribed to modernity by Walter Benjamin (1999, 406). Rhys’s char-
acters could be interpreted as flâneuses in the manner of Deborah 
Parsons (2000, 41–42). On the other hand, as Johnson and Moran 
(2015) suggest, the metaphor of haunting might be more fitting than 
the practice of flânerie, because of the experiential and ontological 
instability of time and place involved in the roaming activities of her 
characters, and the inherent problems of the restricted availability 
of the practice of flânerie for women, which was also pointed out by 
Parsons (Ibid.). In “The Insect World,” haunting brings to the street a 
sense of unreality, but the descriptions of the concrete state of decay 
of the houses give a material, acute form to the abstract theme. Rhys’s 
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characters may fantasize of walls cracking and falling, but the actual 
site of a street where this has occurred lacks the associations with 
freedom and futurity at least as focalized by Audrey. 
In other stories, a sinister street may become the locus of a fleeting 
sympathetic encounter (see also Section 3.1). Especially some means 
of transportation emerge as positive heterotopias accompanied by a 
sense of continuing movement, at least if they imply social mobility. In 
“Till September Petronella,” in a first-class train carriage with a ticket 
bought by the new acquaintance, Petronella states, in a line char-
acteristic of Rhys’s characters’ brief feelings of happiness in a place, 
“This is very nice” (TBL, 29). In a taxi, she starts thinking of “home” 
again, imagining the emptiness left by her roommate. Instead, she 
goes to Hyde Park with another male acquaintance: “Yes, I want to 
look at the trees and not go back to the place where I live” (TBL, 31). 
This belonging in the garden, a “happy universalizing heterotopia” 
(Foucault 1986, 26), is brief and leads eventually to a return to the pris-
on-like home, but it reveals the connection between hope, happiness, 
and public spaces, which is not found in homes.
As in Barnes’s “Lament,” cafés and restaurants appear as extensions 
of the street. They too are social places, offering “fragile tea-cups,” 
bottles and liquor glasses, or wine and food, over which encoun-
ters can take place. Barnes’s café spaces are not without ambiguity, 
however. One of the repeating patterns in stories such as “Cassation,” 
“Dusie,” and “Behind the Heart” (1993), is a random encounter in a 
café between the narrator or another protagonist, and an older lady, 
leading to a period of attachment in the lady’s home. The beginning 
of “Behind the Heart,” after providing spatio-temporal coordinates (it 
is autumn, in Paris), mingles the Paris café and its clientele with the 
surrounding streets and city, gluing them together with the help of the 
weather:
For weeks, days and nights for weeks it had been raining. 
It was raining under the trees, and on the Avenues, and 
over the houses and along the Seine, so that the water 
seemed too wet; and the buttresses of churches and the 
eaves of buildings were weeping steadily; clinging to 
the angles, endlessly sliding down went the rain. People 
sat in cafés with their coat collars up, for with the rain 
the cold came; and everyone was talking everywhere 
about danger in the weather and in some cafés there was 
talk of politics and rain, and love and rain, and rain and 
ruined crops, and in one café a few people talked of Hess, 
this lady, Madame, of whom I am speaking. (CS, 447)
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Writers can use these different types of focalizing to create different 
effects. For example, it is typical of Barnes’s fiction to lead the reader 
toward the main character slowly, by way of other characters and 
especially material details surrounding him or her. The description 
moves from the general to the specific. The rain creates an ambience 
which embraces the entire city, equally touching its trees, streets, 
buttresses, eaves, and people, who come together as part of the city 
space in the cafés. The effect is like that in James Joyce’s short story 
“The Dead” (1914), although inverse in its realization: in the latter, the 
focalization moves from the character to the whole country, bound by 
the falling snow. Barnes’s zooming gesture seems to end up focusing 
on the individual, but she is not positioned as separate from the envi-
ronment. Hess, the “lady” of the story, enters not as one of the people 
talking and being cold, but as one of the objects of talk, comparable 
to politics, love, ruined crops, and rain. The rain adds a sense of fate, 
a natural power beyond human influence, affecting and permeating 
everyone and everything like the “eternal drizzle” in Rhys’s “Who 
Knows What’s Up in the Attic?”
The panorama-like initial gaze tour of the narrator likens the 
passage to realist fiction (Thacker 2009, 32; Herman 2002, 280–281). It 
seems to be showing everything in the public spaces, before zooming 
in on the lived space of Hess’s home, where a brief, passionate affair 
ensues between her and a young boy. The narrator, one of the many 
telling a story to an anonymous and silent “Madame,” tells it as 
hearsay, but cites intimate conversations between Hess and the boy, 
as well as material detail (“she lay on her great white bed with many 
lace pillows and pillows of holy embroidery behind her, and I think, 
Madame, she was very happy and taken aback […],” CS, 449). The 
narrator thus appears more as the imaginer or inventor of the story 
than as one relating actual events. When Hess is feeling better after 
an illness, she and the boy go walking in the Luxembourg gardens. 
The rain, which has ceased, resumes and the boy decides he needs 
to leave and does so. The beginning of the story in the café, and the 
experientially evocative (even without a proxy experiencer in the 
fictional world, cf. Caracciolo 2014b, 173) drenching of its characters 
and settings with rain, combined with the ambiguous and mobile 
position and vision of the narrator produces a sense of movement and 
opening, as well as of dramatic or tragic moments narrated lightly, 
characteristic of Barnes’s stories. The home features in this story as 
well, but rather as an “elsewhere” from the café and the wider expanse 
of space evoked at the beginning. Encounters happen on the street 
and in the café, and that is where stories about them are told: the rain, 
the café, and the Paris streets together “afford” the story. In this order 
of things, the home does not figure as a particularly important setting.
The actual space of the café is not portrayed in Barnes’s stories as 
vividly as in “Lament” quoted above. Rhys, on the other hand, sets 
the action of entire stories in cafés. “In a Café” is an impressionistic 
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account of a moment marked by the entrance and exit of a singer in 
a café in the Latin Quarter of Paris. Readers are told that the place is 
“respectably full that evening” (LB, 49), and its ambience is described 
as follows: 
The peaceful atmosphere of the room conduced to quiet 
and philosophic conversations, the atmosphere of a 
place that always had been and always would be, the 
dark leather benches symbols of something perpetual 
and unchanging, the waiters, who were all old, ambling 
round with drinks or blotters, as if they had done 
nothing else since the beginnings of time and would 
be content so to do till the day of Judgment. (LB, 50)
Such description gives the café slightly different tones from Barnes’s 
idyll of effortless mobility and encounters without bitterness. It is a 
conservative and “respectable” space, with contently unchanging 
elements, human and nonhuman. As such it offers something akin 
to one of the elements of home as characterized by Young, namely 
preservation: it is an environment where material things are cared 
for, also because of their history (cf. Young 2005, 140–145). Other 
stories, such as “Tout Montparnasse and a Lady,” also show the café 
space as defined by a system of classes, the well-off dancing and 
others crouching in dark corners. Women glance at their mirrors at 
intervals, taking recourse in another heterotopia, and the freedom of 
eating and drinking is undermined by narrators reporting how many 
drinks the characters have already had, and what is the cost of a fine 
à l’eau or a cup of coffee.
Biographically considered, this may reflect the different rela-
tionships Rhys and Barnes seem to have had with urban space and 
especially with the city of Paris, where much of their lives probably 
has taken place in cafés. For Barnes, Paris itself remained a kind of 
heterotopia, a place of freedom away from home. Although she stayed 
for several periods of many years, she remained more or less within 
in the Anglo-American expatriate community and maintained her 
connection with New York. Rhys, on the other hand, was much more 
involved: she was married to a Frenchman and separated from him, 
gave birth, lost a child, and never received economic aid or recogni-
tion as a writer as Barnes did. She also had no other place to which 
she belonged as clearly as Barnes did to New York. Thus, Rhys may 
well have been inclined to see and depict the strain of power relations 
and conservative normativity very present even in a Paris café.
In fact, Barnes and Rhys may have had intrinsically different 
purposes for writing about cafés. Rhys’s Left Bank short stories and 
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Barnes’s “Lament” share many characteristics, among them the auto-
biographical⁄autofictional mode, yet Barnes’s “Lament” is a eulogy to 
a past “golden age,” and its purpose is to commemorate the expatriate 
community as a special encounter in a special place and time. Her 
short stories use the spaces of the city, including its streets and cafés, 
as enablers of performance: they are the material scenography that 
affords surprising turns of events and accidents, dramatic encounters 
and aesthetically fantastic descriptions, purposefully surrounded by 
an air of mystery. In this world, houses and apartments, even if shown 
in a state of decay, are still almost invariably luxurious and showcase 
a repertoire of things which takes them even beyond the bourgeois 
interior toward the aristocratic one. Rhys, on the other hand, depicts 
characters who struggle, encounters that may be happy but are never 
without an acute awareness of underlying power structures and the 
fleeting nature of happiness (see Section 4.1.1). What they share in 
their work, however, is the sense of movement and instability, which 
has the potential to imply freedom and challenges to reigning norms.
In these stories, the positioning of focal characters as fictional 
bodies to whom the reader can attribute enacted experiences invites 
the reader to experience movement, lightness, and uncertainty 
paired with occasional senses of stagnation and suffocation, and 
unexpected occasions of freedom and safety. In addition, the means 
of focalization preferred by Barnes where a ray of light or drop of rain 
are used as an aid for the reader’s attention to travel from a single 
space to a wider expanse of scenery, creates other than human-cen-
tered options for the virtual presence of the storyworld for the reader. 
These experiences may occasion slight shifts in the embodied basis 
the reader has for higher-order interpretations and considerations 
of the meanings of private and public, stagnation and mobility. It is 
doubtful whether the public and semi-public spaces discussed here 
offer what Young suggests a home-like space should. In accordance 
with the researchers quoted in this chapter, the analyses show that 
both writers challenge the requirement of the home, and look for 
alternatives to present lived experiences of space and time, yet it is 
worth noticing that some of these characteristics, such as safety, pres-
ervation, and support for identity are present even in the public spaces 
and situations of mobility that Rhys’s and Barnes’s characters inhabit. 
In the spirit of mobility, both writers also often pay more attention to 
what characters are wearing than the spaces they inhabit. This char-
acteristic will be discussed throughout this study, beginning with the 
following, final section of this chapter.
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2.3 Containers and Clothes
[O]nly I know how long I have been here. Nights and 
days and days and nights, hundreds of them slipping 
through my fingers. But that does not matter. Time has 
no meaning. But something you can touch and hold 
like my red dress, that has a meaning. Where is it? 
— Jean Rhys: Wide Sargasso Sea42
At the end of Wide Sargasso Sea, Antoinette fears she has lost her red 
dress, the only thing left to remind her of a time and a place that are 
lost, her childhood and youth in Jamaica and Dominica. Her sense 
of time is questioned by Grace Poole, her nurse and guard, as she is 
locked in the attic of Thornfield Hall. Antoinette claims that the actual 
time, the one that has “a meaning,” is that of her experience, mani-
festing in the tactile metaphor of hundreds of units “slipping through 
her fingers” (Rhys 1985, 571). The red dress has “meaning” in the 
fictional world because it can be touched and held. Clothes themselves 
are contained in trunks, suitcases, and cupboards, while their owner 
might be trapped in a comparable, narrow and completely unhomely 
environment such as the attic of Thornfield Hall. It is suggested here 
that spaces of containment for things and people, including shops and 
museums, trunks, and cupboards, as well as the minimal spaces of 
clothes, provide an alternative way of looking at space in the work of 
the two writers, beyond the dichotomy of private and public.
42  1966; Rhys 1985, 571.
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2.3.1. Collections, Containers, and Plots
One factor that furthers the unhomeliness of Barnes’s spaces is the 
way houses and rooms are portrayed as containers for collections 
of objects, comparable to museums.43 As Wilson observes about 
Nightwood, comparing the spaces and language of the novel:
Homes and sentences appear as collections of 
objects that accumulate meaning through the 
very fact of the collection. No character ever feels 
at home in these spaces, which alternately display 
the collection like a museum or invite performance 
like a vaudeville stage. (Wilson 2011, 431)
Wilson sees the careful collection of objects as a feature that does not 
support feeling “at home”; her view is different from the interpreta-
tion Young makes of the action of “preserving” things as conducive 
to exactly such a feeling (see also, Section 3.3). In Wilson’s interpreta-
tion, the museum and the theatre support one another as spaces to be 
likened to Barnes’s homes as well as sentences, undermining domes-
ticity with their publicness.
In Nightwood, such interiors are found in the home of Nora and 
Robin, filled with found objects and personal memorabilia, Jenny 
Petherbridge’s apartment, which contains memory objects important 
to other people, and Matthew O’Connor’s boudoir with its assortment 
of feminine undergarments and medical instruments. Barnes uses 
similar topoi in her short fiction. Michaela Grobbel (2004) studies the 
connections between modernist texts with the practice and metaphor 
of “memory theaters” (collections of objects in a stage-like space to 
demonstrate and aid the workings of the memory). Memory theaters 
or “memory palaces” refer to imaginary constructions relying specifi-
cally on spatial metaphor, still used as memorizing techniques (Miller 
2014, 482–483; Grobbel 2004, 3). Grobbel’s view of remembrance as 
a performance in Nightwood is insightful, but her study does not 
dwell on the nature of memory theaters as collections of objects and 
the force of this connotation. According to T. I. Miller, the activity of 
listing things involved in the use of a memory palace technique chal-
lenges the notion of narrative space as perspectival perception (cf. 
Stanica 2014, 516). Miruna Stanica compares a container-type space 
with still-life paniting, in which “all is foreground” and “objects are 
pushed forward toward the viewer rather than receding toward a 
vanishing point” (Ibid., 518). Space emerges as a container, where the 
three-dimensional relations of things seen from a single point of view 
are not present. It could be remarked that what containers contain 
necessarily has experiential importance, and thus a certain amount 
43  The actual space of a museum does not appear anywhere in her work
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of perspective in the form of a fictional experiencer is needed, be it 
a character or another kind of focal solution creating an imaginary 
experiencing body. However, the metaphors of memory palace and 
container remain useful for the study of Barnes’s fiction, as they reveal 
how the description of singular things contributes to an impression of 
space as ambiguous, fleeting and without a totalizing vision.
Catalogues and inventories as means of expression can produce 
a sense of the aperspectival space of a container. One example of 
such space is the pawnshop run by Lydia Passova in “Mother” (1920). 
She deals in jewelry and uses even her body as a site of displaying 
precious things, wearing “coral in her ears, a coral necklace, and 
many coral finger rings” (CS, 301). The description of her shop space 
is inventory-like:
She dealt, in most part, in cameos, garnets, and a great 
many inlaid bracelets and cuff-links. There were a few 
watches, however, and silver vessels and fishing tackle 
and faded slippers—and when, at night, she lit the lamp, 
these and the trays of precious and semi-precious stones, 
and the little ivory crucifixes, one on either side of the 
window, seemed to be leading a swift furtive life of their 
own, conscious of the slow pacing woman who was 
known to the street as Lydia Passova. (CS, 301–302)
The reader may first notice that the listing of things does not totally 
eliminate perspective. The inclusion of Lydia lighting a lamp introduces 
her as someone observing the things, and thus the list of material things 
works to point the way toward the human element in the space, yet 
again, it is also the light that directs the attention. However, this subject, 
which we might assume the space to support, is slightly undermined 
by the personifying intrusion of “the street,” the entity to which Lydia is 
known. Thus, the passage is both an introduction of Lydia’s perspective 
as a subject moving in space, and the beginnings of a list of nonhuman 
elements, which takes the point of view further away from Lydia: the 
“conscious” and “knowing” elements of the passage are the street and 
the things contained in the interior; they actually become the focalizers 
of the passage.44 The human subject is not placed in the interior but on 
the street, and the personification suggests that there are other agencies 
as interesting as Lydia’s; the effect of the whole is aperspectival, even if it 
does evoke several kinds of experience.
44  When the instance of metonymy is combined with the “life” and “consciousness” of the 
things inside the pawnshop, the passage suggests a stronger animation of the street as well.
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Miruna Stanica suggests that things in a fictional container are 
often used to “figure their human owner,” like a house would be, but 
that they work to enable the owner’s mobility instead of providing 
shelter, and they foreground temporality instead of spatiality. They 
“do not create a character-supporting setting, extending character in 
space, but rather enable the continuing adventures of the protagonist, 
extending his existence in time” (Stanica 2014, 522). In Barnes’s fiction, 
the logic of the inventory, be it in a shop or in a home, indeed does 
not seem to provide shelter or support for the characters. Some of 
the spaces and things can be seen as affording movement, prolonged 
existence and memory, but some are also restricting, weighing one 
down, not quite amounting to a container in the early modern sense 
as elaborated by Stanica, and maintaining the preference on the 
spatial, while definitely not producing the homely features discussed 
above, as listed by Young. The memory theater, on the other hand, 
is a fitting metaphor for these fictional spaces, but even this form 
becomes defamiliarized.
In “A Duel without Seconds” (1929) the interior could be seen as 
a dysfunctional memory palace. The typically aristocratic setting 
shows Baron and Baroness Otterly-Hansclever, an elderly couple 
alienated from their friends and from one another, in a silent drama 
played out through the space and its material things. They are shown 
having dinner, “each immured in a lonely little canopy of light flung 
by the candles at either end of the long table” (CS, 412). This, too, 
seems to be a haunted space populated by ghosts of the past and 
personified things:
Silent and preoccupied they both were, while between 
them the long, hard expanse of mahogany mocked 
them with a false gaiety of silver and glass and with 
shadows of candlelight that danced along its bland 
surface like ghosts of the company whose laughter it 
once had known. There was silence too, in the room 
that brooded darkly over the lonely couple—silence 
heavy and complete save for the whisper of the butler’s 
feet as he moved pallidly in the dimness beyond the 
high, brocaded chairs. But to the Baroness the very 
silence was loud with echoes of the past […]. (Ibid.)
The interior and its things are described meticulously, which gives 
them a quality of “realness,” while the unreal, in the form of haunting 
“echoes of the past,” is present as well. At the end the focalization 
rests on the Baroness, but earlier it seems to travel around the room, 
following a flickering light. The power of the illusion of the phantom 
guests is made visible in an embodied manner in that the Baroness 
is depicted turning her head toward the habitual places of habitual 
guests, marked by the material detail.
Little by little, the story reveals the peculiar material circumstances 
of the couple’s predicament (by which the Baron, “liv[ing] entirely in 
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the past,” seems unaffected), which has cost them their wealth and 
friends. First, one of their guests claims to have been robbed:
[…] not only of her mother’s emerald pendant but of her 
father’s father’s time-piece, as big as a turnip and wound 
with a key in the shape of a spade, which she valued not 
so much because it was her grandfather’s as because it 
was worth a thousand British pounds, its equivalent in 
dollars, its twin in marks, and its replica in lire. (CS, 415)
The lengthy description of the functioning of the thing and its 
value in different currencies appears as comically out of place in such 
lament. It emphasizes the watch as an exhibition piece, whose exact 
value and properties are more important than personal attachment. 
The implications of collection are again paired with theatricality, 
visible in the narrator’s comment in parentheses before the lament 
of the guest: “(the acoustics of the Baron’s mansion being peculiarly 
perfect for rendering anguish)” (Ibid.). With the theft, suspicion enters, 
“like an evil fog in that brilliant room” (CS, 416). The things are not 
found, and each of the couple’s following parties is marked by the 
disappearance of another valuable thing. No offender is discovered, 
and guests begin to decline their invitations. The couple themselves 
are also said to be robbed of some of their own precious things. Thus, 
the space is emptied of memory-supporting things, including visitors, 
but the memories remain, haunting. The Baroness decides to take 
absurd revenge in a duel, killing herself in the absence of an oppo-
nent. For this purpose, another valuable thing is needed: “She knew 
how she would die, knew that it would be by her own pistol which 
her mother had given her on her wedding day ‘in case of burglars’. A 
handle encrusted in diamonds it had, and a long, gleaming barre” (CS, 
418). The pistol has been locked away in a secret drawer, and over the 
years the Baroness has only “looked at it fondly and […] locked it away 
again” (CS, 418). A final twist ends the story: the pistol, too, is gone.
The things which go missing in the mansion are related to memory, 
not only through obvious allusions to time as the “time-piece,” but 
also through the links to their owners’ family history that almost all 
of them have in common. The story suggests a sense of fate dictated 
beyond generations especially in the pistol given by the mother, but 
the pistol becomes instead a means of a parody of the inevitability 
of the tragic narrative form. The purpose of the pistol as “Chekhov’s 
gun,” an object whose narrative foregrounding means its inevitable 
centrality in the action to come, becomes thwarted. The story does 
not actually call for speculation on the identity of the thief; it seems 
to be more important to the atmosphere of mystery constructed with 
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the help of the things and their capacity to bring several layers of 
time simultaneously within the house, and the way they are used to 
bring about narrative gestures. The “haunting” of the house results in 
things disappearing, but is also brought about by things, that in both 
their absence and presence create memories, ambiences, and actions, 
and bring about the ruin of the couple. The absent pistol is one of 
the things that hs value as an aesthetic part of the collection, for the 
couple as well as the narrative. The Baroness would like to use it as 
an efficient scenographic prop: “to die magnificently, by candlelight, 
the diamonds in her pistol flashing a last challenge to the heartless 
world” (CS, 419). The thing, however, denies the Baroness and the 
story this moment of theatrical unravelling, because it is absent when 
the Baroness would make it “serve” (CS, 418).
The drawer that has housed the pistol is a micro-space within the 
fictional space. Such containers appear as material, spatial metaphors 
for the unhomely interior spaces inhabited by characters, being 
simultaneously stuffy and open (enough to make the pistol disappear, 
for instance). I suggest that a reader’s experiences produced by the 
embodied enactment that the text invites in relation to characters, 
their bodies as contained and freed by spaces, are also evoked by the 
“bodies” of the things. The motif of containment takes a human form 
in a reader’s experience, but it can also metaphorically be expressed 
in the form of nonhuman things such as the pistol and this metaphor 
also rests on embodiment and materiality.
The line between human and nonhuman entities as contained 
is blurred also in “A Perfect Murder,” another story with surprising 
turns and morbid motifs. Professor Anatol Profax, a successful 
linguist, encounters a mysterious woman, whom he is unable to 
“place” based on her speech (CS, 445), in spite of his experience as 
a dialectologist. He takes her home, and with sudden dedication 
slits her throat with a pen-knife. He then stuffs her body inside a 
trunk, not lamenting his deed except for the way it has robbed him 
of the “great secret” of her origin (Ibid.). Later he opens the trunk and 
notices that she is no longer there. Riding frantically around in the 
city, he sees her in an adjacent cab, that subsequently disappears 
in the traffic. The story refers intertextually to Shaw’s Pygmalion, 
motifs in Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd” (1840) with its pursuit of a 
stranger, and “The Fall of the House of Usher” (1839) with the young 
woman who escapes from a coffin. However, in Barnes’s story, no 
natural (even if horrifying) explanation, like the young girl’s prema-
ture burial in Poe’s story, is given. The disappearance of the woman 
becomes a textual gesture, part of the play of metaphors of space and 
time used in a performative way: her characters and things, refuse 
to be “placed,” in the sense of being contained in definite spaces. 
They also refuse to provide readers with a clearly framed identity or 
explainable behavior, as well as moments of recognition or epiphany 
they might have prepared for when reading a short story. The experi-
ential parallelization of people and things as contained works toward 
the goal of recalcitrance.
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Wilson (2011, 431) notes that Barnes’s Nightwood challenges the 
Jamesian idea of the novel as a house, and approaches postmod-
ernist literary problematics, not only because of its settings and 
subject-matter, but by virtue of its structure. Seeing the novel as 
a house makes it a static representation of a totality that is more or 
less contained between its beginning and ending, something that 
Virginia Woolf, in “Modern Fiction,” also writes against, using 
spatial metaphors. Additionally, using spatial metaphors for works of 
fiction foregrounds the aspect of immersion into a fictional world at 
the expense of the capacity for simultaneous real-world experience 
and self-reflection (Polvinen 2016, 20). By definition, the short story 
is a more open format that can invite both intense emotional and 
bodily engagement and distanced reflection within a relatively short 
temporal frame. Barnes’s stories definitely resist being compared to 
any kind of dwelling space. 
A readier metaphor, extending beyond the specific format of the 
memory theater, could be found in the trunks and drawers discussed 
above. They contain a variety of essential elements that are brought 
together to create an effect and perhaps to induce a sense of wonder 
and puzzlement, rarely at least immediately translatable to an affec-
tive closure even in forms found in such modern stories as James 
Joyce’s or Anton Chekhov’s; both are cited by Woolf in “Modern 
Fiction” as authors who let the ambiguities of life manifest itself 
instead of building a wind-proof house. A drawer may contain a 
muddle of things, significant and superfluous in themselves, with 
no clear relation to one another or to the perspective of the observer. 
The combination itself becomes significant as does the potential for 
agency, as will be observed in more detail in Section 3.4. Things in 
such collections are used to support the temporality of plot, as Stanica 
suggests, but often result in foregrounding the collection itself, and 
thereby spatiality over temporality.
2.3.2. Moments of Being within Clothes
In Rhys’s novels and stories, clothes and especially dresses have a 
special role. Here it is important to discern two functions for clothes 
that also appear in Barnes’s work. Firstly, they have a relationship to 
time: especially in Rhys, they are used as “aide-memoires” (Joannou 
2012, 457), that mark a period in a character’s past, and bring it back 
through an act of either voluntary or involuntary memory. Secondly, 
clothes are things that people wear closest to the skin; they create a 
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space of their own, offering a combination of mobility and stability 
that the domestic spaces in the stories fail to provide. 
In Rhys’s stories, there are shop interiors that clearly function 
chiefly as containers for clothes. In novels such as Voyage in the 
Dark (1934) and Good Morning, Midnight, there are crucial scenes in 
which characters use the space of a clothing store to effect or pursue a 
moment of transformation, that leads to a better future, which already 
seems to become actual in the material elements contained by the 
store. In Voyage in the Dark, Anna Morgan’s lover buys her a dress, 
and she rejoices: “Out of this warm room that smells of fur I’ll go to 
all the lovely places I’ve ever dreamt of ” (Rhys 1985, 16). Mulholland 
(2012, 449) views the shop as another threshold area where transfor-
mation takes place, but not the one the character dreams of: Anna is 
“transformed into a commodity that Walter has purchased” (Ibid.). 
This view is justified, but as the analyses here will continue to show, 
the lived experience that readers are invited to feel evoked in such 
moments in the narratives requires realizing the sense of trans-
formation produced in the moment that is interpretable as that of 
commodification.
Stanica (2014, 518–519) observes that a description built around 
a container of things, rather than a space where the positioning of 
things is crucial, “refuses to give vision the dominant role.” In general, 
other senses are also present in spatial description, but the container 
allows for a readier attention to experience related to other senses. 
The forms of description that Rhys uses do not appear as clearly 
perspectival, visual totalities, but neither do they have such cata-
logue-like properties as can be seen in Barnes’s fiction. This is clear 
in another shop interior experienced and described from the point 
of view of another Anna, in the short story “Mannequin” (1927). On 
her first day working as a model in a Paris fashion boutique, she is 
overwhelmed by the shop’s glamorous public spaces and behind it, 
the “countless puzzling corridors and staircases, a rabbit warren and 
a labyrinth” (LB, 60), where she orients herself toward the lunch hall 
with the help of “the smell of food—almost visible, it was so cloud-like 
and heavy” (LB, 63). During this body tour, the reader never has a 
very clear idea of the details of the interior, but rather glimpses certain 
aspects by vision, hearing, smell and touch, relevant in themselves, 
but not necessarily in relation to one another in such a way as to 
convey a general sense of three-dimensional space or a cognitive 
map. The story underlines the function of the shop as a containing 
space for clothes and people, the saleswomen, seamstresses and 
models. Anna comments on a “depressing” dressing room as “a very 
inadequate conservatory for these human flowers” (LB, 61; see Section 
5.1). Thus, the description retains Anna’s perspective as opposed to an 
aperspectival catalogue; however, the sense of a container is present 
in the way different impressions fill the fictional space and the textual 
space of the story without forming a clear continuum or hierarchy.
The space of the dress shop appears in a miniature form in trunks 
and cupboards, even to the point of rendering these, too, commercial 
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spaces. In “Who Knows What’s up in the Attic?” there is one more 
character who was not introduced in the discussion of the story at 
the beginning of this chapter. Mr. Singh is a travelling salesman, who 
sells “blouses, scarves and underclothes” (SIOL, 148). He visits the 
writer-focalizer often, after she has bought “something gaudy and 
useless” in a lonely and bored moment (Ibid.). When Jan arrives, the 
reader at first thinks it is Mr. Singh, after which he is not mentioned in 
the story until its very end. When Jan has left, there is a cut marked 
by five periods signifying a new part in the narrative, which begins 
with Mr. Singh’s unexpected entry through the open door. The writer 
is “delighted” to see him (“Any port in a storm,” she comments; SIOL, 
156). Mr. Singh produces an unspecified garment, advertising it: 
“Beautiful stuff, beautiful. Feel it” (Ibid.). She wants to look closer at 
an “orange-coloured thing,” a short nightgown, and deems it pretty, 
which seems to surprise the salesman. She buys it and a similar gown 
in black. Without trying to sell anything else, he shuts his suitcase 
and leaves. Walking him out, she feels the weather turning colder, 
closes and locks the door to mark the end of the story.
Suitcases are minor, non-domestic spaces that enable their carriers’ 
movement instead of limiting it. We have encountered some of Rhys’s 
suitcase-bearing characters in earlier analyses of this chapter, like 
Selina in “Let Them Call It Jazz,” and Petronella “Till September 
Petronella”; both demonstrate the ambiguity hidden in the allegedly 
free movement of modernity, and the difficulty of conceiving of 
a flâneuse (cf. Parsons 2000). Their suitcases contain clothes, but 
clothes themselves make another “portable” space which is even more 
central in Rhys’s fiction. In “Who Knows What’s up in the Attic?” we 
do not see the writer wear and feel the dresses, but in others, a sense 
of change and possibility in the future, and even happiness in the 
present, is materialized in this very act, as at the end of “Mannequin,” 
where Anna leaves the shop feeling “happy in her beautifully cut 
tailor-made and a beret” (LB, 69).
The writer has been dreaming of another place, while denying 
herself the possibility of leaving; the end of the story is an ambig-
uous fictional-textual gesture that provides simultaneously a sense 
of liberation and confinement, lightness combined with darkness 
and heaviness. Mr. Singh’s suitcase is a promise of the other place, 
a tiny heterotopia loaded with the potential of difference and trans-
formation, akin to the dress shop visited by Anna in Voyage in the 
Dark. His possibly Indian roots add to the sense of his bringing in his 
suitcase a souvenir of an unspecified, longed-for place somewhere in 
the south, so often present in Rhys’s fiction. There is, however, also the 
shutting of the suitcase and the door, and an irony in a possibility of 
happiness having been replaced by a substitute, buying nightgowns, 
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indulging in what Mulholland calls “illusion” (2012, 450). Buying a 
dress can indeed be seen as a rite of transformation, yet it does not do 
justice to the concept of rite to dismiss its outcome as simply illusory. 
In their material presence in the fictional world, highlighted by the 
allusions to their tactile “feel,” the dresses are everything but illusion, 
as demonstrated by the quotation from Wide Sargasso Sea at the 
beginning of this section. On the contrary, they can be touched and 
held, as Antoinette describes, are materially real and very close to the 
feeling body, and therefore “meaningful” in a basic, affective way. For 
the reader, of course, everything happening in the fictional world is 
an “illusion,” but the material things shown to be touched and held 
by the characters contribute to making them “real,” in the sense of 
inviting an enactment in the body of the real reader, drawing on his or 
her real past experiences.
The sensory imaginings invited by the story bring a tangibility 
to the process of interpretation using “higher-order” cognitive 
reasoning and cultural understanding. This is another case where 
attention to the material and bodily changes the interpretation in the 
cultural sense: the illusion of happiness and the transformation into 
commodity that are pointed out by Mulholland become something 
more ambiguous. In buying the gowns, the writer buys an accessible, 
third version of the “other place,” something beautiful and soft to be 
contained within even if she does not leave her house. We might ask, 
what would be the “real,” non-illusory change in the life of the writer 
in “Who Knows What’s Up in the Attic?”, and could it be achieved 
equally well through feeling good contained in one’s clothes as 
through escaping the house, the large container of a life which feels 
unhomely? In this story, the closeness of contact is not only with 
fabric, but with another human being, as Mr. Singh appears as a “port 
in a storm.” Even though this encounter is brief and colored by a 
commercial transaction, its ambiguity is crucial to how the story ends, 
combining a sense of happiness and sharing with the tragic sense of 
its fleetingness. The character of the writer should be seen as parallel 
to the clothes she has bought, but not so much as a commodity as 
someone⁄something shut within an unhomely space.
To return to “A Solid House,” the story discussed at the very 
beginning of this chapter, the unhomely house could also be looked 
at through the metaphors of the container and collection, with its 
multiple rooms filled with antique furniture and curious objects. The 
reader can grasp the feel of the things contained in the house, not 
so much the feel of the house itself. This space, too, contains other 
containers to strengthen the appeal of the metaphor, including a 
cupboard full of dresses and other items of clothing. The small space 
of the cupboard is similar to Mr. Singh’s suitcase in that the dresses 
are for sale: Miss Spearman is practicing second-hand trade as a 
“sideline” (TBL, 117). She opens the door of the cupboard to cheer 
Teresa up, opening a commercial space within the domestic one. She 
offers Teresa a felt hat with a veil and a green dress once owned by a 
“very smart woman.” Teresa likes neither, but is persuaded to try on 
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the green “hideous thing” (TBL, 118); this time the dress does not even 
seem to offer hope of transformation. Instead, she recognizes in the 
cupboard her own black dress she has brought to be sold, “hanging 
next to a shapeless purple coat,” and compares it to a “self”: “A cast-off 
self, it stared back so forlornly, so threateningly that she turned her 
eyes away” (Ibid.).45
Thus, this story uses the schema of containment to introduce 
ambiguity in space, but with a more tragic tone than the previous 
one. The cupboard is not so much a space of dreams and futurity as 
a failed heterotopia; it promises dreams and comfort at low prices 
(both stories cite some exact prices in pounds), but also becomes 
part of a hegemonic order of consumerism, a commercial space. For 
Teresa, the cupboard is placed simply as parallel to the unhomely 
space she inhabits. Her old dress, which Miss Spearman has difficul-
ties in selling (“Black’s too depressing,” Ibid.), appears as a body shut 
in another “inadequate conservatory,” in the company of “hideous 
things.” Its material detail is not described, either; the only reference 
is to its color, which points toward death, night and sleep, the “ways 
out” that Teresa seems to be able to conceive of for herself in her state 
of anxiety, which may for some people experientially resemble being 
shut in a cupboard. This experientiality is what makes the dress 
comprehensible as a metaphorical⁄metonymical, parallel element 
to Teresa, bringing a lived dimension to the interpretation of the 
symbolism of its color or its commodity function.
In the same way as the cupboard in “A Solid House,” the micro-
spaces of dresses are used as an embodied metaphor to convey a 
sense of uncomfortable situations: the badly fitting green dress and 
the black one shut inside the cupboard. In “Sleep It off Lady,” another 
story of unwilling confinement in a space, Miss Verney, just before 
seeing the rat in the shed, observes that this space haunts her dreams. 
She describes one:
One night she was standing looking at it changing its 
shape and becoming a very smart, shiny, dark blue coffin 
picked out in white. It reminded her of a dress she had 
once worn. A voice behind her said: “That’s the laundry.”
“Then oughtn’t I to put it away?” 
said Miss Verney in her dream.
“Not just yet. Soon,” said the voice so 
loudly that she woke up. (SIOL, 162)
45  A very similar instance of fellow-feeling for clothes in a cupboard is found in an earlier 
story, “Illusion”; this is more thoroughly discussed in Section 4.1.
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A dress, a potential embodiment of mobility and possibility, 
becomes fused with a coffin, the definitive image of being shut in. 
The allusion to “the laundry” adds a sense of surrealism and comedy 
appropriate for a dream, but it also points again toward the impor-
tance of clothes. As metaphorical, yet lived things and spaces, they 
can experientially induce suffocation, claustrophobia and even death, 
as well as a promise and even the actualization of a better life. The 
way clothes are worn close to the body, yet make a space separate 
from it, makes them more ready means of expression for these stories 
than larger spaces would be. Like Barnes’s, Rhys’s stories combine 
impressions of various elements, which could liken them as textual 
spaces to small containers instead of houses or rooms. However, their 
focus on the intimate feel of these impressions, even when portrayed 
by very minimalist means, might make a dress an even more fitting 
comparison. The stories are depictions of “moments of being” with 
a strong “what-it-is-like” dimension, which their reader, by virtue 
of embodied enactment and virtual projection, is invited to try on 
and live with for their brief duration, sharing the airiness of hope 
and happiness as well as the uncomfortable, pressing anxiety and 
disillusionment.
This can be seen as a modernist mode of striving toward an accu-
rate rendering of perception end experience, in its multisensory and 
often fragmented and confused form. In the stories discussed in this 
chapter, the experiences of space and of the material things contained 
in it are used as material reminders of both the past and the fluctuating 
passage of time, as well as pointers toward a different future, which is 
simultaneously present as a heterotopia. The stories’ thematic pref-
erences for public over private, mobility over stability, the presence 
of multiple levels of time over linearity, together with the means of 
expression resting on the experienced materiality of things, shows 
space and time as permeated by the conflict and ambiguity that char-
acterize the modern sociocultural context of the stories. The stories 
introduce material forms that afford containment, but paradoxically 
also transgression and mobility. The same applies to the literary form 
of the stories. Caroline Levine argues that in literary fiction, the social 
implications of closure can be set in fruitful conflict with the temporal 
form of reading, which affords continuation (Levine 2015, 40). 
However, even when examining texts as experientially spatial enti-
ties, like containers, they afford open-endedness in the relations and 
combinations of the elements they contain. The short story form, as it 
is used by Rhys and Barnes, can be a stage of playing out a conflict in 
narrative form: it refuses to be a house, or even a room, but arranges 
itself rather as a collection of impressions a reader can go through in 
a multisensory manner, while being capable of active higher-order 
reflection; it is similar to wearing a dress or fumbling through the 
contents of a drawer or a suitcase.
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In Barnes’s and Rhys’s spaces, public and domestic ones, and every-
thing in between, individual objects come to the fore in a way that 
challenges the idea of perspective and thereby of a stable experi-
encing identity, adding a fleeting and sometimes ghostly character-
istic to instances that may still invite an acute enactment of feeling 
on the part of the reader. This process can be seen as crucial for 
grasping, to use another embodied metaphor, the culturally coded 
meanings of the story. However, the analyses suggest that this projec-
tion may also be a feature that transgresses the boundaries of the 
human body, if the focalization structure invites a different kind of 
projection involving, for instance, light functioning as a proxy for 
vision or a thing suggesting the enactment of containment. Further 
following Caracciolo, I suggest that these experiences also feed back 
into the reader’s experiential background, not only involving basic 
sensorimotor experience, but also sociocultural understanding: they 
potentially affect the ways readers can think about the gendered 
dimensions of space, time, home, movement, the private and the 
public, often uncoupling such homely features as safety, individuation 
and preservation from domestic spaces. Attention to this interplay of 
the embodied and the cultural often suggests some modifications to 
earlier interpretations made of these stories, and shows that they are 








3 The Agency of Things
The previous chapter has shown that material things are engaged 
in the world-making and meaning-making of the texts as expe-
riential anchors of time and space. The hypothesis of this study 
remains that the agency of Barnes’s and Rhys’s things is a broad 
phenomenon beyond their functionalism as literary devices, hints 
of which were already seen in the instances of animation discussed 
in the previous chapter. Reading these texts is affected by a sense 
of material, nonhuman, inanimate things that have agency in their 
own right, comparable if not similar to that of the human charac-
ters. From this claim it follows that things also have a special role 
in the affective involvement the texts invite, and ultimately, in the 
way they construct meaning and invite interpretation or sense-
making. However, for the claim itself to make sense, it needs to be 
clarified: what kind of agency can dresses, teacups, paintings, bits 
of lace, postcards, and books have; how should it be discussed when 
reading modernist fiction, and the stories of Jean Rhys and Djuna 
Barnes in particular?
Questions of nonhuman agency have been raised in recent discus-
sions around actor-network theory, thing theory, as well as different 
approaches labelled under posthumanism and new materialism. 
However, the agency of things in the guise of the negotiation of the 
boundary between subjects and objects was also a pressing issue at 
the time when Barnes and Rhys were writing their short fiction. Many 
of these concerns were discussed under the rubric of fetishism. This 
chapter begins with discussions of forms of animism and magical 
thinking in Rhys’s stories, and Barnes’s brand of fetishism. The 
new materialist point of view into the agency of things, as well as a 
focus on embodiment and affectivity that define this study, lead to 
different readings of fetishism, too. Jean Rhys’s characters are drawn 
by commodity fetishes and animistic thinking, in which a dress has 
the power to change lives, while hats, rooms, and parks can be imag-
ined to express opinions. When following the promise of consumer 
goods, human characters and their bodies risk being commodified, 
as has already been pointed out in the analysis of the earlier chapter, 
yet, contrary to a tradition in Rhys studies, they are not made passive 
or victims by their reliance on and parallelization with things, but 
often display a sense of agency enhanced by the things. In Barnes’s 
case, a psychoanalytically oriented reading might identify a fetish in 
an orthodox manner with the disavowal of lack, an absence that is 
filled by the fetish object. Barnes’s texts, while revealing absence and 
longing, also evoke a sense of abundance beyond the economy of lack 
and its applications to female characters.
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By focusing attention on the multiple forms of agency that can be 
identified by looking at the evoked materiality of the fictional things 
and their performative power as fetishes, the first two sections of this 
chapter bring the discussion of fetishism closer to the anthropolog-
ical notion of the talisman, the potential of which has already been 
pointed out by feminist scholars of fetishism. However, a discussion 
of fetish objects as “lived things” has been missing: how does the lived 
experience of a fetishized object as a material thing contribute to a 
sense of its powers? The latter two sections explore newer concep-
tions of agency as distributed and affective. In Section 3.3, I examine 
practices and senses of community, belonging and agency brought 
about jointly by things and human characters in Rhys’s stories, 
while Section 3.4 explores agency in Barnes’s work as distributed 
in affective assemblages of thing-like characters and lively things. 
Both these approaches, I claim, show how Rhys’s and Barnes’s texts 
produce an array of ways of being-with-things in which the things 
take an active part. Their literary techniques exemplify the potential 
for embodied involvement of readers not just with characters, but 
also with allegedly inanimate things. I hope that this is a contribu-
tion to a vein of discussion on what separates humans from things, or 
connects them.
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3.1 Mannequins, Spirits, and Magic 
Fashion: Animism and Fetishism 
in The Left Bank
 
Things are more powerful than people. 
— Jean Rhys, “The Sound of the River”46
 
The notion of magic as it is presently understood embodies the idea 
of something not legitimate within a rational, scientific system of 
thought (During 2002, 20). Defining something as magical explains 
it as unexplainable within a scientific world view, either as illusory 
or as attributable to supernatural powers, depending on the beliefs of 
the speaker. This section examines Rhys’s use of magical themes and 
motifs related to the inherent powers of things and the animation of 
what is supposedly inanimate, and sets these in the literary context 
of the modernist, avant-garde movements that cultivated different 
forms of magical thinking in vogue in Paris at the time of completion 
of The Left Bank (1927). Another contextual framework of conse-
quence arises from Rhys’s roots in Dominica in the British Antilles. 
Such contextually conscious research has been undertaken already 
on many occasions, but the focus on material things and embodiment 
has not been explicitly undertaken in this connection.
Several researchers have pointed out that magical thinking was 
popular in the context of modernism and modernity (see, for instance, 
During 2002; Landy & Saler 2009; Wilson 2013). Tyrus Miller (1999, 
42–43) considers the “anthropomorphic ‘animation’ of the object 
world” as part of the mimetic practices that were seen as symptoms of 
the depersonalization of life in the modern society. The phenomenon 
is attributed to both the revival (and invention) of some superstitious 
practices that gained considerable popularity, and the metaphorical 
and ironical adaptation of magical thinking to the use of art and 
theory.47 In the European modernist intellectual climate of the era, the 
notion of the fetish was quite prominent, not only because of a newly-
found interest in primitivism and the arts and cultures of (former) 
46  1966; Tigers Are Better-Looking, p. 130.
47  In the context of art, a post-rationalist tendency of “re-enchantment” can be observed 
from the 18th century gothic revival onwards (see Paige 2009, 160). I will attempt to clarify the 
special features of early 20th century magical thinking in the course of this section.
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colonies, but thanks to the influence of the two thinkers with arguably 
the most effect on the 20th century, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud.
The core of Marx’s idea of commodity fetishism is that the 
production of value of a commodity is veiled in mystery, arising not 
only from work and material qualities, but also from the magical 
commodity character of the thing. In an oft-cited passage, Marx uses 
an image of a table that as a commodity becomes a “transcendent” 
thing full of “metaphysical subtleties” that “evolves out of its wooden 
brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than ‘table-turning’ ever 
was” (Marx 2001, 75). The fetish object seems to think and act for itself 
and is compared to “table-turning,” a type of spiritualist séance in 
which the spirits of the dead are summoned and eventually cause a 
table to move. Commodities-as-fetishes are agents as far as they form 
relations among themselves and come to define human social rela-
tions; they also have their way of “talking” to the human members of 
the society, luring them to consume. In Freud’s account, on the other 
hand, the fetish is a product of castration anxiety, “a substitute for the 
woman’s (the mother’s) penis that the little boy once believed in,” a 
sign of the simultaneous disavowal and acceptance of this (imaginary) 
lack (Freud 1977, 352). The eroticized fetish object becomes animated 
in a process of metonymy, comparable to magical thinking.
Both uses of the notion of fetish48 hark back to the introduction of 
the term in an anthropological context, but also differ from it (Apter 
1991, 43). In its early definition, an inanimate, artificial object is in a 
metonymical relation to a person, and by this relation assumes part 
of the living creature’s power, like a voodoo doll, a lock of hair, or a 
piece of clothing that once belonged to someone (Wilson 2013, 15). 
Animism, then, is a broader term for the belief in the vitality of inan-
imate things and nature (Pietz 1993, 131–132). The religious, animistic 
notion of fetish as a magic talisman is defined by a peculiar, literal 
version of a representative relation in which something also is what 
it represents: a statue of a deity is also the deity. The psychoanalyt-
ical version rather resembles the Saussurean relation between signi-
fier and signified, in which the latter stands in place of the former’s 
absence. In the modern context, the pairing of woman with absence 
or lack, combined with Marxist thinking of the reification of human 
relations and the lure of commodity fetishes, risks making fetishism 
something of a cage for women: a situation in which a woman is not 
48  The term derives from the Portuguese feitiço, meaning both “charm, sorcery” and “made 
by art, artificial, skilfully contrived”; it was originally used to refer to “any of the objects used 
by the indigenous peoples of the Guinea coast and the neighbouring regions as amulets or 
means of enchantment, or regarded by them with superstitious dread” (OED: ‘fetish’). Religious 
objects are also referred to in the West African context as “Vodun objects” or “Vodun divin-
ities,” and some traditions avoid using the term ‘fetish’ because of the ballast added to it by 
Western theories (Encyclopedia of African Religion 2009, 266). The sexual meanings of the 
term were only added by its use in Freudian psychoanalysis.
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only doomed to fall short of an ideal, but also victimized as both a 
subject and an object of consumption (Apter 1991, 1993; Schor 1995).
By examining these contextual features and Rhys’s employment 
of different versions of magical thinking and fetishism, I aim to 
point out not only some influences and intertexts, but also the ways 
in which her writing challenges its context and provides a different 
point of view to magical thinking and practices in relation to things. 
Furthermore, I wish to show how Rhys’s stories expose the ambiguity 
inherent in the notion of fetishism to the effect of challenging our ways 
of reading gendered subject⁄object positions.49 The mannequin both 
as a motif and as a character points toward both the fetishized female 
body (with its detachable parts) and the magical lure of commodi-
ties, and it is animated in a way that participates in, but is still is not 
completely reducible to, the restraining order of Freudian-Marxist 
fetishism; The Left Bank treats magical practices and superstitions 
with subtle irony, and the animistic beliefs and the embodied lived-
ness hovering in their background might actually provide a way out 
of the sexualized commodity fetishism.
3.1.1. Mannequins and Surrealist Fetishism
The word ‘mannequin’, in French as well as in English, refers 
primarily to an anthropomorphic dummy used for presenting 
clothes. However, the subjects of Rhys’s story of the same name are 
live women working as models in fictional fashion designer Jeanne 
Veron’s store on the Place Vendôme, the most prestigious shopping 
area in Paris. The models Anna works with in this story are defined 
as “types” according to which clothes are selected for them to 
present: “the gamine,” “the blonde enfant,” “the femme fatale”; Anna 
is the “jeune fille” (LB, 64). The women seem to retain their roles even 
when not on display for customers, even when they share the lunch 
table. Their positioning in the shabby dressing-room referred to as a 
“conservatory” (LB, 61), and their luncheon in an austere underground 
room parallel them with mechanically produced types of mannequin 
dummies in a storehouse. When Anna exits the shop after a busy day, 
she seems to be a mannequin dummy come alive, still pretty and an 
object of gazes, yet a feeling subject. 
49  In this chapter, I will be using both the notions of ‘agency’ and ‘subjectivity’, ‘agent’ and 
‘subject’. ‘Subject’ gets its meaning primarily in a dichotomy with ‘object’, as noted in the 
introduction. Thus, when referring to a subject, I am referring to a party in an imaginary 
relation that involves the active doer, perceiver or experiencer, and the receiving object that 
is perceived and appears in experience. However, as the point of departure here is that such 
constructions rarely suffice to explain the varieties of agency in the texts studied, or in the 
world, and a different discourse of agency might be far more enlightening also in terms of 
things, the use of the term ‘subject’ here is always slightly distanced, and refers to a way of 
thinking to which this study does not completely subscribe.
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Intertextually, mannequins evoke both Pygmalion and E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s Olimpia doll in Der Sandmann. In Freud’s analysis of the 
story in his essay on das Unheimliche (1919), he moves from linking 
the horror caused by animated dolls with a transgression of the 
boundary of animate and inanimate to the theory of the uncanny 
as a covert recognition of a repressed desire. However, as Jukka 
Sarjala (2015, 125) explains, Hoffman’s story may also be terrifying 
because it shakes the foundational belief in the superior agency of 
a (rational) human subject, and instead suggests that there may be 
forms of agency in the nonhuman world. The anthropomorphism 
of dolls and the uncanny prospect of their animation also exposes 
a thin line between the human and the nonhuman in Rhys’s story. 
Using the term ‘mannequin’ and foregrounding the way the models’ 
bodies function almost as dolls come alive it questions the ontological 
distinction between human and nonhuman “bodies.”
Fashion dummies embody the fetishist concerns of the beginning of 
the 20th century. They transcend human imperfections and mortality, 
but at the same time bind the human form to the world of objects, and 
display a sexualized, commodified version of an ideal, female body as 
an object of desire. In Rhys’s work, the motif of the mannequin t is a 
clear allusion to the thematic of the consumer society and the urban 
environments in and about which she was writing, but it also forms 
an intertextual link with the surrealist movement. The founding 
theoretician of surrealism, André Breton, found magical meaning in 
uncanny fusions of the animate and the inanimate, in unexpected 
places and encounters, and in found objects. The movement presents 
the most apparent mix of psychoanalytical and Marxist fetishism 
within the modern avant-garde. Breton aspired to show the imag-
inary as part of the real and thus break down distinctions between 
material and ideal, subjective and objective. On the level of artworks, 
this is shown in the aesthetics of the objet trouvé (coined by Marcel 
Duchamp), in the discoveries of mythical and magical meanings in 
urban cityscapes as realizations of chance and fate (in works such as 
Nadja [1928] by Breton and Paysan de Paris [1926] by Louis Aragon), 
and countless visual repetitions that parallel the animate and the 
inanimate, the natural and the artificial.
Quite a substantial proportion of surrealist and dada photography 
of the 1920s and 1930s features the representation of female bodies or 
body parts in connection with the world of objects. These images 
explore an ambiguity and deliberate oppositions of animate and 
inanimate, natural and artificial (see Image 1). Man Ray’s picture 
of “legs within a frame” objectifies the allegedly female lower legs 
sticking through a frame, and simultaneously animates the resulting 
artwork-within-artwork: we can imagine that the legs begin to 
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swing or walk. The frequency of similar motifs reflects an obsession 
with female body parts, but also an interest in artwork with intrinsic 
powers and corporeality.
The shop mannequin seems to have been a particularly fruitful 
motif in art. Mannequins and their body parts frequent surrealist 
and dada photographs and installations (Image 2), and paintings by 
“metaphysical” artists such as Giorgio de Chirico and Salvador Dali. 
In the first manifesto of surrealism, Breton writes of its central term 
‘the marvelous’ (le merveilleux):
[…] the marvellous is not the same in every period of 
history; it partakes in some obscure way of a sort of 
general revelation only the fragments of which come 
down to us: they are the romantic ruin, the modern 
mannequin, or any other symbol, capable of affecting the 
human sensibility for a period of time. (Breton 1924, 12)
The mannequin is here seen as a particularly modern symbolic 
fragment, something transcendent that appeals to the human imag-
ination or the unconscious, comparable to the ruin that fascinated 
the romantics. What makes it modern, presumably, is its origin in the 
world of fashion and consumption, and its place in the public space of 
city streets, enhanced by documents such as Eugène Atget’s photo-
graphs of Paris (Image 3).
Breton’s chest with mannequin legs and hands (Image 2) was 
part of The Surrealist Exhibition of 1938 in Paris, where a number 
of installations were collected in a specific corridor called “Rue des 
Mannequins” through which the viewers passed to reach the rest of 
the exhibition. It included works such as André Masson’s dummy 
with its head enclosed in a birdcage (Image 4), and Marcel Duchamp’s 
mannequin, with its upper body dressed in formal masculine 
clothes and the lower part naked except for men’s shoes, set in front 
of street-signs denoting actual and fictional places. All the manne-
quins-as-sculptures are female50 and are sexualized with innuendoes 
of prostitution, violence, restriction, and objectification. The event, 
according to Lewis Kachur, confirms “the long-standing surrealist 
fetishization of the female body” (Kachur 2001, 38). As exhibition 
pieces, the mannequins were shocking, and might have challenged 
the way the female body was fetishized by the capitalist fashion 
market. However, the installation repeats and celebrates this logic of 
objectification by transforming the artificial bodies from commer-
cial to surrealist fetishes, transcendental symbols of the movement. 
The Rue des Mannequins reproduces normative parallels of woman 
and interior (a chest of drawers, a birdcage) and the image of woman 
as silent (mannequins with their mouths covered by flowers or 
50  Sonia Mossé was the only female artist in this installation.
Image 1. Man Ray, 1930: Jambes dans un cadre (Legs within a frame)
Image 1. Man Ray, 1930: Jambes dans un cadre (Legs within a frame)
Image 2. Man Ray, 1938: Cadavre exquis/Chest with legs Image 3. Eugene Atget, 1925: Mannequin
Image 2. Man Ray, 1938: Cadavre exquis/Chest with legs Image 3. Eugene Atget, 1925: Mannequin
Image 4. Man Ray, 1938: Mannequin d’André Masson
Image 4. Man Ray, 1938: Mannequin d’André Masson
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cockroaches), and celebrates the public display of the female body as a 
subversive act. The Rue des Mannequins may have been shocking, but 
it did not shake normative ideas about the materiality of the female 
body or its agency. Rather, it reproduced them by focusing on the 
symbolic potential of the body and displaying the mannequins as 
imprisoned and mute instead of animated.
Jean Rhys was living in Paris at the time of the exhibition, and 
set her last interwar novel, Good Morning, Midnight (1939), in Paris 
around the same period in 1937. This year also featured one of the 
last Great Exhibitions in Paris and the “Degenerate Art Exhibition” 
organized by the Nazi party in Munich. The novel presents the motif 
of exhibition mostly as haunting and oppressive, as experienced by 
its main character, Sasha Jansen. It evokes the surrealist connection 
by featuring striking motifs of mannequins and a nightmare scene 
with inanimate fingers pointing and street signs reading: “This way 
to the Exhibition”51 (Rhys 1985, 350; Britzolakis 2007, 472–474). Sasha is 
a lonely woman walking the streets of Paris, shopping and dreaming 
of new clothes and hair color; thus, she participates in the commod-
ification masquerade. She experiences both an abstract sense and 
concrete occurrences of the threat of violence and different forms of 
sexual trading, that evoke the darker associations of the mannequin 
motif, yet this novel uses the parallel between woman and mannequin 
to a different end than the Surrealist Exhibition. It is narrated and 
focalized by a woman whose first-person perspective with whom the 
reader of the story is invited to identify. Sasha is shown dreaming of 
dresses, trying on hats and having her hair dyed in ways that empha-
size her role as a consumer and a potential “mannequin” exhibiting 
the things she has purchased, but her hopes and disappointments, 
and moments of happiness related to the things she experiences make 
her perspective lived and embodied in a way that differs starkly from 
the surrealist presentations of mannequins.
In “Mannequin,” Anna is a focalizing subject whose body is objec-
tified by the gaze of others, but whose own perspective is maintained 
in the story. Anna’s lived perspective implies that like her the other 
mannequins, however typified and objectified even by the narrating 
voice of the story, have their own subjectivities and interests beyond 
the type. “Mannequin” offers textual cues for the enactment of 
embodied experience especially in its depiction of the relationship 
between Anna’s body, the spaces of the shop and the clothes that 
51   Here the overt reference is to the 1937 Exposition Internationale des Arts et Techniques 
dans la Vie Moderne in Paris, which Sasha Jansen does visit in the novel. There is no 
biographical evidence that Rhys visited the surrealist exhibition.
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she is wearing, enough to lend her character a sense of subjectivity 
and agency that counterbalance her presentation as an object of gaze 
comparable to a fashion dummy. Many of Rhys’s characters are them-
selves presented as fetishes in the manner of fashion dummies, but 
in her texts, this means animate things, not only parties in a system 
of lack and objectification. Thus, as can be seen in Section 3.3, Rhys 
gives voice, a lived body, and a first-person perspective to an emblem 
of the reification and objectification of woman, while criticizing these 
practices; the surrealist focus on the mannequin and woman as a 
transcendent symbol and a sexualized fetish neither achieves nor 
pursues this goal.
3.1.2. Magical Practices and Supernatural Irony
The surrealists also favored other forms of magical thinking than 
fetishism, and cultivated various occult practices. Rhys, too, uses 
the motif of spiritualism. In “At the Villa d’Or” (1927), Mrs. and Mr. 
Valentine host promising artists in their home on the French Riviera. 
Mrs. Valentine bores “Sara of Montparnasse,” one of the guests and 
the focalizer of the story, with her rambling talk “of the emptiness of 
life before she became a spiritualist, of automatic writing” (LB, 159). 
‘Spiritualism’ refers to the belief in the existence of and the possibility 
to communicate with another world, involving the spirits of the dead. 
The ritualized spiritualist séances often involved practices such as 
automatic writing, “spirit photography” and telepathy (Armstrong 
2005, 123). During the late 19th and early 20th century, the move-
ment was popular among Western middle- and upper-class people, 
especially women, but scientists and writers such as William James, 
H.D., James Joyce and Virginia Woolf52 (Armstrong 2005, 123) were 
also intrigued. Leigh Wilson argues that the domains of the occult 
and magical thinking offered some modernists a chance to redefine 
the meanings of mimesis and representation. A séance was a useful 
model for a modernist approach to writing because it, on the one 
hand, made visible the topical question of the uncertain power of 
language to communicate, and on the other hand, involved “taking 
the metaphor seriously,” challenging the idea of language as repre-
sentative of reality by the idea that “words magically create the things 
they name” (Wilson 2013, 12, 14, 20).
In Rhys’s story, Mrs. Valentine seems to transfer her belief in spirits 
to the everyday material world and its new, technological gadgets, 
whereby they gain an animistic tone that is simultaneously uncanny 
and comical:
52  Zadel Turner Barnes, Djuna Barnes’s grandmother, was one of the pioneers of spiritu-
alism (Armstrong 2005, 122).
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“Sometimes”, said Mrs. Valentine to Sara, “I play 
the Victrola53 for hours all by myself when Bobbie 
is in the billiard-room, and I think how strange it 
is that lovely music—and voices of people who are 
dead—like Caruso—coming out of a black box. 
Their voices—Themselves in fact—And I just get 
frightened to death—terrified. I shut it up and run up 
the stairs and ring like mad for Marie.” (LB, 163–164)
 
In Mrs. Valentine’s mind, the voices of deceased singers like the 
tenor Enrico Caruso (1873–1921) equal “themselves,” trapped in a little 
black box. According to Armstrong (2005, 127), the phenomenon of 
spiritualism is linked with the new discoveries of modern physics 
and the technologies afforded by it, especially the radio, which was a 
recurrent metaphor for telepathy. In Rhys’s story, modern audio tech-
nology becomes infested with magic and the uncanny, but the reader, 
I would argue, is expected to keep his or her guard up, not share the 
bias toward the magical, but rather maintain an ironical distance; this 
is also the most common stance taken by modernist writers toward 
spiritualism54 (Ibid., 120). Mrs. Valentine is a comical character with 
whom readers are not invited to identify, but rather to marvel at as a 
spectacle of privilege and ignorance. Her life used to be “empty” but is 
now filled with fashionable beliefs and magical practices. At the same 
time, she is troubled by superstitions roused by technological gadgets 
that arouse associations to death and spirits. This is shown in contrast 
to the superior clarity of mind but inferior socioeconomic position of 
Sara, whose point of view readers are invited to share.
“A Spiritualist” (1927) introduces, not exactly a spiritualist, but 
another privileged and superstitious character faced with the spirits 
of the dead meddling in the material world. It begins with a framing 
story, in which a male character, “The Commandant,” relates a story 
of a recent occurrence to the unnamed narrator whose gender is not 
specified. It is an account of his visit to the apartment of his former 
lover, Madeleine, after her sudden and untimely death from an 
unspecified illness, to gather some of her “clothes and […] effects” for 
her mother. The visit turns supernatural:
53  A brand name for a phonograph produced from the beginning of the 20th century until 
the 1960s by the American company appropriately named, Victor Talking Machine Company.
54  In “A Solid House” (1963), there is a similar story line of a younger woman staying in the 
house of an older friend, and distancing herself from the latter’s interest in spiritualism (cf. 
Section 2.1).
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“Well, suddenly, there came from the closed sitting-
room a very loud, a terrible crash. The floor shook.” […]
“You must understand that it was a flat on the fourth 
floor; all the windows of the sitting-room were tightly 
shut, naturally, and the blinds were drawn as I had left 
them on the day of the funeral. The door into the hall was 
locked, the other led into the bedroom where I was.” 
“And, there, lying right in the middle of the 
floor was a block of white marble, perhaps 
fifty centimeters square.” (LB, 40)
The loud, unexpected, and unexplainable materialization of a 
block of white marble recalls a famous early gothic motif from Horace 
Walpole’s novel The Castle of Otranto (1764). The novel’s events are 
set forth when a gigantic steel helmet falls from out of nowhere and 
crushes the young prince of the castle on his wedding day. The rest of 
the novel merges supernatural events with (half incestuous) marriage 
and power schemes and accidental homicide. This intertextual link 
is illustrative of the theme, and partly the tone, of Rhys’s story: it is 
equally about sexual relations, power, and death, but also adds a dose 
of irony and distance to the realm of the magical. The narrator of the 
story expounds on the material circumstances of the appearance of 
the marble block that had not been there when they entered, as the 
housekeeper Gertrude confirms. The crash and the appearance of 
the block of marble are persuasively framed by detailed descriptions 
of the circumstances and even the estimated measurements of the 
block,55 which serve to underline its supernatural potential: it cannot 
have been placed there by someone with human strength, who would 
have been held back by closed doors and windows. The setting is also 
made uncanny by the memory of death it contains, since it has been 
left untouched since Madeleine’s death.
The gothic mode continues in the descriptions of the reactions 
of the two characters in Madeleine’s apartment. The Commandant 
freezes, looking at “the thing”; Gertrude crosses herself, “pale as 
death,” and leaves, saying: “[t]here is something strange about this 
flat” (LB, 41). Nevertheless, the Commandant portrays himself as rela-
tively courageous in his own story, staying in the flat after Gertrude 
has fled, also reproducing a gothic trope, in which the point of view of 
a rational, educated, upper-class focalizer is contrasted with that of a 
superstitious, unreliable lower-class domestic, found in novels such as 
Otranto and Ann Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794). Rhys’s 
story reverses these roles. The Commandant explains his bravery by 
knowledge of the reasons of the occurrence, which do not, however, 
“naturalize” it, as it remains within the domain of the supernatural:
55  The helmet in Otranto is “a hundred times more large than any casque ever made for 
human being” (Walpole 1964, 15–16).
116 117The Agency of Things
I had promised her a beautiful, white marble tombstone, 
and I had not yet ordered it. Not because I had not 
thought of it. Oh, no—but because I was too sad, too 
tired. But the little one doubtless thought that I had 
forgotten. It was her way of reminding me. (Ibid.)
Thus, he provides a magical explanation along with some excuses 
for his conduct. His interlocutor, the first-person narrator intradi-
egetic in the frame story, reacts incredulously, as if trying to deter-
mine whether he is being jocular or serious: “I looked hard at the 
Commandant. His eyes were clear and as naïve as a child’s” (Ibid.). 
Therefore, the short story itself is not a straightforward leap into 
fantasy that the reader is invited to join in a willing suspension of 
disbelief. The magical event appears in it only as related by one of its 
characters, one who is clearly unreliable. The Commandant would 
like to present himself as the bright and fearless hero of a gothic tale, 
but the frame story presents him as naïve and childish.
In “A Spiritualist,” the fantastical narrative is turned into a medium of 
gender- and genre-sensitive irony. An attitude toward women motivates 
the Commandant’s story: it begins and ends by his musing about them 
as “disappointing,” “lacking in calm and balance,” and having “droll 
ideas” (LB, 37, 42). He provides the actual example of these character-
istics at the end of the story, by relating another woman’s comment on 
his account of the tombstone: “How furious that poor Madeleine must 
have been that she missed you” (LB, 42). With this added point of view, 
the reader is invited to imagine the poor, belittled woman who “gave 
way in everything” (LB, 39) as a furious lady taking violent revenge 
from beyond the grave rather than providing a gentle reminder, as the 
Commandant would like to believe. Even as such, “Poor Madeleine” 
is another revision of the gothic. She repeats a prototype of the gothic 
heroine such as Walpole’s Matilda and Radcliffe’s Emily, virtuous and 
fragile, but strong and resourceful when encountering dreadful obsta-
cles. The Commandant-Spiritualist is quite obviously the emotional, 
childish character in the story, the one with “droll ideas.”
In the core story of “A Spiritualist,” however, Madeleine is also a 
ghost, and there remains an ambiguity to the magical side of the story, 
which makes it an exception in the context of The Left Bank and Rhys’s 
fiction in general. No alternative explanation is given for the appear-
ance of the block, except for the unreliability of the Commandant. The 
framing structure makes it easier for readers to distance themselves 
from the magical, fantastic elements of the story, but for the materi-
alized irony of the story to work fully, they must to some extent be 
immersed in the story of the girl spirit’s material revenge through a 
block of marble. This is entirely plausible, as readers are likely to, as 
Merja Polvinen suggests, beside engaging enactively with the events 
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and characters in the fictional world, engage with these experiences 
as produced by fiction, not only playing along with the sugges-
tions and conventions of the story, but also remaining rooted in the 
real world. Similarly, engaging in critical reflection need not mean 
being aloof from the story (Polvinen 2016, 20). Readers may be able 
to tolerate the ontological ambiguity of the block of marble in the 
fictional world, as its rules are different from the real one.
Why, then, does the author use a block of white marble as a means 
of supernatural revenge? What is the actual role of this material thing 
in the story and how is its ambiguous relation to magic and fantasy to 
be read? Compared to the other things that are referred to in Rhys’s 
fiction, such as clothes, jewelry, and tableware, it is a heavy object 
in several senses. A block of “fifty centimeters square” undoubt-
edly makes a loud noise and causes the floor to shake when it falls. 
An unused tombstone is also heavy with meaning, with its white, 
smooth surface evoking youth, purity, and death. Its concrete weight 
also gives more sense of weight to the imagined act of “the little one” 
throwing it from the realm of spirits. In its macabre appearance, the 
tombstone also exposes the macabre nature of the Commandant’s 
promise. This blend of metaphor and stony materiality recalls the 
modernist mode of representation that “takes metaphor seriously” 
as Wilson above put it: the block of marble, as narrated by someone 
who believes in it as real, becomes real to the extent that it can be 
used as a fictional tool for evoking imaginary materiality. It can be 
seen as a conceptual metaphor that not only evokes an image but 
also appeals to a variety of senses, relying on the embodied cognitive 
schemata connecting heaviness with a somber mood or difficulty, in 
addition to the culturally defined meanings we are able to attach to a 
tombstone (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 2003). The reader is invited to feel the 
material reality—its texture and weight—and the sound made by the 
tombstone, and they are connected to the subsequent interpretation 
as complementary to its cultural, symbolic function. In this case, they 
give concrete weight to the tombstone’s associations with death and to 
the gesture of revenge with which it is paired in the story.
The text, like “At the Villa D’Or,” builds a community of implicitly 
like-minded subjects, containing the narrator, Madeleine, the earlier 
female commenter of the ghost story, the implied author and the 
authorial audience, who are likely to take the same side against the 
Commandant. Both stories take an ironical stance toward fashionable 
forms of superstition and use the material manifestations of these 
beliefs (the Victrola, the marble block), not only to build a comical, 
ironically distanced mode, but also to maintain an ambiguous rela-
tion to the fantastic. This move contributes to Rhys’s reimagination 
of fetishism, as it repositions its female characters, depending on 
whether they are suggested as sympathetic or not, either to fear the 
magical powers of animation in things, or to fantastically profit from 
them. Thus, especially “A Spiritualist” parodies both modern magical 
thinking and the gothic, but does so in a reparative way that appropri-
ates the tropes and finds new affordances in them.
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3.1.3. Lucky Dresses and Loquacious Parks: 
Magical and Material Challenges to  
Modern Fetishism
Rhys’s stories give fetishist powers to things, not only in their modern 
commodified and sexualized forms, which have been extensively 
researched elsewhere, but also as simply material things. Judith 
Kegan Gardiner writes of the narrator of “On Not Shooting Sitting 
Birds” (1976), a typical Rhysian female character whose well-prepared 
date with a man goes awry because of assumed class differences 
and prejudices: “[she is] in a sexual transaction, agreeing to a tryst 
whose conclusion seems foreknown and complicitly making herself 
a commodity or fetish for the affair by packaging herself in new silk 
underwear” (Gardiner 1989, 10). But is new silk underwear in Rhys 
merely packaging for “a commodity or fetish”? We observed above 
how Rhys gives a “subjective” point of view to objectified mannequin 
characters and thereby challenges the distinction between human 
subject and nonhuman object. In general, she seems to provide her 
readers with a more complicated picture of what it is like to be a 
fetishized body. Emily Apter suggests that the notion of the fetish as a 
talisman “implicitly empowers the female collectible” (Apter 1991, 43). 
The gist of Apter’s argument is that the fetish object, in this case the 
woman as a fetishized body, is not only objectified and made passive 
by desire and gaze, but also gains power of its own over its fetishizer. I 
wish to argue here that Rhys’s texts pursue and achieve a similar aim, 
but that evocations of materiality and experientiality are necessary 
for this empowerment.
To be effective a talisman should be touched and worn close to 
the body. William Pietz has shown that material and sensory factors 
tend to be forgotten in modern discourses of fetishism (Pietz 1993, 144). 
Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s version of modern magical thinking, 
Maurizia Boscagli sees in fetishism a performative power and a sense 
of excess in which neither the subject nor the object becomes reified, 
and suggests turning the abstract and disembodied discourses of 
fetishism toward its inherent pleasure. This view “reclaims pleasure by 
looking at the object as a visual-tactile phenomenon, to be approached 
synaesthetically through all the senses rather than through the mind 
or the eye” (Boscagli 2014, 47). It is this pleasure in tactile materiality 
that Boscagli considers having potential for change. In a similar vein, 
the following discussion aims to show how items such as “new silk 
underwear” function both as talismans and as evocations of materi-
ality and sensuous experience, in both ways contributing to a sense of 
distributed agency beyond the subject-object dichotomy.
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Most of the references to magical thinking and fetishism in The 
Left Bank are not bound to certain systems of belief like spiritualism. 
However, the motif of Obeah is present in “Mixing Cocktails,” one of 
the stories in The Left Bank set in the Caribbean islands. The narrator, 
a young girl, remembers the family’s cook, “the old ‘Obeah’ woman,” 
telling her not to look too much at the moon: “The moon does bad 
things to you if it shines on you when you sleep…” (LB, 91). ‘Obeah’ is 
a common term for a system of varied beliefs and practices of African 
origin practiced in the former colonies of the Caribbean, “depen-
dent on ritual invocation, fetishes and charms” (Fernández-Olmos 
& Paravisini-Gebert 2011, 155). Its practices involve both “white” 
and “black” magic, the use of fetishes for the purposes of luck and 
protection, and for attacking the oppressors during slave trade (Ibid., 
157). Fetishes in this case mean objects constructed of human and 
animal body parts (hair, nails, and blood), items of (under)clothing, 
and dirt, which are then placed strategically around a house or 
a person, usually to protect them (Ibid., 167). Although Rhys was 
born in Dominica, her background in a former slave-owning family 
distances her from indigenous practices. Thereby, she refers to them 
as an outsider, but not quite as completely as that of many other 
modernist artists who appropriated Caribbean and African cultures 
in their work.
Talismanic thinking is present in the way Rhys’s stories portray 
things and spaces as lucky or unlucky, sinister, or friendly. In Good 
Morning, Midnight, the protagonist Sasha, with her characteristic 
ironic tone, describes her life as follows:
[…] a complicated affair of cafés where they like me 
and cafes where they don’t, streets that are friendly, 
streets that aren’t, rooms where I might be happy, 
rooms where I never shall be, looking-glasses I look 
nice in, looking-glasses I don’t, dresses that will be 
lucky, dresses that won’t, and so on. (Rhys 1985, 371)
Cafés where one is or is not liked are quite easy to fit within a Western 
rationalist world view, and the rest of the excerpt might also be apt 
as it features instances of magical thinking that do not require the 
evocations of distant places and cultures. For Rhys, Lucky things are 
often dresses, but can also be pieces of underwear, like for the narrator 
of “On Not Shooting Sitting Birds” in Sleep It off Lady.
However, the frequency with which friendly or unfriendly streets 
and lucky or unlucky clothes are encountered in Rhys’s interwar 
fiction makes them seem like the very foundations on which the 
world of its characters is built. Elizabeth Wilson compares the prac-
tice of ascribing luck to an item of dress to the process between a 
child and a transitional object, often also a piece of cloth, theorized by 
Donald W. Winnicott (2005, 383). A transitional object is a stand-in for 
the mother and a means for the baby to cautiously approach a direct 
contact with the world, without the mediation of the mother (Ibid.). 
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In a comparable manner, a lucky dress can be a protecting layer 
between the embodied self and the world, being simultaneously part 
of both in its material presence. A dress may seem lucky because it 
is beautiful or stylish, but it may also become a symbol of good luck 
after it has been worn on a happy or successful occasion; thus, it can 
seem to bear a residue in the folds of its materiality. With Rhys, it is 
more often the first than the second case. The lucky objects are part 
of daydreams of the future or regretful musings of the past that could 
have had a different future, as in the case of a certain black dress in 
Good Morning, Midnight: “If I had been wearing it I should never have 
stammered or been stupid” (Rhys 1985, 360).
Nevertheless, the idea of a residue and a fetishist metonymical 
relation between a piece of clothing and the body of its wearer is also 
present in Rhys’s work. By the metonymical relation I mean a process 
in which the owner and wearer gives something of herself to the dress 
to “give it life” and make it an extension of her memories and experi-
ences; in a similar manner, the dress contains something of the world 
outside, past events or future dreams, that have a magical effect on its 
wearer as in the tradition of Obeah. 
The most central object motif in Wide Sargasso Sea is Antoinette’s 
red dress already mentioned in Section 2.3 as a container for the 
experience of time and space. It travels with her from Martinique 
to England and thereby becomes a transitional object in a slightly 
different sense. The dress carries residue of her past in Martinique, 
which can be concretely felt as a sensation of warmth, in contrast 
with the cold English climate. The red dress is a symbol of 
Antoinette’s selÐood and agency, as well as a narrative hint of the fire 
of Thornfield Hall to come, but it also evokes a bodily sense of a warm, 
material protective layer against the hostile surroundings. Antoinette 
gives life to her dress, but in return the dress preserves her memories 
and protects her sense of wholeness.
In some stories, the lucky or unlucky objects are also personified 
and given a voice. “Illusion” (1927) is a story about the temperate artist 
Miss Bruce, whose secret habit of collecting exquisite dresses and 
luxurious cosmetics is revealed to the first-person narrator when 
she is let into Miss Bruce’s room to retrieve some of her things after 
she has been hospitalized. The narrator imagines a dress talking: 
“’Wear me, give me life’, it would seem to say to her, ‘and I will do 
my damnedest for you!’” (LB, 34–35). The human wearer gives life 
to the thing, but in exchange the thing will “do its damnedest” for 
its owner and wearer. The dress needs a human being to come alive, 
as it were, but then it will act as a talisman, protect its wearer, work 
against threats, and provide potential success. The dress as a lucky 
charm is relatively innocent, but a dimension of black magic is added 
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by the pronounced expression of the idiom “I will do my damnedest 
for you!” Talking objects can be read as simply a manifestation of 
prosopopoeia and personification, or as rhetorical devices that lend 
voice to and animate the inanimate and humanize the nonhuman. 
As Satoshi Nishimura notes, “it is difficult to speak about inanimate 
objects without giving them any human properties” (Nishimura 
2015, 34). In fact, the frequency and emphasis of this device in Rhys’s 
writing invites further questions: why has it been chosen over 
some others? Whose thoughts are being voiced by the inanimate 
speakers? In “Illusion,” the voices are imagined by the narrator of 
the story, and they arise out of an empathic relation toward both 
the clothes and their owner, the outwardly tidy and unnoticeable 
collector of flamboyant dresses.
Good Morning, Midnight introduces animated versions not only 
of dresses, but also of houses, hotel rooms, streets and windows, that 
are given prosopopoeical lines of speech in the novel, beginning from 
its first sentence: “’Quite like the old times’, the room says. ‘Yes? No?’” 
(Rhys 1985, 347). The environment becomes an inanimate interloc-
utor, as Sasha strolls the streets of Paris recalling her memories. The 
personified talking city as a literary device underlines the loneliness 
of the focal character and introduces her emotions and memories to 
the reader. It is also a device borrowed from advertising, a discourse 
on which Rhys’s writing often draws: the type in which cleaning 
products, oats packages and butter begin to speak (Parsons 2008, 
19). These recall the speaking commodity already present in Marx’s 
famous formulation of the commodity fetish. According to Emma 
Zimmerman (2015, 80), Rhys’s use of prosopopoeia points toward the 
realm of the uncanny and leads to ambiguities as to “whether Rhys is 
attempting to suspend our disbelief by presenting us with a room that 
does really speak—after all, it is marked as direct speech—or if this is 
in fact some sort of psychological projection.” In this case, I suggest 
that the talking room is a textual device of evoking the experience 
of thoughts and emotions being brought forth or “afforded” by the 
material features of the environment; here it is not necessary to view 
the relationship between Sasha and the speaking room as projective. 
Simultaneously, it can be viewed as part of the quasi-magical world-
view of the novel, with its places and objects that can either enhance 
or diminish the powers of one owning or using them. In may not be 
a case for the suspension of disbelief, but one resting on the readers’ 
capacity to simultaneously engage in fantasy and know it to be a 
fictional device, as was suggested in the case of the Commandant and 
the block of marble.
In the short impressionistic story “In the Luxemburg Gardens” 
[sic.] (1927), the park counsels a “very depressed young man” strolling 
in it: “Such a waste of time, say the Luxemburg Gardens, to be morose. 
Are there not always Women and Pretty Legs and Green Hats” (LB, 
71–72). In referring to a woman who has just walked past, the Gardens 
seem to voice a simultaneously surrealist and commercialist, fetishist 
tendency to identify living women with parts of their body and 
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fashionable apparel (see Section 5.1).56 In this story, the girl is objecti-
fied as the life-giving fetish, while the park is personified in a gesture 
of narrative magic. Here the gender positions are conventional and 
resemble surrealist fetishism: the woman equals her body equals her 
hat; all are introduced in capital initials to elevate and typify them 
to something larger and more general than their actual materiality. 
In the context of the whole collection (and the rest of Rhys’s work), 
however, such arrangements become questioned by such stories as 
“The Mannequin,” discussed above, in which the type and the fetish 
are given a voice and experiences.
A more challenging instance of fetishist imagery is found in the 
description of an unfriendly part of Paris, a Montparnasse street in 
the story, “In the Rue de l’Arrivée.” Here a “sinister and unholy” phar-
macy that Dorothy, the focal character, passes a display with a little 
box containing a “waxen head of a gentleman with hollow eyes, thin 
lips and a tortured and evil expression,” with a card saying “I suffered 
from diseases of the stomach, liver, kidneys, from neurasthenia, 
anaemia and loss of vitality before taking the Elixir of Abbé Pierre …” 
(LB, 118). The grotesque attempt to advertise an all-curing elixir with 
a hideous display of illness is rendered both uncanny and comical 
by its confusion of animate and inanimate: a wax head announces 
having suffered from “loss of vitality.”
Dorothy, too, is depressed and suffering, and like the young man 
in the Luxembourg gardens, she finds momentary consolation in 
a passer-by. A man tries to talk to her, but when turned down, he 
passes on without the insisting attempts Dorothy has become used 
to in Paris. The consoling line of speech, however, is given not to the 
man as a speaking subject, but to the gestalt formed by his body and 
clothes: “The back of his cap and his supple slouching walk seemed 
to say: ‘Tout s’arrangera, va!’” (LB, 120.) The man does not speak, 
which renders him sympathetic from Dorothy’s point of view, and his 
modest dress and posture (he is not a “gentleman” like the wax head, 
or many other male characters portrayed in a negative light in Rhys’s 
fiction) work to tell her that “everything will be OK.” Dorothy’s gaze 
and his silence align him with the inanimate surroundings, but make 
him the only positively valued element among them. In the context of 
the entire collection, the man also becomes parallel with the objec-
tified woman-as-fetish in the Luxembourg gardens. “In the Rue de 
L’Arrivée” and “In the Luxemburg Gardens” show different aspects of 
the same issue, which can be justified even by the similarity of their 
56  Intertextually, the hat in the passage recalls Michael Arlen’s popular novel “The Green 
Hat” (1924), in which the said accessory is an emblem of beauty, fashion, and high society.
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titles. Both are short, sketch-like renderings of a moment of being 
embedded in an environment, a link made stronger by the way the 
thoughts and experiences of the characters are shown to extend to the 
environment, and how the surrounding things have power to affect 
the experience and the mood of the characters; sometimes they act as 
enhancing talismans, while other times they are quite the opposite.
The analysis of talismans and personification demonstrates that it 
might sometimes make sense to conceive of objects as agents rather 
than as parts of the background. Researchers have demonstrated how 
narratives with nonhuman narrators point to a tendency to highlight 
the other as an object to maintain the image of oneself as a subject 
(Bernaerts et al. 2014, 70). Rhys’s talking things are textual-rhetor-
ical devices that make use of poetic license to imagine, but they are 
strictly rooted in the “real” as material things inviting the reader’s use 
of sensory imagination, and are often used to criticize human cruelty 
and alienation. On the other hand, they also evoke compassion and 
a sense of wholeness, and offer a way to rethink the human beyond 
subject and object. At the same time, the stories are a manifestation of 
a view of literature itself as magical, a way of not representing some-
thing existing but absent (in the economy of lack), but of creating 
worlds and things and giving them life that affects readers in the 
world (cf. Wilson 2013, 12).
 
Rhys’s writing participates in a general modernist quest to give voice 
to the inanimate, for the purpose of expanding human subjectivity to 
the nonhuman, practicing transcendental symbolism, or attempting 
to approach “things as they are” (Nishimura 2015, 33). In its several 
forms, magical thinking is a thread that runs through Rhys’s stories 
in The Left Bank as well as her novels, notably Good Morning, 
Midnight and Wide Sargasso Sea. What is remarkable in these texts, 
however, is the complexity with which they address both magical 
thinking in general and fetishism in particular. Magical thinking and 
different forms of superstition are allusions to the gothic, residues of 
childhood and different cultures, and means of escapism for alienated 
individuals; yet they are also an integral part of modern and urban 
life. Fetishism in Rhys’s work goes beyond commodities and the sexu-
alization of objects or female body parts, as it involves the common 
practices of using inanimate things as talismans and as transitional 
objects, to provide protection and enhancement. Indeed, in featuring 
these practices, Rhys’s work often reverses human-thing relations, 
finding a sense of power and agency where passivity and victimhood 
are normally found.
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3.2 Djuna Barnes and  
the Excess of Fetishism
The psychoanalytical framework of fetishism, which is a relevant 
one to relate to Barnes’s fiction, does not really allow fetishism 
for women (Schor 1995, 95). Jean Rhys, by employing versions of 
fetishism not arising from the Freudian framework, but rather from 
religious and animistic practices, portrays her female characters as 
equally capable of fetishism as the male ones, which was unusual at 
the beginning of the 20th century. She shares this stance with Djuna 
Barnes. Freud does claim, as Jann Matlock points out, that all women 
are clothes fetishists (Matlock 1993, 60), but his oedipal scheme gener-
ally reserves fetishism to the male in the grips of castration anxiety. 
This was already the case in pre-Freudian discussions of fetishism 
as a sexual pathology, as Matlock has shown (Ibid.). Even some femi-
nist critics, like Elizabeth Grosz, maintain that the Freudian scheme 
needs to be left more or less as it is, and wind up labelling fetishist 
women with a “masculinity complex” in which “they refuse their 
castrated condition and continue to believe in their own phallic posi-
tion” (Grosz 1993, 101, 110, 112).
Djuna Barnes’s stories from the first decades of the 20th century 
feature things that had by then become classic fetish objects: dolls, 
boots and whips, corsets, velvet, and lace. In part, they can be 
counted among the many intertextual references of the texts, toward 
decadent and naturalist fiction of the end of the 19th century, as well 
as to the discourses of psychoanalysis and sexology. However, the way 
these motifs recur is repetition with a difference. This section sets out 
to show how Barnes’s writing, by parodying discourses of fetishism, 
offers alternative ways of thinking about agency, sexuality, and power 
through human-thing relations. The analyses refer to features of the 
original context of writing, but also begin to open the discussion 
toward the potential agency of things beyond fetishism and animism. 
A focus on materiality and the agential potential of things inherent in 
fetishism brings to light, how Barnes’s texts interact with the multi-
faceted concept, while challenging some of the basic assumptions and 
gendered biases sedimented on it. Her fictional women might well be 
124 125
said to “refuse their castrated condition,” but in this refusal they chal-
lenge the whole discourse of fetishism.
The notions of lack and loss seem inseparable from the psychoan-
alytic (and to some extent the Marxist) conception of fetishism. The 
Freudian fetish is actually a product of the denial of lack, wrought with 
contradictions: “a token of triumph over the threat of castration and a 
protection against it” (Freud 1974, 154), involving both the disavowal 
and the affirmation of the castration (Ibid., 156). As a protection from 
a threat that originates in negation (the alleged “nothing” that the 
theory substitutes the female genital with), and a surplus, a material 
“representation” of nothingness whose very materiality is used and 
enjoyed, fetishism thus conceived implies a fantasy of having it both 
ways: eating the cake and having it, too. The implications of this ambi-
guity for female sexuality and agency are far from clear-cut. Several 
feminist scholars have used this territory of ambiguity and mimetic 
play to challenge the fetishism as an exclusively male phenomenon, 
the identification of female genitalia with lack, and the fetishization of 
the female body (cf. for instance, Irigaray 1985; Apter 1991, 1993; Schor 
1995). In the following, I will build on such critics, as well as on the new 
materialist approaches exemplified by the work of Maurizia Boscagli.
The discussion is divided according to a typology of things that 
arises from Barnes’s texts and the context of fetishism. The first part 
discusses the fetishization of the body and its members in the motif 
of the doll; secondly, the focus is on classic objects associated with 
(masculine) phallic power, namely whips, boots and leather; lastly, I 
discuss an array of items of feminine attire that frequent the discourse 
of fetishism, such as underwear, shoes, lace, and jewelry, and the way 
they are combined with the recurring, typified character of the phallic 
woman. With the aim of challenging the early schemes of fetishism, 
this grouping is justified by the way Barnes’s texts clearly draw from 
exactly these schemes, even if only to parody them. This happens, 
once more, through the introduction of materiality and lived, bodily 
experience, as well as another discourse of fetishism with its ideas of 
the performative powers of the talisman.
3.2.1. Dolls and Dismemberment
Barnes most explicitly explored the motif of the doll in the novel 
Nightwood (1936). Robin Vote gives her lover, Nora, the main focal 
character, a doll as a present, and dubs its significance as “the life they 
cannot have, […] their child” (Barnes 2007=N, 128). In a fit of rage, Robin 
is seen holding the doll (as she has earlier held her own baby) above 
her head as if to smash it, and evidently, she does destroy it. Nora also 
finds a similar doll in the house of Robin’s new lover, Jenny. The doll 
is converted to a subject of theory by Doctor Matthew O’Connor, the 
parodied psychoanalyst⁄sexologist of the novel: 
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The doll and the immature have something right about 
them, the doll because it resembles but does not contain 
life, and the third sex because it contains life but resembles 
the doll. The blessed face! It should be seen only in profile, 
otherwise it is observed to be the conjunction of the 
identical cleaved halves of sexless misgiving! (N, 133–134)
This is one clear example of Nightwood’s highly problematic use of 
the concepts ‘the third sex’, inversion and mirroring, as well as the 
notions of sexlessness and immaturity, and ultimately the “equation 
of lesbian desire with the death drive” that Clare Taylor has shown the 
text to present, but not completely support (Taylor 2003, 182).
Ambiguity surrounds the doll as a fetish object. It is a metonymical 
reference to a human child beyond the bipolar gender system and the 
oedipal schema, yet it also embodies normative notions of mother-
hood and femininity. On the other hand, motherhood can already be 
seen as challenging the phallocentric notion of fetishism, not only by 
positing the child as the surrogate penis, but also by pointing to the 
life-creating power of the womb. As an object of desire, the doll points 
toward incest; as a plaything made of inanimate matter that is given 
life and agency in the imagination it embodies life and death. Finally, 
in Nightwood, the doll is a thing with its own performative power, 
shown in human relationships where it is used as a token of love, 
anger, and deception. Intertextually, like Rhys’s mannequins, it also 
evokes Freud’s discussion of the uncanny, in which he refers to the 
fine line between children’s fearless belief in their dolls as live beings, 
and the fear induced by the human-like doll Olimpia in Hoffmann’s 
“Sand-Man” (Freud 1985; Johnson B. 2008, 163). The sense of the 
uncanny in connection with dolls can also be due to the possibility of 
dismemberment of their anthropomorphic bodies.
Taylor (2003, 151) links the doll to Robin as a character fetishized by 
other characters and by the text itself, an evasive vision of childlike 
sexlessness. By virtue of both her name and her behavior, she is also 
presented as androgynous and at times verges on nonhuman, like 
Rhys’s mannequins. Thereby, she produces an ambiguous synthesis 
of male, female, human, animal and thing (cf. Rohman 2009). 
According to Taylor (2003, 155–158), the novel parodies the discourses 
of inversion, penis-envy, and sexual pathology while it remains built 
on its own fetishist logic of absence and disavowal, dismemberment 
and idealized wholeness (Ibid., 150; see also Allen 1996, 19). What is 
behind Nightwood’s fetishism is not the mother’s imaginary loss of a 
penis, but the loss of a loved (female) body that is also the reflection of 
an idealized self as a unified whole, which can only be maintained 
as an illusion: even the “blessed face” of the doll should only be seen 
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in profile (Taylor 2003, 183, 189). Thus, in my interpretation, what is 
lacking from the text and its characters as desiring fetishists, is the 
whole body in which the idea or a feeling of a self might reside; the 
female body, as it is, does not suffer from any lack, yet its limbs are 
picked apart by the narrative, to gain special desiring and loving 
attention, that emphasizes the capacities of these limbs for action and 
sensing, not merely their objecthood (cf. Ibid., 184). The multifaceted 
motif of the doll contributes to this discourse, being not only an ideal-
ized whole body, but also visibly made of separable components.
A similar thematic is found in “Dusie” (1927), whose titular char-
acter can be seen as a precursor of Robin. The comparison shows one 
example of Barnes’s way of recycling motifs and characters in different 
contexts. “Dusie” is one of the three stories narrated by a young, 
cosmopolitan woman, who is named Katya in most of them, to an 
older, silent listener occasionally referred to as “Madame.”57 “Dusie” is 
situated in Paris, and in it Katya relates an obscure drama of love and 
jealousy taking place in a “splendid” house belonging to Madame K—, 
an older lady hosting young women in a salon.58 Dusie at the center of 
the drama is a “very young” girl, “tall, very big and beautiful, absent 
and so pale” (CS, 404). We are told that she wears big shoes, has large 
ankles and wrists and long legs, and is adored by everyone:
All people gave her their attention, stroking her, and 
calling her pet or beast, according to their feelings. 
They touched her as if she were an idol, and she 
stood tall, or sat to drink, unheeding, absent. You 
felt that you must talk to Dusie, tell her everything, 
because all her beauty was there but uninhabited, 
like a church, n’est-ce pas, madame? Only she was 
not holy, she was very mortal, and sometimes vulgar, 
a ferocious and oblivious vulgarity. (CS, 406)
57  The cycle originally begun with the stories “Cassation” and “The Grande Malade” 
published as “A Little Girl Tells a Story to a Lady” and “The Little Girl Continues,” and also 
including “Beyond the Heart.”
58  The salon is doubtless inspired by the one Natalie Barney held in Paris, which Djuna 
Barnes also frequented.  In his introduction to Barnes’s Collected Stories, Philip Herring is 
bolder in charting the biographical referentiality of the story: “’Dusie’ […] is less a story than a 
descriptive narrative centered on the Left Bank lesbian scene which Barnes knew so well. […] 
it is unmistakably about Barnes’s lover Thelma Wood; the setting is Natalie Clifford Barney’s 
house at 20 rue Jacob […]” (Herring 1996, 20). Regardless of the compelling evidence Herring 
has for this claim, I think it is still justified and necessary to read “Dusie,” like the rest of 
Barnes’s fiction, more as a story than as a biographical account.
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Even though Dusie is “absent,” “oblivious,” and “uninhabited,” we 
gain a multifaceted image of her proportions and appeal as a body. 
The description of the size of her limbs links her to the psychoana-
lytical fetishist scheme, beside which Barnes evokes the language of 
religious fetishism in the way she is treated “as if she were an idol,” 
and compared to a church—only to be exposed as mortal and vulgar. 
She is either a pet or a beast, depending on the mood of others. Dusie 
thus resembles an empty locus that can take on any meaning and 
serve the purposes of others, with her own agency only present in 
an animistic sense, not different from a magically animated idol—a 
doll. Like Robin, Dusie is equally fetishized by the characters and the 
text; in this case, also Katya’s narration picks up just these details and 
persuades the reader, by way of “Madame,” to accept and feel these 
ambiguities and unconventional metaphors with her “n’est-ce pas?”
Yet Dusie soon proves to have her own agency, too, which mani-
fests in her “vulgarity”: when ill, she asks “every woman” if they love 
her, but as they answer in the affirmative she throws them out of their 
room, to be left alone and to play with toys instead: “When they were 
gone, thrown out, she would sit up in bed and amuse herself with 
the dolls they had brought her, wooden animals and tin soldiers, and 
again she would cast them from her with cunning energy” (CS, 407). 
Dusie oscillates between the figures of the doll and the large but help-
less child. She is a doll with a will of its own, a fetish that is capable 
of fetishizing others, too, therefore resembling Apter’s reading of the 
“feminine collectible” (Apter 1991, 43).
The narrative draws attention to parts of Dusie’s body and, as it 
were, enlarges them similar to an act of dismemberment that Taylor 
recognizes in Nightwood (Taylor 2003, 182–187).59 On the other hand, 
an act of dismemberment also adds a parodic twist to the fetishism, 
exposing the fetishized members as capable of sensing, in this case, 
pain. The drama is played out as Dusie invites Katya to her room, 
where they lie naked in bed, talking about countries and cities that 
the cosmopolitan Katya has visited. They are interrupted by a knock 
on the door; Dusie leaves and Katya hears another woman, Clarissa’s 
“sharp” voice and feels “that there was evil in her visit, and the 
teaching of evil, and a thing to be done with the heart of Dusie” (CS, 
410). She falls asleep, but is woken up by Dusie who tells her to go 
sleep in another room. In the morning, she goes back to Dusie’s room 
to get her dress and finds her crying, her foot crushed and bleeding. 
Madame K enters, takes the foot in her lap and says, without weeping 
59  Taylor also refers to Barnes’s play manuscript “Madame Collects Herself,” in which 
Madame Zolbo is constructed of the body parts of her former lovers (Taylor 2003, 183).
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as Katya expects: “You see how it is, she can think no evil for others, 
she can only hurt herself” (CS, 411).
It is unclear, and perhaps unimportant, who in the end has hurt 
whom, and the pain is not actually rendered experiential by means of 
focalization. Katya merely presents the crushed foot and even the cry 
of pain as one of the elements of the scene and the drama, again fore-
grounds theatricality. The story weaves a dynamic of playing, being 
played and hurting and being hurt, in which Dusie, albeit idolized and 
infantilized, is both a victim and a perpetrator. Pain can be fetishized, 
but broken limbs and wounds in general are less frequent in fetishist 
fantasies that usually involve unbroken wholeness. In “Dusie,” the 
wound, the blood, and the painful cries complicate the image of Dusie 
as a doll-like, empty-but-whole fetish. Naomi Schor has shown how 
the fetishization of wounds in the work of George Sand challenges 
the phallocentric theory of fetishism and enables more “polycentric” 
readings of fetishism as a strategy available for women to slip out of a 
binary gender order, and to be seen as fetishist (Schor 1995, 93, 95). On 
the other hand, as a bleeding idol, Dusie points toward the realm of 
religious fetishism and magical thinking especially in the context of 
Catholic imagery such as bleeding statues of Christ and the saints, a 
visual tradition also recurrently evoked in Barnes’s fiction. Like Rhys, 
Barnes complements the Marxist-Freudian thinking of fetishism with 
other forms of animistic belief, drawing from the sphere of religion. In 
this way, the fetish as a magical, (even if profane, vulgar, and bleeding) 
idol does not fall neatly into the dynamic of lack and representation. 
The agency and power of the idol rather point toward the plenteous-
ness (even in incompleteness and imperfection) also implied by the 
concept; there is an enhancement rather than concealment of lack, 
“everything” and then some rather than “nothing.”
3.2.2. Little Women, Large Boots
Dusie is an ample woman composed of large parts, with a specific 
mention of the size of her shoes, all of which are in contrast with her 
depiction as doll-like and childlike. Large shoes, more often specifi-
cally boots, are another repeated motif, although they are often also 
worn by small women. In “The Grande Malade,” (1925)60 another story 
with Katya and “Madame,” one of the leitmotifs is a pair of boots, albeit 
absent ones. Katya remembers her father and his “tall shining boots 
that caught him just under the knee” and resolves: “Some day, when I 
have money, my shoes will be higher and come under my knee” (CS, 
60  Originally published as “The Little Girl Continues”; a revised version had a new title in 
Spillway 1962.
130 131The Agency of Things
394–395). Monsieur x (sic),61 the lover of her sister Moydia, promises 
her “a pair of great boots” (CS, 399), but falls ill and dies; the sisters are 
eventually given his cape, but no boots.
In “The Grande Malade,” the absence of boots is paired with the 
absence of the almost abstractly masculine figures of father and 
Monsieur x. They are positioned as phallic fetish objects and can be 
said to signify lack, but this lack is located in the paternal instead 
of the maternal sphere.62 In yet another way, Barnes has turned the 
Freudian discourse of fetishism at least partly around: it is the young 
woman, Katya, who fetishizes the boots as a token connected to 
her father. For her, the boots would be a talisman of power and an 
enhancement of her body; she “rambl[es] on about father and his 
cap and boots” and “rages” that her own boots are too short when 
performing a drunken “Tartar dance” to her sister and Monsieur x 
(CS, 399). The fetishist of this story is not a boy afraid and in denial of 
imaginary castration (of the mother), but a girl wishing to appropriate 
a phallic accessory belonging to her absent father. Furthermore, 
the thematic of lack seems to be challenged by how “full” the girls’ 
life already is: Moydia forgets Monsieur x quite easily, but keeps the 
“tragique” air that the death of the lover has lent her, along with the 
lover’s cape of which she seems to make another talisman that builds 
her own character. Katya briefly laments that “in the debacle my 
boots were quite forgotten,” but the sisters already have other things 
in mind, like going to America: “we speak a little French; now we 
must be moving on” (CS, 403).
Despite the absence of the male characters, I would claim that the 
objects fetishized by the girls signify excess instead of lack. Is it then 
even fetishism that we are dealing with here? It is justified to discuss 
the things in these stories, too in the context of fetishism, for several 
reasons. Firstly, the repeated use of motifs related to leather, boots, 
whips, and horses is so steeped in the tradition of phallic symbolism 
as well as allusions to sadomasochism, which evokes the whole 
pre-Freudian discourse of sexual “pathologies,” that it is impossible 
to ignore. Secondly, if we take into account the original meaning of 
the term ‘fetish’ related to religious, animistic practices, and feminist, 
post-Freudian accounts of fetishism that complicate the Oedipal 
scheme with the reintroduction of this meaning as well as materiality 
and the senses, Barnes’s fetishism as such begins to make sense as 
61  Always typeset in the lower case.
62  The mother of the girls, however, is even more missing, but not missed, it seems; she is 
never mentioned in the “Madame” stories. Perhaps her place is successfully filled by the said 
Madame.
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can be seen in the case of Dusie. As an animated magical talisman 
that has what Boscagli calls “performative power” to do things to the 
world and to the human subject, the fetishes-without-lack remain 
fetishes (Boscagli 2014, 50). The sexual content of the fetish is not 
erased in this process, but it does become more complex. The focus 
on the way the desired thing is used and enjoyed through the senses 
reveals a the agency of both the subjects and objects of fetishism, 
which is present in the religious context but lost in the sexological and 
psychoanalytical ones.
The dynamic between fetishism and the senses is strongly present 
in “A Night among the Horses,” (1918, revised version 1962), a story 
that also lent its name to one of Barnes’s published short story collec-
tions (1929). It is another story of a play of domination and submission 
between characters that come across as both fetishists and fetishized 
objects. The focal character, John describes Freda, the “lady of the 
house”: “[…] that small fiery woman, with a battery for a heart and 
the body of a toy, who ran everything, who purred, saturated with 
impudence, with a mechanical buzz that ticked away her humanity” 
(CS, 249). Freda is unlike Dusie in that she is described as “small and 
fiery” instead of large and absent-minded. On the other hand, she 
is like Dusie in her resemblance to a nonhuman anthropomorphic 
fetish object, like a mechanical doll with a will (if not a mind) of its 
own: “She darted and bobbled about too much, and always with the 
mindless intensity of a mechanical toy kicking and raking about the 
floor” (CS, 252).
Freda has decided to “make a gentleman” out of John (CS, 249), 
who attempts to resist, but submits to a game of cat and mouse with 
sexual innuendoes. The game is played out through things such as 
Freda’s “aggravating yellow veil,” which according to John “stood for 
nothing but temptation” (Ibid.), and “objects of culture” like miniatures 
and ancient books with which she “torments” him (CS, 251). She also 
tempts him with imaginary tokens of phallic power:
“You will rise to governor-general—well, to inspector”
“Inspector!”
“As you like, say master of the regiment—say cavalry 
officer. Horses, too, leather, whips—.” (CS, 250)
Their interaction is referred to as “a game without any pleasure” in 
which both parties are debased and “on the wings of vertigo,” which 
on the other hand does hint at pleasure (CS, 250). The whip is one of 
the objects that embodies simultaneous suffering and pleasure: the 
couple ride together, and John, angry at Freda’s provocations, lashes 
at her boot with his whip. Because of this encounter between the 
materials of two fetish objects, Freda also appears as a thing: “the 
foot flew up in its stirrup, as though she were dancing. ⁄ And the little 
beast was delighted!” (CS, 249–250). A part of her body becomes inde-
pendently animated, like that of a toy, but an animal-like pleasure is 
also introduced.
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The vertigo-inducing mixture of torment and delight goes together 
with the two characters’ ontological wavering between thing and 
human, object and subject. Freda sees her pursuit as a humanizing 
one: “I’ll step you up from being a ‘thing’. You will see, you will enjoy 
it” (CS, 249). John, on the other hand, doubts his future after their 
hypothetical affair, using the same word:
He wouldn’t fit in anywhere after Freda, he’d be 
neither what he was nor what he had been; he’d be a 
thing, half standing, half crouching, like those figures 
under the roofs of historic buildings, the halt position 
of the damned. (CS, 251, emphasis in the original)
In the game of power in which the characters of the story are involved, 
an ostler is a “thing,” but so is an ex-ostler, not fit to his new role as a 
gentleman and perhaps abandoned by his gentlewoman. The liminal 
area between the two subject positions, in which John is caught, does 
not seem any better. Freda holds a masked ball in which she would 
like to have John take part as a human fetish object with his whips 
and boots: “Come […] just as you are, and be our whipper-in,” she 
suggests, which is taken by John as an “unpardonable insult” (CS, 
253). Instead, John dresses in the conventional evening clothes of a 
gentleman, as a desperate gesture of independence. He cannot avoid 
standing out as a curious thing, however: “he was the only person 
present therefore who was not ‘in dress’, that is, in the accepted sense” 
(CS, 253). There is no way out: he would be thingified equally by his 
old clothes and the new costume.
At the same time, John is also shown to have feelings and sensory 
experiences that would not be attributed to a thing. The story begins 
and ends on the night of the masked ball, and in these scenes of the 
narrative present, descriptions of sense experience pertaining to the 
body and its surroundings complicate the possible ways of reading 
the character between human and thing. John has just escaped the 
ball, using his crudely phallic gentleman’s cane as a magical item 
of protection; this event is narrated later in the story discourse: “He 
stepped free, and with the knob end of his cane, he drew a circle in 
the rosin clear around her, then backward went through the French 
windows” (CS, 254). The beginning of the story, narrating the result 
of his escape before moving to the events preceding it, is an inverse, 
parodic parade of symbols of masculine, upper-class power: “Toward 
dusk, in the summer of the year, a man in evening dress, carrying a 
top hat and a cane, crept on hands and knees through the underbrush 
bordering the pastures of the Buckler estate” (CS, 247).
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However, the propositional image of “a man” quickly becomes an 
invitation to imagine an experiencing, embodied subject who feels 
pain in his wrists and whose drunkenly confused feelings of the 
shaking ground, his beating heart, and surrounding odors and lights 
the story evokes. As in Rhys’s “Mannequin,” readers are first given 
the character as an object solidified into an image and given spatio-
temporal coordinates (“Twelve o’clock. Déjeuner chez Jeanne Veron, 
Place Vendôme,” LB, 59; “Toward dusk…”) which are then endowed 
with a rich inner life that resonates with its environment, by virtue 
of cues for embodied enactment of experience. The vividly depicted, 
intermingled textures of the underbrush and John’s evening dress 
contribute to the reader’s ability to imagine John as an experiencing 
subject rather than a fetish or a “thing”: the scene suggests the tactile 
feel of grass, twigs and earth in his hands, and his knees covered by 
the fine fabric of the evening dress. The end of the story discourse 
finds him in the same situation, undecided between a desire to go 
back to his horses, and ambition to try and succeed as a gentleman. 
The horses, however, are free on the field, and fail to recognize John 
as he tries to wave at them. He is apparently destroyed as the horses 
trample him, which makes the story of power and seduction also a 
tragedy. The ending is made more powerful by the embodied experi-
entiality suggested by the image of John in his formal attire crawling 
in the underbrush, which has the potential to lead to the reader’s 
sensory imaginings, and an attribution of experience to the fictional 
body of John. Thus, the fictional materiality of this body, combined 
with its material surroundings makes him simultaneously a fetish 
and an experiencing subject.
In “The Grande Malade,” the motif of boots contributes to a version 
of female fetishism where lack is replaced by excess. In “A Night 
among the Horses,” both characters are simultaneously too much and 
not enough. Things have power over people, who see themselves in 
danger of becoming a thing, yet the way their contact with things is 
described in the stories potentially makes them feel more like expe-
riencing subjects and lived bodies in the reader’s imagination. This is 
akin to what Boscagli refers to as fetishism that “produces an erosion 
of the boundaries separating humans and objects,” a practice where 
the subject’s own materiality becomes molded by the object (Boscagli 
2014, 53). An inversion is evident here, too, as it is the masculine 
gender that is exposed as masquerade, instead of the usual fetishized 
attire that accompanies the female body. However, the abundant 
richness of Barnes’s short stories also encompasses forms of feminine 
masquerade, on which the next section will focus.
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3.2.3. Laces, Corsets, and Furniture:  
The Case of the Madames
In the Freudian framework fetish qualities are applied to women’s 
shoes and underwear metonymically, based on their proximity 
to an imaginary, absent phallus. The fetishization of certain items 
of women’s clothing in general has already been pointed out by 
pre-Freudian sexologists., n his 1887 essay, “Le fétichisme dans 
l’amour,” Alfred Binet cites several cases of “perverts” fetishizing 
women with certain types and items of clothing such as handkerchiefs 
and nightcaps, or wearing these items themselves. As Jann Matlock 
points out, even though Binet features fetishist women as well, his 
principal interest is in the ornamented adornment that women 
have “invented” and men desire, “the garb women can endow with 
fetishistic powers for men” (Matlock 1993, 39). By the end of the 19th 
century, there was a considerable difference between male and female 
dress: men had renounced flamboyant pieces of clothing, fabrics and 
colors, and shifted to more “rational” and simple, less colorful suits, 
while women in public still tended to be corseted, in long dresses and, 
depending on their socioeconomic position, heavily adorned. Parts of 
such dress have remained fetishist staples to this day.
Barnes also evokes something of a 19th century and fin-de-siècle 
style in her short fiction written a few decades later. Instead of 
featuring the non-corseted, short, sports-inspired gowns made 
popular at the time, her stories for the 1910s and 1920s hark to days 
of more complicated dress. This has to do with the texts’ general 
tendency to intertextual evocations of the art and literature of the 
previous century, yet Barnes’s way of dressing the characters is also 
an indicator of the discourses of 19th century and turn-of-the-century 
fetishism. Furthermore, it is known that Barnes frequented lesbian 
communities where cross-dressing was common, but she herself 
preferred to dress quite conservatively feminine, albeit in dramatic 
and impressive clothes (Caselli 2009, 27–34). Without explicit refer-
ences to female cross-dressing, her fiction presents dress in general 
as a form of masquerade and artifice, as was apparent in the case of 
John’s being simultaneously in dress and not in dress for the masked 
ball. The characters are paired with items of furniture as elaborately 
decorated as themselves, again suggesting their thing-likeness and 
artifice. However, as in the cases of the dolls, boots and items of male 
dress, the masquerade is always coupled with ways of evoking a sense 
of materiality and bodily feeling.
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While in Barnes’s work some of the masculinized items of clothing 
such as the boots above are worn by explicitly small women, the 
detailed description of feminine dress often accompanies a larger, 
older lady. However, both types of characters are endowed with an 
unmistakable aura of strength and power. Women referred to as 
“Madame” are present in Barnes’s short fiction, not only as the anon-
ymous listeners in the cycle of stories narrated by Katya, but also as 
actual characters. Their shared traits relating to fetishism and the 
trope of the phallic woman require a brief analysis of this pool of 
characters in conjunction with, although not going very deep into the 
storylines in which they figure.
Madame K— of “Dusie” is described as “large, very full and blond,” 
with an aphoristic addition that “[s]he went with the furniture as 
only a childless Frenchwoman can” (CS, 405). We do not learn much 
about her dress, but her “going with the furniture” hints at something 
elaborate and abundant, these being the properties of the furniture in 
her house as described by Katya. In her salon, she embodies power 
as well as wit and reason, having kept from her days as a physician 
a capability to “remove” an argument “within the exact bounds of 
its sickness” (CS, 406). In “The Hatmaker” (1996)63 the protagonist is 
also an independent professional living in a splendid house (“a sort 
of Schönbrunn,” CS, 468). She is named simply Madame, and she 
runs not a salon but a hat maker’s workshop with younger women 
as apprentices. She, like Madame K—, is linked to excess and plenty; 
her house is “filled” with “Louis Quinze chairs, Empire sofas, dolls, 
crazy jades, heavy Buddhas, and Roman busts” (Ibid.). As if explic-
itly playing with the definition of woman as negativity drawn by 
Freudian fetishism, the author writes that “[…] she could not write a 
letter that was understandable, being incapable of employing a nega-
tive in any sentence” (CS, 469). Both women are made thing-like by 
their parallelization with the furniture (and hats) with which they are 
surrounded, but at the same time they are shown to gain a talismanic 
power from these surroundings, in addition to seemingly being 
“filled” with power in several ways, thanks to a large or refined body 
(although we know of Madame in “The Hatmaker” only that she has 
been told “she resembled Récamier,64 was a little like the Gioconda 
and had Early Italian bones,” CS, 470), and an independent social 
status or even exact monetary worth, as in “The Hatmaker”: “In the 
year nineteen hundred and thirty-two Madame was worth half a 
million dollars” (CS, 469).
The fetishized “objects of culture” and the intricate decorations 
of the houses in these two stories lend support to the bodies of the 
women like the whalebone in a corset. A similar pattern can be seen 
in “The Coward” (1917), although there is no explicit mention of a 
63  The first publication of the story is in The Collected Stories.
64  Probably a reference to Juliette Récamier (1777–1849), who held literary salons in Paris 
at the beginning of the 19th century, yet it also evokes a piece of furniture, a chaise lounge, “the 
Recamier,” that was named after her.
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“Madame.” In this story, Varra, the focal character, realizes the basis 
of her alleged courage:
 
This reputation of hers had been built of the things 
the house was built of, the daily household sayings. It 
was in the atmosphere; it was a household quality, a 
something that had been given life by all these things that 
surrounded her, and she abruptly realized that it was with 
the household that she was trying to bury herself. (CS, 161)
Varra’s power, her courage, rests on her house and the things in it, 
comprising both material things and “sayings,” linguistic practices. 
Later in a difficult situation when her lover is arrested for theft, Varra 
wants to bury herself within all this. These things do not come across 
as clear fetish objects, but they have a similar function in the story: to 
enhance and support the character. Matlock cites Magnus Hirschfeld, 
a turn-of-the-century sexologist who claimed that “clothes make the 
body” (Matlock 1993, 40): clothing molds the form of the body that is 
visible in public.
In “Mother,” Lydia Passova is given a name, but otherwise she too 
conforms to the Barnesian type of “Madame”:
Her long heavy head was divided by straight bound 
hair. Her high firm bust was made still higher and still 
firmer by German corsets. She was excessively tall, 
due to extraordinarily long legs. Her eyes were small, 
and not very focused. The left was slightly distended 
from the long use of a magnifying glass. (CS, 301)
Everything about Lydia, including the plentiful jewelry she owns and 
deals in (see Section 2.3.1) is high, tall, long, and multiple—with the 
exception of the eyes—they gain a metonymical relation to bigness 
through the magnifying glass (and one is physically bulged). The 
German corset adds firmness to the description. It carries an allu-
sion to sturdy, German-made ware, and evokes the character as an 
embodied being imaginable by a reader, who is invited to enact the 
feeling of something tight around one’s body. Further, in addition to 
the jewelry surrounding her in the pawnshop, she is made larger in 
contrast to her male lover, “a little nervous fellow” (CS, 302); this is also 
a recurring character type for Barnes.
In “Aller et Retour,” the main character, Madame von Bartmann, 
is also “a woman of great strength” (CS, 362); she is large and heavily 
jeweled, and her “bosom was tightly cross-laced, the busk bending 
with every breath” (Ibid.). Her husband has just died, and she 
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describes him as a “queer, mad fellow” (CS, 367). The tight corseting of 
large, strong women as a repeating motif evokes femininity in several 
of its normative, material senses (parts of body and dress), but omits 
everything fragile and submissive as well as the idea of negativity and 
lack; these qualities are replaced with power and fullness. Barnes’s 
corseted “madames” eat the cake and have it too. Madame von 
Bartmann’s character actually blends the support of feminine under-
garments and the phallic motif of boots: she wears “tan boots laced 
high on shapely legs” (CS, 362). Therefore, these stories and characters 
again point toward fetish objects, this time corsets and shoes, more as 
talismans of power than as a signifier of lack. There is still absence 
and lack in the stories, even the kind that in its slightly twisted and 
ambiguous way refers to the Oedipal family scheme. There is no 
mother present in “Mother,” for instance; the lover’s mother keeps 
sending him money, and Lydia is set as her present substitute, very 
real in her materiality. However, as in Nightwood, once again the 
whole woman is missing and has been replaced. If we interpret that 
she has been replaced by Lydia as a fetish offered to the reader (and to 
the little nervous lover, perhaps), there seems to be more than enough 
to fill the lack; the corseting also contributes to a sense of firmness 
and wholeness, or, in this case, more-than-wholeness, bulging and 
transgressing bodily boundaries. Thus, Lydia may well be a thing-
like fetish, but thanks to the bodily, sensory experience described for 
readers to enact, she also emerges as an indicator of a lived body.
These examples show how Barnes’s stories create their own brand 
of fetishism. It shares some characteristics with the “female fetishism” 
that Schor introduces in her essay on George Sand: the introduction 
of wounds to the realm of desire and the use of the thematic of the 
masquerade. It also highlights the dual dynamics of objectification 
between the fetish and the fetishist, which Apter calls for in her affir-
mative readings. However, there is more to it, literally. The repeated 
tropes of excess and abundance transform the fetishism in the stories 
from a fantasy and disavowal of lack to a fantasy of plenty, power, and 
wholeness, or even bulging excess. The negation of negativity is at the 
heart of Freudian fetishism, but in Barnes’s hands this double negative 
becomes positive. The fetishized things—the corsets and boots, whips 
and dolls—are removed from the sphere of symbolic representation of 
the absent signified, and entered into a magical system of talismans. 
Finally, they are exposed in their materiality that is made available 
to the senses of the reader, constructing another kind of wholeness 
defining both fictional things and people.
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3.3 Communities of Commodities 
At the very end of “Mannequin,” when Anna leaves the shop after 
a stressful day of presenting clothes, her exhaustion is replaced by a 
sense of being at home in another still image:
At six o’clock Anna was out in the rue de la 
Paix; her fatigue forgotten, the feeling that now 
she really belonged to the great, maddening 
city possessed her and she was happy in her 
beautifully cut tailor made and a beret. (LB, 69)
As we have seen, Anna is a mannequin and a “type,” and her job is 
to be used more or less as an inanimate dummy might be. However, 
here we have her feeling happy and as though she belongs. Are we 
to read the passage as wholly ironical, as a critical comment on a 
brief moment of bliss in the life of an underdog? Is the feeling itself 
produced by normative notions of femininity and consumership, or 
simply by the fetishist magic that has brought the dummy to life? 
From the previous discussions in this chapter, we can already infer 
that the case is slightly more complex.
In contrast to the historically evocative fashions of dress in Barnes’s 
work, Rhys’s is the world of uncorseted flappers and the “little black 
dress,” the interwar invention of Coco Chanel. In terms of geograph-
ical place and historical time, the characters in Rhys’s Left Bank live 
at the heart of fashion, but they are also marginalized, living precar-
iously and with the continuing threat of losing the small privileges 
they may have secured. Her work also depicts fashion as a necessity 
and a strategy for survival, and directs criticism at the socioeconomic 
structures that create the need for independent women to fight for 
survival in the first place. Rhys’s interwar novels and short stories 
often feature single women struggling to make a living and get out 
of economic difficulties with the limited means available to them. 
Mostly these consist of borrowing money from acquaintances, or 
finding precarious and quite poorly regarded jobs as mannequins, 
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artists’ models, chorus girls, or tourist guides.65 Amateur prostitution 
is sometimes hinted at, as an ultimate recourse, as in “Hunger”: “Has 
she means? She has means. I have been a mannequin. I have been… 
No: not what you think…” (LB, 101; see Mulholland 2012, 455). All 
these “means” are shown to depend largely on relationships, which 
in turn depend on social skills, good looks, and the maintenance of a 
successful impression even in a desperate position. For this purpose, 
an array of gendered commodities including clothes, jewelry and 
make-up is needed.
It is a common trait in the legacy of historical materialism to pair 
the notion of reification with passivity and alienation, seeing the 
increase in purchasable material objects as parallel to an inability 
to belong or function as an agent in the sociocultural environment 
one inhabits. Georg Simmel (1903) links the abundance of goods to 
nervous overexertion, boredom, and a sense of rootlessness; twenty 
years later Georg Lukács combines Simmel’s influence with histor-
ical materialism, stating that “reification” is “the necessary, imme-
diate reality” of an inhabitant of a capitalist society (Lukács 1971a, 197; 
Brown 2013, 282). In this logic, as shown by Apter above, commodities 
have the power to make things out of people; perhaps not surpris-
ingly, women seem to be especially at risk. Simone de Beauvoir writes 
in The Second Sex: “[…] not only does the woman of fashion project 
herself into things, she has chosen to make herself a thing” (Beauvoir 
1953, 512).
In Rhys’s work, this would be represented by a lonely woman 
clinging to her last personal belongings and looking for means to 
acquire more, drifting in an urban jungle where she ends up being 
at the mercy of other people—and things—in abusive relationships. 
Certainly, these are elements of Rhys’s writing that have been targets 
of its social critique, and have been rightly exposed by researchers 
(see, for instance, Karagouni 2010; Maslen 2009; Britzolakis 2007; 
Zimring 2000; Le Gallez 1990). Paula Le Gallez, however, warns of 
equating the life and comments of the writer with her characters, as 
has often happened with Rhys, who herself has commented:
I’m always being made into a victim… a passive person… 
but the fact is I was active. God knows I hardly think 
I should be copied in the way I lived my life and loves; 
but I didn’t always make a mess of them, and I wasn’t 
always the abandoned one, you know. (Devlin 1979, 114)
Rhys did not wish to be thought of as a victim, nor is it justifiable 
to see her characters merely as such. Le Gallez suggests that the 
“’Rhys woman’ is passive only in a culturally determined way, and 
that underlying this attitude is an ironic awareness that the quality 
65  Rhys herself worked in all these professions. Unlike Rhys, however, her heroines are 
rarely writers.
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is actually part of the feminine condition in the society in which she 
lives” (Le Gallez 1990, 4). This is an important observation, but this 
study proposes going slightly further into investigating the alleged 
passivity of the characters, and its relation to the world of things, in 
an effort not to solidify the “feminine condition” as victimized more 
than the texts suggest. As in the discussion of fetishism, the analyses 
strive to remain open to all the readings the texts afford, including not 
only the negative and the problematic, but also the good and hopeful. 
In Rhys’s case, as we began to see before in this chapter, it is especially 
the characters’ depiction as lived bodies, feeling and sensing beings 
that can change the picture of the critical potential of the texts, too.
There is a risk involved in assuming that commodities related to 
women’s fashion are somehow more artificial and more dehuman-
izing than other commodities. If one acknowledges the extent to 
which our everyday conception of humanity depends on clothing and 
other material things, one might find that the opposite is true. Maroula 
Joannou has successfully called to attention the ways in which Rhys’s 
fiction evokes the sense of urgency involved in fashion: in Kaja 
Silverman’s words, “clothing is a necessary condition of subjectivity” 
(Joannou 2012, 464; Silverman 1986, 147). As Joannou suggests, what 
makes Rhys different from her contemporaries writing on fashion 
and modernity, is “her refusal to divorce fashion from the feelings of 
the women who purchase and display it” (Joannou 2012, 486). This 
section asks, how the human characters in Rhys’s stories are depicted 
as experiencing the owning and desiring of material things, and what 
positions are inscribed for the reader in relation to these human-thing 
communities introduced in the text. Things are not involved in these 
imaginary communities only as background props or symptoms of 
a society gone wrong. They do things also beyond fetishist fantasies 
of animation; they are participants in an assemblage that emerges 
between the human and nonhuman agents on the pages of the story 
and the embodied reader turning them.
3.3.1. Having Something of One’s Own
Rhys’s characters often regard other people with suspicion, as poten-
tial competitors or abusers. However, her work is also full of moments 
of intersubjective, emotional connection between different characters, 
and descriptions of circumstances that create a sense of belonging 
and ensuing happiness, often brief but very vivid, and almost 
always involving the vivid presence of material things. The things 
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are perhaps made livelier by the fact that they are scarce, as are the 
descriptive passages in most of the short stories in The Left Bank, but 
not only for stylistic reasons. In these stories, many of the characters 
are shown to hover above an abyss, the possibility of having nothing, 
and the prospect of eventually becoming nothing themselves. 
Therefore, when personal possessions are described, they stand out: 
a reader is invited to feel they are crucial to the story as well as the 
character to whom they are attributed.
As observed in Chapter 2, public and liminal spaces are more 
common loci than domestic ones in Rhys’s work, and characters are 
often shown to inhabit other geographical locations than their home 
country. In the Left Bank stories set in Paris, the epithet “Anglo-
Saxon” is repeated in association with many major and minor char-
acters. It is synonymous with not quite fitting in Paris, being “down 
on her luck,” “incongruous about the shoes,” “a failure, a tragedy” 
(LB, 114, 54, 132). The focal characters are shown to be sensitive to the 
atmosphere of unhomeliness, and to look for something to help them 
to attain a feeling of belonging. In “La Grosse Fifi,” the queerly moth-
erly Fifi consoles the unhappy Roseau, who admits she is crying for a 
man. Fifi suggests graphically that she kick him out of her life: “…Put 
him at the door with a coup de pied quelque part.” (LB, 176). Roseau’s 
response is typical of Rhys, combining tragedy and irony: “‘But I 
haven’t got a door’, said Roseau in English, beginning to laugh hyster-
ically. ‘No vestige of a door I haven’t—no door, no house, no friends, 
no money, no nothing’” (Ibid.). In “Illusion,” Miss Bruce’s principal 
problems, as interpreted by other characters, are both that she is in 
the hospital, and that she has none of her things with her: “Nothing at 
all, pauvre Mademoiselle,” laments the cleaning lady in her boarding 
house (LB, 31); “she must at least have nightgowns and a comb and 
brush” (LB, 32). In Rhys’s world, when in a predicament, what one first 
needs may well be the things closest to the body, the clothes and the 
equipment for maintaining (minimal) appearances. This is the basis 
from which one can meet and face up to other people and accept help; 
in T. S. Eliot’s words, one needs to “prepare a face to meet the faces 
that you meet’ (Eliot 1963, 3; cited in Joannou 2012, 478). For this need 
there are both obviously practical reasons, as well as ones related to 
magical thinking.
In the fields of anthropology and sociology, a type of interaction 
between human and nonhuman agents has been raised in the discus-
sion of intersubjective sharing through inanimate objects, and the 
being-with-things always involved in intersubjective being-in-the-
world (Lehtonen 2008; Miller 2008). In his anthropological study of 
the habitants of a London street, Daniel Miller proposes a bold pattern: 
the closer one’s relations are with everyday objects like home decora-
tions, the closer they are likely to be with people as well. Conversely, 
empty apartments correlate with lives empty of social contact and 
often empty of a sense of meaning (Miller 2008, 1.) Inanimate, material 
things that compose one’s personal belongings, one’s stuff, are part of 
an aesthetic order that communicates continuity of values, beliefs, and 
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relationships. Miller uses people’s ways of being with their stuff and 
the sense of belonging as an argument against a received notion of 
modern alienated existence of individualities in a materialist society 
(Ibid., 286, 293). Even if we do not see a direct correlation between 
sociability and stuff, the homeless position of Rhys’s characters might 
explain the way the descriptive focus of the stories rests on clothes 
and paraphernalia, not on interior items, for instance. As we saw in 
Section 2.3, they are the minimal container for a human being, and 
as discussed earlier in this chapter, they also often act as a protective 
armor or a lucky talisman. Clothes can also rarely be taken from one, 
even if everything else can. In the beginning of “Mannequin,” Anna 
is shivering in a short “black cotton, chemise-like garment of the 
mannequin off duty” (LB, 59), while at the end she feels happy and at 
home in her own stylish clothes of good quality.
The texts create an opening for a sympathetic authorial audience, 
to whom such things are clear and meaningful. The embodied joy of 
wearing well-made clothes can be shared by readers quite broadly, 
as it appeals to the feelings of having clothes against one’s body that 
are familiar to all people. As Marco Caracciolo argues, referring to 
the faculties of imagination employed in reading fiction, “If percep-
tion is embodied, then mental imagery must be embodied, too. [It is] 
deeply rooted in our real body and in memories of our past senso-
rimotor interaction with the environment” (Caracciolo 2014b, 160). 
Even though we tend to forget it, clothes are a constant companion 
in our “sensorimotor interactions with the environment”; they are 
unusual in their position of partly belonging to that environment, 
partly incorporated, as it were, to the sensing process and the body 
itself (see Colombetti 2016). This makes the evocation, even indirect, of 
such basic experience, an efficient way of engaging the reader in more 
complex, socioculturally colored experiences that like the sense of 
belonging, can also involve clothes. What Rhys’s text invites readers 
to share is not only an ideology or an attitude toward things, or a 
socioculturally determined understanding of what it is like to own 
things, but also a sense of embodied being-in-the-world that accom-
panies these considerations.
3.3.2. Style, Taste, and Community
Rhys’s short stories are not just about having one’s own clothes and 
things, or not having them. Similarly, there is never a “pure” bodily 
instance of just the sensory experience of wearing clothes: the notions 
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of style, taste, and fashion always accompany such events. In Maurizia 
Boscagli’s definition, style is “the way matter exists,” what gives 
matter a semiotic and communicable dimension in human terms. 
Matter is always also culturally framed and defined, as are bodies that 
can sense it. All materiality is so drenched in style and aesthetics that 
it impossible to discuss it without them, yet style has not yet been a 
prominent feature in new materialist discourses (Boscagli 2014, 25). 
This is understandable given the desire to explore materiality apart 
from anthropocentric categories. However, Boscagli’s suggestion 
merits some consideration. In Rhys’s writing, style, taste, and fashion 
play a significant role.
Taste, if we follow Pierre Bourdieu, is a competency of relating to 
(among other things) the material reality acquired unconsciously 
through habituation to a certain environment (Bourdieu 1979). 
Fashion, then, could be defined as the commodified art of changing 
styles, which affects and is affected by taste (Wilson 2007, 3). Rhys’s 
characters are influenced by fashions and have formulated their 
taste accordingly; what they see in individual (decorative) objects is 
either style and beauty, or the lack of them. Sharing a regard for some 
objects as delightful and good creates human groups and communi-
ties, and these objects are used to transfer emotions to other human 
beings; ideas of happiness are conveyed by a shared orientation 
toward “happy objects” (Ahmed 2010, 35).66 In Rhys’s fictional world, 
it seems important to many protagonists that they have beautiful, 
possibly expensive or at least not cheap-looking things, to get by in 
the consumer society; when this desire is paired with a constant lack 
of money, problems and even tragedies occur. However, this sort of 
taste is also a source of aesthetic pleasure in clothes and other things 
and creates an embodied sense of belonging, which cannot simply be 
read in the light of socioeconomic positions and relations.
The combination of economic necessity and aesthetic pleasure in 
relation to style and things is what makes it interesting to consider 
Edith Wharton’s The House of Mirth (1905) as an intertext so far not 
explored for some of the stories in The Left Bank. In the American 
belle époque, Wharton’s heroine Lily Bart leads a life more luxurious 
than any of Rhys’s women, but it is still precarious. She alternates 
between skillfully managing her social position (finding a wealthy 
husband), and acting carelessly or rebelliously against it. She states: “A 
woman is asked out as much for her clothes as for herself. The clothes 
are the background, the frame, if you like: they don’t make success, 
but they are a part of it.” (Wharton 2000, 22.) However, besides a func-
tional view of clothes as the frame of success, she is shown constantly 
enjoying the sensory qualities of beautiful surroundings, with a 
66  The notion of happy objects will be explored more thoroughly in Section 4.1.1.
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horror of everything “dingy.”67 Rhys’s heroines are equally conscious 
of style and aesthetics related to commodity culture, which in the 
twenty years of time between the texts has become even more widely 
available. However, what is different is the way these commodities 
are “singularized,” acting as more than a background or a frame (see 
Tischleder 2014, 25).
Just as having nothing of one’s own against the skin is portrayed 
as tragic in The Left Bank, so is being bound to interiors that are 
bare or unpleasant. Rhys repeatedly uses words such as “empty” 
and “blank”68 that are equivalent to Wharton’s “dingy” to describe 
an unpleasant interior. As a narrative strategy, human beings can be 
thingified to form a part of the bleak environment: even the famous 
café Le Dôme is rendered unpleasant by “unpainted faces” that look 
“bald and unfinished,” or the painted ones that are like “cruel stains in 
the sunlight,” as in the story “The Blue Bird” (LB, 131). Conversely, even 
living-spaces that do not amount to a home, or commercial spaces 
that are public rather than private by definition, can become home-
like if they contain homely or just aesthetically pleasing things, as 
was noticed in the previous chapter. This might still be ideologically 
in line with Miller’s anthropological observations, but also introduce 
more possibilities: the space that enhances belonging need not be a 
privately-owned home, if it has “stuff” one cares for.
In “Mannequin”, the splendid shop and showroom interiors are 
contrasted with the mannequins’ “bare and cold” dressing room (LB, 
61). Their lunch room, “the regions of utility and oilcloth” (LB, 63), is 
described as follows: 
She was in a big, very low-ceilinged room, all the 
floor space occupied by long wooden tables with 
no cloths... She was sitting at the mannequins’ table, 
gazing at a thick and hideous white china plate, a 
twisted tin fork, a wooden-handled stained knife, a 
tumbler so thick it seemed unbreakable. (LB, 63)
67  Dinginess seems to be a quality that threatens to take over her whole existence. The 
early comment, “Who wants a dingy woman?” points at the tragic inevitability with which 
Lily’s life slips toward loss (Wharton 1990, 22). Babette Bärbel Tischleder (2014) thoroughly 
discusses inanimate things, taste, and aesthetics in The House of Mirth. 
68  In Good Morning, Midnight, an oppressive employer, who is set to represent an entire 
patriarchal system, is called Mr. Blank, which emphasizes the negative meaning Rhys’s work 
puts on the word.
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Anna, the focalizer might be down-and-out, and lucky to get the 
place even “at an exceedingly small salary” as she remarks, (LB, 60), 
but this does not affect her taste: we see her gazing at the hideous 
tableware in almost comical disbelief. Nevertheless, she calls getting 
the job as mannequin, with a dose of irony, “this dazzling, this incred-
ible opportunity” that she thinks she owes to her legs (LB, 59). Anna is 
shown wavering between a clear sense of taste combined with a sense 
of self-worth, and a tendency toward ironic self-thingification.
The co-dependency of self-respect, economic position and style 
is a recurring theme in the collection. The thematic is verbalized in 
“Discourse of a Lady Standing a Dinner to a Down-And- Out Friend,” 
in the “Lady’s” thoughts, presented in parentheses between her lines 
of speech (the story consists entirely of the alternation of the two): 
“A woman supposed to be starving ought not to go about in silk 
stockings and quite expensive shoes” (LB, 105). The “down-and-out” 
woman’s responses are not included in the story discourse, but it is 
evident that the readers’ sympathies are invited to reside with her. The 
story indeed seems to promote the dignity of the underdog, and a look 
at the practical side of aesthetics: it was not probable to make money 
by selling one’s stockings or shoes,69 but keeping up appearances 
might help in securing a more stable income. The “Lady” of the story 
is shown to contradict herself in disapproving of her friend’s looks 
and alleged loose manners, but covertly wondering, why she does 
not use them to extract money from men (presented with ellipses, 
like most of Rhys’s references to prostitution): “[...] these people with 
not enough to eat. You can’t trust them with men...”; “And there is that 
man opposite making eyes at her. Quite a good-looking man. Well, if 
she is that sort... Well, why doesn’t she?” (LB, 106–107, emphasis in the 
original). What is more, the reader has no access to what the down-
and-out friend thinks about style or how she feels within her clothes, 
but it is quite intuitive, by virtue of experiential knowledge of different 
materials, for a reader to imagine that it feels better to have silk stock-
ings and “expensive” shoes, regardless of their potential contribution 
to socioeconomic mobility.
In this story, it is made clear that feelings of fellowship are absent 
between the two women. In “Mannequin,” the lunch scene of the 
typified models has much the same effect. However, what is intriguing 
is that Anna’s sense of being surrounded by mannequin dummies 
instead of people is most strongly present in the shabby lunch room, 
where she is also surrounded by aesthetically unpleasant objects 
and dressed in her uniform-like cotton chemise. In the showroom 
with “white and gold walls,” “staring at a marvelous nightgown,” 
she feels exhausted, but is comforted by a friendly saleswoman, who 
grasps her feeling of pointlessness, but encourages her to go on (LB, 
69). The ending, quoted at the beginning of this section, again marks 
69  “You cannot get any money for women’s clothes in Paris,” complains the narrator of 
“Hunger” (LB, 100). See also, Joannou 2012, 486.
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a sense of belonging. I suggest that the tailor-made suit and beret in 
this scene are something essential for the sense of belonging and a 
sense of agency contrary to the notion of objectification as alienation. 
Anna’s feelings are clearly brought about jointly by the clothes and 
by having a place to work and a community to work with, even if it 
is a community of doll-like “types.” Joannou sees “Mannequin” as an 
“acerbic commentary upon alienated female labour” (Joannou 2012, 
482), which it doubtless is; its belonging is of a normative nature and 
can be seen as restrictive and objectifying. Yet the feeling of belonging 
it evokes invites the reader to conceive of Anna as a feeling subject, 
not as an object.
In “Tea with an Artist,” a sense of belonging is similarly built 
on everyday things. The narrator meets a Dutch painter called 
Verhausen in a Paris café. When she goes to Verhausen’s studio 
to look at his paintings, a tea table is set for the two. Unlike in 
“Mannequin,” the setting enables a sense of belonging and a sort 
of understanding between two human characters. The style of the 
table is the opposite of the mannequins’ lunch room: “On the table 
was spread a white cloth and there were blue cups and saucers and 
a plate of gingerbread cut into slices and thickly buttered” (LB, 76). 
There is a tablecloth, the tableware is not “hideous,” and even butter 
has not been spared. On the wall, a collection of smoking pipes make 
the room “Dutchly homely” (LB, 77).70 The hominess of the setting is 
also enhanced by language: the painter announces in “astonishingly 
good English” that he has made English tea because “[t]wo cups 
of tea all English must have before they contemplate works of art” 
(LB, 77). The narrator seems to be at ease, and describes the artist’s 
personality as “comfortable and comforting” (Ibid.). The reader is 
invited to imagine the tokens of “Englishness” and Dutch homeliness 
in an artist studio in Paris, and react to them either by sharing the 
feeling of belonging, or possibly being amused by this description of 
precarious belonging, with a hint of pity for the characters. I would 
argue that both readerly positions are likely, and can even exist 
simultaneously, in relation to Rhys’s text. The comfort and happiness 
depicted are acutely imaginable, but there is always also an ironic 
dimension that actually exposes the normative dimensions of the 
characters’ taste in “happy objects”: they indulge in a moment of 
conservative, Northern-European bourgeois comfort in the middle 
70  The pipe is a masculine or phallic object that probably already in the 1920’s carried 
connotations of tradition, rural culture or indigenous peoples, in contrast to the urban, 
modern and feminine cigarette (Connor 2013, 156).
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of bohemian Paris, both quite apparently in a socioeconomically 
unstable situation and far from the ideal toward which they seem to 
momentarily orient themselves.
“Tea with an Artist” is followed by the three stories set in the 
Caribbean islands (“Trio,” “Mixing Cocktails,” and “Again the 
Antilles”), which also convey a sense of hominess and a description of 
settings slightly different from the rest of the collection. This sequence 
of themes is repeated in the 1939 novel Good Morning, Midnight, in 
which a visit to a primitivist painter’s studio in Paris causes Sasha to 
remember vaguely an image of a Caribbean past and feel safe enough 
to cry. Sasha too has tea with the artist, although the room is less 
cozy and the encounter eventually less direct, more business-like 
than Sasha had perhaps hoped. Nevertheless, the connection with 
the Caribbean context, which often represents a lost home in Rhys’s 
work, is achieved in these stories not only through objects of art (in 
Good Morning, Midnight, paintings, masks and béguine music), but 
also through the sense of home bound to material detail, home deco-
rations and food. Similarly, in “Mixing Cocktails, the cocktails create 
a link between with the Left Bank stories set in Paris restaurants with 
their cocktail offerings.
From the fragments analyzed above, it is clear that that inani-
mate things are present, and even necessary, also in human-human 
encounters in the stories. I would like to emphasize the sense of 
necessity that surrounds objects of style that are considered excessive 
and luxurious. By condemning such feelings as part of the lures of 
the commodity fetish, one would risk demonizing and trivializing a 
feminine sphere of life. Rhys’s writing participates in social criticism 
too, by depicting the urgency of a cultural context, which is moving 
away from the rigorous world of Wharton’s The House of Mirth, but 
still carries some of its values and customs. To make it in the social 
reality, a woman must succumb to a certain amount of reification 
of human relations. However, it is not the stylish clothes and things 
that thingify the woman. Rather, they make it possible for her to be 
counted as human in this context and join a community. This is in 
no way an exclusively feminine requirement; Verhausen is “human-
ized” by his “Dutchly-homely” tableware and pipes just as much as 
Anna in “Mannequin” is by her “tailor made and a beret.” They are 
humanized both in the sense of shared normative understanding of 
style and taste, and the embodied feeling of the things that can be 
shared between people. Besides being vehicles for social require-
ments, commodities as meaningful but material things are also 
sources of embodied feelings of pleasure, which then connect to more 
cognitively conceptualizable states of belonging and happiness and 
their sociocultural connotations, which will be further explored in 
Chapter 4. Through things, the characters are constructed as expe-
riencing subjects and agents. The final sections of this chapter turn 
from communities to constellations, exploring nonhuman agencies 
beyond fetishism and even beyond human relations as they appear in 
Djuna Barnes’s work.
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3.4 Entanglements of Humans  
and Things
The scene is set but seems the actor gone.
— Djuna Barnes: Antiphon71
In “Dusie,” the bodies of the characters are surrounded by elaborately 
described things. In fact, the mode of the story, like most of Barnes’s 
stories, is descriptive. The excerpts below are only approximately half 
of the descriptive passage dedicated to Madame’s house, in a story 
that is less than eight pages long:
The house was very French. All gold and blue, and, in the 
boudoirs, pink. There were three, but the part of the house 
I saw most often was blue and white, with much lace and 
gold. The walls were blue satin, and hanging from tasselled 
cords were many golden framed women hung. […]
There were many chrysanthemums, and a long 
white harp in the embrasure of the window, and in the 
dust lying upon it many women had written “Dusie.” 
And above all, in an enamelled cage, two canaries, 
the one who sang, and the one who listened.
But in the boudoirs there was much pink, and 
everything was brittle and glazed and intricate. 
Ribbons dangled from everything and bon-bons 
were everywhere, and statuettes of little boys in satin 
breeches, offering tiny ladies in bouffant skirts, fans 
and finches and flowers, and all about in the grass 
were stuck shiny slinking foxes. (CS, 404–405)
71  Barnes 1958, 8.
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A list-like description such as this one conveys both the importance 
of detail and a sense of the whole, which according to Julie Taylor is 
what makes Barnes’s writing enjoyable: “Not to pay attention to the 
particular things is to miss out on most of the pleasure, but the nature 
of abundance conveyed by the list as a whole is equally important” 
(Taylor 2012, 156, emphasis in the original). The repetition of certain 
quantifying and qualifying words in the list of this passage extends to 
a spectacle of plenteousness ad absurdum: “many chrysanthemums,” 
“many women,” “much pink,” “long harp”; “everything,” “every-
where,” and “all about.” The material luxury depicted does not come 
across as the reverse to a lack or a loss in some other domain. There 
is pain, too, in the triangle drama that results in the crushed foot, 
later in the story, but all this is presented rather as part of the excess 
than as its balancing other. The description of the house bulges with 
luxurious materiality, which becomes more stuff than things: a mass 
of matter in the unstable state of becoming (see Boscagli 2014, 14). The 
choices of words according to which there is so much of everything 
cause the contents of the house to swell beyond its limits.
Katya, the narrator, also describes Dusie and Madame K—, along 
with other women present in the house. However, the most extensive 
and vivid descriptions are devoted to the things surrounding them, 
and they also come before the characters in the discourse of the 
story. This is not quite a standard procedure of building up charac-
ters with the help of their surroundings, because the abundance of 
the preceding descriptions of environment and things all but swal-
lows up the character. The form of Barnes’s descriptions and her 
employment of detail will be the main topic of discussion in Section 
5.2. In this chapter, “Dusie” and other texts sharing these features are 
discussed from the point of view of agency and the wavering distinc-
tions between human and nonhuman bodies. The suggestion is that 
the stories invite a reading in which agency is distributed between the 
human and the nonhuman, even more strongly than in Rhys’s fiction, 
and that this new materialist conception of agency contributes to the 
subsequent analyses of affectivity and meaning-making.
In “Dusie,” agency appears as a constellation of human and 
nonhuman elements, and idea that can be supported by new mate-
rialist thinking. According to Karen Barad, the habitual way of 
conceiving of individual agency is inadequate. Instead, she suggests 
that agency emerges in constellations involving more than one 
party, out of which any number can also be nonhuman and even 
ones that can be considered inanimate. Agents not only interact in 
these constellations, what she calls “phenomena”; they themselves 
are also constituted in and through them: “agencies are only distinct 
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in relation to their mutual entanglement; they don’t exist as individ-
ualelements” (Barad 2007, 33, emphasis in the original).72 
Such a formulation calls for a question: if I am to follow this line 
of thought, then how do I justify all the talk of things? Following the 
observations in cognitive sciences and phenomenology on which 
this study is built, while living in a world of such entangled agencies, 
humans still tend to experience the world as divided into things, even 
if physically considered they were made of innumerable micro-agen-
cies. A table, a book, and a building appear as separate things with 
their specific affordances as do more abstract entities such as “the 
government” or “the university,” or even other people, as bodies occu-
pying space. 
Barad, drawing on and developing the natural sciences, has an 
alternative point of view to offer researchers of human activities 
and institutions, and this study takes up the challenge offered by the 
theory of agencies as profoundly entangled and emerging in what 
Barad calls “intra-action” (Barad 2007, 33).73 Barnes’s texts are largely 
constructed in and for a world made of discernible things, human and 
nonhuman. It is possible to simultaneously take the cognitive-phe-
nomenological perspective to things as they are experienced, but 
also be aware of the possibility to think differently, and remain open 
to instances where the experience actually supports a more intra-ac-
tive, entangled interpretation instead of a neat division into things as 
separate agents.
Considering the experiential participation of the reader into these 
phenomena gives reason to foreground the role of affectivity in distrib-
uted agency, in the manner of Jane Bennett (2010). Bennett’s notion 
of “vibrant matter” conceives of agency, following Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari (2013), in assemblages, “confederation[s] of human and 
nonhuman elements,” in which the force of the confederation is more 
than the sum of its parts, although the parts need not be completely 
constituted by one another, as in Barad’s account (Bennett 2010, 23, 21): 
72  At the background of this view, also influenced by Latour’s actor network theory, are 
empirical findings in the field of quantum physics. However, Barad shows how the approach 
is applicable to a wide array of philosophical questions, including ones pertaining to society, 
ethics, art, and literature. The entangled phenomena she is referring to are mixtures of what 
we might habitually call material and cultural; in this vein of thinking, the distinction may 
cease to matter. Barad emphasizes the importance of nonhumans in distributive agency 
(Barad 2007: 32), yet she also specifies that the use of the term ‘posthumanism’ in denoting 
a “posthumanist performative account” “marks a refusal to take the distinction between 
‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ for granted” (Ibid.), a will to see them as profoundly entangled, and 
to investigate the very practices in which these poles are enacted (Ibid., 139).
73  As distinctive of interaction, which would imply the previous independent existence of 
the agents.
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Assemblages are not governed by any central head: no one 
materiality or type of material has sufficient competence 
to determine consistently the trajectory or impact of the 
group. The effects generated by an assemblage are, rather, 
emergent properties, emergent in that their ability to make 
something happen […] is distinct from the sum of the vital 
force of each materiality considered alone. (Ibid., 24)
An assemblage such as the combination of the things and human 
characters in the descriptive sections of “Dusie” gains its potential to 
affect—in this case, the reader—through the grouping of the different 
material agents. The force of this argument lies, firstly, on the decon-
struction of the boundary between matter and life. It enables looking 
at humans as well as nonhumans and things as simultaneously 
material and potentially animate bodies. To address the agential 
potential in nonhuman existents in a text, we thus need not limit our 
scope to instances of personification, fetishization, or even communi-
ty-building. Secondly, the notion of the affective body as a party in the 
emergence of agency is a fruitful one for the reading of fictional texts, 
as it enters into dialogue with the embodied cognitive approaches to 
reading and narrative referred to in this study.
This chapter will first illustrate the agency of material things and 
their co-operation with character-descriptions, and then discuss the 
ways Barnes’s characters, often verging on nonhuman themselves, 
figure in these assemblages. The aim is to offer ways of reading 
Barnes’s fiction that would recognize the thing-like in humans and 
the agency of things, and simultaneously shed light on the appeal that 
both have for readers, leading toward the more detailed discussion of 
affectivity in the following chapter.74
3.4.1. Things as Fictional Agents
In the passage from “Dusie,” there are multiple human elements 
present, beginning from the fact that most of the things are human-
made and infused with human culture and style. We recognize rococo 
elements in the color scheme and in the anthropomorphic statuettes 
of boys in breeches and tiny ladies; there are paintings described as 
“golden women,” and even the intrusion of the character, Dusie, in 
the way her name is written in the dust on the surface of the harp. 
The whole is observed through the human eyes of Katya. The house 
encompasses all these things, the boudoirs afford dreams and encoun-
ters, the dust makes up the words, the statuettes seem to be engaged 
74  The analyses in the following two sections, with the exception of those related to “Dusie,” 
are based on observations published in an article in On_Culture 2 (Oulanne 2016).
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in a completely independent activity, while adding their ambiguous 
gestures to the total “phenomenon” of the house. On the level of read-
er-text interaction, the materialities of language participate in the 
action: the form of the list of items linked with commas and conjunc-
tions creates a sense of plenty, while the synesthetic potential of words 
such as “bon-bons,” “glazed,” and “brittle,” as well as the sense of accu-
mulation evoked by the repetition of “many,” invites an embodied, 
schematic understanding of the abundance of things. The words on 
the page give the impression of having gathered75 there to make up the 
plenitude of fictional things gathered in the fictional house.
Additionally, the length and the position of the description of 
materialities in the narrative discourse is worth noticing: it appears 
before the detailed description of either of the main characters, 
although their names have been mentioned. The things are presented 
as though it was they who made up the action of the story, and they 
interrupt the flow of readerly interest in the direction of characters 
and events: what are Madame K— and Dusie like? What is going 
to happen to them? We can imagine these questions more vividly 
because of the inclusion of “Madame” as the listener of the story in 
the fictional world. Instead, however, Katya’s narrating voice provides 
a flood of decorative objects small and large, along with pets, dust, 
furniture, and fabrics, which continues long enough to leave a multi-
sensory impression on the reading mind. The description constitutes 
a fictional assemblage with the power to affect a reader, in addition to 
the more ambiguous power the things seem to have in the fictional 
world, engaged in a gathering all their own, where characters are 
invited only as quick references.
How does such an effect of things act as a constellation created 
in readers? Bennett writes of an experience of being “struck” by a 
random arrangement of debris she encounters on a Baltimore street:
In the second moment, stuff exhibited its thing-power: 
it issued a call, even if I did not quite understand what 
it was saying. At the very least, it provoked affects 
in me: I was repelled by the dead (or was it merely 
sleeping?) rat and dismayed by the litter, but I also 
felt something else: a nameless awareness of the 
impossible singularity of that rat, that configuration 
of pollen, that otherwise utterly banal, mass-
produced plastic water bottle-cap. (Bennett 2010, 4)
75  As Bill Brown (2016, 29) notes, the Germanic origin of the words “thing” and “ding” refers 
to a gathering, a political assembly.
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We could argue that the fictional assemblages of objects, such as 
the ones described in “Dusie”, are capable of setting the stage for 
“enchantment” and fictional encounters phenomenologically resem-
bling the one described by Bennett. Such passages consist of deictic 
gestures offering the reader a specific array of things: “that” cage, 
those canaries, tassels, chrysanthemums, and statuettes. In providing 
a thing as a fictionalized focus of attention, they have the capability 
to defamiliarize and thereby make the things tangible and, paradox-
ically, more real (see Shklovsky 2004). In Bennett’s description, the 
things are not animated or personified, but they have a capacity to 
affect: “the figure of enchantment points in two directions: the first 
toward the humans who feel enchanted and whose agentic capacities 
may be thereby strengthened, and the second toward the agency of 
the things that produce (helpful, harmful) effects in human and other 
bodies” (Bennett 2010, xii).
As she is the human narrator of the passage, Katya’s body yields 
itself as a proxy, to align the reader’s “virtual” bodily experience with. 
However, a human body in the fictional world is not required for the 
production of such experientiality. In instances that can be called 
“figuralization,” an “empty deictic center” in a passage without a char-
acter experiencer is filled by readerly immersion (Banfield 1987, 273; 
Fludernik 1996, 192–207). Therefore, it can be argued that a text implies 
a human subject and thereby a lived body even if one is not explicitly 
mentioned. This was mentioned in Chapter 2 with reference to the use 
of light as a proxy for focalization, even in the presence of a character. 
“Finale” (1918), for instance, is a two-page story narrated extradiegeti-
cally and focalized by an empty deictic center; the focus roams around 
a room at the center of which lies a dead man in a coffin, surrounded 
by candles and mourners. Clearly, there is no “lived” body inviting 
projection or attribution of experience: “Everything else in the room 
seemed willing to go on changing—being. He alone remained cold 
and unwilling, like a stoppage in the atmosphere” (CS, 232). 
The focalization of “Finale” contributes to the ambiguity of the 
story in relation to the bodies presented: the categories of animate⁄
lived and inanimate, passive, and active do not coincide neatly with 
those of the human and the nonhuman. The dead body seems “cold 
and unwilling,” but physically speaking it certainly is “changing” 
and “being” in its way: the biological processes of its decomposition 
must already be in action. Around the dead man, the human and 
nonhuman elements in the room, all included under the scope of 
“everything,” are still living. There are the kneeling bodies of his wife, 
mother, and children, explicitly lived; we learn from the narrator of the 
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mother’s weeping, the girl’s damp palms, the boy’s private, pleasurable 
memory of rubbing his head against a nurse’s arm. There are also 
burning candles, and in the corner, “the dead man’s dearest possession: 
a bright blue scarf embroidered with spots of gold” (CS, 233). The scarf 
has been acquired during a brief romantic encounter in Italy. It has a 
history of experientiality in sensory contact with the man’s once-lived 
body: “It was a lovely thing, but much treasuring had lined it; and the 
marks of his thumbs as they passed over it in pleasant satisfaction had 
left their tarnish on the little spots of gold” (Ibid.).
After this description of the room, the narration marks the passing 
of time by introducing growing shadows. The end of the story moves 
from stagnation to action, but with a nonhuman agent:
A large rat put his head out of a hole, long 
dusty, and peered into the room.
The children were going to rise and go to bed soon. The 
bodies of the mourners had that half-sorrowful, half-bored 
look of people who do something that hurts too long.
Presently the rat took hold of the scarf and trotted 
away with it into the darkness of the beyond. 
One thing only had the undertaker forgotten to do; 
he had failed to remove the cotton from the ears of the 
dead man, who had suffered from earache. (Ibid.)
In this story, the form of the human body is not clearly present in a 
focalizer’s fictional body, but the room is full of more and less thing-
like bodies that still invite experientiality. The characters are empha-
sized as bodies in postures, which arguably invite readers to resonate 
experientially with their briefly narrated personal experiences, and 
by a general reference at the end, with what it is like to “do something 
that hurts too long.” In the description of the scarf, a clear opening 
for a reader’s enactment of bodily experience comes in the reference 
to the man’s thumbs having touched it. Traces of human agency and 
experience become entangled with nonhuman elements: the rat is the 
most vivid, fast-moving agent in the story, while the scarf is described 
in the liveliest manner. The human bodies are all silent and thing-
like except for their briefly narrated experiences of grief, while the 
corpse keeps changing its own, invisible way. The last sentence of the 
story returns from the entrance and exit of the rat to the slow rhythm 
of description, the changing and being of bodies. It foregrounds the 
contrast between a live and a dead body by pointing to the point-
lessness of the cotton in the ears of a dead man, which are no longer 
capable of hearing nor hurting; paradoxically, the mention of earache 
may be enough for the activation of some readers’ bodily memory of 
such an experience.
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No character in the fictional world of “Finale” is shown to recog-
nize these goings-on between the human and nonhuman: the scarf 
steeped in experientiality and the rat, or the cotton in the ear. The 
scarf has been held dear and caressed, but is now forgotten; the 
once helpful, now out-of-place cotton is ignored, making a part of 
the body-turned-nonhuman of the dead man. I suggest that these 
encounters, revealed by the narrator of the story as if behind the 
backs of the mourners, are crucial for the story’s potential to strike 
and enchant the reader. The rat, unlike the one in Bennett’s descrip-
tion, is a very lively one, but also the scarf has some vividness both 
in its color and its having attracted the dead man as well as the rat; = 
most importantly, it is described so vividly as to leave a mark on the 
reader as well. Solicitations of sensory experience in the story are not 
reducible to the human fictionally actual bodies, but arise between 
them and the nonhuman ones. Furthermore, were there no descrip-
tions of or hints toward experience, readers would be able to project 
them to the description of the scarf, for instance: an introduction of a 
scarf in a story at least evokes a sense of how it feels to wear one.
As shown by the analyses above, readerly capacity to be affected by 
a story reaches beyond representations of human bodies and experi-
ence. Readers respond to fictional things, firstly, because they have 
their own experience of sensing and otherwise dealing with actual 
things, being-in-the-world as three-dimensional bodies themselves. 
They do not read descriptions of material detail passively, waiting 
for the human agent to come along. The experience of agency in the 
stories emerges in the affective assemblage of fictional elements, both 
human and nonhuman, in their materiality, grasped in the materiali-
ties of language by material readers in a lived body, all molded by the 
very experience of the phenomenon of reading. The stories experi-
ment with techniques where the representation of human experience 
is delayed or removed, but they still invite readers to draw on their 
experiential background, a reservoir of experience of life shared with 
things like those presented in the stories. This does not mean they 
need the actual experience of completely “similar” things: the stories 
give cues for basic, bodily experience in the ways they point out the 
materials, textures and colors of the items.
3.4.2. Characters as Thing-like Agents
Djuna Barnes’s characters often challenge interpreters with their 
caricature-like impenetrability. This will be the topic of more detailed 
discussion in the context of affects and emotions in Chapter 4.2, while 
this chapter focuses on the thing-like sides of the characters from the 
point of view of agency, which is already closely linked with affec-
tivity. Barnes’s characters have often been likened to animals, (see 
Taylor 2008; Rohman 2009, 2007). The most often-mentioned example 
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of such characters is Robin Vote, the elusive and deceptive lover in 
Nightwood, who is cited here as an example of a type of character also 
present in Barnes’s short stories. According to Carrie Rohman (2007, 
131), Robin “figures nonidentity as a form of subjectivity, where the 
nonlinguistic, the undecidable, and the animal serve to revise what 
counts as human.” Clare Taylor sees Robin as the manifestation of a 
fantasy of wholeness that Nightwood shows to be destructive (Taylor 
2003, 168–169). is introduced in the novel when she is seen by her 
future husband Felix Volkbein and doctor Matthew O’Connor, lying 
unconscious on the bed in a luxurious hotel room. As Rohman points 
out, the passage evokes a sense of smell, which locates Robin in the 
“realm of animality” (2007, 66): she is said to exude an odor with a 
“quality of that earth-flesh, fungi […] texture of plant life” (N, 31).
Other features in the passage point toward the “realm” of 
nonhuman things, which also have consequences for how readers 
are invited to imagine Robin. The narration of the story takes its time 
before reaching Robin’s body, passing first by way of a carpet, two 
windows and several furnishings and decorations:
On a bed, surrounded by a confusion of potted plants, 
exotic palms and cut flowers, faintly oversung by the 
notes of unseen birds, which seemed to have been 
forgotten—left without the usual silencing cover, 
which, like cloaks on funeral urns, are cast over their 
cages at night by good housewives—half flung off the 
support of the cushions from which, in a moment of 
threatened consciousness she had turned her head, lay 
the young woman, heavy and disheveled. (N, 30–31)
As in “Dusie,” the narrating voice of Nightwood seems to lose 
itself in details of things, plants, fabrics and birds in cages, evoked 
in a multisensory manner (the birds, for instance, are not seen but 
heard, and afterwards also Robin’s smell is mentioned). The result is 
a tableau vivant that could be a parody of “The Sleeping Beauty.” The 
scene is also compared to a painting by Henri Rousseau (1844–1919) 
and thereby to a jungle, where human and nonhuman agencies are 
further mixed: “she seemed to lie in a jungle trapped in a drawing 
room (in the apprehension of which the walls have made their 
escape), thrown in among the carnivorous flowers as their ration […]” 
(N, 31). The picture features the figure of a female human being, but 
the sheer amount of sensory information from nonhuman elements 
in general overrides (and “oversings”) the human form.
Similar patterns of character presentation emerge in many of 
Barnes’s stories. In “A Boy Asks a Question” (1923), Carmen la Tosca 
is a famous actress spending her holiday in a village. The main event 
of the short narrative occurs when a neighborhood boy of fourteen 
156 157
approaches Carmen, a well-known “woman of the world” (CS, 346), 
with a question vaguely related to the nature of love. The resulting 
discussion is equally ambiguous, and the aesthetic focus of the story 
is, again, rather on a spatial tableau than on temporally organized 
action. Like Robin, and like Dusie at the end of her story, Carmen is a 
pictured in bed, surrounded by a multitude of materialities:
Carmen la Tosca breakfasted in bed, and late. Having 
caught herself out of sleep in a net of bobbin-lace, she 
broke fast with both food and scent, lazily dusting 
her neck and arms with perfumed talc, lolling on the 
bed (which stood between two ovals of pear-wood, 
framing versions of Leda and the swan), ripping 
through the wrappers of Puerto Rican journals and 
French gazettes with the blade of a murderous paper-
cutter, and finally, in the total vacancy of complete 
indulgence, her hand sprawling across a screaming 
headline, would stare out into the harsh economy of 
russet boughs, pranked out in fruit. (CS, 346–347)
Carmen, too, is surrounded by fabrics, furniture, art, small objects, 
and plants. The structures of agency suggested by the verb forms 
of the passage are ambiguous: Carmen has “caught herself out of 
sleep,” in a net of lace, whose way of participating in the action is 
not specified. This description evokes the sense of smell like the one 
from Nightwood, but it also introduces sounds that foreground the 
very materiality of the words of the passage as well as the things and 
actions they denote: there is “ripping through the wrappers” and a 
“screaming headline.”
In “A Boy Asks a Question,” as in Nightwood and “Dusie,” the 
description of the surrounding space does not simply support the 
construction of the character around whom all the things are gath-
ered. They may appear as more vivid than the character itself, and 
override the human agent by their sheer volume, and thereby have 
more potential for affective agency in relation to the reader. On 
the other hand, it is the body of the character and the thing-bodies 
together that make the vivid tableau. The richness of different mate-
rials invites the reader’s bodily, sensory imagination, and the human 
body among the things, while providing itself as a lived body, is also 
a thing-like body with a virtually imaginable surface and dimen-
sions, occupying space. None of these bodies in Barnes’s assemblages 
needs to be seen as an agent in itself; it is the whole that makes up the 
tableau at the center of the story.
In a stagnant scene like this, the thing-likeness of human elements 
is more plausible, yet even characters who are presented as more 
“animated” and perform actions in Barnes’s fiction, retain a close 
relationship with the nonhuman. In Nightwood, as Robin wakes up, 
rises from the bed and begins to move about in the fictional world, 
she never sheds the sense of being a mixture of human, animal and 
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thing. She drifts from marriage with Felix to childbirth and alien-
ation from both, and further into a relationship with Nora Flood, 
which does not stop her drifting. Her actions are not involuntary, 
but rather their motivations are kept a mystery from the readers, 
and thereby she remains pronouncedly a body occupying space, 
a surface. At the end of the novel, after another period of absence, 
Nora and her dog find Robin in an abandoned chapel. She begins 
miming the dog, falling to the floor, barking, and crying; this scene 
has puzzled scholars. Here, too, the “surface” level of Robin’s action 
may be more important than the psychology behind it. Barnes 
herself has commented: “I do not go any further than this into the 
psychology of the ‘animal’ in Robin because it seems to me that the 
very act with the dog is pointed enough” (Barnes, letter to Coleman 
11 July 1935). Such unreadability of characters and its relationship to 
affectivity and gestures will be discussed further throughout the 
following chapters. As affective agents, Robin, Carmen, as well as the 
women of “Dusie” and the lived bodies of “Finale,” are characters the 
reader follows and experiences virtually as lived bodies, even though 
they are foregrounded as thing-like. Applying embodied cognitive 
approaches to narrative study suggests that the structures of focal-
ization and readerly projection can be what takes readers beyond 
the clear-cut human⁄nonhuman divide. The imaginary experi-
entiality of the characters emerges in the phenomenon of reading 
together with readerly reactions to the characters chiefly as bodies, 
a condition they share with the nonhuman things surrounding them. 
 
The discussions of this chapter have shown how human and 
nonhuman fictional agencies are entangled in Rhys’s and Barnes’s 
fiction. They range from the ambiguous power relations in fetishism 
to the interaction of humans and things in communities, and in 
affective assemblages that involve the reader: a body simultaneously 
human and thing-like herself. As Bennett describes her work: “One 
moral of the story is that we are also nonhuman and that things, 
too, are vital players in the world” (Bennett 2010, 4). The experience 
of reading fiction is dependent on material, nonhuman agencies as 
well as human ones; the two also share several traits, and readers are 
capable of seeing both as expressive, be it through magical animation 
with the help of literary devices, or simply something they have been 
accustomed to thinking of as mere ‘stuff’ surrounding the allegedly 
meaningful characters and events of a story. The following chapter 
will ask more detailed questions about how this ‘stuff is conceived of 







It was odd, she thought, how if one was alone, one leant to 
things, inanimate things; trees, streams, flowers; felt they 
expressed one; felt they became one; felt they knew one, 
in a sense were one; felt an irrational tenderness thus […] 
as for oneself.  
— Virginia Woolf:  To the Lighthouse76
Human beings “feel” material things via the sense of touch, along 
with other senses. We also have feelings for them; we are touched by 
them. Barnes and Rhys show characters experiencing recognizable 
emotions such as desire, fear, anxiety, happiness and contentment 
accompanied by a concrete feeling of a material thing, and sometimes 
clearly directed toward such a thing. In other cases, it seems that the 
things, along with the human characters’ bodies, have the role of 
expressing an emotion, mood or ambience. Even more often, a single 
emotion or mood is not identifiable, but the reading of the stories 
nevertheless gives a sense that the things participate in general affec-
tive shifts. Besides, there are also characters, like the ones encountered 
in the previous chapter, who somehow resemble things: flat charac-
ters, impenetrable minds, and bodies moving in mysterious ways. 
Nevertheless, readers are capable of feeling for and with them, too.
Feeling for and being touched by material things is not easily 
expressed in the language of literary studies. Emotions tend to be 
attributed to readers, characters and possibly implied authors. Things 
are there for support, projection and mediation: like in the passage by 
Woolf quoted above, they are leant to “if one was alone” and felt for 
“as for oneself,” as surrogates for human contact and self-reflection. 
Nevertheless, we do have feelings for inanimate things, even fictional 
ones that appear on the pages of a book, directly without mere human 
interest, even while our being human affects our reading and the ways 
we subsequently interpret these feelings. “What a lovely dress; soft 
cushion; dull room; scary dark alley; funny hat!” Such slight affective 
evaluations in the reader make up a great part of the reading of a story. 
The “affective turn” in the humanities has resulted in heightened atten-
tion to the body and emotions, and new syntheses between body and 
mind, reason and passion (Clough 2007, 1). Affect and emotion have 
gained visibility in the field of literary studies as well. Patrick Colm 
Hogan (2011) suggests that the structures (events and actions, plots and 
76  1927, p. 53.
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even genres) of narratives are profoundly shaped by how our emotions 
work; Jenefer Robinson (2005) argues that unconscious, affective 
appraisals guide our reception of literature and art and are necessary 
for the understanding of some works of fiction.
modernist literary works often associate inanimate things with 
feelings. In a strict sense of high modernist poetics, they can act as 
a manifestation of the objective correlative of T. S. Eliot, symbolic 
images that provide access to an emotion by showing rather than 
telling. The quotation from To the Lighthouse provides us with various 
other roles things might have, especially when it comes to prose 
fiction. In Woolf ’s fiction, as well as in Jean Rhys’ and Djuna Barnes’s, 
even more obviously thing-like things than streams and flowers, 
such as shoes, dresses, books, chairs, and liquor bottles are present 
in abundance, to be involved in affective dynamics that involve their 
human companions, characters and readers. A cape or a gun, a 
painting or the texture of a fabric can be among the most powerful 
things to remain in the memory of a reader of one of these writers’ 
stories. Maurizia Boscagli (2014, 13) suggests that modernist texts are 
prone to pair material things with affective and somatic responses in 
both characters and audiences. However, the conscious, interpretive 
eye tends to glide over affective things in fiction, perhaps registering 
them as a motif but then waiting for more human fictional entities, a 
character or a narrator, to provide a meaning for the feeling evoked by 
the presentation of the thing.
This chapter points out moments of affective intensity in Barnes’s 
and Rhys’s stories, in which material things are involved. The discus-
sion introduces further complexity to the notions of subject and 
object as tools of analysis. How do things participate in the creation 
of emotions and affects in fiction? Is it a question of surrogation 
and projection of emotions whose actual “target” would be another 
human being, or are things as agents also independently involved 
in the affectivity of the work? What means do the texts use to invite 
their readers to feel for humans and nonhuman things? The discus-
sion of how fictional things gain their potential to affect us leads to a 
better understanding what fictional texts do: how they achieve their 
power to move readers, keep them interested in the story and have 
them leave it with a sense of having been touched.
Conceptually, this text has so far moved quite freely between feel-
ings, affects, emotions and moods, but the terminology requires some 
clarification. There is little agreement about the use of terminology 
in this domain, and it is possible to use these terms as almost synon-
ymous. However, ‘affect’ and ‘affectivity’ are also umbrella concepts 
that can encompass all the other phenomena, or even denote the 
general “interestedness” and value-ladenness inherent to all life 
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(Colombetti 2013). More specifically, these notions evoke affect theory, 
a combination of approaches that foreground the biological and 
impersonal, presubjective qualities of feeling. ‘Emotion’ usually refers 
to short-lived episodes of feeling in an individual, as opposed to more 
pertinent and sometimes impersonal ‘moods’, and feelings that are 
conceptualized by a conscious mind and thus can be named. These 
terms evoke research traditions in the vein of cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience. Emotions are thus linked to human subjects, 
although several studies importantly recognize their intersubjective 
and socioculturally constructed characteristics (see Damasio 2003, 
47; Ahmed 2004). ‘Feeling’ is a more vernacular and general term 
that is used here, too, to highlight the embodied experientiality of 
affects. ‘Affect’, too, has a more specific meaning in which it becomes 
an alternative to emotion. It denotes an ambiguous intensity and an 
instance of being “moved” or “touched,” rather than a conceptualiz-
able psychological event. As explained by Jonathan Flatley: “Where 
emotion suggests something that happens inside and tends toward 
outward expression, affect indicates something relational and trans-
formative. One has emotions; one is affected by people or things” 
(Flatley 2008, 12, emphasis in the original). This definition of affect is 
embraced by the study at hand, because of the way its relationality 
situates affect in encounters between surfaces rather than in the 
metaphorical depths of a human subject (see also Seigworth & Gregg 
2010; Ahmed 2004), which offers more possibilities to describe affec-
tive encounters between people and things.
The notion of affect is related to two different research traditions. 
Psychologist Silvan Tomkins’s influential work, developed later 
especially by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, is charac-
terized by naming of eight or nine primary affects that each arise 
from changes in the intensity of neural stimulation (Sedgwick & 
Frank 1995, 74).77 Thus, Tomkins’s affects resemble various versions 
of lists of “basic emotions” that are recognized by affective scientists 
(Colombetti 2013, 26–29). Significantly, this approach understands 
affect as a phenomenon that surpasses the body-mind dichotomy, 
and arises and is distributed in networks (Flatley 2008, 17; Sedgwick 
& Frank 1995, 74; Gibbs 2010, 191).
The other influential branch within affect theory stems from 
Baruch Spinoza through Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Brian 
Massumi. Massumi defines affect as “prepersonal intensity corre-
sponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to 
another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s 
capacity to act” (Massumi 2013, xv). Diana Coole and Samantha Frost 
(2010, 20) suggest that we see affectivity as a process in which “bodies 
communicate with other bodies through their gestures and conduct 
to arouse visceral responses and prompt forms of judgment that do 
77  For referring to Tomkins’s work, I mostly use the compiled edition Shame and Its Sisters 
edited by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank.
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not necessarily pass through conscious awareness.” Following this 
approach, in this chapter, affects are regarded as embodied, social 
and potentially contagious via different material expressions, but 
not limited to the human sphere. This study benefits from affect 
theory for its inclusion of the nonhuman and the material, but also 
draws from cognitively oriented and phenomenological discussions 
of emotion and affect, especially enactivist and phenomenological 
approaches, which often come quite close to affect theory.
This chapter focuses on the affectivity of material things first in 
Rhys’, then in Barnes’s short fiction. Rhys’ stories invite a discussion 
of the normative, political, and cultural aspects of happiness and their 
resonance with the acute bodily feeling in experiences of happiness 
and belonging evoked by the text. The latter part of the discussion of 
Rhys’s work deals with a more specific and complex case of empathy 
between human beings and things in her work. Section 4.2.1 focuses 
on Barnes’s fiction, with a special interest in the sense of touch and 
its connection to affectivity. Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 discuss the role 
of things in gestures that express and realize affectivity, and the 
specific case of pleasure in material things. The discussion begins 
and ends with positive affect: happiness and pleasure. These feel-
ings have largely been ignored in the study of both Rhys and Barnes. 
Both authors write about characters experiencing positive feelings of 
pleasure, joy, belonging, comfort and bliss in relation to things, but 
it is possible that some previous ways of reading have obscured the 
reality of these affects, by assuming that they are covert expressions 
of another affective state, such as shame, depression, mourning, jeal-
ousy or trauma, which are seen as the principal affective denomi-
nators of their texts (see for instance Czarnecki 2009; Maslen 2009; 
Parsons 2007). Following the same logic, it is easy to view material 
things as covert expressions for the actual human object of the orig-
inal emotion. Recent research has begun to challenge these positions 
(Taylor 2012; Frost 2013), and this study joins them with the addition 
that by paying attention to materialities and sensory experience, the 
affective fields of happiness and pleasure in the texts can be explored 
in all their ambiguity.
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4.1 Nice Things: Belonging, 
Happiness, and Empathy with 
Things in Jean Rhys’s Stories
“Don’t get excited. You know what happens when you get excited and 
exalted, don’t you? […] And then you know how you collapse like a 
pricked balloon, don’t you?” Sasha Jansen warns herself in Good 
Morning, Midnight (Rhys 1985, 351). It is almost a commonplace that 
Jean Rhys’s heroines are unhappy, alienated, down-and-out and 
depressed. As we have seen, the women she creates are usually set 
away from any home, in hotel rooms, streets or cafes of a city that 
they seem to be only visiting, even if indeterminately. Their attitude 
toward the world outside is marked by a sense of separateness, alien-
ation and even hostility. When the characters experience positive 
feelings, it often comes with a caveat for the risk of overdoing it, and 
an acute sense of its fleeting nature. However, moments of pleasure 
and happiness, togetherness, belonging, empathy, and sympathy 
are be notably intense even in the midst of the bleakest stories, and 
often seem to come about with the help of material things. As Laura 
Frost notes, pleasure is indeed a “dominant concern” in Rhys’s texts, 
although it has been overlooked (Frost 2013, 163). Rhys herself seems 
to have had a complex relationship to positive affect. Interviewed in 
The Paris Review, she states: “I’ve never written when I was happy. 
I didn’t want to” (Vreeland 1979, 224). On the other hand, in Harper’s 
Magazine a year earlier, she mentions having derived pleasure from 
clothes, to defy the role already ascribed to her, largely based on her 
heroines, of a victim; an assumption that “I have never had any good 
times, never laughed, never got my own back, never dared, never 
worn pretty clothes, never been happy, never known wild hopes or 
wilder despairs” (Rhys 1978, 70). The comment suggests a connection 
in Rhys’s thinking between “pretty clothes” and “good times” as well 
as their inherent complexity that always hints at negative feelings, but 
not necessarily amounts only to those.
In the following, I use Sara Ahmed’s discussion of happiness to 
look at the part material things play in the evocations of positive 
feelings and affective encounters in Rhys. How does happiness as 
a cultural, normative orientation relate to happiness as something 
experienced, a bodily feeling of pleasure? A sense of belonging can 
be a sign not only of being at home in one’s surroundings and one’s 
body, but also submitting to sociocultural norms to pass as one of the 
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crowd. The suggestion is that a focus on materiality and embodiment 
added to the sociocultural discussion can help in acknowledging the 
latter dimension without it undermining the first, to appreciate the 
critical aspects of Rhys’s work without ascribing excessive victim-
hood to her characters.
4.1.1. Normative and Lived Happiness
In “Learning to Be a Mother” (1927), the narrator has just given birth 
at an obscure clinic, and her friend Colette comes to visit: “Colette 
came as soon as I could see visitors, laden of course with flowers 
and grapes” (LB, 125). The situation is not exclusively happy: the 
narrator feels depressed and unable to “like” her child, and the father 
of the baby is apparently not in sight. A policeman inquiring after 
him is the narrator’s only visitor besides Colette. Gifts are a way of 
passing emotion and orientation and recognizing the importance of 
a certain moment or transformation: “I think grapes and flowers are 
nice things, so I give them to you to celebrate this event” (see Mauss 
2000, 11–12). Thus, they can be included among what Sara Ahmed 
calls “happy objects.” The term pertains not exclusively to material 
objects, but also culturally constructed objects of orientation, such as 
marriage and childbirth.
Sara Ahmed locates emotion in the intersubjective, social sphere, 
as an effect of the circulation of signs and objects (Ahmed 2004, 
45). Emotions are not reducible to objects, nor are they a subjective 
phenomenon, but in constant movement between the two, something 
shared and socially defined. For Ahmed, what defines a group is an 
orientation toward the same objects as “happy” ones (Ahmed 2010, 
35).78 Such communities come with an inherent danger, since they 
create norms for the right and wrong ways to be happy. Ahmed uses 
examples from queer fiction to illustrate the conflict between the idea 
of a heterosexual marriage and family as the culmination of happi-
ness, and other possibilities of a happy life. There is no necessary 
danger of normative inscriptions of happiness in concrete grapes 
and flowers of Rhys’s story. They can exemplify a bond between two 
characters, or an adherence to custom that affords bringing certain 
items to a new mother in hospital. In this scene, however, there arises 
a suspicion typical of Rhys’s work. In the context of the narrator’s way 
78  Ahmed most often uses the term ‘emotion’, but she uses it much in  the way ‘affect’ is 
used here.
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of speaking about herself and her situation, the use of “of course” in 
the passage can denote activity typical of Colette that the narrator 
does not put such importance on, but it also exposes the normativity 
of the situation. Colette is happy about the family event, but for the 
narrator it is more ambiguous. This passage exposes the ironical tone 
in which most Rhys’s depictions of such happy objects are delivered.
Sometimes gifts, along with other happy things, are the stuff of 
daydreams for Rhys’s characters. “He will buy me roses and carna-
tions and chocolates and a pair of pink silk pyjamas and heaps of 
books” (LB, 111), the narrator of “A Night” (1927) describes a fantasy of 
a man she is conjuring up in her imagination, one who will rescue 
her from her unspecified predicament. Before encountering the wax 
“gentleman” and the comforting stranger (see Section 3.1), Dorothy 
Dufreyne of “In the Rue de l’Arrivée” sits in a Montparnasse café, 
dreaming of becoming a famous fashion artist and being “restored to 
a life when afternoon tea, punctually at five, toast, cakes, maid, rattle 
of cups in saucers would be a commonplace” (LB, 116). The narrator 
comments: “Such was Miss Dufreyne’s strange and secret idea of bliss” 
(Ibid.). The dream does not actually seem that strange nor secret. It is 
a version of a stereotypical British ideal, very “commonplace” indeed. 
In Rhys’s writing, such stereotypes are both cherished as safe havens 
and looked at slantly in an ironic or queering perspective. The unre-
ality of the dream man in “A Night” is revealed by the frantic list of 
gifts the narrator imagines receiving from him, in which their rather 
conventionally romantic character is combined with quantitative and 
qualitative exactness (“a pair of pyjamas,” “roses and carnations” as 
opposed to “flowers”). These are normative fantasies, things that are 
socially acceptable for a young woman to dream of (with the excep-
tion of “heaps of books”), presented in a slightly comical tone and 
even marked as “strange.” In Dorothy’s case, the irony is highlighted 
by her encounters on the street with the dismal wax head and the 
comforting, silent stranger, neither of which complies with the norms 
exemplified by the daydream.
At the same time, however, the reader of the stories is invited to 
experience what it is like to have such dreams. This is helped by the 
sensory cues given by the mention of things: an opportunity to enact, 
as fictionally experienced by Dorothy, the rattle of cups, the fabric of 
silk pajamas, the smell of roses and carnations and the taste of grapes. 
These qualities need not be explicitly described, or even ascribed to 
the experiences of a character. I suggest that merely mentioning them 
may act as a cue for the reader’s sensory imagination that draws on 
experiential traces of similar things (see Caracciolo 2014; Zwaan 2008). 
This makes them experientially real and tactile as well as fictional, 
and lends the feeling of “realness” to the potential emotions experi-
enced alongside them; research has shown that emotions induced by 
fictional accounts of experience are similar to ones produced by real 
stimuli (Schroeder et al. 2006, 26–30; Gibbs 2017). Thus, readers can 
get a relatively complex sense of emotional activity even within a very 
short piece of writing like “A Night” (three loosely set pages in the 1984 
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facsimile edition of The Left Bank). They may sense the hopes attached 
to the pajamas, flowers and books, accompanied with a feeling of 
leisure and comfort. The context of the whole story, its focalizer lying 
alone in bed, moving between reverie and insomniac rumination, 
makes these pleasant sensations more ambiguous, but they have a 
great role in making this ambiguity meaningful. The sensory imag-
inings that accompany the reading event actually bring Rhys’s char-
acters (as experiencing bodies) quite close to the reader, even if their 
ironical stance keeps them at a distance (cf. Frost 2013, 206).
“Mixing Cocktails” and “Again the Antilles,” the Caribbean stories 
in the middle of The Left Bank are positioned as though they, too, 
were an enjoyable daydream in the middle of the grim Paris reality 
of the majority of the stories. They are led to by a description of an 
encounter in a Montparnasse restaurant with a Caribbean family 
in “Trio,” and followed by a harsh account of the focalizer’s mental 
stages during five days without food in Paris, in “Hunger.” In “Mixing 
Cocktails,” the child-narrator lies in a hammock on the veranda, 
dreaming of a future full of “sweeping dresses and feathered hats” 
and love affairs, illustrated by “the dark moustache and perfectly 
creased trousers” (LB, 91). These dreams are an unambiguous illus-
tration of a socially acquired orientation toward gendered objects that 
are considered to embody happiness, this time related to the ideas of 
heterosexual romance. In the context of the entire collection, these 
fantasies acquire an ironic tone. There are indeed dresses, hats and 
creased trousers in the lives of the women in The Left Bank, but life 
with them does not always turn out to be happy.
The narrator’s orientation toward the adult community is also 
present in her dedicated duty of mixing cocktails for the rest of the 
family, which she claims to do very well: “I measure out angostura 
and gin, feeling important and happy, with an uncanny intuition as 
to how strong I must make each separate drink” (LB, 92). For her, the 
cocktails are an actual, material (unlike the “virtual” dresses, hats and 
trousers she dreams about) shortcut to adult life as a fully authorized 
subject in a human community, while for the grown women in The 
Left Bank, cocktails serve mostly as treatments for sorrows, although 
they also afford rare moments of bliss (cf. Frost 2013, 193–194). The 
sense of irony in relation to the other stories in the collection is height-
ened by the choice of the word “uncanny” to describe the narrator’s 
skills with cocktails. By its Freudian links to horror and the repressed 
it creates a sense of premonition of the melancholy women sitting in 
Paris cafes with a fine à l’eau. However, like in the previous stories, 
the fact that the narrator feels “important and happy” dreaming in 
a warm, sunny place, should not be dismissed because of the fore-
boding overtones. A reader is invited to spontaneously enact these 
feelings while reading, and they remain as “real” and tangible even 
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when the social structures that support them (heterosexual power 
relations and the link between cocktails and unhappy women) are 
looming in the background.
Similar ambiguity can be read in the scene with the “tailor-made 
and beret” in “Mannequin.” Such stylish clothes are worn by all the 
models in the store. There is pleasure in buying and owning the beau-
tiful things that mark a shared taste and an orientation toward shared 
ideas of happiness, beauty, and femininity. A reader has the choice to 
identify with such pleasure and the feeling of happiness that follows it, 
but also regard it critically, given the overall ironic tone of the collec-
tion. However, there is also a sensory feeling of pleasure in the very 
act of wearing the clothes. Attachment to things is never abstract or 
disembodied: important things must be “kept close to the person,” 
like Louise Purbrick (2014, 9) argues, and clothes cannot shed their 
proximity to the body. The literary construction of Anna’s fictional 
body and its livedness through material things and bodily affectivity 
allows for readerly experience of what it is like to be supported by 
well-chosen clothing in a social situation. This enactment actual-
izes the materiality of the “happy” clothes and brings them to life as 
affect-inducing bodies in both the narrative space and the space of 
reading. The acuteness of the experience thus created challenges the 
readers’ ability to distance themselves completely from the feelings 
ascribed to the character. An ironically sensitive implied reader, who 
is able to decode the tailor-made and the beret as metaphors or even 
symptoms of the consumer society and the objectification of woman, 
does not existseparately from affective engagement. Actually, in their 
affective materiality, the things refuse to be read only symbolically 
or symptomatically. Instead, there is an acute sense of happiness, 
however short-lived, that the reader has to encounter and feel in some 
form while reading and interpreting the text. As Jenefer Robinson 
(2010) suggests, when reading we cannot avoid feeling the emotions 
evoked by the text. Their cognitive judgment comes later and is 
colored by the initial affective appraisal.
Another affective tone that emerges in encounters with things in 
The Left Bank is a sense of belonging and its counterpart, alienation. 
As Sara Ahmed writes:
We become alienated—out of line with an affective 
community—when we do not experience pleasure 
from proximity to objects that are already attributed 
as being good. […] If we are disappointed by 
something that we expected would make us happy, 
then we generate explanations of why that thing is 
disappointing. […] We become strangers, or affect 
aliens, in such moments. (Ahmed 2010, 37)
Rhys’s characters are recurrently pictured as “affect aliens.” The 
ambiguous dimensions of belonging and object-orientations are most 
markedly present in “At the Villa D’Or.” This story marks another 
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change of scenery in the collection, from the dreary prison in “The 
Sidi” to the French Côte d’Azur. The associated ideas of warmth and 
the proximity of the sea place the stories in this part (“Villa D’Or” and 
“La Grosse Fifi”) as parallel to the ones set on the Caribbean islands.79 
In “At the Villa d’Or,” the Villa is filled to the brim with objects that 
imply conspicuous material well-being. Sara is shown in “the depths 
of a huge arm-chair,” observing the room and its people, thinking 
benevolently: “And very nice too” (LB, 155). However, she also thinks: 
“At the Villa d’Or life was something shallow… that tinkled meaning-
lessly… shallow but safe” (LB, 159). The most detailed description in 
the story, as is typical of Rhys’s work, is of articles of dress, including 
Mrs. Valentine’s shoes of gold brocade, her necklace of green beads 
“with which she fidgeted incessantly” (LB, 158), Mr. Valentine’s horn-
rimmed spectacles, and the manservant’s livery. Even the detail of 
the drapery around the waists of “little lady” figures that an artist is 
decorating Mr. Valentine’s bedroom panels with is taken into focus.
The latest example of concealing apparel points at the hypocrit-
ical atmosphere of the house, in conflict with the sensuous pleasure 
offered by the beautiful surroundings. There is also a dehuman-
izing and thingifying touch in the story, as in the description of the 
manservant: “Charles was like the arm-chairs, English” (LB, 156). 
Sara answers “patiently” to Mrs. Valentine’s rambling talk, and agrees 
“politely” to Mr. Valentine’s knowing explanations about stars and his 
propositions verging on indecent (LB, 159, 162). She knows her place 
and her responsibilities as a sponsored guest. The story hints that 
the couple is not that happy after all, for instance that Mrs. Valentine 
seems to feel disgust at a portrait of her husband. In light of this, the 
story comes to seem like another outright account of modern alien-
ation, this time not in an urban environment but in the sunny luxury 
of a home in Southern France.
In the middle of “Villa D’Or,” however, there is a moment of serenity 
as Sara, while listening to Mrs. Valentine, imagines the “silken caress 
of the water when she would bathe next morning,” meaning either 
swimming in the sea or taking a bath (LB, 159). The story ends with 
Sara retreating to her bedroom:
She opened the windows wide and looked out on the 
enchanted night, then sighed with pleasure at the 
glimpse of her white, virginal bathroom through the 
open door: the bath-salts, the scents, the crystal bottles.
She thought again: “Very nice too, 
the Villa d’Or.” (LB, 164)
79  The other story set on the Côte d’Azur, “La Grosse Fifi,” has a further allusion to the 
Caribbean: its focal character is called Roseau, which is also the capital of Dominica, the 
island on which Rhys was born.
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The sensations of the imagined caress of water and the air of the 
“enchanted” night coming in through the window create moments 
of pleasure that are also rendered to the materiality of language, in 
waves of rhythm and rhyme (wide-night-sighed-white). Water as an 
enjoyable element is reified in the bathroom bottles that contain salt 
and scents, and simultaneously banalized by these things set in the 
interior world of the house as opposed to the depths of the nearby sea, 
or the night air. This comparison adds to the ironical dimensions of 
the story. Then again, the sensory pleasure the toilette items are able 
to create does not need to be questioned in order to appreciate the 
irony and ambiguity. They are smaller in size, artificial and conven-
tionally feminine, but none of these features actually justifies consid-
ering them any lesser as affective or pleasure-giving things. The Villa 
d’Or may be a banal and dehumanizing environment, and staying 
in it may mean submitting to some norms of behavior and affective 
orientations that are portrayed as alienating; yet Sara’s “very nice 
too,” not only denotes an ironical submission to normativity but also 
the actual pleasure that the Villa affords, through the enactment of 
which the reader may be more likely to sympathize with Sara’s point 
of view in the ironical and critical sense as well.
Rhys often blends natural and artificial manifestations of materi-
ality, making the latter act as surrogate for the former, as in Voyage 
in the Dark (1934), in which the main character Anna, also from a 
Caribbean island, describes her actions when feeling out of place 
in England: “I would put my head under the water and listen to the 
noise of the tap running. I would pretend it was a waterfall” (Rhys 
1985, 56). In Voyage in the Dark, the scene contributes to a tragic 
rather than happy effect, while Sara’s pleasure in scents and bath 
salts is more clearly ambiguous. Readers are invited once again to 
enact this mixed pleasure of nature and man-made things, and to 
attribute these sensations to Sara’s character. Thus, embodied sensa-
tions brought about by material objects create Rhys’s characters as 
experiencing fictional subjects. At the same time, the evocations 
of happiness and the sense of belonging create a position for the 
reader to take within the text, to partake of these sensations on an 
embodied level, simultaneously with perhaps sneering knowingly 
at the shallowness of the life described. This position is ascribed to 
Sara in the fictional world, and the ambiguity is already inherent in 
her character. Ahmed sees a danger of downplaying unhappy expe-
riences and affective alienation in affirmative feminist readings that 
emphasize positive and empowering experience. “We want to reread 
melancholy subjects,” she states (Ibid., 50). Rhys’s stories are undeni-
ably full of melancholy subjects and affect aliens, but rereading them 
also seems to produce affirmative results. They expose happiness as 
a socioculturally constructed normative orientation, yet make their 
reader live through simultaneously enjoyable and uncomfortable 
feelings, evoked even by such allegedly superficial things as bath-
salts, cocktails and berets, and thereby experientially recognize the 
ways we care for and feel with such things.
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4.1.2. Objects Having Fun
The last two stories in The Left Bank, “La Grosse Fifi” and “Vienne,” 
are the most complex from the point of view of things and affects. 
The last and longest story, “Vienne,” is composed of eleven sections 
that by themselves resemble the shorter and sketchier pieces in the 
collection. The first ones relate Frances and Pierre’s prodigal life in 
and around Vienna, focusing on anecdotal accounts of their friends 
and acquaintances. The young couple’s prosperity ends abruptly as 
Pierre’s shady business transactions and debt are revealed. In the 
latter sections, the couple flees through Prague and Budapest toward 
London in hope of finding financial aid. The physical movement is 
paralleled in the narrative discourse by movement from one sensa-
tion, one desired or encountered affective body (person or thing) to 
another. Material things are here used as tokens of memories, but they 
are also tokens of orientation, happy objects. In this story, too, there is 
comfort and pleasure to be found in pretty clothes to wear and “nice” 
and “elegant” things to surround oneself with (LB, 232, 235).
Even before the revelation of the Pierre’s problems, readers can 
see some hints at the precarity of this happiness in the exagger-
ated tone of the descriptions of the pleasure of spending, as well as 
in Frances’s comment of being surrounded by “pretty people with 
doubtful husbands or no husbands, or husbands in jail” (LB, 200). 
Frances’s frantic eulogy to money, which follows this comment, 
is ironically charged; it creates a typical sense of pleasure as a 
state of excitement that contains a sense of insecurity and excess: 
Nice to have lots of money—nice, nice. 
Goody to have a car, a big chauffeur, 
rings, and as many frocks as I liked. 
Good to have money, money. All the flowers I wanted. 
All the compliments I wanted. Everything, everything.
Oh, great god money—you make possible 
all that’s nice in life. Youth and beauty, the 
envy of women, and the love of men.
Even the luxury of a soul, a character and thoughts 
of one’s own you give, and only you. (LB, 221–222)
In all its dramatic expression, the passage is a striking vision of the 
relationship between things, money, and human subjectivity. The 
accumulation of the adjectives “nice” and “good” paradoxically acts 
as a diminutive that foregrounds the precarious character of happi-
ness. The passage connects “nice” and shallow things, money, and 
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commodities, with notions that tend to be considered “deep”: beauty, 
soul, character and thoughts. The way readers of The Left Bank see 
its characters cling to clothes and other commodities, the intensity 
with which the stories depict emotions related to the love of nice 
things and the dread of poverty, and the sheer number of references 
to such nice things probably cause this passage in the last story of the 
collection to look like a burst of honest and acute feeling rather than 
a melodramatic exaggeration. We can agree, drawing from Ahmed’s 
blend of social constructivism and phenomenology, as well as from 
enactivist thinking, that the things we call ‘soul’ and ‘character’ do not 
arise from the depths of human nature, but are created and negotiated 
in interaction with the sociocultural sphere in which money, flowers, 
compliments, chauffeurs, and frocks also circulate. 
A world in which money buys subjectivity is a grim one and the 
agency it grants is limited, but all this is also highly identifiable, 
especially when preceded by a collection of short stories that depict 
the insecurity, despair and fleeting moments of happiness of women 
navigating a modern, urban, commercial environment. Rhys’s female 
characters cannot be reduced to passivity or victimhood even if 
money gave part of their agency, for in this system of thought the same 
applies to everyone’s agency. By putting readers through Frances’s 
travels in Europe and her attachment to precariously pleasurable and 
supportive things, the story invites them to adopt a simultaneously 
critical and immersed position: to grasp the allure of “nice things” and 
to see the happiness built on them as perilous, but understandable. 
The story offers no moral solution. The couple is at a risk of getting 
caught, but they always escape; Frances contemplates a joint suicide, 
but it does not happen as she planned. The end leaves their fate open, 
providing hope but no closure: “It was: ‘Nach London!’” (LB, 256).
The most intriguing feature of “Vienne” may be the way Rhys paral-
lels Frances’s briefly described human acquaintances with material 
objects, both of which seem to have similar functions as signs of a 
happy time (always already lost in the moment of narration). Consider 
for instance this passage from that uses a list form to give an expe-
riential insight into what Vienna was like at the time of the events: 
Hot sun, my black frock, a hat with 
roses, music, lots of music—
The little dancer at the “Parisien” with a Kirchner 
girl’s legs and a little faun’s face.80 (LB, 193)
This passage is followed by a description of the couple’s friend André’s 
succession of lovers (see Section 5.1). Further on, there are three 
phrases that describe the place and time, more explicitly Radetzsky 
Hotel near Vienna, the summer of 1921, “cracky with the joy of life” 
80  Probably a reference to the paintings of young women and dancers by German artist 
Ernst Ludwig Kirchner (1880–1938).
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(LB, 202): “The girls were well dressed, not the slightest bit made up—
that seemed odd after Paris”; “Gorgeous blue sky and green trees and 
a good orchestra”; “I’d darling muslin frocks covered with frills and 
floppy hats—or a little peasant dress and no hat” (LB, 201–202). The 
narrator describes herself at a particularly happy moment as follows: 
“face like a doll’s—not a line, not a shadow, eyes nicer than a doll’s” 
(LB, 229). The women in these excerpts, both the focalizer and the 
ones observed by her, are diminished and reified by words such as 
“little,” “child,” “doll,” and “nice.” The precarious moments of happi-
ness attributed to a character can be made experientially relatable 
with the help of material things and embodied feelings. But what 
happens to characters who are shown to be made happy, again with 
the help of material things, but who are thus thingified by the speech 
of others or themselves? Do we need to read them as victims or vehi-
cles of irony, and is the reading doomed to rely on the subject⁄object 
dichotomy that the text so strongly seems to suggest?
To foreground this complexity, let us look at the last story but one in 
The Left Bank, “La Grosse Fifi.” At the hotel restaurant, the character 
of Fifi is introduced to the reader through the bewildered eyes of Mark 
Olsen, a young man in the company of the focalizer, Roseau. From 
Mark’s first words, Fifi joins the ranks of women-as-things in the collec-
tion. Roseau’s answer, however, reveals her as a more complex figure: 
“Oh my Lord! What’s that?”
“That’s Fifi,” answered Roseau in a low voice 
and relaxing into a smile for the first time.
“Fifi! Of course—it would be—Good Lord!—Fifi!” 
His voice was awed. “She’s—she’s terrific, isn’t she?”
“She’s a dear,” said Roseau unexpectedly. (LB, 166–167) 
Fifi is not a “who” but a “what.” She is presented as a thing, a terrific 
and awe-inspiring, grotesque apparition of femininity that is well 
beyond the norm. Nevertheless, Roseau feels “unexpectedly” warmly 
toward her, while she participates in the objectifying discourse and 
at times sees her as an abject part of the seedy hotel surroundings. 
Sympathy and empathy between focal characters and grotesquely 
presented figures of “bad” women recur in Rhys’s fiction as part of 
the stories’ general tendency to disrupt notions of sexuality and femi-
ninity. Fifi, however, is an especially complex, both lively and thing-
like example of such character. When Roseau is crying in her room 
in a fit of desperation following a large dose of Veronal,81 Fifi enters to 
console her with an array of comforting things. She is “[…] wonderfully 
81  A brand name of a barbiturate commonly used as a sleeping aid in the first part of the 
20th century.
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garbed in a transparent night-gown of a vivid rose colour trimmed 
with yellow lace,” with a “dirty dressing-gown” thrown around her 
neck (LB, 173); she helps Roseau dress in a lace nightgown and hands 
her a pocket handkerchief; Roseau clutches the flannel sleeve of Fifi’s 
garment, begging her to stay. The next day she lends her a book of 
French poetry and, after Roseau tells her she would rather read a 
detective novel, Le fantôme de l’Opera (1910).
In her role as a consoler, endowed with consoling things, Fifi 
becomes both a mother-figure and a subject of apotheosis, “as kind 
as God” (LB, 175). This is, once again, an ironical statement, but the 
feelings of affection that accompany it are acutely imaginable. At the 
same time, Fifi remains the “terrific” object of (patriarchal) gaze until 
the end of the story, which is also her own both melodramatic and 
tragic end. Fifi is a controversial object of attachment, and the affec-
tion Roseau feels toward Fifi makes her temporarily an “affect alien” 
in the eyes of her acquaintances. The affection seems to be expressed 
equally as sympathy toward another suffering woman and as admi-
ration of her appearance as an object, her kitsch aesthetics and the 
comforting things she has to offer, possibly also her physical size. 
Curiously enough, her thing-likeness is part of what renders Fifi a 
subject in the story. She becomes an agent in the story through her 
looks and the things that she surrounds herself with, and through 
which Roseau’s focalization suggests her as potentially identifiable. 
The mentions of corsets, night-gowns and dressing-gowns wrapped 
around Fifi’s fictional body are cues for the reader to imagine her as a 
feeling, lived body. She may be a thing, but she is not an object.
The same applies to the other characters in the stories discussed 
above as well: Anna in her stylish clothes, Sara surrounded by the 
beautiful things she does not own, Frances with everything money 
can buy. Abreast all the objectifying gaze and talk, the stories fore-
ground their characters as things in a manner of presentation that 
resembles Barnes’s descriptive passages analyzed in the previous 
chapter. The characters are material bodies surrounded and supported 
by material things, whose very materiality, albeit fictional, makes 
them experientially real to a reader. Thus, their subjectivity (agency) 
and objectivity (passivity) are inseparable. Besides recognizing and 
enacting fictional, embodied sensations and emotions, and attributing 
these to a character, readers resonate with the way material things 
participate in such emotions. In the field of phenomenology, it has 
been suggested that material objects can be incorporated or used as 
scaffolding in the experience, sustenance and expression of affective 
states (Colombetti 2016; Maiese 2016). A coffee cup can be habitually 
grabbed in need of strength or support; a nice suit can be used to gain 
self-confidence; a musician’s capacity to express emotions and create 
affective response depends on her interaction with the instrument. As 
can be seen in many of the stories analyzed in this study so far, espe-
cially clothes are often incorporated into the affective experiences of 
Rhys’s characters. This can be recognized and enacted by readers as a 
practice they most likely themselves have engaged in.
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In a related instance of new materialist analysis, Maurizia Boscagli 
reads the “Nausicaa” episode in Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) as a challenge to a 
modern idea of subjectivity as a rigorous abstraction, separate from the 
body and the material. Boscagli presents Gerty McDowell, the young 
girl Leopold Bloom peeps at on the beach, as a bricoleur, an active 
subject who is able to reshape commodity fantasies and the clothes that 
carry them to suit her own needs and to negotiate her identity (Boscagli 
2014, 94–95, 100). She reads the pornographic spectacle of Gerty’s femi-
ninity affirmatively, as a description of means for resisting commod-
ification and objectification, in which “the object is alive and has lots 
of fun” (Ibid., 91). I would argue that this is exactly what Fifi is doing, 
too, besides her suffering from jealousy and uncertainty, and only until 
she is killed, of course. Ulysses is intertextually linked to Rhys’s work, 
and she employs many literary devices that resemble Joyce’s.82 Possibly 
she even develops them further, at least in the problematic case of the 
representation of male gaze⁄female spectacle.83 When the reader is 
offered a position that enables embodied identification, the characters, 
although objectified, become subjectively “alive,” and the “fun” they are 
having can be felt as real. The reader is invited to imagine the subjec-
tive, embodied being of the characters by being shown them as things, 
as bodies that engage with and incorporate other things. All this can 
be read and understood on parallel with the ironical, critical tones in 
relation to normative ideas of happiness, for instance, that are equally 
prominent in the text, because of what Merja Polvinen (2017) has called 
“the double vision of fiction.” Furthermore, in such intuitive reading 
there is no question of the agency of the female characters: they are not 
only experiencing bodies, but also active ones that use the material 
means and affective orientations available for the purposes of self-defi-
nition, survival and pleasure.
4.1.3. Empathy, Sympathy, and Being-with-Things
The child plays at being not only a shopkeeper 
or a teacher, but also a windmill and a train.
Walter Benjamin: “On the Mimetic Faculty”84
82  In fact, the detailed description of Gerty’s clothes and make-up paired with her vague 
dreams of an ideal husband, and the parodic tone of their representation are shared features 
with The Left Bank.
83  On the reversal of the positions of gendered spectacle and spectator in Rhys’s work, see 
Oulanne 2012.
84  1933; Benjamin 1979, 160.
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“Let Them Call It Jazz” in Tigers Are Better-Looking begins with 
an encounter between Selina and her landlady, who is turning 
Selina out of her apartment after she has refused to pay rent in 
advance. As if to make her point more concrete, the landlady 
kicks Selina’s personal belongings: “When I tell her no, she give 
my suitcase one kick and it burst open. My best dress fall out, 
then she laugh and give another kick” (TBL, 44). Later, in a new 
but unpleasant flat, she wants to put on the same “best dress,” 
to leave and look for a better place to live, but she is stopped by 
an emotional reaction that leads her tTo be too tired to leave: 
[…] but it’s a funny thing—when I take up that dress and 
remember how my landlady kick it I cry. I cry and I can’t 
stop. When I stop I feel tired to my bones, tired like old 
woman. (TBL, 45) 
There is a metonymical and metaphorical relationship between 
Selina and the dress: one is dumped out of a suitcase, the other out 
of an apartment, and the imagined proximity of the dress to Selina’s 
body makes it expressive of something that she feels “to her bones.” 
Readers are also invited to imagine that the dress has travelled a long 
way with Selina, from Martinique, enclosed in the suitcase and worn 
on important occasions. Thus, it is reminiscent of Antoinette’s red 
dress in Wide Sargasso Sea (see Section 2.3.2). This dress, too, carries 
residue of its wearer and their common past. In the context of “Let 
Them Call It Jazz,” we can observe that the dress is a motif with a 
structural function: after several misfortunes and a period in prison, 
Selina finds a job as a seamstress in a department store (“altering 
ladies’ dresses,” TBL, 62), meets a man who is interested in a prison 
song she is singing and who sells it forward, not leaving Selina more 
than five pounds. However, the story ends with a retaliation that 
shows how important dresses are for Rhys’s characters and stories, 
out of necessity but also for providing style and enjoyment: “I buy 
myself a dusty pink dress with the money” (TBL, 63).
In “Illusion” in The Left Bank, the narrator realizes in a sudden 
epiphany the meaning the clothes she unexpectedly discovers in the 
cupboard of Miss Bruce have for their owner. However, she is moved 
by the clothes themselves:
I went to lock the wardrobe doors and felt a sudden, 
irrational pity for the beautiful things inside. I 
imagined them, shrugging their silken shoulders, 
rustling, whispering about the anglaise who had 
dared to buy them in order to condemn them to 
life in the dark… and I opened the door again.
The yellow dress appeared malevolent, slouching on 
its hanger; the black ones were mournful, only the little 
chintz frock smiled gaily, waiting for the supple body 
and limbs that should breathe life into it… (LB, 35–36)
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The narrator feels pity for the dresses, but deems it “irrational.” She 
is first shown to imagine the dresses displaying anthropomorphic 
gestures and attitudes, which she reports as free indirect speech to the 
reader. In the latter part of the quotation, she has opened the ward-
robe door again, and instead of merely imagining, sees the clothes as 
expressive of personalities, each with its own “appearance” mental 
state of malevolence, mournfulness or gaiety. The clothes clearly have 
an expressive function in both these stories. The narrator of “Illusion” 
not only imagines, but sees clothes as displaying emotions, which 
give rise to pity in her. Like Antoinette’s dress in Wide Sargasso 
Sea, Selina’s dress as a literary device expresses something other 
than itself, but it is still a thing made of fabric whose material being 
is evoked in the text. Can this kind of affective movement between a 
person and a thing be called an instance of empathy or sympathy? If 
a reader of the passage is called to an empathic reaction, what is the 
role of the dress and its materiality?
‘Empathy’ has a variety of definitions that range from motor 
mimicry and mental simulation to mind-reading and conscious 
recognition of the mental state of another (see Bateson 2009). 
Empathy can be caring for another, being affected by another, or 
imagining what it is like to be that other (Zahavi 2014, 129). It is also, 
in its many forms, an affective and cognitive component involved in 
reading fiction. In her seminal account of narrative empathy, Suzanne 
Keen (2007, 4) defines it as “vicarious, spontaneous sharing of affect” 
that occurs between readers and fictional characters, which can then, 
possibly, lead to sympathy or personal distress, both distinct from 
empathy. However, the relevance and possibility of “sharing an affect” 
for empathy has been contested for instance by phenomenologists 
Dan Zahavi and Philippe Rochat (2015), who suggest that empathy 
is not about the blurring of borders between the self and other, and 
therefore cannot be described as sharing an emotion or affect, but 
about accessing or grasping the mental state of the other through its 
embodied expression, while the other remains other. Both accounts 
of course rest on an assumption of a minded creature and an experi-
ence, fictional or actual, to empathize with. 85
Nevertheless, if we go back to early discussions of empathy and 
sympathy, in which their definitions are especially entangled, the 
focus is surprisingly often on nonhuman, even inanimate entities. 
Jane Bennett (2016, 607, 609) points out how 19th century accounts 
85  In the context of “object-oriented ontology,” there is talk of the experience of inanimate 
objects, discussed at length by Ian Bogost in his book Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like 
to Be a Thing (2013). However, Bogost remains too vague and makes too rash conclusions on 
the basis of examples from computer technology, to be of assistance here.
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of the concept of sympathy, as they appear in the poetry of Walt 
Whitman, range from a moral sentiment to mimetic “contagion,” 
embodied resonance and gravitational pull, a “more-than-human” 
material force that operates upon human and nonhuman bodies 
alike. Empathy, as well as its German originator Einfühlung,86 were 
first used in the domain of aesthetics. Vernon Lee uses it in the sense 
of the emotional, embodied reaction that occurs in a viewer of a 
scenery, an object or a piece of art, and the subsequent effect that this 
reaction has on the perception of the object (Lee 1913, 61–69). This is a 
case of self-objectification slightly different from the ones discussed in 
the previous section. The process described by Lee is located between 
a perceiving subject and a perceived object as an affective relation, 
in which both actually emerge as active parties. This is a projective 
account of empathy: we ascribe emotions to a thing, but the only 
emotions we have access to are our own. This view has ben criticized 
by phenomenologists, who suggest that we can perceive emotions, 
not just project our own, based on our ability to recognize feeling in 
another, not separating body and mind: the emotion is in the expres-
sion of the other, and while perceiving it we know it to be another’s 
emotion (Ratcliffe 2015; Zahavi 2014; Scheler 1979; Stein 2010). We also 
need not have gone through a “similar” emotion to be able to grasp it.
Nonhuman things such as dresses are indeed others to us, and we 
cannot have the experience of being a dress. In phenomenological 
accounts, empathy in relation to them would be regarded as based on 
an illusion, because there is no actual mental state to perceive, yet the 
experience of empathy as cognitive and affective activity can still be 
seen as “real.”87 As regards literary fiction, readers are in the domain 
of illusions, quite wittingly, and still capable of being immersed in 
feelings evoked by them. Fiction can animate and personify things 
(see Bernaerts et al. 2014; Nishimura 2015), but Rhys’s stories do not 
solely rely on such devices of fantasy. Nevertheless, they seem to deal 
with a form of empathy for or involving clothes. Dresses, of course, 
are literally anthropomorphic: they follow the form of the human 
body. Jane Bennett suggests that anthropomorphism might also work 
against anthropocentrism, by bringing some aspects of the things 
closer to human experience and, consequently, suggest that the 
human is not located above or outside the nonhuman world (Bennett 
2010, 120). Literary means can be of help in bringing the nonhuman 
experientially close to human readers (Caracciolo 2016, 140).
What is the difference between Rhys’s characters and the dresses 
they interact with, as fictional entities expressive of emotions? For 
one thing, readers are probably readier to attribute emotions to the 
human characters, but as they seem capable of feeling for and with 
nonhuman things, readers are invited to try on this perspective. But 
86  Coined in 1873 by Robert Vischer and first applied to social cognition by Theodor Lipps.
87  I thank Anna Ovaska for an especially careful reading and discussion of this section, and 
of conceptual suggestions in relation to empathy.
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is it empathy? Drawing on developmental psychology and affect 
theory, Anna Gibbs (2010) suggests that the contagion of affects in 
“mimetic communication” is neither a property of a subject or an 
object, but a multisensory synchronization of bodies, the capacity for 
which humans develop in early infancy (cf. Tomkins & Izard 1966, vii). 
We see emotions we can grasp in human bodies in other things and 
visual media bevause of a cross-sensory resemblance in expressive 
gestures, and these gestures in turn make us go through a mimetic 
affective experience on a very basic level, involving the other’s other-
ness. Humans constantly communicate with the things around us 
in a bodily, kinaesthetic way that does not rely on projection but a 
tendency to perceive affective tones in the environment, and to act 
out affectivity in collaboration with the environment.
“Let Them Call It Jazz” stages an encounter in which the percep-
tion and expression of emotion become intermingled. A reader can 
imagine, and mimetically respond to, Selina mimetically communi-
cating with the dress. We can imagine that Selina knows how it feels 
to be kicked and to fall like the dress, and see the dress as expressive 
of her feelings of disappointment and fatigue, but we can also imagine 
Selina as mimicking the dress, experiencing feelings parallel with its 
form and tactile feel, haptically experienced by the reader. The two 
make up an assemblage toward which readers can be pulled as they 
engage with the scene and draw on their own experiential traces. 
A reader’s empathy might be consciously directed toward Selina, a 
lived, experiencing body, but it is nevertheless induced by the entire 
assemblage and the mimetic relations involved. Readers can identify 
Selina with the nonhuman thing on both a minimal preconscious 
level and a level of metonymical interpretation that can also result in 
narrative empathy.
In “Illusion”, the narrator is shown to feel mostly pity and amaze-
ment and to imagine what it is like to be a beautiful object shut in a 
dark wardrobe. These dresses are not metonymically expressive 
of her experience, or their absent owner’s; they are given their own 
fictional lives. These lives are expressed by the material properties of 
the dresses. They resemble human beings as they follow the shape of a 
human body, but they also remain clearly other, distinctly nonhuman 
and inanimate, like the chintz frock that waits for a human body to 
“breathe life into it.” A part of the mimetic communication in the 
passage is produced by the personification of the dresses, but part 
is due to their expressive qualities as material things. We cannot 
claim for sure that this passage would result in narrative empathy. 
Instead, it seems to invite mimetic, kinesthetic enactment of the 
expressive forms of the dresses, with an affective content of its own. 
Narrative empathy, again, could be evoked by the whole scene, but it 
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is importance to note the vitality of the things as affective players in 
the potential empathic relation.
In “A Solid House” in Tigers Are Better-Looking, there is a similar 
encounter, only with less personification. Teresa’s relationship to her 
black dress as a second-hand item in Miss Spearman’s cupboard is 
different from the ones described here because of the similarity of the 
situations of the narrator and the dress: the latter is used as a meta-
phorical expression of the former (see Section 2.1). In another story 
with a cupboard, “A Spiritualist” (see Section 3.1), the Commandant 
describes the moment of opening his deceased lover’s wardrobe: “I 
had the tears in my eyes, I assure you, for it is sad to see and to touch 
the dresses of a dead woman that one has loved” (LB, 39–40). The 
emphasis of the passage is on the senses, seeing and touching, which 
reminds us once more that the dresses are not only metaphorical or 
symbolic entities: if they work metaphorically, it is because of of their 
material, tactile qualities. The clothes are to be imagined as real and 
material, while Madeleine has become “a dead woman that one has 
loved,” distanced by the indefinite article and the pronoun “one.” The 
Commandant’s feelings seem to be directed more toward the clothes 
than their owner.
Similarly, in a later story set in the same context, “Night Out 1925” 
(1976, published in Sleep It off Lady), a couple sees a “woman’s scarlet 
hat” lying in a Paris gutter, and Suzy, the focalizer, reacts sympathet-
ically: “Poor old hat […]. Poor poor old hat. Someone ought to write a 
poem about that hat” (SIOL, 109). This happens after they have visited 
a brothel to have a drink with prostitutes. Suzy has taken a sympa-
thetic stance toward the women, too, but it has largely been left unex-
pressed except for a large sum of money she has given them, which 
arguably reinforces the class and power divide between them. When 
she expresses her feelings, their object is a hat, a thing that may seem 
like an easier target for sympathy, left outside the tangles of human 
relations. On the other hand, things such as hats are actually quite 
central to human entanglements, too. The color of the hat reinforces 
its connections with transgressive female sexuality, denoting adul-
tery for instance in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter (1850).88 
Its lying in the gutter is another way Rhys’s things make visible the 
expectations and fears of their protagonists and give material form 
to metaphorical language: in this case, to the risk of landing “in the 
gutter” that seems to haunt Rhys’s characters. Suzy’s reaction suggests 
that she feels sympathy, based on a bodily, mimetic relation, toward 
both the hat and the prostitutes. In the real world, if not a poem, then 
a short story is written about the hat, and with it, the experiences 
of marginalized women are brought within the sphere of potential 
narrative empathy on the part of the reader.
88  Jane Bennett, too, quotes a passage from The Scarlet Letter, demonstrating the sense 
of vitality given to the red cloth in the story, as the narrator feels it as “a burning heat” that 
causes him to shudder and drop it on the floor (Bennett 2016, 608).
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In The Left Bank, even the conception of a human character as an 
object seems to paradoxically help, not hinder the empathy and identi-
fication of another character in relation to them, as was already noted in 
the case of “La Grosse Fifi.” In “In the Rue de l’Arrivée,” Dorothy defines 
a view of sympathy that could be applied to Rhys’s work in general:
And the sympathy which would have maddened her from 
the happy, the fortunate or the respectable, she strangely 
and silently accepted coming from someone more 
degraded than she was, more ignorant, more despised… […]
For the first time she had dimly realized that only the 
hopeless are starkly sincere and that only the unhappy 
can either give or take sympathy. (LB, 120–121) 
The stranger’s clothing, a cap to which a line of speech is assigned, 
is part of a system of style that informs readers about the man’s and 
Dorothy’s shared position as underdogs, and is in a metonymic rela-
tion to the man seen from behind. Nevertheless, there is another 
significant side to this angle of seeing: the man has left the woman 
alone and returned to his role as a stranger with his back turned. In 
light of other passages analyzed here, especially recalling the other 
hat in “A Night Out,” it seems justified to claim that the way the man 
is presented as a thing paradoxically makes him a plausible object 
and source of empathy. Miss Dufreyne, like Suzy, is more comfortable 
with empathy for a thing than for a human.
Affect and empathy are not held back in Rhys’s fiction by the 
distinctions between subject and object, human and nonhuman, 
animate and inanimate. The stories participate in what Bennett, 
writing about sympathy, calls “a mimetic tendency at large among 
bodies continuously affecting and being affected by each other” 
(Bennett 2016, 608). A reader of the texts is drawn into these affective 
relations and given both human and nonhuman agents to “commu-
nicate” and empathize with. It might well be more common for flesh-
and-blood readers to direct their empathy toward the character, even 
though in the fictional world, it is the things that actually attract more 
empathy from the characters than other humans. Here, too, it is useful 
to look at the things and characters as assemblages, in which they 
generate the affectivity together.
When reading these passages, readers need not go through the 
exact same “state” as a dress that of course has no states of conscious-
ness. It is not necessary to imagine what it is like to be a dress, at 
least on a conscious level. The evocation of feeling is built on more 
complex and ambiguous relations of mimicry in which things are 
incorporated. Dresses, as said, are a special case, being expressive 
especially thanks to their proximity to the body. The fictional frame 
that invites our empathy, in whatever form, is built on relations of 
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mimetic, affective communication and contagion that incorporate 
things. What the early aesthetic and phenomenological accounts of 
empathy and sympathy, as well as later contributions to new materi-
alism and affect theory have in common is an understanding of the 
various phenomena of affective, corporeal intersubjectivity and inter-
objectivity89 that occur not so much within the individual mind but 
between human and nonhuman agents, which is why they resonate 
with the fictional examples, too. This is something that Keen recog-
nizes, as she points out that narrative empathy is not merely about 
character identification, but also involves other actants and surround-
ings as well as the whole narrative situation (Keen 2013). Most impor-
tantly, these accounts help with the study of narrative empathy, by 
giving words to describe a basic, empathy-like grasping of feeling that 
is possible without an assumption of sameness.
In the stories discussed, the boundaries of the self can be tran-
scended not by knowing an actual mental state, as there is none, but by 
the very fact that the mental states are constructed in the assemblage of 
things and humans, and between fictional assemblages and the reader. 
Many instances of narrative empathy on its basic level rely on our 
everyday experience of being-with-things. The sensory and expres-
sive cues provided by the references to materialities act as suggestions 
of feeling, in which case it is the entire assemblage of characters and 
things that solicits the potential empathic response, intermingled 
with cultural issues and interpretations. Navigating these notions and 
theories around empathy, we can investigate how literature evokes the 
relations of self and other in a material, embodied way, and provides 
readers not only “the experience of the embodied mind of the other” 
(Zahavi 2014, 55), but also an understanding of this embodied mind as 
embedded in and extending into the material world.
The way the material, inanimate, purchasable things in Rhys’s 
fiction contribute to its affectivity shows the stories’ complex relations 
with pleasure, happiness, and empathy. On the basis of this reading, 
the affective whole changes and some new shades of happiness, 
belonging and empathy emerge beside grim and ironical tones. At 
the same time, paradoxically, the issue of agency discussed in the 
previous chapter becomes more complex as even objectified charac-
ters come across as agent-like, mimetically identifiable, lived bodies, 
in all their thing-likeness. Rhys’s stories allow for and even invite a 
reading in which immersion in material pleasures and critical irony 
go side by side, and can be experienced simultaneously. Human and 
nonhuman bodies become intermingled and take various positions 
of subjects and objects, and their affective encounters are enacted in 
encounters between the body of the reader and the body of the text.
89   A sociological-phenomenological notion defined as interaction in which the other 
parties appear as objects, be they human or material things (“the nonconscious engagement 
in the course of social interaction that occurs within a social field that is phenomenally objec-
tive for subjects and that includes interactions with objects.” (Gordon & Moghaddam 2014; see 
also Morton 2013).
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4.2 The Materiality of Affect in  
Djuna Barnes’s Stories
Compared to Rhys’s sparing, restrained and even sardonic presen-
tation of emotion, Djuna Barnes’s “passionate prose” (Miller 1999, 
121) bulges with dramatic affectivity, grand gestures, and intense 
pleasures. In the preceding chapters, we have already seen how 
Barnes’s work challenges received ideas of time, space, subjectivity, 
and agency by presenting abundant descriptions of detail, under-
neath which her characters, events and plots occasionally seem to 
be buried. Julie Taylor argues convincingly that Barnes’s writing acts 
within canonized high modernism as a reminder of the embodied 
sides of reading. As formulated by Taylor, “Rather than leading her 
reader along the route of making sense, Barnes encourages her reader 
to just sense” (2012, 87). ‘Sense’, as meaning or significance, is often 
elusive in Barnes’s stories. However ambivalent, her texts are affec-
tive in a performative manner: they do things to words and bodies. 
As embodied and sensory, affects in Barnes’s work circulate between 
human, nonhuman, and textual bodies, including inanimate objects 
and the text itself as a material entity. Further, according to Taylor, 
Barnes presents us with “mixed feelings”: even the expressions of 
trauma and shame are intermingled with traces of pleasure and 
happiness, and sometimes positive affect (itself already mixed) is all 
there is to be found in the text (Ibid. 74–109). This study shares the 
central points of departure with Taylor’s work, while the aim is to 
complement the discussion of Barnes’s “affective modernism,” with a 
demonstration of how central material, “lived” things are to it.
I begin by exploring the evocations of touching and the sense of 
touch in the texts, connecting affectivity with the haptic sensation of 
tangible textures and surfaces that Barnes introduces in her stories. 
The focus is on how she uses touch to construct the affective whole 
of the work and to situate its characters on an axis of subject—object, 
or to disrupt the conception of such axis. Other senses have their 
parts to play as well, but touch has a clear priority. The second section 
discusses gestures that involve material objects, and the use of objects 
as gestures, treating them as a special case of how things are used to 
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transfer affects in the stories. The final section is about pleasure in 
relation to material things. By this I mean instances of bodily pleasure 
evoked by way of things, pleasurable mergers of bodies and things, 
and possibilities of readerly pleasure in thing-like textual features. 
The readings show how the affectivity central to Barnes’s modernism 
is clearly located between humans and things, and how it challenges 
their separate treatment and conventional classification into subjects 
and objects.
4.2.1. Touching Things: Two Affective Journeys
Touching is one of the ways available for sensing surfaces and textures 
that remind us of the materiality of whatever it is we encounter. In 
her introduction to the suggestively named work Touching Feeling, 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, iobserves that “a particular intimacy seems 
to subsist between textures and emotions” (Sedgwick 2003, 17).90 
‘Touching’ and ‘being touched’ refer to physical contact, but also, as 
bodily metaphors, to emotional effects; like ‘feeling’ and ‘moving’ 
(Sedgwick 2003, 17; Stewart 2002, 162). Physically speaking, when a 
human agent touches a material thing, touching and being touched 
occur simultaneously to both parties in the event, and consequently it 
becomes harder to distinguish between the subject and object, active 
and passive party of the event, even though the two surfaces touching 
one another remain separate instead of merging together (Merleau-
Ponty 1968, 133, 147; Ahmed 2006, 106).91 Thus, as Susan Stewart puts 
it, touch “traverses the boundary between interiority and externality” 
(Stewart 2002, 178); or in Sedgwick’s words, it “makes nonsense out 
of any dualistic understanding of agency and passivity” (Sedgwick 
2003, 14). When I touch the surface of a cloth, I am simultaneously 
touched by it. An object repositions itself as a subject by doing 
something to me. In a number of mythological sources, the action 
of touch is a magical cause for the animation of inanimate things. It 
can be a means to experience one’s own body as other (Barad 2015, 1; 
cf. Stewart 2002, 163, 178); on the other hand, touching things and the 
sense of resistance they offer is seen to be partly responsible for the 
experience of embodied subjectivity and its corporeal boundaries 
(Colombetti 2013, 9). In Barnes’s texts, touch is used to construct char-
acters and evoke a sense of their bodily being as well as to blur their 
90  Sedgwick notes that visual and aural senses are also involved in the perception of 
texture (ibid, 15).
91  In cases of touching between human beings, power issues, for instance, make the ques-
tions of agency and passivity more complex. Equally, when heat or cold is sensed as tactual 
sensation, the “object” is not necessarily in immediate contact with the perceiver (Ratcliffe 
2012, 417–418). The sensation on a minimal level is of most interest here: the encounter of 
surfaces, which is more or less similar in both human-human and human-thing encounters.
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subjective boundaries and to locate them as embedded in a vibrant 
material world, grasped (to use another haptic metaphor) by a reader 
by way of haptic bodily imagination.
In Barnes’s short stories, certain patterns appear repeatedly in rela-
tion to touching. Characters are most often found touching different 
types of clothes, a bias noticed above in the discussion of Jean Rhys’s 
work. There is a plausible explanation for this in the way clothes 
constantly provide sensations of touch for the human beings who 
wear them, which makes them useful as literary means of evoking 
sensations in the reader. Some items of clothing, such as boots, gloves, 
pieces of lace and jewelry, come up as especially charged, and their 
fetish qualities were already explored in Chapter 3.2. We have also 
noticed how tactility and affectivity have a role in the specific type of 
fetishism that Barnes employs. 
Such fetish objects have a special role in the two stories discussed 
here. “Spillway” and “Aller et Retour” both begin with an unconven-
tional homecoming of a mother and a transgenerational encounter 
that is shadowed by death, in the first case an approaching, in the 
second a recent one. These concrete and metaphorical journeys 
are formulated on the level of narrative discourse as a succession of 
clothes and accessories to be put on and removed, and as different 
surfaces to be touched with gloved or bare hands. Such construction 
of sensory progression is crucial for the experience of reading the 
story, and for its potential of affective involvement. Even if the visual 
sense has a priority for humans and may dominate the cognitive 
experience of reading, haptic imagination also plays a part (Cave 
2016, 35). I suggest that the composition of several of Barnes’s stories 
relies on a series of fictional stimuli for haptic experience. As Susan 
Lohafer (1983, 159) observes, short stories often invite their readers 
to go through an experience. This is true to all art and literature, 
but more pronounced in the short prose form. Furthermore, in the 
modernist context, there is a tendency to view an artwork as a “series 
of impulses and shocks, assaulting the nerves” (Armstrong 2005, 94).92
At the beginning of “Spillway,” Julie and Ann, the mother and the 
daughter coming from the tuberculosis sanatorium, are traveling in a 
carriage toward the house of Julie’s husband. Their illness manifests 
itself in synchronized coughing fits. Its bodily location is pointed at 
by details of Julie’s clothing that evoke haptic sensations: “She took 
92  In Armstrong’s argument, this tendency is attributed especially to futurism, which 
strives toward a new human created by these impulses and shocks. However, as has been 
noted before, Barnes’s texts have similar aspirations, visible in the way they challenge 
notions of subjectivity, identity and interiority as well as the boundary between human and 
nonhuman (cf. Section 2.1).
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a deep breath, stretching the silk of her shirtwaist across her breasts” 
(CS, 268). When Julie speaks for the first time, in a short affirmative 
to the driver, she raises her face “from her collar” and nods (CS, 268). 
A succession of gestures performed by the child and an ermine muff 
follows.93 When they reach the destination, Julie picks Ann up from 
the carriage, “thrusting her black gloved hands under the child” (CS, 
269). The movement of the hands seems rapid and slightly violent 
(“thrusting”), and they are denoted as being one with the black gloves 
covering them, whose color is transferred to an attribute of the hands. 
The blackness forms a parallel with the black horses (a standard motif 
in Barnes) in front of the carriage, and so becomes associated with 
muscular power that agrees with the force of “thrusting.” Combined 
with the allusions to illness, the color of the hands and the horses 
contribute to a gloomy overall mood. The child has already been cast 
as fragile and pale from the illness she is carrying, while Julie seems 
to be a combination of frailty and exploding strength.94 The gloves 
come between the mother and the child, but more as an object incor-
porated in the sensation than as a boundary.
They enter the house and meet the husband, Paytor, who is aware 
neither that his wife is coming home, nor that she has a child. Ann 
is sent away and Paytor begins to grasp the situation. After a heated 
exchange of Paytor’s moralist accusations and Julie’s musings on 
death, guilt and mercy that reach rather abstract heights, he disap-
pears in anger into his shooting loft and she is left leaning on her hand 
by the window, seeing, hearing, and smelling the world outside and 
inside. The different senses are painstakingly evoked in this passage: 
Darkness was closing in, it was eating away the bushes 
and the barn, and it rolled in the odors of the orchard. 
Julie leaned on her hand by the casement edge and 
listened. She could hear far off the faint sound of 
dogs, the brook running down the mountain, and she 
thought, “Water in the hand has no voice, but it really 
roars coming over the falls. It sings over small stones 
in brooks, but it only tastes of water when it’s caught, 
struggling and running away in the hands.” […]. She 
could hear Paytor walking on the thin boards above, 
she could smell the smoke of his tobacco, she could 
hear him slashing the cocks of his guns. (CS, 275–276)
Together, the senses create a synesthetic experience: a sense of natural 
texture that constitutes an affective whole is conveyed by a combina-
tion of vision, sound, touch and smell out of which Julie composes the 
aphoristic emblem about running water. It can be related to Julie’s own 
93  These gestures are investigated in more detail in the following section.
94  Susan Sontag has famously explored the habitual metaphorical connections of tubercu-
losis with unexpressed passion (Sontag 1978).
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situation, in which she is “caught” and “struggling,” and it evokes the 
dichotomy of natural and artificial, inside and outside that recurs in 
Barnes’s writing even though always in a mixed and ambiguous form.
Between sensations, Julie encounters remembrances:
Tears came into her eyes, but they did not fall. Sentimental 
memories of childhood, she said to herself, which had 
sometimes been fearful, and had strong connections 
with fishing and skating, and the day they had made 
her kiss the cheek of their dead priest—Qui habitare 
facit sterilem—matrem filiorum laetantem—then Gloria 
Patri—that had made her cry with a strange backward 
grief that was swallowed, because in touching his cheek, 
she kissed aggressive passivity, entire and cold. (CS, 276)
The static moment in the movement of the main character in the 
fictional space leads her to an imaginary space that evokes powerful 
experiences and metaphorical references to various directions, 
including the Catholic faith. Brief mentions of active childhood life 
lead to a macabre image of touching between active youth and passive 
death. The Latin verses from Psalm 112 are closely tied to the content 
of the story, with a slight dose of morbid irony: “He maketh the barren 
woman to keep house: and to be a joyful mother of children.”95 Julie 
has survived long past the time her doctors have expected her to have 
left, and she has even given birth to a child, yet there seems to be no joy, 
nor a possibility of “keeping house,” as Julie’s life is marked by absence 
from home, her husband seems to reject her and the house itself as a 
lived space shifts and merges with the world of textures outside.
Metaphors, emblems, and memories that rely on haptic experience 
are followed by the action of touching in the storyworld, as Julie starts 
to move around the room again. She walks “mechanically” to a chest 
and begins to rummage through the items of clothing it contains: “She 
turned over the upper layer of old laces and shawls until she came to 
a shirtwaist of striped silk …  the one she had worn years ago, it had 
been her mother’s. She stopped” (Ibid.). The things are shown to lead 
to memories while the accumulated thoughts linked to motherhood 
lead Julie to worry about Ann and Paytor. Here she takes off her 
gloves, and the way she wonders about not having done that before 
may surprise a reader with a realization that she has been wearing 
them throughout the previous descriptions of actual and imagined 
touching. The gloves have been incorporated in all the previous 
95  From The Book of Common Prayer (orig. 1662).
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sensations, and the intensity of these sensations can be seen as saved 
in the motif of the gloves. Removing them exposes Julie’s hands to 
even more acute sensation. She tries to think of what to do and what 
to say to Paytor, becoming more upset. The intensity of Julie’s feel-
ings might be difficult to comprehend on psychological terms, as the 
case often seems to be in Barnes’s work: there is excessive affectivity 
but no conceptualized “explanation” for it (see Taylor 2012, 152–157). 
The feeling is there, available to readers for grasping and reacting to, 
in the heated thoughts and sensations evoked in the text. There is a 
space for embodied projection into the fictional world, but not much 
for psychological interpretation of certain emotions. The thoughts 
narrated and affects evoked do not even always fit together, but the 
affectivity still “makes sense” in the context of the story.
It is possible to read Julie’s character in a naturalizing manner, in 
the sense of attributing her an interiority or personhood composed 
of knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions, and besides under-
standing all of these as fictional constructions (Palmer 2004, 38). In 
such an approach, following a cognitive-behavioral paradigm of the 
psychology of emotions, emotion is connected causally with beliefs 
or judgments and thus can be demonstrated as plausible or not: 
“cognition causes emotion” (Ibid., 116; see also 113). Barnes’s stories 
seem to resist this paradigm, not only in that cognitive states leading 
to emotion are not described, but in that such states do not provide a 
cause or a justification for the overall affectivity presented. However, 
the lack of cause does not diminish the affects. They seem to resonate 
in the text, between its animate, inanimate, concrete and abstract 
subjects and objects.
The story takes the reader along in its frenzy of affect that may lead 
to dizziness such as described in its final paragraphs. According to 
Susan Stewart, dizziness resembles touch as a threshold activity in 
which “subjectivity and objectivity come quite close to each other” 
(Stewart 2002, 178). Dizziness is the absence of the grounding effect of 
touch, an “ek-static” state of lost contact with the body. On the other 
hand, it can be described as a state in which the body becomes exag-
geratedly material but separate from the mind, causing an experien-
tial enforcement of the Cartesian dichotomy that is actually absent 
from most everyday lived experience. Dizziness is evoked at the 
ending of “Spillway”:
What could she do, for God’s sake, what was there that 
she could do? […] “Because I am cold I can’t think. I’ll 
think soon. I’ll take my jacket off, put on my coat…”
She got up, running her hand along the wall. 
Where was it? Had she left it on the chair?
“I can’t think of the word,” she said, to keep her mind 
on something. […] She became dizzy.  
“It’s because I must get on my knees. But it isn’t 
low enough,” she contradicted herself, “but if I put my 
head down, way down—down, down, down, down…”
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She heard a shot. “He has quick warm blood—”
Her forehead had not quite touched the boards, 
now it touched them, but she got up immediately, 
stumbling over her dress. (CS, 277–278)
In Julie’s experience, thinking and doing, abstract ideas and 
embodied actions, seem to fly in different directions, up and “down, 
down, down, down,” while feelings hover in between. Her feeling 
of cold could be another expression of the sense of disembodiment 
and dizziness. In the conceptual metaphors that involve verticality, 
a reader can recognize the dualistic, folk-psychological idea of mind 
and body as separate, vertically arranged areas, yet at the same time 
the text counterintuitively complicates this vein of thinking. The 
Cartesian dualism becomes fuzzy, but the story makes sense, if we 
consider its affectivity to arise from the sensation of the materiality 
of the things. The illness, the child, the house of the husband and all 
the material things that Julie touches make an assemblage that drags 
her down and makes her dizzy; Julie is not only feeling her environ-
ment and thinking about it, but “feeling with” and “thinking with” it, 
looking for her coat not as a metaphor but as a means of looking for 
answers, and perhaps the socially “right” emotion that she does not 
seem to be able to find for a situation that transgresses the norms of 
marriage and family, and even life and death.96
The previous passages have offered the reader some scenes of 
touching, both actual and imagined by the character, to be interpreted 
more or less symbolically in relation to illness, death and mother-
hood: the water in the hands, kissing the cheek of the dead priest with 
its Latin accompaniments, the mother’s shirtwaist, the forehead on 
the floorboards. During all this, Julie has had her gloves on. In the last 
passage, however, the symbolic meanings that could be reached by 
thinking have escaped, and her hands are bare. Julie’s body seems 
to struggle for balance and to replace thinking by doing. Approached 
thus, the jacket, the coat, the wall, the chair, the floorboards, and the 
dress refuse to yield completely to symbolism, and to provide them-
selves chiefly as surfaces to be touched. These gestures have been 
ways of indicating the culmination, the shot she hears, which also 
gives an explosive justification to the heat of emotion (parallel with 
the “warm blood”), although inverse in terms of the order of events in 
the narrative discourse.97 
96  The problematic relationship between feelings and their acceptable meaning is also 
vocalized by Julie: “Torment should have meaning” (CS, 272).
97  The event of the shot has of course been worked toward in the narrative, with a literal use 
of the classic device of “Chekhov’s gun”: Paytor is heard pacing in his “shooting loft,” there is a 
smell of (tobacco) smoke in the air. However, these hints do not seem to suggest danger to Julie; 
they are presented as mere distractions to her thoughts, not stimuli for more worry.
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Kneeling and bowing are also central motifs in Nightwood (with its 
chapter titles “Bow Down” and “Go Down, Matthew”). In “Spillway,” 
the gesture of bowing down is also an action afforded by the form of 
the story, the tragic culmination that Barnes teasingly leaves slightly 
twisted, even awkward, like Julie’s gesture of repentance that has 
not quite finished before it falls apart in her stumbling: has someone 
been shot and died, is there a punishment or a redemption? All is left 
open and conceptual explanations miss their mark, yet the affec-
tive composition has grasped something that resonates phenom-
enologically with readers. Julie kneels before no one, for a reason 
that remains unclear just as we remain unable to provide names 
or psychological causes for her emotions. There is a socioculturally 
normative assumption of what she is supposed to feel, yet this does 
not seem to work: she tries out a gesture of repentance, but its failure 
and the image of her stumbling creates something else, an affective 
surplus. Psychological interpretations simply stop short and fail to 
grasp the affective assemblage that the passage creates.
How, then, do the things actually contribute to the understanding 
of affectivity at the end of “Spillway?” According to David Herman 
(2011, 253), modernist narratives suggest that “mental states have the 
character they do because of the world in which they arise, as a way 
of responding to possibilities (and exigencies) for acting afforded by 
that world.” Touching creates feeling, feeling ignites movement that 
results in another encounter with a surface, and so on, in a circle of 
affectivity that is afforded—and constrained—by the lived world of 
Julie and Paytor, with its normativities. Among the features of the 
world are, then, also Julie’s memories of her mother and childhood, 
which it would be tempting to pick up as clues to a deeper signifi-
cance in a psychoanalytical frame. Nevertheless, the text does not let 
readers linger on the mother or the memory of the priest, but presents 
them, as it were, on the surface of a table as objects of equal value with 
the gloves and the floorboards. Thus, the text leans more in the direc-
tion of the interpretation of the unconscious proposed by Thomas 
Fuchs, following Merleau-Ponty, as a property of the lived body and 
the actions it takes and omits in the lived, intercorporeal space, rather 
than one of an interior psyche (Fuchs 2012, 75; Merleau-Ponty 1968).
The affective content circulates between things, involves readers, 
and leaves them with no clear meaning or explanation, but a sense 
of having touched something beside the book-object they are 
holding. According to Cheryl Plumb (1986, 65), readers are inclined 
to be sympathetic to Paytor as the one who has been wronged in the 
story. However, they are invited to “go through” Julie’s confused and 
confusing feelings that arise in interaction with the material world 
around her. Julie is the focalizer of the story, while Paytor remains a 
distant and almost archetypical character, standing for the patriarch 
around whom the whole scheme of family crumbles, like the roof 
of their living-room. I suggest that a reader may not feel for either 
of the characters, but the affective structure of the story is a strong 
invitation to feel with Julie, even if only by imaginatively engaging 
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with the fictional surfaces she touches. Narrative empathy is given 
a chance to appear thorough the way the lived world and its lived 
things are shared.
“Aller et Retour,” as its name suggests, is also constructed around 
a journey, this time there and back. As in “Spillway,” the journey is 
defined by haptic and affective elements alike, as well as the gestures 
of taking off and putting on clothes. The narrative begins with a 
woman on a train from Marseilles to Nice. To be more exact, readers 
are first given the train, then told that it “had on board a woman of 
great strength” (CS, 362). The woman, Madame Erling von Bartmann 
(“Russian, a widow” who lives in Paris) is firmly located in and tightly 
framed by her material surroundings. Her “great strength” is made 
tangible in her contact with clothes and other things: 
Her bosom was tightly cross-laced, the busk bending with 
every breath, and as she breathed and moved she sounded 
with many chains in coarse gold links, the ring of large 
heavily set jewels marking off her lighter gestures. (Ibid.)
Madame has “tan boots laced high on shapely legs” and she 
“control[s] the jarring of her body with the firm pressure of her small 
plump feet against the rubber matting” (Ibid.). In the space of half a 
page, the reader of the story is already presented with a tightly pack-
aged parcel of a character, with the sense of a muscular, heavy body 
resonating in contact with a multitude of materials around it.
As Madame von Bartmann leaves the train in Marseilles, a caval-
cade of experiences for different senses begins. “[N]oting every 
object,” holding her skirts, she goes from “foul odors” of side streets, by 
a woman in a doorway “holding a robin loosely in one huge plucking 
hand,” to a ship-chandler’s, where she “smell[s] the tang of tarred 
rope” and on to a side alley, where she “touche[s] the satins of vulgar, 
highly colored bedspreads” laid out for sale (CS, 363). Again, readers 
encounter many sensory experiences, but their affective significance 
for the character remains obscure. This, at first, seems to be quite 
the opposite of what happens in “Spillway.” Madame von Bartmann 
as a focalizer is, insofar as possible, a detached observer. Readers are 
only told that she “looked neither pleased nor displeased” (Ibid.). Her 
fictional body is lent for the reader as a virtual body to imagine with, 
but at the same time her thoughts and emotions are silenced. When 
she reaches her hotel, the narrator reports that she is “trying to think,” 
while removing her clothes and washing her hands with a “large 
oval of coarse red soap” (CS, 364). Things and their haptic, visual or 
olfactory qualities are precisely and experientially described and 
graspable, and we are invited to attribute a consciousness to Madame 
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von Bartmann, even if the alleged contents her psychological mind is 
out of reach; her thoughts refuse to be formulated completely, apart 
from the effort of “trying to think” that resonates with Julie’s strug-
gles at the end of “Spillway.” Madame von Bartmann is constructed as 
another character whose mind, or what is most often described as the 
cognitive part of it, is unattainable for the narrator and the reader, but 
whose experience can be to some extent imagined via the embodied 
expression of her body and a reader’s mimetic engagement with it.
The following day, before reaching her destination, the house on 
the outskirts of Nice, Madame von Bartmann visits a church, and 
again like Julie, kneels down: “She turned the stones of her rings out 
and put her hands together, the light shining between the little fingers; 
raising them she prayed, with all her vigorous understanding, to God, 
for a common redemption” (Ibid.). This is the first idea of the content of 
her thoughts that readers are given, and it seems to resonate strongly 
with “Spillway,” in its abstract grandeur and indication of the longing 
for an abstract forgiveness expressed by the kneeling posture. After 
she has got up, “feeling the stuff of the altar-cloth,”98 the narrative 
jumps to Nice and the gate of the garden around her house, which 
she opens “with a large iron key” (Ibid.). In the garden she meets her 
daughter. This meeting, like almost everything that has preceded it, is 
mute, mediated by a thing—and a glove—and without psycho-narra-
tion or other references to nameable emotions: “She still held the key 
to the gate in her gloved hand, and the seventeen-year-old girl who 
came up from a bush took hold of it, walking beside her” (CS, 365). 
Madame von Bartmann has been first introduced as an object seen 
from without, and now her daughter emerges from a bush, as tightly 
connected with her surroundings as the mother, and grasping at the 
same thing, the key. It is easy to see that Barnes suggests a version of 
an oedipal scheme, a composition that involves a mother, a daughter, 
and a phallic object. Chapter 5 will examine how Barnes’s texts rein-
vent Freudian motifs and dynamics, but at the same time construct 
dead ends for interpreters keen to make psychoanalytical excavations 
for meaning. This section sets grounds for this argument.
In fact, the triadic composition is not static, nor are its components 
strictly recognizable as separate units. They become enmeshed in 
each other as well as embedded in the textures of the garden and the 
shifting positions of bodies and things inside and outside the house. 
In the garden, the mother and daughter have conversations; now a 
level of abstraction is introduced, some of Madame von Bartmann’s 
thoughts are revealed and even some recognizable emotions are 
displayed (here the content of the discussions receives less attention, 
as they are taken up again in Section 5.1). The characters’ gestures, 
98 Touch and prayer, conventionally brought together in rituals such as a rosary, are more 
unconventionally combined in other Barnes’s stories as well, such as “Renunciation” and most 
notably “No-Man’s-Mare.” In the latter story, the sister of a dead woman grappling with her loss 
is shown “touching things, vases, candlesticks, tumblers, knives, forks, the holy pictures and 
statues and praying to each of them, praying for a great thing, to many presences.” (CS, 135)
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however, are relevant for the section at hand. First, the mother 
answers Richter’s questions about Marseilles (not very large but dirty) 
and Paris (“Paris was Paris”) while sitting down on a knoll “warm 
with tempered grass” that Richter begins to pluck (CS, 366).99 The 
following, now explicitly affective exchange is framed once again 
with gestures that involve gloves:
Madame von Bartmann drew off one of her tan gloves, 
split at the turn of the thumb, and stopped for a moment 
before she said: “Well, now that your father is dead—”
The child’s eyes filled with tears; she lowered her head.
“I come flying back,” Madame von Bartmann 
continued good-naturedly, “to look at my own. Let 
me see you,” she continued, turning the child’s chin 
up in the palm of her hand. “Ten, when I last saw you, 
and now you are a woman.” With this she dropped 
the child’s chin and put on her glove. (CS, 366–367)
Unlike Julie, Madame von Bartmann takes off her glove to touch 
her child and examine her face. The recent death of the father is 
mentioned, and this brings out an affective response in the child. 
The mother’s response is from a different world and continues her 
portrayal as strong, brisk, and detached: she talks in a “good-na-
tured,” imperative tone, picks up the child’s chin in a gesture of quite 
detached examination, only to “drop” it again right away. If there was 
for a moment a direct contact between two skins, coinciding with an 
affective burst on the other’s part, the more neutral state and a focus 
on the touch of skin and fabric, human and thing, is restored as the 
hand returns to the glove. 
Madame von Bartmann behaves toward her daughter more or less 
in the same indifferent yet interested manner she takes toward all 
things. This, however, does not come across in a scandalous or tragic 
tone. Richter is said to be seventeen at the moment of the encounter. 
Therefore, the mother has been absent for quite a significant time, 
which partly explains the distance and discomfort built between 
the characters, and adds to the reader’s possible uncertainty as to 
how they will interact. The period of absence is not explained, and 
readers are not provided with any hints for the interpretation of its 
significance: it is in no way presented as a tragic motif, as one would 
perhaps expect a mother’s prolonged absence to be, especially with 
the death of the father. This is another example of the stories’ apparent 
incompatibility of form and content, affect and circumstance, which 
99  Certainly, another sexualized metaphor.
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reflects a rebellious attitude especially in relation to family norms.
Some more discussions, or rather Madame’s lessons in life given to 
Richter as a passive listener, are interrupted by a scene with Madame 
playing the piano (“the sparkles of her jewelled fingers bubbled over 
the keys”) and Richter listening in the garden, “shiver[ing] in the fur 
coat that touched the chill of her knees.” Later, Richter plays, “touch-
ingly, with frail legs pointed to the pedals, […] with thin technique and 
a light touch” (CS, 371). The mother and the daughter are set as oppo-
sites: heavy, sparkling, and round versus light, frail, and thin; warmth 
versus chill, and Schubert versus Beethoven. All this is done with the 
help of haptic expression: a coat touching knees, fingers touching 
keys and feet touching pedals, all of which result in “touching” music. 
The gestures of touching reach mostly toward things, and from the 
story toward the reader, while the two characters remain distant from 
one another. The narrator reports that for the next few days Richter 
avoids her mother, and then suddenly announces her engagement 
to an older neighbor. Madame von Bartmann has urged her child to 
experiment and experience the beauty and ugliness of life, an ambi-
tion that now seems to be thwarted with the engagement. An ellipsis 
replaces the event of the wedding and the “retour” closes the story in a 
similar passive description as the beginning of the “aller”:
Within two months Madame von Bartmann was 
once again in her travelling clothes, hatted and veiled, 
strapping her umbrella as she stood on the platform […].
Once the train was in motion, Madame Erling von 
Bartmann slowly drew her gloves through her hand, from 
fingers to cuff, stretching them firmly across her knee.
“Ah, how unnecessary.” (CS, 373)
Madame von Bartmann is “hatted and veiled” and placed on the 
platform as if making visible the hand of the author that has again 
packaged her in her clothes and placed her there to be transported. 
The story ends with another gesture of the gloves from the paradox-
ically strong and passive lady, who utters a sigh and expresses her 
feeling of pointlessness. The feeling behind the sigh is again expressed 
as (hatted and) veiled, unnamed and somatic, something to grasp by 
taking in the pointed event of drawing the gloves through the hand 
and stretching them across the knee. The story invites its reader to 
linger on this image.
“Spillway” and “Aller et Retour” are narrated as a succession of 
tableaux vivants. Their characters are set in a variety of situations, in 
relation to and affected by different others in the form of characters 
or things. In “Spillway,” there is much passionate feeling. This feeling, 
however, seems exaggerated and disconnected from the story and 
its characters, if it is read through naturalizing or conventionalizing 
lenses, looking for unity of content and form, credible causality, or 
imaginable minds. In “Aller et Retour,” the principal feeling is perhaps 
one of strain and tension. Its affectivity is constrained by corset laces 
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and tight boots, but emerges in sudden sparks, when different mate-
rials come into contact with one another. None of the affective flashes 
in the two stories have their grounds in a clearly imaginable mental 
state of a character. I argue that to do justice to the texts, such grounds 
need not necessarily be looked for. The idea that fictional things func-
tion as symbolic or metonymical representations of emotional states 
that can ultimately be attributed to a character, applies here even less 
than in relation to Rhys’s stories. Terence Cave (2016, 38) describes a 
poem in a way that could also be applied to the two stories: it is not a 
“rarefied conceptual thing, a creature of the transcendental imagina-
tion,” but “an ingenious gadget, or a small, compact box that delivers, 
when one opens it, an explosive cocktail of responses.”
This cryptic unreachability of Barnes’s characters has been charac-
terized by Deborah Parsons as follows:
Her protagonists resemble silhouettes, or marionettes, 
who present angular and impenetrable exteriors. 
Often bizarre and emotionally or physically abusive, 
and frequently involved in mysterious relationships of 
strange intensity, they seem to respond to forces which 
remain inaccessible to the reader. (Parsons 2003, 23)
H. Porter Abbott suggests that characters with “unreadable” minds 
tend to be “naturalized” or made more readable by classifying them 
as types, catalysts for understanding other characters, or symbolic 
(Ibid., 450–452). Such characters, he suggests, are even more common 
in short stories than in novels, and they appear as poetic images less 
than parts of a whole fictional world. In short fiction, they usually 
seem to call for a symbolic reading (Abbott 2008, 458–459). There are 
undeniably symbolic dimensions to Julie, Ann, Paytor, Madame von 
Bartmann and Richter. However, neither symbolism nor typification 
suffices as an explanation for the affectivity of the characters, and as 
Abbott notes, such explanations should not “displace the experience 
of unreadability” (Ibid., 463), which is ultimately experience of the 
unattainable other. As I have suggested here, the minds of the charac-
ters may be unreadable and other, but the characters remain to some 
extent open for the reader’s experience, like the dresses that elicit 
forms of empathy from Rhys’s characters and potentially her readers. 
They function in the stories as bodies that react to other bodies in a 
shared, lived world, whereby the line between character and thing 
becomes quite thin. Despite all this, the texts remain affective and, to a 
certain extent, experiential. Other narratological approaches drawing 
from cognitive sources that allow for such experientiality (see, for 
instance, Fludernik 2003), or underline action instead of character: we 
can even go back to Aristotle and find him stating that “you could not 
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have a tragedy without action, but you can have one without charac-
ter-study” (Aristotle 1932, 1450a; quoted in Jannidis 2013).
In “Mother,” Lydia Passova’s lover voices the impenetrability of 
Barnes’s characters by separating bodily expression from meaning: 
“[…] my tears are nothing, have no significance, they are just a protec-
tive fluid—when I see anything happening that is about to affect my 
happiness I cry, that’s all” (CS, 304). The tears are related to a state 
of things that affects the character, but they are a surface phenom-
enon. According to Kukkonen and Caracciolo (2014, 261), characters’ 
fictional minds should be considered as embedded in the material 
and social reality, and engaged in by readers with embodied reac-
tions. Furthermore, even cognitive schemes thus brought in closer 
contact with the lived body and the material world do not suffice 
to explain the actions and emotions of Madame von Bartmann and 
Richter, Julie and Paytor. The affective states of Barnes’s characters 
are not inner states of characters, but rather “states of things” in the 
world. The texts remain affective, even when a reader can have a 
hard time accounting for the affectivity by way of any imaginary idea 
of the mind or subjectivity of a character. In Barnes’s case, it might 
simply be too much to ponder upon characters as minded subjects 
at all: they are bodies with agency, but so are the inanimate objects 
surrounding them in assemblages often organized as tableaux.100 
Their human form lends them as virtual bodies ready for readerly 
imagination and experience, but otherwise their experientiality 
actually remains quite minimal.
Barnes’s characters as affective beings “make sense” as sensing 
bodies that act and react to touching other bodies, animate or inan-
imate. Their senses, of course, are produced by the imagination of a 
reader, and their affectivity is produced in the encounter between two 
further bodies in an assemblage: the reader’s and the text’s. The event 
of touching always has two subjects, either animate or inanimate. 
Thus, the imagined interiority of the characters begins to matter less. 
It is equally possible to produce affect between text and reader by 
reporting the touch of two materials, as it would be by attributing a 
“natural” mind and emotions to these materials. The characters’ affec-
tivity is constructed by an imaginary puppeteer-author who moves 
them in relation to one another and selected objects. Their surfaces 
meet, they move each other while being moved. When they function 
as agents in a text, in its assemblages, both are capable of producing 
experiences.
100  Abstract ideas and intertextual references can be, as has been suggested above, added 
to this list of agents, but they will be discussed more closely in the following chapter.
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4.2.2. Gesturing with Things
The importance of gestures has already been hinted at earlier in the 
discussion of “Spillway” and “Aller et Retour.” Clothes are the most 
common things to gesture with in these stories. To begin the analysis 
of how things mediate or create affects through gestures in other 
stories, I take another look at the beginning of “Spillway,” in which 
the mother and daughter, Julie and Ann, journey toward the house, 
and Ann’s activities with the ermine muff. This luxurious item of 
clothing is described as “old-fashioned,” and it seems to be out of 
place in the “heat of noon” in which the mother and daughter are said 
to be traveling (CS, 266–267). Because of these characterizations, it 
attracts attention as a means of expression rather than a necessary 
item of clothing. Like other objects in the stories, it also has playful 
sexual innuendoes, hinting at female external genitals, but its use as 
an affective gesture is not completely dependent on these meanings.
Julie is discussing local events with the driver and becomes 
agitated by suspected corruption. The child responds with fear and 
curiosity, after which Julie attempts to distract her:
“[…] I said, all is lost from the beginning, 
if we only knew it—always.”
The child looked up at her, then down into her muff.
“Ann,” said Julie Anspacher suddenly, 
lifting the muff away from the child. “Did 
you ever see such big horses before?”
The child turned her head with brightness and 
bending down tried to see between the driver’s arms.
“Are they yours?” she whispered.
“[…] no, they are not mine, but we 
have two—bigger—blacker— ”
“Can I see them?”
“Of course you will see them—don’t be ridiculous!”
The child shrank into herself, clutching 
nervously at her muff. Julie Anspacher 
returned to her reflections. (CS, 267–268)
The sense of touch is not the only means by which the muff gains 
its affective associations. Ann is clutching the furry object for safety, 
and when her mother attempts to gain contact with her and perhaps 
cheer her up, she lifts off the muff, paradoxically removing the means 
to safety, too. Julie tries to interest Ann in the horses, although the 
large, black animals are quite a scary way to comfort a child. They 
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are almost in complete opposition to the child, who is determined by 
illness, frailty and whiteness (ermine muffs tend to be white and tuber-
culosis is also called “the white death”; the house they travel toward is 
white, too). Ann, however, seems excited to see their own horses. She 
is drawn to a common sphere of discussion by her excitement for just 
a moment, until Julie snaps at her about being ridiculous (a phrase she 
repeats later in the story), and she returns to the safety of the muff. The 
muff is not only a medium, but also a barrier in the affective exchange 
between mother and daughter, and for the child it seems to be the muff 
that equals safety and comfort, not the erratic mother.
The affective progression in this scene is very similar to the one 
in which Madame von Bartmann raises Richter’s chin, yet another 
example of Barnes’s ways of recycling and reworking formal and 
thematic material. Madame and Julie are unconventional, phallic 
mother figures characterized by sudden gestures. Their behavior 
toward their children mixes tender affection with a chilly attitude and 
an urge toward what is “frightful” in life, as Madame puts it (CS, 369). 
These are among many instances of Barnes rejecting conventional 
ideas of a heterosexual family and procreation (Caselli 2009, 4), and 
imagines new meanings for motherhood: openness, detachment, and 
support for freedom and exploration. The physical and verbal connec-
tions between mothers and daughters are cut short by a sudden line 
or gesture on the mothers’ part, and the child’s role remains to be 
puzzled by and alienated from the whole situation. What the mothers 
do and say is certainly central to the story, but the controversial 
nature of their characters is heightened by the thwarted relations they 
have with their children. The scene in “Spillway” shows once again 
how affectivity is created in between, this time in an assemblage that 
contains mother, daughter, muff and horses.
In “The Grande Malade,” it is two daughters whose clothes become 
agents in expressive assemblages. Katya, the main character and 
narrator of this story in addition to “Cassation,” “Dusie,” and “Behind 
the Heart,” is another Barnesian character who remains quite unat-
tainable, this time also because of the embedded story structure 
in which she is narrating events that have occurred to her earlier 
(Parsons 2003, 4). Moydia, the sister about whom the story told by 
Katya, remains even further away. The sisters have a special way of 
wearing clothes as expressions of emotion or attitude, as well as talis-
manic fetish objects, as was observed in the previous chapter. Katya 
tells Madame:
Now I have come to Paris and I respect Paris. First I 
respected it in a great hat. I am short and a great hat would 
not, you see, become me, but I wore it for respect. It was 
all a jumble of flowers and one limber feather; it stood out 
so that my face was in the middle of a garden. (CS, 394)
Katya explains that she does not wear the hat anymore, because 
she has begun to look back to her remembrance of her father, “his 
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astrakhan cap, his frogged coat, with all those silver buttons, and 
the tall shining boots that caught him just under the knee” (Ibid.). 
She continues:
So now, out of respect for that man, I wear my hats small. 
Some day, when I have money, my shoes will be higher 
and come under my knee. This is my way, Madame, but 
it is not the way it is with Moydia. She has a great memory 
in the present, and it all turns about a cape, therefore now 
she wears a cape, until something yet more austere drives 
the cape away. (CS, 394–395, emphasis in the original)
Katya wears clothes based on attitudes such as respect; later, she 
is wears satin trousers “for respect to China” (CS, 196). Moydia, on 
the other hand, wears hers as expressions of an affective, qualitative 
state of being: “austere,” for instance. The combination of abstract 
epithets and concrete objects into “a respectful hat” and “an austere 
cape” creates a comic tone that recalls surprising noun phrases such 
as “the sudden spoon” and “a method of a cloak” in Gertrude Stein’s 
Tender Buttons (Stein 2011, 12, 6). Both Stein’s experiments from 1914 
and Barnes’s stories highlight objects as well as abstract definitions 
and concepts and literary formulations as expressive, not necessarily 
as symbolic or even representational (see Oulanne 2017a).
Moydia’s affair with “Monsieur x” begins first to show in gestures 
that involve objects: “She sprinkled her sugar in her tea from too 
great a height” (CS, 396); “she was always kicking her feet in the air 
and tearing handkerchiefs and crying in her pillow” (Ibid.). Moydia 
also displays grand gestures that express abundant and contradictory 
emotions in her behavior toward him: “She flew at him then and 
pulled his clothes about and ripped his gloves, and said with absolute 
quiet: ‘It amazes me how I do not love you’” (CS, 198). At home she is 
“put to bed” while crying: “I adore him!” (CS, 399). Moydia goes to 
Germany to see their father, and buys a dress fit for two purposes: “to 
please Monsieur x, and not to alarm father—all at the same time”:
So it was a cunning dress, very deft and touching. It 
was all dotted Suisse, with a very tight bodice, and into 
this bodice, just between the breasts, was embroidered, 
in very fine twist, a slain lamb. It might, you see, mean 
everything and it might mean nothing, and it might 
bring pleasure to both father and lover. (CS, 400)
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The austere cape is preceded by a “cunning,” “deft,” and “touching” 
dress, the symbolic ambivalence of which the passage spells out. The 
dress carries a symbolic image of the slain lamb, but the text toys with 
attempts to interpret it symbolically: she declares that “it might mean 
everything and it might mean nothing.” In Katya’s narration, this 
ambivalence is actually the source of the cunning nature of the dress. 
Buying and wearing the dress are expressions and gestures in many 
directions at once: directed at the father and the lover and the world at 
large. As they appear in a narrative, they also become gestures directed 
by Katya at the narratee, Madame, and on to the reader of the short 
story. Both Madame and the reader become recipients of gestures that 
are bursting with affect, which might mean everything or nothing, but 
certainly express something, albeit contradictory and ambivalent.
As in “Spillway,” a tragedy paradoxically seems to follow the 
outbursts of affect rather than give rise be to them in “The Grande 
Malade.” Monsieur x has “caught a chill” and dies while Moydia is 
away. Katya goes to the house in which he has died, and is given his 
talismanic cape as a memento to give to Moydia. Upon her return, 
Moydia first weeps but then states quite enthusiastically: “Now I 
have a great life!” The next day she is already “quite well” (CS, 402). 
She wears the cape, but it seems to be a token of her “great life,” and 
her own character as tragic, rather than a means of remembrance. 
Katya repeats the sugary metaphor in describing her sister: “She is 
gay, spoiled, tragique. She sugars her tea from far too great a height” 
(CS, 402–403). Monsieur x’s newspaper obituaries all feature a photo-
graph of him wearing the cape, which seems to please the sisters. 
As a symbol, the cape remains ambivalent, like so many things in 
the stories. As a gesture, it expresses the mixed feelings typical of 
Barnes’s work: great tragic sorrow and earlier hysterical outbursts 
paired with light carelessness (sprinkling sugar from a height) and 
enjoyment of aesthetically or sensuously pleasing objects, not to 
forget the pleasure or amusement that the comic presentation of the 
story might provide its reader.
Julie Taylor’s study warns against looking for explanations for 
affectivity in Barnes’s biography, especially in theories of childhood 
trauma (Taylor 2012, 9–11). The author is not to be considered an 
authority who carries the final solution, the final meaning in her own 
history or her own body. Instead, we can follow Maurice Merleau-
Ponty in his view that writers do not deliver messages; they make 
gestures (Merleau-Ponty 1974, 60; Gibbs 2010, 199). Dominic Head (1992, 
11–12) connects a similar metaphor to short stories, describing their 
writing process as “something almost physical, the movement of the 
wrists.” As I argue at length elsewhere (Oulanne 2017b), the biograph-
ical figure associated with the imagined body of Barnes can be seen 
as another fictional, affective body that participates in the phenom-
enon of reading along with the characters, although invisible but for 
the gestures of a mover behind the text. Like Monsieur x and Moydia, 
the biographical Barnes is shown in several photographs and carica-
tures wearing a great black cape. The cape as a signature garment is 
Image 5. Berenice Abbott, 1920s: Djuna Barnes
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also mentioned in bibliographical texts. Barnes’s “picturesque” (Bruno 
1987, 388) way of dressing and her “grande dame manner” (McAlmon 
1968, 34, cited in Caselli 2009, 15) have been interpreted as elements 
in a masquerade (Cagidemetrio 1979, 28). The use of capes and cloaks 
in both her prose101 and photographic portraits (see Image 5 below) 
suggests a game of pose and spontaneity, a playful performance of 
mystery and revelation that might or might not be about femininity 
and sexuality (Caselli 2009, 15, 28–29; see also Newman 2017, 148–150): 
“it might mean everything and it might mean nothing.”
It is tempting to take Barnes’s cape as a symbolic veil that covers the 
original meaning while alluringly gesturing toward it. This way the 
photographed cape would become a clue that could somehow lead to 
a secure clarification of meaning for the fictional capes. Nevertheless, 
the texts and pictures alike play with gestures, affectivity, quests for 
original meaning and the double nature of objects as material and 
symbolic. In “La Grande Malade,” there is no final meaning, only 
gestures of veiling and unveiling. Great sorrow is replaced by great 
pleasure in the performance of wearing the cape and in planning 
another move abroad. This is the mixed sensation a reader is left with, 
in addition to photographs of capes on various levels of fictionality.
4.2.3. Pleasure in Things
Julie Taylor quotes Barnes’s letter from 1957, in which she gives an 
incarnate definition for her writing: “[…] I’m not a ‘writer’; once in 
every twenty years of so, the wound bleeds, that’s all” (Djuna Barnes 
to Edwin Muir 26 October 1957, cited in Taylor 2012, 1). It would be easy 
to use this passage to label Barnes’s work as (only) trauma writing, 
taking the author’s word for it, as it were.102 However, it can be read 
with the same mindset as the photographic evidence above: as a 
performance. Dramatically sinister one-liner statements form almost 
a trademark for Barnes. Deborah Parsons describes her outlook as 
“one of despair at the indifference, even malignancy, of the cosmos, 
to which the individual, failed by the inadequacy of both religious 
and psychoanalytical explanations of existence, could only respond 
with a bitter laugh and grotesque irony” (Parsons 2003, 5). Following 
101  In addition to “The Grande Malade,” at least” The Robin’s House,” the novel Ryder and 
many journalistic pieces feature capes and cloaks of some importance. See Caselli 2009, 16.
102  In English, ’trauma’ is derived from the Greek for ‘wound’ or ‘defeat’ through the Latin 
‘physical wound’.
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this, the bias in Barnes studies has been toward the grimmer sides 
of affectivity: pain, shame and trauma, excepting Taylor’s reading of 
happiness and pleasure in Ladies Almanack and Ryder (Taylor 2012, 
150). I aim to add more grounds for suggesting an alternative focus for 
trauma-based writing, departing from the very comment involving 
“the wound.” Considering the imagery of Barnes’s oeuvre, a bleeding 
wound need not be exclusively emblematic of trauma. Alternatively, it 
recalls the Sacred Heart of Roman Catholic iconography (a motif also 
present in “Aller et Retour”), stigmata and statues that miraculously 
exude. An occasionally bleeding wound can also refer to menstru-
ation, which involves pain as well as the possibility of a new life and 
creativity. This reading of the wound suggests a further ambiguity in 
the ways Barnes’s uses pain and pleasure in her fiction.
Positive emotions and affects, like the negative ones, are a concep-
tually complicated area. We can speak of ‘pleasure’, ‘enjoyment’, 
‘happiness’, ‘joy’ (see Taylor 2012, 147). Out of these, only joy-enjoy-
ment is on Tomkins’s list of primary affects. It is defined as a coun-
terbalance to excitement, a lessening of stimulation (Sedgwick & 
Frank 1995, 74, 81–105). Happiness usually implies a balanced serenity. 
Pleasure, on the other hand, has more explicit potential for intensity 
and excess: “Pleasure can get out of hand; happiness, never” (Frost 
2013, 8). Pleasures in Barnes’s work are often excessive and abundant, 
yet they lack the fearful, inhibiting character they have in Rhys’s. In 
Nightwood, Barnes writes: “The unendurable is the beginning of the 
curve of joy” (N, 105). According to Laura Frost, modernist texts and 
their commentators tend to elevate difficult pleasure or “unpleasure” 
earned by way of skillful reading practices of “hostile” texts, that is, 
difficult ones in the sense of not being immersive or popular (Frost 
2013, 20). Barnes’s texts, on the other hand, have a distinctly different 
stance toward pleasure, although her work is located—also by her 
own commentary—within high modernism (Taylor 2012, 158).
We have encountered some instances of pleasure in the preceding 
analyses of Barnes’s stories. “The Robin’s House” introduces Nelly 
Grissard, a character who has several properties in common with 
Rhys’s Fifi. She is a wealthy, large and bold woman who indulges in 
fashion, food, and other material pleasures:
Every ounce of Nelly Grissard was on the jump. 
Her fingers tapped, her feet fluttered, her bosom 
heaved; her entire diaphragm swelled with little 
creakings of whale-bone, lace and taffeta.
She wore feathery things about the throat, had a liking 
for deep burgundy silks, and wore six petticoats for the 
“joy of discovering that I’m not so fat as they say.” (CS, 308)
The outline of Nelly’s body and especially her chest, a part of the body 
that is often experienced as the locus of emotional experience, is high-
lighted experientially by items of clothing, as were those of Madame 
von Bartmann and Julie. Unlike in their cases, Nelly’s tastes and her 
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enjoyment of the clothes she is wearing are brought to the fore. Her 
active, lived body that takes pleasure in itself is cast as an exqui-
site thing, covered enjoyably with excessive amounts of luxurious 
fabric. Nelly’s late French husband, on the other hand, is described 
as someone who “had dragged his nationality about with him with 
the melancholy of a man who had half-dropped his cloak and that 
cloak his life, and in the end, having wrapped it tightly about him, 
had departed as a Frenchman should” (CS, 308–309). These excerpts 
show Barnes’s recycling of motifs and compositions: swelling chest 
under whale-bone, a cloak, a strong widow and a weak late husband, 
a blend of nationalities, “half-dropping” a piece of attire. The clothes 
are prominent and the woman is powerful, made more powerful by 
the use of their talismanic fetishism; the man has disappeared.
Nelly resembles a female Des Esseintes, a decadent eccentric hero 
who has had different “periods” of tastes: a Russian, a Greek and a 
Chinese one, as well as a period of coloring her drinking water green 
(CS, 311). She does not fear ageing, and the narrator deems such fear 
a sign of a “decaying mind” (CS, 312). The narrator describes her as a 
“sentimentalist” (CS, 309) and “depraved,” “if depravity is understood 
to be the ability to enjoy what others shudder at, and to shudder at 
what others enjoy” (CS, 311). This makes Nelly an “affect alien,” like 
some of Rhys’s heroines, yet the choices of words suggest that here, 
too, the question is not only about taste but also embodied, sensory 
and affective experience. The text uses words such as “depravity” and 
“decaying,” but delivers them in a cheerful, comical tone. Further, 
the story repeats the decadent trope of abundance in pleasures, but 
by the focus on the enjoying body brings it out of the darkness that 
seems to surround decadent pleasures in the history of literature, 
into the chiaroscuro of sensory experience that a reader may enac-
tively live through.
In the slapstick plot of the story, Nicholas, one of Nelly’s two lovers, 
ignites a rumor that he has killed himself. The news is delivered to 
Nelly by the other lover, Nord, while Nicholas spies behind the door. 
The aim is to see how Nelly will react, to disclose any feelings she 
might still have for Nicholas, who has fallen out of favor. First, Nelly 
has a grand reaction typical of Barnes, but equally typically it fades 
into thin air. Nicholas accidentally makes a noise with his cane, then 
walks into the room, where Nelly seems to be about to kiss Nord’s foot. 
Nelly reproaches Nicholas, who bows awkwardly and leaves. When 
reading “A Robin’s House” and other early stories with comical plots 
of intrigue, in which much is left unexplained, the needle in readers’ 
genre-sensitive meter might oscillate between tragedy suggested 
by the affective intensity and the presence of death, and comedy 
suggested by many of the plots. In such context, the descriptions of 
208 209
characters with peculiar tastes and grand affects are prone to appear 
in a lighter tone. These stories of pleasantries share the anticlimactic 
and anticathartic sense of plots that fall through, and the unground-
edness of affects, with the more gloomily toned ones.
In other stories, there is no actual plot to fall through, but the lack of 
climax is present in a version of morality that is at the same time acute 
and dissipating. In Carmen La Tosca’s breakfast scene in “A Boy Asks 
a Question” (see Section 3.4.2), the specific indulgences of perfumed 
talc, fruit and foreign journals103 are decadent motifs, presented very 
much like the ones in “The Robin’s House.” Carmen is extravagant, 
but a sense of morbidity is absent. The enjoyment of the material 
world, including one’s own body, becomes a knowledge of the world, 
very much like the one Madame von Bartmann seems to possess 
and wish to deliver to Richter. The boy who lives nearby has come 
to Carmen with his question, or rather a series of vague and puzzled 
attempts to discover the point of love and sex and the suffering they 
cause, because he has the idea that she “know[s] everything”: “The 
postman says you are a ‘woman of the world—‘” (CS, 348). Carmen’s 
answers sound quite sincere and poetic: “Everyone suffers—all of 
us. […] men cry too—men can hurt” (CS, 349). She also addresses the 
“nothing” and “everything” that recall equally “Aller et Retour” and 
“Cassation”: “when it is all over, you’ll listen to nothing at all; only the 
simple story, told by everything”; “now is the time when you leave 
everything alone”; “[t]hat is everything. In the end it will be the death 
of you” (CS, 349–350). The sentences are at the same time extremely 
weighty and quite vague. No final word or gesture of understanding 
or ease from the part of the boy is delivered; Carmen draws him close 
to herself, their foreheads meet and she gives her final advice: “[s]tart 
all over again” (CS, 350) The story ends with the narrator reporting 
that the same afternoon, Carmen and her entourage leave the village.
The discourse of “A Boy Asks a Question” proceeds from mate-
rial pleasures to an exchange of abstract but pressing ideas that is 
sealed by haptic contact between two foreheads. Moral outcomes 
and psychological interpretations are circled around but not touched 
upon, as in all of the stories discussed. The story has provided its 
reader with various ingredients and left them to form an assemblage 
in the fictional world, on Carmen’s bed amid scraps of breakfast, news-
papers and rumpled laces. In this disarray, suffering and pleasure 
go hand in hand in a life that, like Madame von Bartmann states in 
“Aller et retour,” has “everything in it: murder, pain, beauty, disease—
death” (CS, 369). In both stories, innocence meets experience, and the 
implicit knowledge of a “woman of the world” becomes expressed in 
her pleasurable relationship to the material world equally as in what 
she can convey verbally. The linguistic expressions remain so vague 
as to give priority to the experiential kind of “knowledge.” Overall, 
103  On decadent references to perfumes and some modernists’ complex relationship to 
them, see Frost 2013, 39–43.
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a sense of lightness surrounds both the material enjoyment and the 
philosophy of life. In “The Robin’s House,” the levity arises from the 
comical plot, whereas in “A Boy Asks a Question,” it is more from 
the description of the sensory enjoyment, and the departure of the 
main character for new adventures at the typical ending for a short 
story by Barnes. In Barnes’s decadent stories, morality and psycho-
logical explanations are replaced by non-propositional knowledge 
and experience, which are sometimes beyond words and come to be 
synonymous with enjoyment. Enjoyment also brings with it some 
forms of pain, as in the Barthesian notion of jouissance (Barthes 2014). 
For Barnes, pain is not something concealed behind the enjoyment, 
but part of the affective whole of the experience, which becomes 
material for knowledge and affectivity.
The same applies to Rhys: beside (not beyond) cynical, somber, and 
critical tones that can also be appreciated, even in a reader’s embodied 
reaction, there are spaces for the enactment of material pleasures. The 
two writers’ ways to bind pleasures to material objects can be linked 
to a general modernist interest in the material world and even tenden-
cies of “dehumanization” of art, a vision of art removed from narrative 
features of human interest. José Ortega y Gasset writes:
[The new style] tends toward the dehumanization of art; 
to an avoidance of living forms; to ensuring that a work 
of art should be nothing but a work of art; to considering 
art simply as play and nothing else; to an essential irony; 
to an avoidance of all falsehood; and finally, toward 
an art which makes no spiritual or transcendental 
claims whatsoever. (Ortega y Gasset 1968, 70)
A preference for play and irony and the absence of “spiritual or tran-
scendental claims” is as characteristics of the fiction of Barnes and 
Rhys. However, Ortega y Gasset demands clarity and rationality, not 
leaving much room for affectivity. Affective qualities are prominent 
in Rhys’s and Barnes’s stories alike, although even they become 
slightly “dehumanized.” Tim Armstrong (2005, 94) points out a 
modernist tendency of depicting sensations as “distributed” rather 
than “owned,” while David Herman (2011a) suggests that experience 
in modernist texts spreads beyond the confines of the individual. 
Barnes’s prose definitely moves in the direction of distributed cogni-
tion, occasionally taking it even further into the direction of ques-
tioning human subjectivity.
The stories discussed in this chapter invite affective involvement 
with all kinds of material things, including “superficial” or “frivolous” 
things and thing-like characters presented to the reader in varying 
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tableaux and assemblages. The things are present to the senses 
and thus involve the reader as an embodied being in their affective 
experientiality, even when characters’ minds remain unreadable and 
there is a difficulty in naming specific emotions; when characters are 
portrayed as things rather than lived human bodies. The nonhuman 
things, as well as the thing-like characters encountered in the stories 
are expressive of feeling even when they seem to lack inner life, and 
thus create interaffective and empathic bonds beyond those we are 
accustomed to look for in studying fiction. Different forms of happi-
ness and pleasure are especially frequent to stem from these things, 
and attention to them brings forth hitherto undiscovered reserves of 
affirmative affectivity that exists beside, not on top of or underneath 
the critical, ironical, cynical and tragic tones that also frequent the 
texts. The affectivity in Rhys and Barnes is complex and ambiguous, 
and located in the shared, lived world of lived bodies, instead of 








5 Making Sense of Things
Djuna Barnes’s and Jean Rhys’s stories invite readerly sense-making 
on many levels, as has become clear from the analyses in the 
preceding chapters. Their evocations of things and materialities reso-
nate with our basic sensorimotor experiences and our sociocultural 
knowledge; they invite affective immersion as well as symbolic inter-
pretation and a critical consciousness. These levels tend to be inter-
mingled: critical, reflective considerations are built on and modified 
by embodied, pre-reflective affectivity. The basis of this discussion of 
inter-level sense-making was laid in the analyses of the meanings of 
spaces, domesticity, and movement in Chapter 2. This final analysis 
chapter takes meaning and sense-making as its main foci.
The previous analyses in this study have shown that the stories’ 
tendency to highlight similarities between things and people has 
embodied, affective and aesthetical grounds, as well as ethical impli-
cations. In this chapter, the tendency is inspected further in Jean 
Rhys’s short fiction. Djuna Barnes, on the other hand, favors abundant 
descriptions, whose implications for agency and affectivity have been 
explored in the previous chapters. These, too, can be read in multiple 
ways, and sometimes they purposefully lead their reader astray: 
symbolic or allegorical interpretations of things, as well as psycholog-
ical attributions of mind and emotion to the humans in these assem-
blages, are ironically thwarted. In terms of sense-making, the proper-
ties of symbolic and allegorical readings in relation to materiality and 
embodiment, as well as their alternatives, need to be explored and 
spelled out: what kind of reading would best do justice to the texts? 
Consequently, the aim is not to answer the question “what do the 
things in these stories mean,” but rather, “how do they mean?”
The aim is to shed light on how meaning is made with the help of 
an “embodied mode of attentiveness that involves us in acts of sensing, 
perceiving, feeling, registering and engaging,” as Rita Felski suggests 
we ought to see reading (Ibid., 176). The analyses examine how the 
evocations of things and materialities and their experientiality invite 
readers to engage in such acts. In their manifesto of “surface reading,” an 
approach resonating with the attention taken here to things and materi-
alities, Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus suggest paying attention to the 
materiality of the text under scrutiny (referring both to its language and 
to the “material” makings of the reading mind). They suggest pursuing 
a descriptive attitude, with “no need to translate the text into a theoret-
ical or historical metalanguage in order to make the text meaningful” 
(Best & Marcus 2009, 9–11). Methodologically, translation into any 
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metalanguage is not the aim here, either; however, I consider the evoca-
tion of cultural and historical contexts important for the discussion of 
how the short stories make meanings with things. Djuna Barnes’s abun-
dant descriptions draw on fin-de-siècle decadence and Roman Catholic 
iconography, while Rhys’s allusions to the domains of photography, 
impressionistic art and contemporary discussions of mass culture are of 
importance for the interpretation of her texts.
Thus, the focus of this chapter is on the production of meaning 
for someone, in which case the definition of ‘meaning’ is colored by 
embodied experientiality, even in the case of culturally sensitive and 
symbolic meanings. Mark Johnson importantly suggests that we see 
higher-order meaning-making “as growing out of and shaped by 
our abilities to perceive things, manipulate objects, move our bodies 
in space, and evaluate our situation” (Johnson M. 2008, 11). Building 
on conceptual metaphor theory as well as John Dewey’s “continuity 
principle” between “lower” and “higher” forms of mental activity 
(Dewey 1991, 28–31), Johnson claims that our sensorimotor being-in-
the-world sets the basis for higher capacities of meaning-making, like 
the ones present in literary reading. Additionally, material things, 
even ones evoked in fiction often come with “tacit meanings” based 
on the kind of use and interaction they have habitually afforded us 
(Määttänen 2015, 89). The division of cognitive activities and capaci-
ties into “higher” and “lower” is not without problems, but the main 
principle here is important for the arguments of this study, and itself 
not entirely dependent on these hierarchical classifications. The basic 
affective engagement with materialities as expressive and meaningful 
in Barnes’ and Rhys’s texts, as it was studied in the previous chapters, 
is not to be seen as a separate phenomenon from conscious or intel-
lectual activities to do with of interpretation and understanding, but 
a basis on which the latter are built, or something that permeates it, if 
we want to avoid a spatially hierarchical metaphor.
According to Lakoff and Johnson (2003), our higher-order, meta-
phorical capacities of making sense of the world rest on the experi-
ence our body and the lived world of things afford in their interaction: 
we conceptualize the world though metaphors of directions (the 
future is forward, the past is behind), containers (the mind is a vessel 
with content) and things as individuals and groups, based on our 
sensorimotor interaction with such phenomena. This approach, with 
its updated forms, remains current within cognitive linguistics and 
psychology as well as some of their applications to literary studies 
(see Evans & Green 2006, Fauconnier & Turner 2002, Caracciolo 2012, 
2014b). When looking at the phenomenon of literature, meaning is 
of course made by means of language. However, it is not an intrinsic 
property of language or words, but, like experientiality, a relational 
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phenomenon brought forth jointly by the text and its reader (cf. 
Caracciolo 2014b). As Terence Cave has pointed out, seeing our rela-
tionship to language as grounded on our bodily being-in-the-world 
gives reason to view language itself as a set of affordances that restrict 
our thinking but also enable different courses for it. Importantly, 
language viewed this way does not ontologically precede and deter-
mine our thinking, as has been suggested in postmodern, poststruc-
turalist approaches (Cave 2016, 54). For Gilles Deleuze “sense” emerges 
as an effect or an event that is neither a property of linguistic or logical 
propositions nor a property of “things,” but enabled by both (Deleuze 
1989, 19–20, 70, 95). Applied to the task of this study, we cannot find 
“sense” in the things of Rhys and Barnes’s stories, in the words used 
to evoke those things, nor exclusively as propositional content in 
the mind of the reader who encounters these words⁄things and at 
complete liberty to interpret them; sense happens in this encounter 
of “surfaces.”
‘Sense’ is a valuable notion for this study because of of its evocation 
of the domain of the senses as well as the more reflective, conceptually 
organized parts of interpretation that in everyday use fall under its 
scope. 104 Meaning and sense are still used here interchangeably, while 
‘sense-making’ refers to a specific activity that produces meaning, as 
defined by enactivist cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind. 
Ezequiel Di Paolo’s recent definition demonstrates how a discussion 
of meaning (here significance) is enhanced by attention to sense-
making as activity, and how sense-making may involve both primor-
dial, pre-reflective processes and higher-order ones:
To make sense is for a body to encounter value and 
significance in the world […]. Sense-making is not 
something that happens in the body, or in the brain, but 
it always implies a relational and value-laden coherence 
between body and world—the world does not present itself 
as sense-data to be interpreted, but is itself a participant 
in the sense-making process and often the stage where 
my sense-making is enacted […]. Sense-making is not 
primarily a high-level voluntary interpretation of the 
world (though it can take this form) but bodily and worldly 
activities of all sorts, from biological and pre-reflective to 
conscious and linguistic. In all these cases, sense-making 
is always affective. (Di Paolo 2014, xii) 
This definition asserts that sense-making can take the form of 
conscious, conceptual (“high-level”) interpretation, but it also encom-
passes biological and pre-reflective engagement with the world, and 
that affectivity colors the activity throughout these “levels” (see also 
104  In some basic definitions of enactivism, drawing from the Buddhist tradition, the 
connection between senses and sense is also explored as the mind is suggested to function 
like one of the senses, with thoughts as its “object” (Varela, Thomson & Rosch 1991, 64).
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Colombetti 2013). In this chapter, different types of meaning and 
sense-making are discussed in relation to the literary works, but with 
the overarching idea that they share a common basis in an embodied, 
affective activity like the one described by Di Paolo; activity in a 
material world with material things. As stated by Johnson, meanings 
do not “pop up” out of nowhere; they “must be grounded in our bodily 
connections with things” (Johnson M. 2008, 25). Our feelings of the 
qualitative dimensions of this world develop and acquire meaning, 
yet these are not experiences of an isolated subjective nature, but 
qualities “in the world as much as they are in us” (Ibid.). We also expe-
rience qualities of the material world as colored by culturally shared 
meanings (Johnson 1987, 14). Therefore, even if we approach meaning 
as always being for someone, it is not to suggest solipsistic or subjec-
tivist account.
The first sections discuss Jean Rhys’s work, this time exclusively 
the stories published in the collection The Left Bank, to examine 
how sense and meaning are made on the level of individual stories as 
well as the entire collection. Drawing especially on Johnson’s notion 
of embodied meaning, I examine how the materiality of both things 
and people and Rhys’s ways of presenting them as uniform masses 
or as aesthetic detail affect readerly sense-making from the basic, 
embodied and affective levels to aesthetic and ethical considerations. 
In fact, if we follow Dewey’s and later Johnson’s thinking, aesthetic 
experience is not a “higher” faculty per se, but a condensed form of 
basic sense-making experiences (Johnson M. 2008, xi; Dewey 1934). 
In Section 5.2, the focus is on Djuna Barnes’s short stories and their 
use of description and material detail. Allegorical interpretation is 
compared and combined with an “archaeological” one, tracing histor-
ical and cultural connections of material things, before these, too are 
read in the light of theories of embodied sense-making, meaning, 
and metaphor. Both sections end with a discussion of the narrating 
and focalizing structures of the short stories, suggesting how these 
devices combined with the materialities of meaning work to create 
aesthetic experience, and how they contribute to what is alluring and 
affective in the stories and collections.
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5.1 Meaning with the Masses:  
Sense-making, Aesthetics,  
and Ethics in The Left Bank
In the previous chapter, we have seen how Rhys’s stories build 
communities around things, and invite our affective engagement in 
the form of empathy for things and people-as-things. I have suggested 
a reading that both reveals the ironical mode and the critical social 
commentary and acknowledges the affective aspects of texts that 
involve moments of happiness and belonging that the reader is 
invited to enact. What all preceding analyses have shown is that 
Rhys’s fiction does not comply with a system of thought that divides 
the world neatly into subjects and objects. The environment and its 
“objects” such as clothes, rooms and parks are sometimes provided 
with speech and an imagined liveliness, and they gain the status 
of agents in conjunction with human characters by way of magical 
thinking as well as the “interobjectivity” of the social practices they 
are involved in. On the other hand, human characters (particularly, 
but not exclusively women), are “thingified” by the style and voice of 
the narration in texts such as “Mannequin” and “Vienne.” However, 
even these characters are paradoxically presented as subjects of 
feeling and participants in action. As Mark Johnson (2007, 20) puts it, 
“subjects and objects […] are abstractions from the interactive process 
of our experience of a meaningful self-in-a-world.” The world pres-
ents itself to us as subjects and objects, yet these are not ontological, 
“objective” categories, but abstractions made in interactive, culturally 
colored sense-making, and therefore also imprecise and malleable. 
The following analyses discuss the ways in which Rhys’s characters 
and narrators in The Left Bank make sense of their surroundings, with 
varying degrees of subjecthood and objecthood, and how they in turn 
invite the reader to see the meanings involved, creating three levels 
of interpretation: the basic embodied sense-making, the aesthetic 
consciousness of a reader of fiction, and the reflective appraisal of 
ethical questions.
In his preface to The Left Bank, Ford Madox Ford taunts Rhys (in 
an ultimately laudatory manner) on erasing even the few “words 
of descriptive matter as had crept into her work,” for the benefit of 
“passion, hardship, emotions” (Ford 1984, 26). It is true that Rhys’s 
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stories are not filled with such rich descriptive passages as we are 
about to examine in the work of Djuna Barnes; yet her equalizing, 
aestheticizing approach to both people and things, and the tendencies 
toward journalistic observation, seem to arise from a writerly ethos 
that is predominantly descriptive. This leads to the stories’ portrayal 
of their human characters as types and masses of people. The notion 
of ‘the masses’ was present in many discussions about phenomena of 
modernity contemporary to Rhys, from commercialism and enter-
tainment to factory work and fascism.105 In the following, masses of 
people lead to masses of things and to the discussion of how both 
things and people are picked out of these groupings for aesthetic effect 
and ethical consideration. The final part focuses on the narrating 
voice that persists throughout the entire collection. I analyze its part 
in construing a textual style dominated by things and masses as well 
as its effect on the sense-making invited by the aesthetic whole of the 
work and the ethical considerations invited by it. The connections 
between experientiality, ethics, and aesthetics in Rhys’s work have not 
yet been thoroughly discussed; nor has an analysis of The Left Bank 
as a textual whole has not been undertaken. By focusing especially 
on The Left Bank, the discussion investigates how the format of a 
collection of short fiction, made up of stories, anecdotes and sketches 
loosely bound by shared themes, temporality, geography, and reper-
toire of things, affects readerly possibilities of sense-making.
5.1.1. Sprinklings and Masses of People
Jean Rhys portrays people as representative of a type, or part of a mass. 
The tendency of early researchers to read her protagonists as repre-
sentatives of a type has been rightly criticized for its narrowness and 
reductionism as well as victimizing tendencies, a usual type being “the 
underdog” classified as such already in Ford’s introduction to The Left 
Bank (Emery 2012, xi; Le Gallez 1990, 1–8; cf. Ford 1984). However, I main-
tain that typification as an aesthetic device is such an important part of 
Rhys’s writing that it needs to be studied here, and its relations to habitual 
ways of thinking through metaphorical things and masses pointed out. 
Only the scope needs to be broadened from the main protagonists, 
easily seen as representatives of the authorial outlook, to other char-
acters and elements, and the orientation kept closer to the “surface” of 
105  In Siegfried Kracauer’s essay collection, The Mass Ornament, whose publication in 1927 
coincided with the publication of The Left Bank, and Adorno and Horkheimer’s later “The 
Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” (1944).
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the text, regarding the textual devices used to produce the impression 
of types and masses. Typification is looked at as a textual strategy with 
cognitive grounds and effects, instead of assuming a representative rela-
tion of the fictional type to one actually existing, while recognizing also 
the historical and cultural context of these textual choices.
Let us reconsider the models’ lunch hour in the story “Mannequin.” 
The young women come across as a uniform mass in that they are all 
dressed in identical black cotton chemises designed for their off-duty 
time; in addition, each of them is acting according to her “type,” on the 
basis of which clothes are selected for the models to present in the shop. 
Similarly, Rhys’s writing classifies and typifies chorus-girls, café-going 
artists and tourists, different nationalities as well as men and women. 
Specific subclasses such as the “anglaise” (an Engliswoman in Paris), 
or the “cerebrale” (an intelligent woman, portrayed as a hybrid monster 
in Good Morning, Midnight) also emerge, always with a heavy dose of 
irony. These types reflect the close ties of Rhys’s life and writing with 
the fashions and issues of the day and media such as fashion maga-
zines, as pointed out by Sophie Oliver (2016).
In addition to its resemblance to surrealist photography and 
installations, as shown in Section 3.1.1, the stance of Rhys’s stories 
toward their characters and things can be compared to early 20th 
century “humanist” photography by artists such as Henri Cartier-
Bresson (1908–2004) and Brassaï (1899–1984).106 These photographers 
continued the documentarily oriented portrayal of workers, dancers, 
prostitutes, café clients and other urban (or more specifically Parisian) 
types, undertaken in the previous century by painters such as Henri 
de Toulouse-Lautrec (1864–1901). In their pictures, there is a curious 
mixture of, on the one hand, the celebration of individuals and forms 
of life that are at the bottom or margins of social hierarchies, and on 
the other, a tendency to position the “subjects” of the pictures as speci-
mens of a recognizable type; something that can be seen as dehuman-
izing rather than “humanist.”
A similar tension haunts Rhys’s writing, and it takes a visual form. 
In addition to the intertextual connection to impressionistic painting 
and humanist photography, we can look at Rhys’s writing in the 
framework of bodily metaphors and conceptual blending, in which 
the experience of one sense, or here one art form, is used to concep-
tualize that of another (see Section 2.1; Lakoff & Turner 2002; Lakoff 
& Johnson 2003, 3). At the very end of “Mannequin,” following the 
description of Anna’s newly found sense of happiness and belonging, 
it is as if the scope of the narrative “lens” was widened to encompass 
first her colleagues from the shop, then the whole street with other 
similar shops, to form an image of the streets near Place Vendôme that 
could be an iconic shot by one of the humanist photographers:107
106  Brassaï’s photographs of Paris are used to illustrate Rhys’s Complete Novels published 
by W. W. Norton (1985).
107  Literary fiction allows for imagining this picture in color instead of black and white, 
which was still used by photographers at that point.
222 223Making Sense of Things
Georgette passed her and smiled; Babette was in 
a fur coat. All up the street the mannequins were 
coming out of the shops, pausing on the pavements 
a moment, making them as gay and as beautiful 
as beds of flowers before they walked swiftly away 
and the Paris night swallowed them up. (LB, 70)
The ending repeats the flower metaphor that Anna, the focalizer 
of the story, has already used for the models in the dingy dress-
ing-room (“an inadequate conservatory for these human flowers,” 
LB, 6). Georgette and Babette are named and singled out as indi-
viduals, Georgette even as a smiling agent, while Babette begins to 
disappear within her fur coat. The rest of the passage shows manne-
quins en masse, forming a delightful spectacle of beauty and gaiety 
on the streets. In the earlier chapters, we have already begun to see 
how such “thingified” presentations of human beings as bodies and 
as surfaces need not immediately equal representations of alienation 
and objectification, although these discourses are never far from 
Rhys’s writing. What is the mechanism of sense-making invited by a 
story that buries the human subject in a fur coat or presents her as a 
flower, a decorative element?
If we take a step back and look at “Mannequin” in the context of 
the whole collection of stories, we begin to see a variety of “human 
flowers” scattered all through the work. The Left Bank is constructed 
as a collection of both longer, “linearly” proceeding stories and 
shorter, “spatial” or “anecdotal” (Harrington 2007, 5; Frank 1991) 
glimpses into moments of life on the Paris Left Bank, with detours 
to the south of France, other European cities, and the Caribbean 
Antilles. Despite changing narrators, sometimes intradiegetic, 
named characters, sometimes extradiegetic third-person narrators, 
the way situations and human beings are perceived and commented 
on remains rather constant, which creates a sense of continuity in 
the narrating voice throughout the collection. The same is true of 
the focalizers, who do not always coincide with the narrators.108 The 
way the stories invite their readers to make sense of them is strongly 
guided by the way their focalizers are shown to be making sense of 
their surroundings; a focalizer, after all, usually invites the reader 
to share her point of view more strongly than other characters 
(Caracciolo 2014b, 173). For referring to this guiding voice present 
throughout the collection I use the concept of “mind style” coined by 
Roger Fowler. It denotes “an impression of a world-view,” the means 
that the text uses to convey a certain point of view and conception 
108  These distinctions are explored further in Section 5.1.3.
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of the fictional world as taken by a character in that world.109 This 
is a concept more related to a “mind-set” or a world view than, for 
instance, the notion of ‘voice’ as applied by Genette (Fowler 1977, 76, 
emphasis mine; Herman 2011b). However, before investigating the 
overall combination of mind styles in The Left Bank, we begin with a 
single story with a single narrator and focalizer, useful for its ample 
examples of characterization and typification.
The final and longest story in the collection, “Vienne,” is divided 
into eleven titled sections.110 As discussed briefly in Section 4.1, it is 
a narrative of a young couple, Frances and Pierre, staying in Vienna 
and leading a conspicuously affluent life, before fleeing from debtors 
and authorities through different European countries and cities. 
The events, narrated and focalized by Frances, take place during or 
just after the First World War. However, the war is only marginally 
present in the story. Most of “Vienne” consists of a cavalcade of people 
encountered during the few years depicted. The titles of the sections 
emphasize this impression, especially ones closer to the beginning 
of the story: “André Parisien,” “Tillie,” “Fischl: Winter 1920–Spring 
1921,” “Dancing at Eisenstein’s with Antoine Renault.” In the whole 
story, both people and things become tokens that help to keep track 
of time and place, but these subsections tend toward character study 
using typification.
André is a “little man,” who takes pains to disguise his height with 
the cut of his suits. This comic characterization is accompanied by 
what is hinted at already in his epithet in the subtitle, “Parisien.” In 
Frances’s, and Rhys’s, system of types, being Parisian not only means 
coming from Paris: “One could tell a Frenchman, Parisian, a mile off. 
Quantities of hair which he had waved every week, rather honest 
blue eyes, a satyr’s nose and mouth” (LB, 195). The image of the satyr 
that is used to brand André’s physiognomy also introduces his most 
central characteristic, namely a ceaseless interest in women (usually 
dancers) and a habit for games of seduction that are usually realized 
as simple plots of chase, conquest, and abandon. In the beginning, 
André dominates the games, but in the fourth section he gets conned 
(a classic plot that involves supposedly missing pearls that he has to 
recompense for) and eventually abandoned by another typified char-
acter, Tillie. She is described in a passage characteristic of Frances’s 
narration as “the most complete specimen of the adventuress, the 
Man Eater, I’ve ever met” (LB, 200). Tillie is shown in contrast to Ridi, 
Andrés previous “friend,” a “shy” girl who gets mistreated by him. 
“Glory to the Tillies, the avengers of the Ridis!” (LB, 208) Frances 
exclaims, pushing both Tillie and Ridi further into the realm of 
109  I use the concept emphasizing the “style” component as a reference to textual devices; 
according to Elena Semino (2007, 169), it is unclear whether the main reference of the concept 
is to this level, or to the level of the attribution of consciousness to fictional minds by inter-
preting the text (if a clear difference between the two can even be made).
110  That is, in its complete version included in The Left Bank. The story was shortened, and 
its subtitles removed for republication in Tigers Are Better-looking (1968).
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specimens, names that in the plural define their own type instead of 
pointing to an individual, like “The Parisien.” They have their places 
in a system that is built on the moral mind-set constructed around 
Frances, expressed by her mind style that favors neat and definitive 
characterizations and a cynical approach to sexual relations, as well 
as socioeconomic ones, as a game of eat-or-be-eaten. Most focalizers 
of the collection can be said to share a similar mind style. None of the 
characters comes across as bad or deplorable, nor as virtuous, but 
they both are portrayed by Frances’s narrating voice as victims of 
the way of the world. The section “Tillie” ends with Andrés hope for 
reconciliation as imagined by Frances: “The next girl perhaps—will 
be sweet and gentle. His turn to be eater. ⁄ Detestable world” (Ibid.).
Many of the characters in “Vienne” are defined by nationality-re-
lated stereotypes. Fischl, a casual acquaintance with whom Frances 
plays golf, is characterized as “An Important Person,” and “like most 
Viennese, charming, and clever as hell” (LB, 217). Eisenstein, on the 
other hand, is described, this time in a newspaper article read by 
Frances, as “the typical Viennese aristocrat” (LB, 218): he has lost his 
fortune because of the war and become a dancing instructor to make 
ends meet. These characterizations sweep through the whole story, 
to the point of nagging repetition: “all Vienna was vulgar” (LB, 201); 
“Excessively good-looking, but, being a Prussian, brutal, of course” 
(LB, 203); “the Japanese thought a lot of the German army and the 
German way of keeping women in their place” (LB, 211); “the Viennese 
have nearly as much temperament as the French, the Hungarians 
even more” (LB, 213); “the attractive Englishman is a little bit stupid, 
a little bit ‘thick’, more than a little bit an egoist, and a hypocrite” 
(LB, 219).111 All in all, the classifying stance that the narrator⁄focal-
izer (many of the characterizations are attributed to Frances in free 
indirect discourse) takes toward people contributes to their appearing 
in the story as a large mass of people under the mercy of power 
structures and habits, divided into smaller masses with their typical 
representatives.
This mind style, combined with the ironic tone, can be seen to 
reflect alienation and cynicism brought about in Frances by travel 
and a life based on spending her husband’s money of dubious origin, 
what Judith Kegan Gardiner has called her moral downfall (Gardiner 
1989, 29). However, if we look at a more basic level of sense-making 
that the text invites, and the context of the whole collection, these 
small and large masses come across as a continual way of tapping into 
very basic, embodied experience in readers, and producing a certain 
111  There is also a group of Japanese expatriates who refer to Viennese women as “war 
material” (LB, 209), set as a disturbing parallel to Frances’s point of view.
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aesthetic outcome. I suggest that the reasons for such strategies of 
characterization are not merely related to the “moral” of the story 
exemplified by Frances as a “fallen woman.”
A group or a mass that consists of individual things is one of the 
basic patterns created by experiences of bodily interaction with the 
world, what Johnson (1987) has called ‘image schemas’ (Johnson M. 
2008, 81–82).112 These schemas are used in the arts to appeal to the 
reader’s experiential background (Johnson M. 2008, 209; Caracciolo 
2012, 97–98). In “Vienne,” this would involve the schema of things 
grouped together on the basis of a characteristic. It can appear in a 
vaguely visual form, but also invite the imaginary hapticity involved 
in the perception of forms and groups. Human bodies afford the possi-
bility of social interaction (see Froese & Di Paolo 2011, 21–25; Gibson 
1979, 135–136), but they, too, can be seen as bodies in space grouped 
in various formations. As James Gibson puts it, other animate beings 
appear to us as “animate objects,” with their own affordances: they are 
“detached objects with topologically closed surfaces, but they change 
the shape of their surfaces while yet retaining the same fundamental 
shape.” (Gibson 1979, 135–136). The way the story insists on its narrator 
grouping human “animate objects” into sets with one defining prop-
erty (German and French, shy dancers and ruined aristocrats, Tillies 
and Ridis) solidifies the presence of the schema in the flow of reading, 
whereby it can dominate the reading as an underlying basic experi-
ence. The groups of people are considered as exemplary of a certain 
narrator’s mind set and world view and thereby serve to characterize 
her experiential point of view constructed in the narrative.
This, of course, is not the only thing a reader of the story is made 
aware of. When engaged in reflective interpretation, a reader can 
proportion these experiences conveyed by the narrator’s mind 
style with a historical context feeding gendered and ethnic stereo-
types, and read the whole as part of Rhys’s critical commentary of 
the “detestable world.” However, if we stop to consider the stories as 
aesthetic arrangements that invite visual and multisensory imag-
ining, it becomes clear that humans and things play similar parts in 
the worldmaking of the narrative, tapping into the way human minds 
are capable of and often restricted to experiencing people as masses 
and groups. In the moment of reading, the schematic arrangement of 
elements into groups is encountered within the frame of fictionality 
defined by the fact that the reader is, indeed, reading a short story. As 
Merja Polvinen (2017, 143; 2016, 29) suggests, the whole discourse and 
communicative status of a work of fiction becomes enacted imagi-
natively by the reader, in addition to the world and character experi-
ences represented by it. The discursive strategies and the situation in 
which the reader is participating when engaging with the story are 
112  This is a slightly misleading title for an otherwise useful concept, since these schemas 
do not (and Johnson does not claim they would) pertain exclusively to the sense of vision, and 
should not be conceived as “pictures in the head” with representational content (cf. Johnson 
1987, 45).
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likely to be recognized as part of a fictional, artistic whole. Thereby 
the perception of the aesthetic and rhetorical value of Frances’s 
stereotypical comments gains attention beside their ethical implica-
tions, which would be pre-eminent if Frances’s words were uttered by 
an actual person in the real world.
The Left Bank calls forth various schemas that rely on the embodied 
being-in-the-world, but the tendency of grouping becomes high-
lighted in the context of the whole collection. Partly this is due to typi-
fication, as in “Vienne,” partly to other strategies such as the photo-
graphic description encountered in the final scene of “Mannequin.” 
When the collection is read as a whole, these repeating narrative 
devices form part of the communicative framing of the narrative. The 
scene in “Mannequin” is aesthetically unified in its presentation of 
the human flowers that beautify the streets and its borrowing from 
the visual arts. The stereotypes in “Vienne,” on the other hand, have 
no common aesthetic characteristics, but the very repetition of the 
gestures of grouping throughout the collection is likely to feed back 
into the aesthetic experience of this story, too: it is not only recognized 
by the reader, but lived through enactively as part of the repertoire 
of fictional devices that make up the experience of reading The Left 
Bank. The collection invites enactive participation on many levels. 
The stories solicit basic bodily image schemas, along with sociocul-
turally shared schematic features readers can draw on; the repeated 
evocation of such schemas becomes a stylistic device contributing to 
the aesthetic effect of the stories and part of the enactive experience of 
readers schooled by reading fiction. Reflective considerations of the 
stories’ ethical implications are invited by interpretive connections 
that can be made between the mind styles of the narrators and the 
historical context of the stories, and these interpretations arise beside 
and are colored by the basic schematic experiences and the recogni-
tion of the fictionality of what is being read. On the other hand, we 
need to remember that the image-schematic experiences, too, are 
partly culture-dependent, and the experience of reading affects the 
reader’s experiential background on all levels: they make a feedback 
loop of reflective and pre-reflective sense-making (see Caracciolo 
2014b, 49–50).
Human bodies can also be presented as decorative elements that 
create the ambience of a story. In the impressionistic description of a 
prison visiting hour in “From a French Prison”, people are compared 
to spiders:
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From the foot of the staircase leading down from 
the room in which they waited, ran a very long 
whitewashed corridor, incredibly grim, and dark 
in spite of the whitewash. Here and there a warder 
sat close against the wall looking in its shadow 
like a huge spider—a bloated, hairy insect born of 
the darkness and of the dank smell. (LB, 44)
 In “The Grey Day,” on the other hand, a depressed poet, one of the few 
male focalizers in the collection, sees nothing inspiring or beautiful 
around him: “Then his despair faded again to greyness in that dark, 
quiet café, where two men with hooked noses and greasy, curly hair, 
played draughts” (LB, 142). The human elements in these two descrip-
tions appeal to our ready ability to imagine a human figure, but at 
the same time these figures are shown blending into and “born of ” 
their environment. They act as parts of the environment to create the 
ambience of the scene, with which the focalizers are then shown to 
interact in the formulation of their mind-states. In the prison scene, 
the narrator as the perceiver and experiencer of the scene retains 
his⁄her humanness, but the anonymous warders, “here and there,” 
emerge not only as animals but parts of the scenery, created by its 
darkness and humidity. In the café, the two men act as furnishings 
that heighten the “greyness” of the environment.
The description in these two stories recalls realist use of environ-
mental detail as a support for characterization (Stanica 2014, 514); on 
the other hand, they can equally well be seen as exemplary of the 
modernist vision of the interconnectedness of the experiencing being 
and its environment (Herman 2011a). Rhys seems to blend these two 
aesthetic aims: she combines a realist observation and classification 
with a modernist focus on experience that extends into the world. In 
the prison story, the narrator-focalizer is not identified as a character 
in the story but rather acts as an “empty deictic center” (Fludernik 
1996, 273). Experientiality is still present in the voice that recounts the 
surroundings and creates a virtual presence of a proxy-experiencer 
for the reader (Ibid., Caracciolo 2014b, 169). This would be likely to 
happen in realist fiction, too.
In “The Grey Day,” the environment is there not only to reflect the 
moods of the focalizer: it is also shown to participate in their emer-
gence. In the dark, quiet café, decorated with the “greasy” men, his 
mood “fades” from a slightly agitated state of despair, which could be 
better expressed by sharp forms and warm colors than greyness. The 
color grey is a metaphorical expression of a vaguely depressed mood 
in line with the environment; the title of the story may equally well 
denote weather and a mind-state.113 The environment, in this sense, 
113  The color gray seems to be a repeating motif in Rhys’s life and work. Rhys used Gray as 
her last name, with changing first names, when she performed as a chorus girl, and named 
the protagonist of her first, unpublished novel, Triple Sec, Suzy Gray. Sue Thomas (2015, 27) 
also points out the intertextual connections of Rhys’s work to Wilde’s Picture of Dorian Gray.
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does not mean all that is left outside the human: it is composed of both 
nonhuman and human elements. In many of the stories in The Left 
Bank, the exploration of an individual consciousness, even as spread 
out in the world, actually does not seem to be of most importance. 
Here the journalism-like, descriptive tendencies of realism are a closer 
comparison. The journalistic ethos of the collection is intensified by 
its paratexts (the title and preface) that direct its readers to approach it 
as a documentary, although impressionistic account of contemporary 
Parisian (expatriate) life centered on the Rive Gauche, of which “Miss 
Rhys” has “profound knowledge” (Ford 1984, 23).
Similarly, set in the context of the whole work, moments of 
psycho-narration and other references to individual consciousness 
become parts of its descriptive ethos. The poet of “The Grey Day” 
unsuccessfully tries to conjure up inspiration and faith with the help 
of his imagination:
He shut his eyes and tried hard to think of blue 
seas in the sunshine, of the white, supple arms of 
a dancer dressed in red–of the throb that lives in a 
violin and the movement of flowers in the wind.
It was quite useless.
Besides, flowers have stupid faces and so have 
dancers for the matter of that. (LB, 142)
Almost all the “happy objects” (see Section 4.1.1, Ahmed 2010) that 
the poet imagines also appear in one or several other stories in the 
collection. We have encountered blue seas and sunshine as affective 
things in the stories set in the Caribbean and the French Riviera. 
Dancers are present regularly, especially in “Vienne,” and flowers 
are not only given as gifts (“A Night,” “Learning to Be a Mother”), but 
also presented as metaphorical stand-ins for human characters, as 
in “Mannequin.” At the end of the passage from “The Grey Day,” in 
free direct discourse, flowers are compared with dancers and given 
“stupid faces,” in a gesture of personification, a phenomenon that is 
inspected more closely in the following section. Thus, a reference to 
the other stories of the collection lends some color to the otherwise 
“grey” passage, but offers the colors as “useless” and illusory and grey 
as the tone of reality.
The stories in The Left Bank are sprinkled with human “animate 
objects” and nonhuman lively things, to use another metaphorical 
expression derived from the world of things. One of the stories, “Tout 
Montparnasse and a Lady,” actually features sprinkling as a means of 
expression, combined with a list of nationalities and origins charac-
teristic of the collection. The fictional space observed in this story is 
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the Bal Musette, which refers to an actual, famous Montparnasse café 
with an international clientele. It is defined as follows: “It is Chelsea, 
London, with a large dash of Greenwich Village, New York, to liven 
it, and a slight sprinkling of Moscow, Christiania and even of Paris 
to give incongruous local colourings” (LB, 54). The metaphorical 
expressions of “dash” and “sprinkle” parallel the café space and its 
visitors with the cocktail served there and their ingredients. This 
contextually fitting metaphor binds together the embodied-concep-
tual, aesthetical and historically conscious levels of reading: cocktails 
evoke a basic sense experience of a mixture of tastes and colors that 
can solicit an enactive response based on reader-specific experiential 
traces; they are intratextually linked with the aesthetics of groups and 
combinations evoked in multisensory images throughout the collec-
tion; and they are likely to have been a fashionable drink of choice 
among the cosmopolitan clients of a Left Bank café in the 1920s. It may 
fit a certain selection of images a reader is already able to associate 
with this scene on the basis of her cultural and historical knowledge.
The Left Bank invites readers to imagine people in masses, defined 
by gender and origin and “dashed” or “sprinkled” over the map of 
Paris, Europe and beyond. In “Vienne,” the same effect is accom-
plished within one story. This textual strategy can be read as a defa-
miliarizing repetition-with-a-difference of gendered and ethicized 
stereotypes, ironically presented by the implied author who seems to 
almost but not quite share the mind style of the character-narrator; 
this issue is addressed in Section 5.1.3. The repetition of such topoi 
throughout Rhys’s work creates a sense of what Johnson and Moran 
(2015, 2) call “estranged familiarity,” which is also thematized in her 
stories in the form of memories and spatial experiences (see Chapter 
2). However, the interpretation of the repetitive strategy of grouping as 
such is built on ambiguous meanings lent to the people-as-things by 
the stylistic and aesthetic choices borrowing from imagery contem-
porary to the story, and the evocations of basic bodily, cross-sensory 
schemas. If we follow the pragmatist idea that things acquire tacit 
meanings as a result of habit, and the embodied cognitive approach 
to readerly sense-making as an interaction between the discourse 
of the text and the reader’s experiential background, we can suggest 
that Rhys’s repetition of a certain embodied schema (a mass of 
things) in connection with a certain object (people) can create new 
“affordances” in the reader’s repertoire (see Määttänen 2015, 91; 
Gibson 1979). For instance, in “Tout Montparnasse and a Lady” and 
“Mannequin,” the aesthetic gesture of sprinkling objectified and 
typified human bodies on the scene of the story likens the humans 
to decorative elements or cocktail ingredients. They are masses of 
thing-like objects, colored, delicious entities promising joy; they are 
vivid not in spite of but because of this objecthood.
The ambiguity of Rhys’s masses raises ethical questions. As noted 
earlier, the tacit meanings and affordances are also evaluative, and 
form an affective basis for ethical considerations. They can lead 
readers to ponder interpretively whether the values the text invites 
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them to share are sound ones, to be taken ironically or to be contra-
dicted (cf. Määttänen 2015, 96). All this can occur simultaneously with 
the enactive engagement with them. As Gibson (1979, 140) suggests, 
The perceiving of an affordance is not a process of 
perceiving a value-free physical object to which 
meaning is somehow added in a way that no one has 
been able to agree upon; it is a process of perceiving 
a value-rich ecological object. Any substance, 
any surface, any layout has some affordance for 
benefit or injury to someone. (Gibson 1979, 140)
All literature solicits such movement between levels of sense-making; 
what makes Rhys’s massified people noteworthy is the texts’ blend of 
ironical commentary, aesthetic experience and tacit, affective reso-
nances produced by a mixture of human and nonhuman bodies. In 
the following, the ambiguities of personifying things and thingifying 
people are investigated from this perspective.
5.1.2. “Vividnesses”: Lively Things and  
Thing-like People
In many of the anecdotal pieces of The Left Bank, there is no one char-
acter or thing that would be singled out and investigated with closer 
interest. The narration of these stories travels around and focuses on 
several participants present in a given situation and a given space. 
“In a Café,” one of the briefest sketches, has an external focalizer, and 
consists of the documentary description of a scene: another Paris café 
in the evening, with a five-person band playing. The customers are 
characterized as “stout business men” drinking beer, “neat women in 
neat hats,” “temperamental gentlemen in shabby hats” drinking fines 
à l’eau, and “temperamental ladies” wearing turbans and drinking 
mint liquor, all enveloped in a “peaceful atmosphere” (LB, 50). The 
peace is disturbed by a visiting singer, who performs the song “Les 
grues de Paris” that tells the tragic story of a prostitute. This seems to 
cause some agitation among the clientele, continuing when the singer 
proceeds to sell records of the song. An American lady buys two, 
the usual orchestra starts playing once more without the singer, and 
“peace descend[s] again on the café” (LB, 52).
The main “event” of the story thus is a change in the general ambi-
ence, and its protagonists consist of the general group sitting in the 
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café; a protagonist given en masse. The narrator of this story, too, 
takes a typifying and distanced stance toward the mass protagonist, 
which likens the mass to the grue:
The grues are the sellers of illusion of Paris, the frail and 
sometimes pretty ladies, and Paris is sentimental and 
indulgent toward them. That, in the mass and theoretically 
of course, not always practically or to individuals. (LB, 51)
The grues “in the mass” sometimes give rise to sentimental attitudes, 
but the agent these attitudes are attributed to is also massified by 
the synecdochical expression “Paris is sentimental.” In the context 
of the story, both expressions contribute to the logic of the mass: the 
narrative repeats the attitude pictured in the quotation toward the 
grues in its description of the people in the café. This can be used 
as an example of Rhys’s sympathy for the underdog, this time the 
fictional prostitute. Her story in the form of a song, a nonhuman 
agent, agitates the respectable crowd (“it was respectably full that 
evening”, LB, 49), and is positioned as more similar to than different 
from them. Paradoxically, but typically of Rhys’s writing, the thin-
gifying gesture of the narrator toward human beings also affords a 
sympathetic reading.
However, it is noteworthy that the peaceful and stagnant ambi-
ence of the café (“an atmosphere of a place that always had been and 
always would be,” LB, 50), and thereby of the story, is slightly stirred in 
the description even before the appearance of the singer and his song:
The only vividnesses in the café, the only spots of 
unrest, were the pictures exposed for sale, and the 
rows of liqueur bottles in tiers above the counter 
of the bar, traditional bottles of bright colours 
and disturbingly graceful shapes. (LB, 50)
In the storyworld, art induces unrest, which might be a hint that this 
is also the desired effect of the story. In the passage above, even ordi-
nary things in the form of “traditional” bottles above the café counter 
are accepted into the realm of “graceful” and “disturbing” things or 
events. Moreover, calling these things “the only vividnesses” of the 
place contributes to the leveling of human and thing as factors in 
how to make sense of it. They all contribute to the aesthetic whole of 
the story: an impressionistic description of a place, the human and 
nonhuman bodies in it and the subtle changes in its atmosphere, from 
stagnant to slightly stirred to stagnant again, like a drink poured from 
one of the bottles.
Bottles and liquor as material metaphors create intratextual links 
within the collection. In the passage above, the bright colors and the 
graceful shapes of the bottles are presented as vivid and disturbing, 
and accompanied by an invitation to imagine the taste and intox-
icating effect of their contents, some of which have already been 
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brought forth in the descriptions of the café clients and their drinks at 
the beginning of the story. In “Mixing Cocktails,” the frothing cock-
tails that the narrator-as-child remembers having been so skillful at 
making, are metaphorically paired with the highly affective vivid-
ness of the sea: “It was very difficult to look at the sea in the middle 
of the day. The light made it so flash and glitter: it was necessary to 
screw the eyes up tight before looking” (LB, 89). This vision recalls the 
parallelization of the sea, bath-salts and crystal scent bottles in “At 
the Villa d’Or,” with sea and bottles as common denominators (see 
Section 4.1).
In “Villa D’Or”, Mr. Valentine actually also becomes an eager 
spokesman for the aesthetics of bottles, in an attempt to justify that he 
is no stranger to “Art”:
Now, for instance: Bottles—the curve of a bottle, the shape 
of it—just a plain glass bottle. I could look at it for hours…I 
started life in a chemist’s shop—I was brought up amongst 
the bottles. Now the pleasure I get in looking at a bottle 
makes me understand artists… (LB, 163) 
Mr. Valentine’s childhood has taught him his aesthetic tastes, just 
like “Mixing Cocktails” might lead the reader to imagine that the 
narrator’s early affinity with mixing cocktails is bound with the 
interest in bottles and drink in the later collection, considering the 
sense of continuity that is produced by the narrating voice. Many 
stories mention specific drinks, such as “menthes of striking emerald” 
(LB, 50) and the f ines à l’eau of “In a Café.” Visually expressed 
vividness and alcohol also come together in the beginning of Rhys’s 
writing career: according to her unfinished autobiography Smile 
Please, Rhys used black note books to write out her first love affair 
that had just ended, with quill pens of different colors that she had 
bought to “cheer up” her bare table. The result was the manuscript of 
her first, unpublished novel, which she titled Triple Sec after the citrus 
drink (Rhys 1979, 105). The colors were cheerful, but the experience, 
as described by Rhys, was close to dying, recalling the connection 
between autobiography and epitaph (see Section 2.1). Erica Johnson 
and Patricia Moran (2015, 1) see in this moment the beginning of 
an “affective stance” that colors all Rhys’s works. The stance is not 
defined very clearly, but the combination of bright colors and black 
notebooks, vivid moments of sense experience and somber themes 
and moods characterizes it well.
Bottles have a metonymical link to alcoholism and thereby to 
melancholia⁄depression, (all of which also plagued the biograph-
ical Rhys, see Maslen 2009). Simultaneously, however, the aesthetic 
232 233
choices in their presentation as vivid, bright and graceful things 
create a tension with these meanings. The drinks have their place 
in the aesthetic whole of the collection and the visual sensations it 
evokes, like the characteristic green absinthe in Toulouse-Lautrec’s 
paintings. The aesthetics tickle the more basic levels of sense-making, 
too, evoking conceptual metaphors and affective values, especially 
as they are paired with people presented as thing-like and lacking a 
spark of life: on a very basic level, bottles filled with sugary, fermented 
liquid come across as life-generating or enhancing, like the often 
“misperceived” affordances of food value (Gibson 1979, 128, 131). This 
connection is re-enforced in the collection Tigers Are Better-Looking, 
in “Till September Petronella,” when Petronella and her casual 
acquaintance order a bottle of “Clicquot”114 in a pub and the man 
remarks in what could be a line in an advertisement, “It puts some 
life into you, doesn’t it?” (TBL, 26). Petronella, the focal character, 
agrees, and she leaves the pub not feeling tired “nor even sad” (Ibid., 
27). Alcoholic drinks are plausible objects of affective incorporation 
(see Section 4.1, Colombetti 2016), in that they directly, chemically 
participate in the creation, enhancement and sustenance of affective 
states. In Rhys’s stories, they are simultaneously connected to plea-
sure and sadness, depending on the interpretive distance. Both levels 
of meaning are present and not completely separable, but rather in 
tension than in harmony with one another.
So far, we have seen that some things in Rhys’s stories are literally 
more vivid than others, as they are personified and given imaginary 
lines of speech, like the dresses shut in the cupboard by their collector 
in “Illusion.” In “Vienne,” there are floods of people en masse that 
appear and disappear, and most of the things also appear potentially 
purchasable, quickly forgotten items, which only might serve to mark 
a memory of a place or a period of time (“as many frocks as I liked”; 
“not a friend, not a pretty frock—nothing left of Vienna,” LB, 221, 193). 
However, the story makes an exception with an anthropomorphized 
sofa. Frances begins a new section with a description of a sofa that 
resembles, not so much in its form but in its setting within the narra-
tive, the characterizations of temporary companions like André, 
Tillie or Fischl: “There was a hard, elegant, little sofa in our room, 
covered with striped, yellow silk—sky-blue cushions. I spent long 
afternoons lying on that sofa plunged in a placid dream of maternity” 
(LB, 235). In this section, Frances is pregnant and the couple are living 
in Budapest. Right before the story takes a turn to worse, Frances 
mentions the “calm sense of power” she gains when lying in a dark 
room on the sofa, which she associates with her pregnancy; the sofa 
seems to be incorporated into the affective state.
The sofa makes one more appearance as Frances finds Pierre 
contemplating suicide with a revolver in his hand. She manages 
to convince him to plan for escape instead. The section titled 
114  Veuve Clicquot champagne.
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“Catastrophe” ends, the night before their f light, as follows: “I 
remember the table covered with cigarette-ends and liqueur-glasses, 
the two empty bottles of champagne, and the little yellow sofa looking 
rather astonished and disapproving” (LB, 242). The sofa is one of the 
few items in the story that is mentioned twice, which suggests it has 
been imprinted in the narrator’s memory. That she would imagine the 
sofa having an attitude of astonishment and disapproval is a personi-
fying projection of human emotion.It stems from the earlier incorpo-
ration of the sofa into sense of power and belonging in the absence 
of human connection in Frances and Pierre’s desperate situation. In 
this scene we find another example of affective color produced jointly 
by an assemblage human and nonhuman bodies, this time including 
the sofa, cigarette-ends and, once again, glasses and bottles. These 
singular elements echo similar ones in other stories, weaving further 
intratextual threads between bottles glasses and vividness.
The sofa in “Vienne” appears like an individual singled out from 
the masses of things and people found on the pages of the collection. 
Such underlining is often done on aesthetic grounds: if a thing or a 
human brings something interesting, often a visual effect, to a scene, 
the descriptive narration lingers on it slightly longer, and the focal-
izing characters might give it more attention. The narrator of “In the 
Luxemburg Gardens” another depressed young man, observes chil-
dren playing in the park. One of them is called by his name, Raoul, 
by his nanny, while the focalizer is “gazing morosely at all the other 
Raouls and Pierrots and Jacquelines in their brightly coloured over-
coats” (LB, 71). The children are a mass, not saved from this outlook 
even by their individual names. Then the woman in a green hat 
enters the scene and steals the young man’s attention. The park, as 
was observed earlier, is the personified thing of this story, but the 
content of its voiced consolation draws on the image of human bodies 
wrapped in colorful clothes: “Are there not always Women and Pretty 
Legs and Green Hats” (LB, 72).
The children and the woman, multiplied and generalized at the 
end, become specimens of park-goers who are part of its visual world, 
with their brightly colored clothes as a shared feature (the woman is 
wearing a hat “as green as Raoul’s overcoat,” LB, 71). The story tempts 
a visualization in which these bright colors light up the somber ambi-
ence of the park. It consists of the characteristic light grey of the Paris 
ground simultaneously with the mind-state of the focalizer, and the 
two enforce one another. Readers leave the story having encountered 
the young man, Raoul, the other children, and the woman in the 
green hat, but their most vivid recollections may well be of a green 
overcoat and hat, like splashes of color on a light canvas in an impres-
sionist painting (in which women indeed often seem to be swallowed 
by their hats).
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In “Trio,” vividness is suggested as an attribute of a human 
character, but in a way that is close to its attribution to objects. The 
narrator, describing a group of people in a Paris restaurant who she 
realizes come from the Caribbean Antilles, uses terminology and 
stereotypes that read as outright racist:
The fuzzy, negress’ hair was exactly the right frame 
for her vulgar, impudent, startlingly alive little face: the 
lips were just thick enough to be voluptuous, the eyes 
with an expression half cunning, half intelligent. She 
wore a very short red frock and black, patent leather 
shoes. Her legs were bare. Suddenly she began to 
sing: J’en ai marre […]. As she grew more excited she 
jumped up, swung her slim hips violently, rolled her 
eyes, stamped her feet, lifted her skirt […] (LB, 84)
The girl’s face is “startlingly alive,” which likens her ironically rather 
to liquor bottles and green hats than to most people. Her presence is 
framed by her red frock, another splash of color. It is also a familiar 
thing connected with the Caribbean islands and expatriate women in 
“Let Them Call It Jazz” and Wide Sargasso Sea. She is exoticized and 
thingified, like many other people in the collection, but her actions 
are completely contrasted with those of most characters in The Left 
Bank: by singing “J’en ai marre” (“I’ve had enough of this”), she voices 
a sentiment common to many stories, often attributable to the narrator 
or focalizer, who usually share it with the reader only in a grudging 
remark rather than by dancing and singing. Here the girl’s protest may 
even be directed at the narrator who imposes racist stereotypes of 
voluptuousness and vulgarity on her: she has had enough of that, too.
The whole “trio” of people in the story is thingified on the level of 
the collection, in the sense that they act as a Proustian “madeleine,” a 
memory-aid that operates through the senses that leads the narrator 
to recall and recount the two following stories, “Mixing Cocktails” and 
“Again the Antilles”: “It was because these were my compatriots that 
in that Montparnasse restaurant I remembered the Antilles” (LB, 85). 
Once again, in an ironic manner, objectification leads to identification 
and sympathy: the girl is first made “other” by the narrator’s exoticizing 
gaze, then recognized as “same,” a compatriot. Even the narrating 
voice objectifies itself as an “other.” As we have seen, earlier research 
has importantly recognized the socially defined objectification and 
otherness that Rhys’s (focal) characters experience; Cathleen Maslen 
(2009, 15) identifies them as suffering from a “culturally informed” 
condition of “melancholia of otherness” and rightly views their alleged 
depression more as a malady of the society than individual pathology, 
whose attribution to a fictional character is always problematic.115
115  Similarly, Patricia Moran connects Rhys’s aestheticizing tendencies with the processing 
of painful memory (2007, 3).
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The continuing tensions between agency and thingification have 
aesthetic, ethical, and political grounds and consequences. Rhys’s 
uses of form and color are affected by the visual arts, and so are her 
tendencies toward grouping, “massification” and typification.116 The 
“tacit meanings” arrived at through embodied sense-making rest on 
the affordances of things such as sofas and bottles that a reader can 
recognize. Human bodies are likened to these things by way of the 
repetition of schemas and descriptive formulations that create new 
habits of meaning to connect with people as well as things. Women 
in green hats, children in green raincoats and a dancing girl in a 
red frock are set on the same visual plane with bottles and sofas. 
Thenarrator ascribes the same function to all of them: the preserva-
tion and transmittance of “vividness” and the precarious possibility 
of happiness. These vivid bodies are contrasted with the masses and 
the grey color exemplified by the customers of “In a café.” Sofas and 
bottles invite different tacit meaning-making than people by way of 
incorporation into affective states, while the girl in “Trio” both shares 
the qualities of vivid things and surpasses them by pronouncing 
a point of view. She is not only lending power (or in this case, also 
memory) but also wielding it, despite her thingification as a character.
5.1.3. The Author, the Narrator, and Levels of  
Sense-making
In general, the narrators of many of the stories in The Left Bank 
appear functionally as observers and organizers of aesthetic elements, 
whose agency reaches beyond the confines of one story. There are 
strong hints that readers should identify the narrator in the cycle of 
the Caribbean stories with the author, given the knowledge of Rhys’s 
Caribbean roots. Many of the stories set in Paris offer similar possi-
bilities. This section discusses how the collection-wide narratorial 
agency and the focalizers of individual stories are related to the autho-
rial agency of the collection, and how these together invite readerly 
sense-making with material things and thing-like characters.
The implied author of the collection strongly resembles the 
biographical Rhys. The sense of the presence of an author-figure as an 
organizer of the textual, aesthetic whole is due, firstly, to the framing 
116  These, however, are by no means “purely” aesthetic choices without sociocultural signif-
icance in the visual arts, either.
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of the collection by the preface as impressions and observations of a 
“Miss Rhys,” with a “profound knowledge of the Left Bank” (Ford 1984, 
23), secondly, to the repetition of motifs and schemas, and thirdly, to 
the sense of continuation in the narrating and focalizing mind styles. 
Readers familiar with Rhys’s fiction and life can view The Left Bank as 
autofictional, like Sleep It off Lady (see Section 2.1). Even typograph-
ical choices contribute to the same end; for instance, the preference 
for ellipses in the form of three or four periods throughout the work.117
As we have noticed, some stories have first-person intradiegetic 
narrators, who appear clearly different from the nameless, extradi-
egetic third-person narrators. However, intradiegetic narrators such 
as Frances or the unnamed character narrators in “Illusion” and “A 
Spiritualist” share a similar mind-style with many of the focalizers 
of the extradiegetically narrated stories, such as Sara of “At the Villa 
d’Or” or Roseau of “La Grosse Fifi.” Sometimes also an extradiegetic 
narrator can be associated with the same voice.118 We have seen 
examples of this voice all through the discussions of the Left Bank 
stories. It is characterized by a negatively ironic mode expressed by 
snapping one-liners, and the classifying and typifying, aesthetically 
thingifying interest in characters and things. In just a few cases, an 
intradiegetic narrator also comments on her⁄his position. One was 
encountered just above, in the transition from “Trio” to the Caribbean 
stories. Another, at the end of “Hunger,” a descriptive account of the 
first days of living without food, is also an example of the narratorial 
mind-style at its grimmest: “I have never gone without food for longer 
than five days, so I cannot amuse you any longer,” the narrator states 
to close the story abruptly (LB, 103). This address to the reader draws 
attention to the narrator-narratee relationship, and underscores the 
imaginary link between the narrator and an actual author, who is 
composing these “amusing” stories, and who has had all the experi-
ences they relate. In place of this imaginary construction, it is quite 
easy to imagine the biographical Jean Rhys.
However, the recognition of the sense of the author’s virtual pres-
ence in the reading event does not require the reduction of fictional 
characters, emotions or events to the actual author’s biography. I 
propose that the sense of authorial presence behind the text exists as 
part of the embodied sense-making process of the work, sometimes 
stronger, sometimes weaker, regardless of the reader’s knowledge of 
biographical details (see Oulanne 2017b). The virtual author is the 
body we imagine, on our own embodied level, to be behind the orga-
nization of things, characters and events that constitute the stories. 
Following Paul De Man (1979, 921–922), all texts presented with the 
name of their author are to an extent autobiographical, but they also 
117  This is quite a common device, of course, and one used for the effect of impressionistic 
writing; nevertheless, its constancy here unifies the narrating voices of the collection, as 
material markers of a continuous presence.
118  Here the concept of ‘voice’ is more appropriate, as it is used to refer to a sense of contin-
uous identity, not limited to world view.
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deny the possibility of actual presence or a totality of identity. The 
text objectifies its author, as Rhys’s narrators objectify themselves and 
other characters. As Rishona Zimring (2015, 48–49) suggests, The Left 
Bank is aesthetically a skillful creation of masks and poses, combina-
tions of ironic detachment and evoked pleasure, even if Ford’s preface 
to the collection strives to celebrate authenticity rather than artifice.
Some characters other than the focal ones also act as proxies for 
a leveling inclination toward people and things. In “Illusion,” Miss 
Bruce, the tidy and controlled Englishwoman who is also a secret 
collector of extravagant clothes and make-up, seems to have the 
same mildly interested attitude toward her dresses and toward other 
human beings. This is made clear at the end of the story, in Miss 
Bruce’s comments to the narrator, first about her peculiar hobby, and 
second about a “plump, dark girl” sitting in a nearby café table: “Why 
should I not collect frocks? They fascinate me. The colour and all that. 
Exquisite sometimes!”; “Not bad hands and arms, that girl!” (LB, 36). 
As always in The Left Bank, there is irony but also empathic warmth 
in how Miss Bruce’s character is presented. The narrator has stated 
earlier, in an ambiguous use of the word “nice” typical of the overall 
voice of the collection: “In fact Miss Bruce was an exceedingly nice 
woman” (LB, 30).
What are the actual ethical considerations invited by such displays 
of people and things on the level of the whole collection, and how 
does the aesthetic base affect them? Many of the ethical implica-
tions have already been taken up throughout this study: the stories’ 
consciousness-raising about the situation of women in the society 
and the possibilities of empathy or sympathy between people, often 
experienced and expressed with the help of inanimate things. At first 
sight, Rhys’s critical “passion for stating the case of the underdog” and 
“sympathy for […] law-breakers” (Ford 1927, 24) do not seem to be in 
line with the aesthetic strategies of thingification, othering typifi-
cation and massification. The relationship between an objectifying 
outlook and a critical stance toward such practices in society is not 
explicit in the story. It is not like the implied author made the narra-
tors perform the gestures of objectification and then, taking an iron-
ical distance, showed the readers the related sociocultural problems, 
using the narrators as cautionary examples. Rather, the very gestures 
are often paired with affirmative meanings present in the stories: they 
are accompanied by a sense of empathy, recognition or belonging, 
as was observed in Section 4.1, and as can be seen in the ambiguous 
treatment of the dancing girl in “Trio.” The thing-like presentation of 
a human character does not seem to get on the way of empathy and 
sympathy, identification, or a sense of belonging and community. 
This can be sensed on a basic affective level, but it is also part of the 
critical appraisal of the work.
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Furthermore, the level of aesthetics parallels the sensory imagina-
tion and the interpretation. If the stories suggest a presence of beauty, 
even if it is in a thing-like human being as part of a mass or as a type 
(the models, the “Women and Pretty Legs and Green Hats,” or the 
girl in “Trio”), they also introduce a possibility for at least minimal 
happiness and connection. In the storyworld, properties that are 
often considered human, such as the possession and expression of 
an individual consciousness, do not come across as a prerequisite 
for “humane” feelings. Overall, as we have seen, the work challenges 
meanings based on dividing things into subjects and objects. In 
this case, a notion such as “objectification” all but loses its meaning, 
and “thingification” means merely being regarded as an animate or 
inanimate body in space, with affordances for intersubjective or inter-
objective interaction and aesthetic properties. People are presented 
mostly as opaque to one another, but this comes across as a basis for 
an ethics. The passages suggest a non-anthropocentric version the 
Levinasian approach, in which the face of the other as other is seen as 
morally binding (Levinas 1969). In Rhys’s fiction, there are no prereq-
uisites as to what kind of subjectivity lies behind the face, or rather, 
the surface. Thereby they afford a broad scope of empathy, sympathy, 
and identification, which involves the nonhuman world. The stories 
suggest that intersubjective or interobjective phenomena as based 
on a shared worldly being rather than the attribution of a human 
mind and subjectivity to nonhuman things. Furthermore, the opaque 
human bodies are fictional characters made of textual gestures, and 
a reader can be expected to engage with them as such. As readers of 
the collection are already positioned within the frame of fictionality, 
they remain capable of experiencing the opacity partly as a matter of 
course in a literary device, and of proportioning their ethical consid-
eration of the stances taken by the narrating voice accordingly.
As regards the phenomena of “masses” and “bunches” of people 
and things, a similar interpretation can be made. The modern 
condemnation of “the masses” rests on a belief in the primary nature 
of the human individual as the basis of ethics. Rhys’s work likely aims 
at showing how the value of the individual is challenged by modern 
capitalism, and how the value of the female individual always seems 
to be slightly less than that of the male. However, the reciprocation 
that The Left Bank offers is not a newly-found celebration of individ-
uality or certain exceptional individuals. It is a more modest sugges-
tion to see possibilities of recognition and identification regardless 
of how similar to or different from the surrounding other minds and 
bodies one is. This is not to imply that Rhys’s writing proposes an 
ethical system,in which the human individual has no value except 
as an object among objects. However, individualism has some impli-
cations that do not follow the stories’ aim. Individualism often rests 
on the notions of depth and interiority, and an anthro(po)centric 
preference of the human individual in possession of a disembodied 
self and a rational mind, who is essentially separate from its envi-
ronment and who tends to appear as masculine. In contrast, if we see 
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human cognition as embodied and embedded in and extended into 
its surroundings, the gap between the individual self and the world is 
made smaller. I hope to have shown that in Rhys’s stories, too, charac-
ters feel and make sense with the world of things, instead of making 
sense of it while remaining separate from it.
Furthermore, the theories of distributed agency presented earlier, 
do their part in challenging the idea of the human individual as the 
primary subject of action, and suggest a more inclusive account of 
subjectivity.  They show that even human agency is collaboratively 
constituted, and that human beings are molded by affective encoun-
ters with material things. As Karen Barad writes, 
What if it is only in the encounter with the inhuman—the 
liminality of no/thingness—in all its aliveness/liveliness, 
its conditions of im/possibility, that we can truly confront 
our inhumanity, that is, our actions lacking compassion? 
Perhaps it takes facing the inhuman within us before 
com-passion—suffering together with, participating with, 
feeling with, being moved by—can be lived. (Barad 2015, 8)
Rhys’s work does not explicitly propagate such new materialist 
ends, or a Buddhist inclusive cosmology, for that matter. However, if 
we do as Rita Felski suggests, and experiment with focusing on the 
effect that the stories afford, ways of thinking beyond the human indi-
vidual quite necessarily emerge. The masses of people and things, 
as Rhys presents them, should not be seen primarily as agents of 
dehumanization in a sense that would be associated with the modern 
context of war or the exploitation of labor, for instance. These are true 
concerns, and present on one of the critical levels of reading that the 
stories invite. However, the masses and sprinklings of people readers 
are invited to imagine and enact, along with bunches of lively things, 
insistently point toward possibilities of recognition and empathy. The 
affective and aesthetic whole of The Left Bank, building on embodied 
sense-making processes, is a combination of sinister forebodings, 
critical considerations steeped in irony, and reparative instances in 
which people and things come together in assemblages that invite 
readers to enact sympathy, empathy, happiness and belonging. 
Importantly, the latter meanings are not dependent on the human 
characters surpassing their embeddedness in the world of things and 
the intersubjective⁄interobjective world of the crowd and the mass. 
The mannequins sprinkled on the Paris streets as “human flowers” 
suggest a sense of belonging regardless of their dehumanization; vivid 
things on bar counters or brightly colored clothes in the Luxembourg 
Gardens induce happiness and pleasure primarily as things.
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Some of Rhys’s typifications repeat sexist and racist stereotypes, 
and the aim of this study is by no means provide an apology for 
this sort of attitudes, or to present all of them in a light that would 
somehow magically turn them into affirmative or reparative gestures. 
An important part of the meaning of the collection is built on tensions 
and contradictions of sameness and otherness, happiness and despair, 
agency and objectification. I hope to have shown the variety of 
different tones and colors that exist in the stories and has potential 
to exist between the stories and their readers; not in harmony, but in 
a movement capable of producing meanings on many levels. In that, 
The Left Bank is a mixture of modernist and realist sensibilities, with 
added impressionistic detail, addressing very topical concerns of 
alienation and the value of human beings, but doing so in a manner 
that is not preaching or didactic, but ambiguous and “disturbingly 
graceful,” like the tempting liquor bottles in a Paris café. This is how 
Rhys’s work surpasses its function as contemporary commentary, 
and justifies the interest of readers one decade after another.
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5.2 Everything, Something, and 
Nothing: Meaning and Detail  
in Djuna Barnes’s Stories
“Is that all?” Said Julie.
“Isn’t it enough?” Answered Wendell.
“And what does it mean?” said Timothy.
“Well,” answered Wendell, “much and little,  
like all wisdom.” 
— Djuna Barnes: Ryder119 
During all previous discussions of Barnes’s short stories, a number 
of things and characters have emerged as agents in various assem-
blages. We have also learned that Barnes’s fiction tends to include 
long descriptive sections dedicated to material detail. As in the case of 
Rhys’s journalistic-impressionistic sketches, a preference for descrip-
tion can point to several directions. Barnes borrows devices and 
motifs associated with realism and naturalism, but the descriptive-
ness of her work also reflects modernist tendencies. David Herman 
points out how for Georg Lukács, modernism’s paradoxically alien-
ated “inward turn” resulted in “replac[ing] narration with description” 
(Herman 2011a, 252; Lukács 1971b). In the modernist case, the focus 
would be on the description of experience, but as we have noticed 
before, the line between describing experience and describing mate-
rial surroundings is far from clear in Barnes’s work. Barnes’s descrip-
tion resembles the way Jonathan Culler has suggested that Flaubert’s 
descriptions move beyond the experience of the focalizer and demon-
strate a break between experience and meaning (Culler 1974, 24).
In some cases, the main affective content of a story comes across to 
the reader by means of description of assemblages and tableaux; recall 
how the boundaries between human bodies and material detail were 
blurred in “Dusie” and “A Boy Asks a Question” (Section 3.4). This 
119  Barnes 2010, 121.
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chapter sets out to inspect this form of description and presentation 
of detail more closely. While Barnes’s use of types in characterization 
has already been discussed (see Section 4.2), her characters nor the 
things described in her stories do not appear as masses like Rhys’s, 
and neither do the things described. More accurately, they appear 
in lists and floods, occasionally organized into an assemblage. How 
does this kind of presentation create meaning, if it does? Where is the 
modernist experientiality located in such passages, and what means 
do they have to affect or engage their readers?
As Naomi Schor (1987) has shown, attention to detail in art has 
been linked with triviality, femininity, decadence, crowds and riots. 
Thus, detail shares some of the theoretical ballast of Rhys’s masses, 
even though it could be viewed as their opposite, in case there is 
not too much of it. In classicist as well as modernist theories of art, a 
good, useful detail is one which contains or produces meaning and 
stays within the confines of the hierarchy and perspective of the 
whole work, often to be made sense of synecdochically (Ibid., 21, 42, 
59). Detail, in these accounts, is often commensurate with material 
things. In the more modernist end of the spectrum of criticism on 
literary, material detail, Willa Cather sketches a “Novel Démeublé,” 
with an exclamatory sentence: “how wonderful it would be if we 
could throw all the furniture out of the window” (Cather 1922, 6). On 
the other hand, it has been observed how, from 19th century literature 
onwards, a suspicious regard of description gives way to material 
things’ demand of visibility (Freedgood 2009, 4). Philippe Hamon 
(1982, 170) suggests that a realist preference for description overrides 
narration. This has to do with the production of the “reality effect” 
(Barthes 1968), the presentation of material detail as nonsymbolic 
and literal, although their referentiality to reality is ultimately an 
illusion. Barthes’s claim has also been questioned based on cognitive 
narratology with a suggestion that the way narrative details appeal to 
cognitive frames actually gives them back their referential function 
(Auyoung 2013, 70). The call to enact the material presence of a detail 
does not, however, need to render it representative, even though it 
might add referentiality to it.
In the psychoanalytical framework, on the other hand, a “good 
detail” can be characterized as one interpretable by the talking 
cure, and thereby ultimately able to produce meaning (Schor 1987, 
68–75). The material used to form dream-images does not arise from 
important events in the dreamer’s past. Rather, dreams make overde-
termined metaphors out of seemingly worthless fragments of the past. 
Walter Benjamin applies this idea to cultural history by turning his 
attention toward the material detail of 19th century Paris: “I needn’t 
say anything. Merely show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate 
no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the refuse—these I will not 
inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: 
by making use of them” (Benjamin 1999, 460, emphasis in the original). 
In the psychoanalytic and Benjaminian accounts, seemingly unim-
portant and excessive detail is given pride of place in the production 
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of meaning, but the method of each is slightly different. Here, the aim 
is to show how Barnes “makes use of” her detail, and how her stories 
bot invite and deny interpretation. Barnes’s work balances between 
tempting her readers to follow a path of symbolic interpretation, as if 
in relation to dream images, but on the other hand cuts this path short 
and provides other forms of sense-making instead.
Barnes has definitely not thrown all the furniture out of the 
window, as Willa Cather would have liked modern fiction to do.120 On 
the other hand, the detail in her descriptive passages is not satisfacto-
rily explained by the reality effect, either. The first point of reference 
to look for when exploring meaning and sense-making in relation to 
these descriptions is the realm of “inessential” detail that Lukács, for 
instance, finds in naturalism: “realism whose details have gone bad” 
(Lucáks 1971b, 60; Schor 1987, 44). We have seen how Barnes’s work 
utilizes naturalist aesthetics and evokes intertextual connections 
to both decadence and naturalism; we have also noted its parodic 
relation to some themes and approaches of Freudian psychoanalysis. 
Consequently, I discuss both psychoanalysis and decadence as inter-
textual elements rather than potential frameworks for interpretation.
While the previous section discussed sense-making in the context 
of the whole collection The Left Bank, this one  looks closely at one 
story in which the descriptive features come across as especially 
forceful, “Cassation.” The study of Barnes’s collections such as Spillway 
or Collected Stories as textual wholes is not as necessary as that of The 
Left Bank, since neither of them constitutes a similar totality. Barnes’s 
stories have been published multiple times in several collections, and 
before that as individual printings in magazines. References to other 
stories in the Collected Stories are made when needed. “Cassation” is 
also part of a larger whole with a unified narrating voice, namely the 
cycle of “Madame” stories, along with “The Grande Malade,” “Dusie,” 
and “Behind the Heart,” all already discussed in the previous chap-
ters. “The Grande Malade,” on the basis of its original title “The Little 
Girl Continues,” recounts events following those of “Cassation” (orig-
inally “A Little Girl Tells a Story to a Lady”), while the other two are 
not positioned as clearly on a timeline, except by their location in the 
Collected Stories after the “Little Girl” stories, and the location of their 
narrated events in Paris.
Katya is the aspiring dancer, cosmopolite and the narrator of at 
least three of the stories (in “Behind the Heart” she is not named). In 
Cassation, she tells Madame about a phase of her life in Berlin. In a 
café, she meets a mysterious older lady named Gaya, who invites her 
to a house shared with a “declining” husband and a disabled child. 
120  Cather does not abide by this rule in her own fiction, either.
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In a seemingly mutual, yet silent understanding, Katya accepts 
the invitation and stays a year. She compares this period to life in a 
convent as a “religieuse.” She also describes it as happy, serene and 
rewarding coexistence of the two women, consisting of walks in the 
garden and discussions about philosophy and life. The husband and 
child are seen and heard only occasionally. Their haunting presence, 
along with Gaya’s display of signs of worry, leads Katya to think that 
“there was trouble in other parts of the house” (CS, 384). After a year, 
the  atmosphere and Gaya’s behavior change. She asks Katya not to go 
out any more, to take care of her disabled child and stay “forever” in 
the house, without leaving the child’s bedroom; her discourse is more 
distracted than previously. Katya does not want to do this, and leaves, 
in spite of proclaiming her love for Gaya. She returns once, to find the 
older woman succumbed to a mental state beyond language, mani-
fested by lying in bed beside the child and making a buzzing noise. 
The end is a departure similar to many of Barnes’s stories. “Go away,” 
Gaya retorts; Katya goes and briefly concludes her narrative: “Things 
are like that, when one travels, nicht wahr, Madame?” (CS, 392).
In addition to the ending, “Cassation” shares many themes and 
motifs with other stories discussed in this study: there is a slightly 
twisted Oedipal schema involving a “weak” or “declining” man, a child 
and a woman-as-child, and tones of seduction; there is also a sense of 
psychological drama, realized ambiguously and theatrically by charac-
ters with unreadable minds. Even Katya, when telling the story, refrains 
from any self-narration, apart from her defamiliarizing description of 
her initial experience of living with Gaya: “It was that I was happy” 
(CS, 387). A distributed sense of affectivity is expressed by her sensing 
trouble “in the house”; she also asks Gaya, more specifically, “Why is 
it that you suffer so” (CS, 391), but Gaya also seems to remain opaque 
to her. The action of the narrative is constructed following a pattern 
familiar from other stories, such as “Aller et Retour,” “Spillway,” “A Boy 
Asks a Question,” and “Dusie”: an arrival at a house, a conflict involving 
members of an actual or an allegorical family, and a departure.
Katya’s describes the experience relies largely on material instead 
of psychological detail. These descriptions have a tendency to extend 
so that they stand out in the context of the whole story; they do so 
also because of the repetition of expressions and structures occurring 
within and across stories. Katya describes the first bedroom she sees, 
the one with Valentine, the child, lying in the middle of a large bed:
Everything was disorderly, and expensive and 
melancholy. Everything was massive and tall, or broad 
and wide. A chest of drawers rose above my head. The 
china stove was enormous and white, enameled in blue 
flowers. The bed was so high that you could only think 
of it as something that might be overcome. The walls 
were all bookshelves, and all the books were bound in 
red morocco, on the back of each, in gold, was stamped a 
coat of arms, intricate and oppressive. […] (CS, 384–385)
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After an ekphrastic description of a painting that hangs over the 
bed, (a battle scene with charging horses), and some more words 
dedicated to the bed (“The sheets were trailing, the counterpane 
hung torn, and the feathers shivered along the floor […]”, CS, 385), a 
human element is introduced in the middle of the fictional assem-
blage: “[…] it was not until some moments later that I saw a child, not 
more than three years old, a small child, lying in the center of the 
pillows, making a thin noise, like the buzzing of a fly, and I thought 
it was a fly” (CS, 385). The two women do not discuss the child. Katya 
leaves, only to come back later the same night, and Gaya lets her 
in through a window to another bedroom that is to become hers. 
Another description follows:
It was a beautiful room, Madame, ‘traurig’ as she said. 
Everything was important and old and gloomy. The 
curtains about the bed were red velvet, Italian you know, 
and fringed in gold bullion. The bed cover was a deep 
red velvet with the same gold fringe: on the floor, beside 
the bed, a stand on which was a tasselled red cushion, 
on the cushion a Bible in Italian, lying open. (CS, 386)
The two descriptions are variations of the same wording and 
rhythm: first everything is disorderly, expensive, melancholy, 
massive and tall, broad and wide; then everything is important, old 
and gloomy. Image schemas of largeness and heaviness dominate the 
first room, while the second appeals to a sense of color and texture, 
evoking haptic affordances of surfaces to be touched. Both refer to 
luxurious materials in the colors of red and gold. The construction 
of the passages, beginning with “everything” and leading to detailed 
descriptions, creates a sense of excess even though the style of neither 
is particularly flamboyant per se: the adjectives used are matter-of-
fact ones that denote color, material, and size. However, the very fact 
that there is so much of this description of material detail causes it to 
take on a sense of excess, “detail gone bad.” As the characters and 
their actions remain opaque, readerly attention is directed toward 
existents instead of events. What kind of sense-making is invited by 
a text like this, which of its features have the potential to attract and 
affect, and what interpretations do its devices of presentation make 
possible? The following sections answer these questions first by 
inspecting allegorical interpretation questioned and enhanced by an 
“archaeological” one, then comparing these with embodied cognitive 
approaches, and finally returning to the ways meanings are produced 
by a narratorial presence.
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5.2.1. Collecting References:  
from Allegory to Archaeology and Back
The application of the term “archaeological” in this context is 
inspired by Elaine Freedgood’s (2009) study of objects in Victorian 
literature, as well as Naomi Schor’s (1987) method of tracing mean-
ings in relation to detail in the history and theory of art. In these 
studies, the thing or the detail invites a historical survey of cultural 
meanings, beside a symbolic interpretation. I do not mean to over-
look symbolic meanings, but approach them through an orienta-
tion toward the surface of the text underneath which we habitually 
expect meaning to reside. As Freedgood suggests, commenting 
on the “showers” of things in Victorian literature, they “often over-
whelm us at least in part because we have learned to understand 
them as largely meaningless” (Freedgood 2009, 1). Freedgood 
follows a Benjaminian “rag-picker” approach to detail when stating 
that “the reader who wishes to recover (or rather, imagine) the mate-
rial qualities of fictional things must avoid the temptations of alle-
gory and follow instead the protocols of the collector” (Freedgood 
2009, 2). A collector, in this sense, does not look for definite rela-
tions and properties of things, but “shows” things as found objects 
together based on their affinities in space and time, and the history 
that “haunts” them (Ibid., 3).
The form and style of Victorian literature, which Freedgood 
focuses on, justifies the archaeological approach better than the texts 
and contexts under scrutiny here. The modernist gesture of showing 
the world of things (and details) as experienced, and the experiencing 
consciousness as embedded in the world, already begins to challenge 
the duality of the detail as either symbolic or insignificant. Thereby 
modernist fiction might invite readers to consider details as parts 
of the lived world, significant in themselves. Furthermore, in short 
stories, the very constrictions of textual space suggest that the details 
of the material world that get to be mentioned must be significant. 
They may tempt a mode of reading that Schor attributes to figures 
such as Sigmund Freud and Sherlock Holmes: the assumption that 
detail, even if it seems excessive, is significant as a clue that points 
toward a revelation (Schor 1987, 65–78), or as a “red herring” set to 
lead the reader astray. However, the challenges presented by Barnes’s 
flood-like descriptions are different from what can be expected of 
the modernist minimalism of carefully selected, meaningful things. 
Thus, in Barnes’s case, readers’ initial approach to the flood of detail 
might not lead to a sense of meaninglessness, assuming that they are 
familiar with other modernist fiction. Rather, the way the text itself 
presents details and things, may deny the meaning these readers are 
looking for, while affording other, more basic and embodied forms 
of sense-making. The discussion of this section is partly inspired by 
Thing Theory’s suggestion of things that resist meaning, but it also 
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suggests that some levels of meaning are actually dependent on our 
experience of things (cf. Brown 2004).
According to Schor, modernist detail appears as particular but 
abstract, an allegory without transcendence: “a parody of the 
traditional theological detail” (Schor 1987, 60–91;). In the case of 
“Cassation,” the bedrooms in the descriptions quoted above appear 
as allegorical in that the things they present seem to be excessive as 
regards their possible “practical” uses in the story: among them, there 
is no Chekhovian gun whose presentation would mean that it will be 
“used” in some further part of the story. Moreover, they are formally 
related to tableaux vivants, or still-lifes (in the absence of a human 
element), and thereby also accompanied with a cultural convention to 
assume them to have at least some allegorical content. Their cryptic 
and archaic language has a similar effect. However, the guidelines 
given by the text for readers to fill the gaps in meaning prove to be 
misleading. After providing a brief example of the allegorical lures of 
the story, I follow Freedgood’s metonymical-archaeological approach, 
to map some of the adjacent domains of meaning that “haunt” 
“Cassation,” namely Catholic kitsch, decadence and psychoanalysis. 
The Bible in Italian that is lying open on the cushion on the stand 
in the second bedroom, is a reference to the Christian faith and to 
Roman Catholicism. Even though Katya describes her stay in the 
house as a religious experience and compares herself to a nun, 
the period is framed by luxury rather than by the asceticism and 
abstinence associated with a convent. She uses ambiguous words to 
describe her experience: “a religion, Madame, that was empty of need, 
therefore it was not holy perhaps, and not as it should have been in its 
manner” (CS, 387). She is not betrothed to Christ, as a nun would be; 
if Katya is someone’s “bride,” it is Gaya’s, which is perhaps not “as it 
should have been in its manner” because their relation also resembles 
that of mother and daughter. On the other hand, Katya is supposed 
to act as a surrogate mother for the child, who in its otherworldliness 
associates with Christ. However, the child has no resurrection or 
redemption to offer, quite the opposite: it seems to signify madness 
and emptiness, “vacancy” (CS, 391). Ludwig, the declining husband, is 
at best a parody of a paternal god-figure, like the slightly extraneous 
Joseph, if we stay within the framework of the Holy Family.
“Cassation” tempts an interpretation in the light of Christian 
allegory, or at least a decadent parody of it. However, the allegory 
seems to be challenged so much by the fluctuating and overlapping 
roles the characters play in it, that any pattern of such explanation 
would seem too rigid and bound to leave out something essential. 
The excess of material (be it concrete material things or other refer-
ences) is presented as if it formed an essential part of the allegorical 
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whole, but it never does: the “gloom” and “importance” of the room, 
the “intricate and oppressive” coats of arms on the back of books in 
red morocco, the war paintings and the general sense of mysticism, as 
well as the roles and dynamics of the characters alternating between 
nun, bride, mother, daughter, Christ and Mary refuse to make a mean-
ingful totality. The allegorical tableau refuses to be read, like the Bible 
in the storyworld (“lying open at a page that I could not read,” CS, 
387); there is simultaneously too much of “everything,” and too little: 
references to “vacancy,” “emptiness” and “nothing” are repeated in 
Gaya’s speech. The reader seems to be led to the brink of allegorical 
explanation only to step back confused, with a sense of the affective 
movements and a general ambience instead of an explanation. As 
Deborah Parsons (2003, 22) suggests about Barnes’s early stories and 
plays, Barnes seems to be mocking everyone “reading for meaning.”
In an archaeological reading, the framework of Catholic 
Christianity is rather an expressive style than as an explanation. 
Similarly, the Bible in the story is primarily a thing, expressive in 
its material being, rather than a book whose contents could be read 
and understood by Katya. The style of the room, with its red and gold 
colors and the velvet fabrics surrounding the “religieuse” and the bible, 
recalls Papal luxury, but it also refers to royal abodes; it might even 
pass as a luxurious brothel. 
In Barnes’s use, Catholic iconography in general has a consider-
able amount of common ground with kitsch: repeatable, affordable, 
consumable reproductions of “beautiful” or “artistic” objects made 
of cheap materials, and copies of religious objects such as statues, 
pictures and rosaries (see Calinescu 1987, 226–229). In “Cassation,” 
kitsch is present in references to Valentine, the child implicitly present 
in the passages quoted above. She (or “it,” the pronoun used in the 
story discourse) lies as if hidden in plain sight, on the huge bed in the 
middle of the room, surrounded by all its massive and ornamental 
furniture and the picture of a battle, like a “putto,” a baby angel in 
a baroque illustration. Katya also formulates this association in a 
simile: “It was beautiful in the corrupt way of idiot children […] like 
those dwarf angels on holy prints and valentines” (CS, 388). Here the 
allegorical tendencies of the story appear on a formal, aesthetic level, 
as the child is presented in an impressive tableau, as though in an 
emblem, and compared to the pictorial motif of “dwarf angels.” Once 
again, the emblem remains ambiguous. Valentine is associated with 
Christ, the playful baby angels that might surround him in a religious, 
symbolically loaded picture, and romantic greeting cards.
Katya’s description of Valentine combines the schematic lightness 
and newness of kitsch objects and greeting cards (mass-produced 
and made of cheap, light materials) with the heavy, old, emblematic 
room. The kitsch objects are associated with another story from the 
same period, namely “Aller et Retour,” in which the variety of objects 
Madame von Bartmann encounters in Marseilles includes arrange-
ments of funeral wreaths with embossed tin images of the “bleeding 
heart” (part of Catholic iconography as a symbol for Christ’s love for 
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humanity) as well as lightly pornographical postcards (“showing 
women in the act of bathing; of happy mariners leaning above full-
busted sirens with sly cogged eyes” CS, 363).121 The effect achieved 
is a conceptual blend of the visual and haptic spheres. Instead of 
acting as help for allegorical meaning, the blend evokes metonymical 
connections. Valentine, the postcards and the embossed tin deco-
rations create a tension between high and low, “important, old and 
gloomy” and frivolous, cheap and naughty. This is clearly a parodic 
and cheerfully blasphemous gesture. It also participates in the basic 
aesthetic sense-making in the same manner as Rhys’s bunches and 
masses were shown to do, by appealing to our embodied sensations 
and perceptions of things in the form of image schemas while also 
showing their cultural connections.
Decadence, like kitsch, is a phenomenon partly defined by an 
allowing relation to detail (Calinescu 1987, 161). Barnes’s connec-
tions with decadence have been pointed out by earlier research (see 
Taylor 2012, 1–3; Sherry 2014). Intertextually, both the qualities of the 
things in the passages of “Cassation” (antiquities, luxurious mate-
rials of velvet and leather, gold and red) and their way of presentation 
recalls the lists of curiosities collected by protagonist Des Esseintes 
in J.K. Huysmans’ À Rebours (1884), a staple work of decadence, and 
the repetition of a similar topos in Oscar Wilde’s Picture of Dorian 
Gray (1890). Both novels can be cited as examples of the illumination 
of the detail at the expense of the whole: the flow of both narratives 
is interrupted by catalogues of things that go on for entire chapters. 
The decadent style is ornamental and emphasizes the singularities of 
small units at the expense of unity, overall effect, which is why the 
detail in it tends can be seen as excessive (Schor 1987, 43; Calinescu 
1987, 161; Bernheimer 2003, 18). The excessivity can also be questioned, 
however, depending on how “overall effect” is defined. In the discus-
sion of affective dynamics in the earlier chapter, we have seen how 
initially conflicting descriptions and their stray detail contribute to an 
overall effect as assemblages, even if they might not yield to an overall 
interpretation. The list-like passages in “Cassation,” or in Huysmans 
and Wilde, may cause a reader to lose their way toward an expected 
turn or resolution of the plot, or to become highly interested in the 
different form of presentation. In any case, the aesthetics and materi-
alities of the things presented embed the whole narrative in a multi-
sensory experience of luxurious things in their color, scent, taste, 
sound, and texture. Besides undergoing story-driven experiences 
solicited by these fictional things, a reader is also able to recognize 
and engage with the list form as a literary means of expression.
121  Later, when her daughter asks Madame whether there is anything nice in Marseilles, she 
smiles and recalls exactly these two things: “The Bleeding Heart—sailors—” (CS, 366).
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The literary framing of these lists suggests the possible assertion of 
each thing as noteworthy in itself, for having made it to the list, even 
if they do not conform to a totality of interpretation.122 In Barnes’s 
case, especially, the detail is significant from the point of view of the 
affective potential of the work, as it has been included in the fictional 
assemblages on its pages and the phenomenon of reading. decadence 
participates to these ends as a cultural “thing” like Catholic iconog-
raphy and kitsch. These cultural, intertextual associations, partly built 
on embodied schemas, are summoned in the sense-making process 
the reader is invited to take part in, enacted beside the experientiality 
of affordances and habits suggested by the references to material detail.
In addition to an intertextually vibrant style and subject-matter, 
Barnes’s short stories also allude to decadence by way of the idea of 
concrete decay. Physical decay is present in the historical decadent 
literary style as well, stemming especially from decadent consider-
ations of hereditary flaws in Emile Zola’s work. In “Cassation,” the 
“declining” husband Ludwig and the disabled Valentine suggest this 
interpretation. Material things decay also in “Aller et Retour”: two 
chairs (also presented more specifically as ones with “carved legs”) 
have broken during the mother’s absence from the house, as Richter 
bashfully confesses. In “Spillway,” the topos of material decay in the 
paternal house reaches comical proportions. Upon her arrival, Julie 
tells Paytor (who is still alive and well, in contrast to the other fathers 
and husbands, though apparently not for long) she is glad he has taken 
down the crystals she always hated, to which Paytor replies: “I didn’t, 
the roof fell in—just after my last visit to you in December” (CS, 270).
The surprising introduction of a roof falling in adds to the high-
strung drama of “Spillway” a touch of the slapstick comedy elements 
recurrent in Barnes’s work. This kind of comedy is not a customary 
part of decadent aesthetics, whereby readers face a stylistic blend 
that produces parodic effect. Barnes can indeed be said to approach 
a decadent literary style in a typical parodic tone that shows rever-
ence for the past text while making fun of a phenomenon or an 
ideology (Taylor 2014, 56–57; Hutcheon 1985, 35). In Barnes’s stories, 
the gesture of blending heavy and solemn elements with light and 
comical ones permeates the levels of thematics, style, and the fictional 
world. All these contribute to the affective “path” of making sense of 
the work that the reader is invited to follow while reading the story. 
Furthermore, if the stories are read as part of a collection, the tendency 
of recycling and repeating motifs and topoi between stories causes an 
associative, affective path to form throughout them. In this context, 
the references to literary decadence and material decay constitute 
an assemblage of their own, the cultural meanings supported by the 
material detail and vice versa.
122  Some “Object-Oriented” philosophers use the humorous term ‘Latour litanies’ to denote 
such lists, common in the writings of their field, in which the objects or phenomena partici-
pating in an event are listed to highlight the equal importance of each of them (Bogost 2012, 
38–39).
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The final frame of reference to be discussed in this archaeological 
survey of detail is Freudian psychoanalysis. In the earlier chapters, the 
parodic relationship of Barnes’s work to psychoanalytical schemas 
and motifs has already been pointed out on several occasions, which 
is why it does not require a lengthy discussion here. In “Cassation,” 
the unreal atmosphere, the ellipses in the events, the patterns of 
family combined with the overtones of seduction, as well as the 
“excess” of detail tempt readers to look at the detail as if it were mate-
rial for a symbolic interpretation of a dream or a symptom. However, 
as the cast of “Cassation” does not quite fit into an allegory of the Holy 
Family, the Oedipal family as a frame of explanation is not sufficient, 
either. The way the women take up agency and desire is psycho-
analytically relevant, but in a parodic relationship to the Freudian 
framework, as we saw in the discussion of Barnes’s fetishism (see 
Section 3.2). The potential oedipal drama between Katya, Gaya, and 
other players is never acted out. In “Cassation,” descriptions of slight 
movements remain most poignant: hands touching fabrics, taking off 
and putting on clothes, touching the pages of the bible, like an inti-
mate ritual, or like a dream. The text offers no final interpretation of 
the excess of detail.
Except for outright allegorical tales such as fables, fiction is bound 
to host an interpretive excess: not all elements of a story fit into the 
overall picture, and a totalizing interpretation is very seldom what any 
literary researcher would be looking for. In this sense, most narratives 
are “decadent” as to their details. Furthermore, a Freudian frame of 
reference could even incorporate the “excess” of detail and see it as a 
clue, a proof of overdetermination, in the manner of dreamwork and 
screen-memories (see Schor 1987, 75). However, he “translation” of 
an array of objects into representations of genitalia, and fabrics and 
spaces into the representation of the maternal does not do justice to 
the aim of this study, namely the investigation of the effects and senses 
of the very materiality of things. This materiality, so clearly present in 
Barnesian detail, constitutes an excess that cannot be restored even 
to a Freudian (dream) interpretation. Rather, the Freudian frame-
work is one more sphere of ideas that is taken into the assemblages 
of the stories and their combinations. Together with decadence and 
Catholically influenced kitsch, it participates in the interplay of high 
and low, heavy and light, realized through culturally defined concepts 
but also on the embodied schematic level, by combining thematics of 
the basic struggles of human sexuality and development with a lightly 
parodic attitude to their handling.
This reading has shed light on the spheres of meaning, the “ideas” 
(all of which participate in and draw on the history of ideas) that the 
material detail evokes, while letting the things remain “literal,” so as 
not to reduce them to any one framework of interpretation. However, 
considering the aims of this study, the fictional materiality of the 
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things in these associations, as well as the embodied schemas that the 
associations themselves seem to call forth, needs more attention. In 
this vein, like in the discussion of Rhys’s work above, some questions 
need to be asked about how the things and ideas in the stories mean. 
A focus on embodied sense-making helps us approach the initial 
challenge of symbolic interpretation provided by the text, without 
disregarding its allegorical gestures in the name of “surface reading.” 
How does the very materiality and thingness of things, along with the 
materiality of words used to express ideas, affect the construction of 
symbols, allegories and metaphors in the story? The question implies 
that, contrary to Freedgood’s proposition presented above, attention 
paid to allegory does not necessarily mean letting materiality slip 
away from the attention of the researcher (cf. Freedgood 2009, 2, 12).
5.2.2. The Materiality of the Symbolic
To explore how things mean, we need to once again focus on how the 
very sensuous qualities evoked by the descriptions of material detail 
engage readers in making sense of the work at hand. The enactive and 
embodied cognitive approaches to reading are combined with the 
context of meaning and interpretation: how is the way we interpret 
texts such as “Cassation” built on the initial enactive engagement 
with the materialities evoked in it? The discussion above pointed at 
the embodied senses of not only concrete material things, but also 
attributes such as ‘high’ and ‘low’ and ‘heavy’ and ‘light’, which can 
be attached equally to concrete and abstract things. Thus the things 
become party of both the basic sense-making invited by a natural 
environment and more complex forms of interpretation. To explore 
these levels of sense-making, symbolic and metaphorical readings 
are set in dialogue with the theory of conceptual metaphor as devel-
oped by Lakoff and Johnson (1980).
Lakoff and Johnson suggest that metaphorical thinking, in the 
form of image schemas, permeates our everyday language and ways 
of conceptualization. The way these schemas are constructed has to 
do with our experience of inhabiting the spatial dimensions of the 
world: “that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they func-
tion as they do in our physical environment” (Lakoff & Johnson 2003, 
14). The schemas are such simple notions as “up” or “high,” and their 
metaphorical use means that these notions go together with attributes 
such as, in the case of “up” and “high,” “good,” “more,” or “conscious.” 
Furthermore, as briefly noted before, for a large part constitute the 
physical environment in which we move and act, and therefore also 
of our meaning-making. Culturally defined and shared meanings 
that also affect our sense-making do not constitute a separate layer 
of experience, but are grounded the same metaphorical system. 
So-called “higher-order knowledge structures” build on the basic 
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limitations and affordances of what kind of bodies we have and how 
they can interact with the world.
The aim of the following analysis is to look once again at “Cassation” 
and the sense-making invited by it, not only to inspect a basic layer 
of affective123 sense-making, but to focus on how embodied experi-
ences of materiality are involved in the metaphorical and symbolic 
levels of meaning.124 Firstly, let us look once more at the descriptive 
passages in “Cassation” quoted at the beginning of this section. Both 
passages are descriptions of a room (the bedroom where Valentine is 
sleeping, and the other one which Katya is invited to stay in) and the 
things contained in that room, a feature that already by itself serves 
to enact a sense of closed space, a schema of containment. What is 
contained within the spaces is less concrete. The word “everything” is 
used at the beginning of both descriptive passages: “Everything was 
disorderly, and expensive and melancholy. Everything was massive 
and tall, or broad and wide”; “Everything was important and old and 
gloomy.” The repetition raises it out of the text as somehow mean-
ingful. In contributes to the sense of the room as a totality. It is also 
noteworthy that in both passages, the word “everything” is actually 
used in the concrete meaning of “all things.” It refers to the physical 
reality of things that then collaborate in forming the ambience of the 
fictional room.
The adjectives used to define “all things,” however, are diverse: 
disorderly, expensive, melancholy, massive, tall, broad, wide; 
important, old, gloomy, deep. In the first passage, words denoting 
size dominate the more detailed descriptions of things, which follow 
the initial list of adjectives to define “everything” (“The china stove 
was enormous and white, enameled in blue flowers. The bed was so 
123  Lakoff and Johnson do not discuss their metaphors and sense-making as predomi-
nantly affective, and neither does Johnson’s later account that develops the theory (Johnson 
M. 2008). However, based on the later enactivist notions of sense-making in general as affec-
tive (Colombetti 2013, Di Paolo 2014, Maiese 2015), and for the sake of continuity within this 
study, it is justifiable to add this term to the discussion of this section, too.
124  ‘Metaphor’ is here, like in Lakoff and Johnson’s work, used in a broad sense, not 
restricted to the actual trope in literary language. The definition of ‘symbol’ is included in this 
broader metaphorical thinking, but as a special case: “Something that stands for, represents, 
or denotes something else (not by exact resemblance but by vague suggestion, or by some 
accidental or conventional relation); esp. a material object representing or taken to represent 
something immaterial or abstract […]; a representative or typical figure, sign, or token” (OED). 
Symbolic interpretation here, as before, refers to the assumption of another level or framework 
of meaning behind a fictional item, while a symbol is something recognizable as such because 
of this underlying framework. ‘Allegory’, on the other hand, denotes a totality of meaning in 
which all systems in a fictional assemblage would be party of. In contrast, anything can be a 
metaphor, and it does not require an underlying system to interpret it, yet the alleged arbitrari-
ness of metaphor is slightly challenged by the conceptual account, as it demonstrates how the 
most everyday metaphors rely on embodied perceptions shared by human beings.
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high that…”), although “expensive” is also present in the references 
to luxurious materials. The characterizations of the room recall the 
culturally shared meanings that point toward Roman Catholicism, 
decadence and psychoanalysis, but they also involve the realm of the 
senses. The softness of the velvet of the curtains and the bed cover, 
the “red morocco” leather of book-covers, the glitter of gold in fringes 
and tassels, all of which appeal to the reader’s sensory imagination 
and contribute to the experientiality of the passage via Katya’s focal-
ization, are also present in the cultural meanings: they affect the 
very ways of understanding and imagining concepts such as ‘kitsch’ 
and ‘luxury’. Barnes’s text mixes these concrete images with adjec-
tives such as “expensive,” “melancholy,” and “gloomy,” with their 
own metaphorical relations to embodied schemas (melancholy⁄
gloomy=heavy, dark, stagnant, down; expensive=bright, pleasant, 
up etc.). There are no exact matches but a more varied result with its 
tensions, which is likely to contribute to the aesthetic appeal of the 
passages and the stories.
References to size are of interest here, as they rely on the bodily 
proportions of the narrator and invite a version of the fictionaliza-
tion of the reader’s virtual experience as a way to enact the experi-
ence of space (see Section 2.1; Caracciolo 2014b, 160). That a chest of 
drawers “rises” above one’s head relies on a schema of verticality that 
is initially defined by the typically erect, bipedal posture of a human 
being and its sensorimotor affordances (see Johnson 1987, xiv). 
Hereby the visual experience of a tall item is attained by raising our 
gaze along with it, while the thing itself actually does not rise; here we 
are reminded of Vernon Lee’s exemplification of aesthetic empathy 
with the sense of a mountain “rising” in the horizon (see Section 4.1). 
The bed, on the other hand, is “so high that you could only think of 
it as something that might be overcome.” These descriptions show 
Katya’s body as dwarfed by the furniture (also including the “enor-
mous” china stove), but the creative use of what Lakoff and Johnson 
would call “new metaphor” complements size and verticality with 
other schematic meanings: in addition to its height, the bed becomes 
for Katya both a threat and something to conquer, an adversary or an 
obstacle. Katya’s mind style as an experiencing narrator demonstrates 
a certain attitude to the world, in which a very high thing means a 
thing to be overcome, not to be hindered by or crushed underneath.
The bed actually becomes a metaphorical locus of a sense of 
opposition and battle, and, typically for Barnes’s work, this sche-
matic metaphor spills over the edges of one story. In “Cassation,” the 
description of Valentine’s room, before introducing the child, diverts 
into an ekphrastic sequence:
A great painting hung over the bed; the painting and 
the bed ran together in encounter, the huge rumps of the 
stallions reined into the pillows. The generals, with foreign 
helmets and dripping swords, raging through rolling 
smoke and the bleeding ranks of the dying, seemed to 
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be charging the bed, so large, so rumpled, so devastated. 
The sheets were trailing, the counterpane hung torn, 
and the feathers shivered along the floor, trembling 
in the slight wind from the open window. (CS, 385)
There is no other explanation given to the state of the bed but the 
proximity with the battle depicted in the painting, whereby the two 
items together create a metonymical type of meaning. The fiction-
ally actual bed is rumpled and the feathers from its depths “shiver” 
and “tremble” because of the wind that blows into the room from a 
window, but also as though they were reacting to the doubly fictional 
representation of the tumult of battle in the painting. The subject-
matter of the picture, which also takes up a lot of space as a thing in 
the fictionally actual space, is shown as “charging” from the canvas 
to the bed and to the room. In this sense, through Katya’s description, 
the bed comes to embody simultaneously the opponent in a battle 
and the battleground.
The metaphor of the bed as a battleground is applied in other 
stories as well, whereby it becomes something of a symbol within 
the closed system of Barnes’s stories. For instance, the schematic 
connotation comes across in “Aller et Retour,” when Madame von 
Bartmann schools Richter in the good and bad that is in life, in highly 
metaphorical terms:
Horses hurry you away from danger; trains bring 
you back. Paintings give the heart a mortal pang—
they hung over a man you loved and perhaps 
murdered in his bed. […] Contemplation leads to 
prejudice; and beds are fields where babies fight a 
losing battle. Do you know all this? (CS, 370)
This passage becomes more meaningful when looked at in the 
context of the whole collection and its private symbolism that draws 
on both common cultural meanings and shared embodied, meta-
phorical schemas. Horses, along with trains, are involved in the same 
schematic sphere with paintings, beds, battles and babies, embodying 
(this time quite concretely), tumult and the power to charge and to 
resist. They also appear as such in “A Night among the Horses” (see 
Section 3.2.2). Overall, the metaphorical content in this passage is new 
and creative in its way of combining very different schemas: the asso-
ciation of battle and murder with the softness of beds and the inno-
cence of babies, for instance.
A reader of “Aller et Retour” might also be aware of the placement of 
these things together in “Cassation”: the concrete position of the baby 
in the middle of the bed enforces the feeling of softness that clashes 
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with the battle and the horses surrounding it, as it were, charging 
from the painting in the description. Beds do not equal safety in this 
symbolic system, even though their softness and association with 
private space and sleep might do so in an embodied schematic under-
standing. As was noted in the discussion of the domestic spaces in 
Barnes’s fiction (Section 2.1.2), the house⁄home itself also becomes 
the locus of murder and danger (as the discussion in “Aller et Retour” 
takes place in “the home,” the “back” at the beginning of Madame 
von Bartmann’s speech seems to refer to this place). Generally, the 
aesthetics employed by Barnes rest on the clash of habitual conceptual 
metaphors and a private symbolism, which gives rise to new, poetic 
metaphors. Both systems rest partly on embodied sense-making, 
partly on cultural meanings shared by the authorial audience.
The use of the motif of the child as symbolic in “Cassation” and 
“Aller et Retour” is affected by the material detail that it is surrounded 
by. A symbolic reading is certainly one that all the framing of the 
child-as-motif points toward. Valentine is a thing among things in 
various senses: it is referred to as “it”; it is human and has a name, 
but it does not move or speak, and even the name, Valentine, seems 
to be a symbolic gesture instead of a denominator of a human indi-
vidual. Valentine is a paradoxical symbol of the “non-symbolic,” in 
the way the child is shown to be untouched by language, making its 
own buzzing noise. There are also other ways in which Valentine 
as a symbol remains mute: the polysemy of the whole assemblage 
denies an exact reference to any outside symbolic system of the type 
“Valentine=Christ” (a special child, surrounded by Christian refer-
ences, presented in an emblematic tableau with a parodic version 
of the holy family), or “Valentine=depression” (a condition beyond 
language in an “oppressive” maternal house, defined by “vacancy” 
stagnation or “cassation”: cf. Kristeva 1989). In the spirit of Thing 
Theory, we can see Valentine as a thing that resists the interpre-
tation, evasive and untouchable like the Heideggerian Ding in its 
Dingheit (Brown 2004, 4–5; Heidegger 1971). However, as Jane Bennett 
points out (2010, 1–2), the potential for agency in things goes beyond 
resistance. Reading Barnes with the help of embodied cognitive 
approaches seems to suggest that this vibrancy of things applies to 
their meaning as well.
In this light, a more plausible interpretation would be that Valentine 
actually does mean, not in spite of but because of “its” presentation as a 
thing, similarly to how the china-stove, the painting and the bed mean. 
First, the way the child is framed by the material detail presents it to us 
as a meaningful thing, an object of interest toward which the narration 
of the story gravitates. Secondly, the description of the surrounding 
materialities evokes schemas of containment, bodily force, and heavi-
ness, which are combined with cultural-symbolical meanings around 
kitsch, decadence, and the allegorical families of both Christianity 
and psychoanalysis, leading further to new and creative metaphor-
ical expressions of the bed as a battle-scene, the house as a luxurious 
convent, the child as an angel beyond redemption. These together 
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constitute a symbolic system within the collection, of which Valentine 
is part. In this chain of meaning, the material is essentially linked with 
the symbolic, not an alternative to it.
This reading of Barnes’s story shows how things are not foreign to 
meaning or interpretation, and how to find meaning in a thing does 
not have to equal imposing an interpretive framework on it or delve 
underneath its surface to find what is hidden. If the way we constantly 
interact with material things is crucial to our ways of making sense of 
the world, and the world that appears to us is always already colored 
by significance in the form of affordances and evaluative affectivity 
(Gibson 1979; Colombetti 2013) then there is no way that things would 
not “have meaning.” In the context of Barnes’s fiction, this meaning is 
created as an interplay of references within and without the fictional 
world and between the stories, with intermingled evocations of the 
material and the cultural. When granting the senses access to the 
domain of sense-making, we might actually not always need to shed 
symbols and metaphors to appreciate the materiality of things: on 
the contrary, that very materiality is necessarily at the core of our 
sense-making also on a metaphorical and symbolic level, and can be 
studied alongside these processes. 
5.2.3. Meaning in Gestures
Some passages of “Cassation” have now received detailed attention; 
this section is dedicated to the discussion of the entire story, and its 
use of the narratorial voice. We have seen how sense-making when 
reading “Cassation” can be driven by the affective, sensorimotor 
processes of imagining that a reader goes through while reading a 
story and encountering the things-presented-as-significant in it. 
This is not to say that the whole (the descriptive passage, the fictional 
space, the story) and its parts (the material detail, particular words 
and phrases) would make up a synecdochical entity, which still 
would result in one coherent meaning, an ontologically separate 
thing available to be discovered by interpretation. In some types of 
short fiction, this kind of logic is certainly at play: if “Cassation” was 
aimed to be read as detective fiction, the detail in it would present 
itself as clues, and Katya as the focalizer would appear as a sleuth 
figure. If we follow Naomi Schor’s comparison of Freud with Sherlock 
Holmes, a psychoanalytical approach, which would partly—but only 
partly—be in line with Barnes’s subject-matter, calls for a similar 
approach with respect to detail.
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However, there is no temptation for detective work in “Cassation.” 
Katya’s narrating voice does not encourage us to picture her as the 
reader’s surrogate as an agent whose task is to find clues and make 
deductions, interpreting a mystery parallel to the task of the reader 
interpreting the short story (cf. Caracciolo 2012). She spends no time 
or words wondering about things that might be considered pecu-
liar: Gaya’s invitation, the decorations of the rooms and the battle-
ground-bed, the child and the husband, Gaya’s subsequent demands 
and descent into a catatonic state. There is no narrative suspense 
related to the discovery of a “secret,” the belated noticing of Valentine 
on the bed,  or Gaya’s psychological change; nor are they presented 
as moments of tragic culmination. The case is rather the opposite, as 
can be read in Katya’s matter-of-fact statement at the end of the story: 
“Things are like that, when one travels, nicht wahr, Madame?” (CS, 
392). The story is full of peculiar things, but what its narrator has to say 
about them is simply that they “are like that.” The “nicht wahr” invites 
a confirmation for this in the narratee and the reader, even though 
what has just been read is more likely to be strange than familiar. 
In the recourses to sentences like “nicht wahr, Madame,” the reader 
becomes the recipient of a plea that denotes the ethos of the whole 
story in a gesture: a plea to accept “things as they are,” even though 
they might be counterintuitive. Thus, readers are invited to broaden 
their experiential horizon and, likely in the case of readers contempo-
rary to the publication of the story, to “try on” a new, accepting stance 
toward love between women or the role of a mother. Furthermore, 
rather than appealing to a reader’s curiosity to find out what is behind 
the things (what the behavior of the women is a symptom of), Katya’s 
narration, affirmed by the silent Madame, seems to be saying: “This is 
everything there is.”
An intratextual echo that supports this reading is found in “Aller et 
Retour,” in Madame von Bartmann’s instructional speech to her daughter:
“Life”, she said, “is filthy; it is also frightful. 
There is everything in it: murder, pain, beauty, 
disease—death. Do you know this?”
The child answerred, “Yes.”
“How do you know?”
The child answered again, “I don’t know.”
“You see!” Madame von Bartmann went on, “you know 
nothing. You must know everything, and then begin. You 
must have a great understanding, or accomplish a fall.” [...]
“Think everything, good, bad, indifferent; 
everything, and do everything, everything!” 
(CS, 370–371, emphasis in the original)
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Madame von Bartmann emerges as a guiding voice also for a reader 
who may be struggling to figure out how to make sense of “Aller 
et Retour,” and experiencing similar difficulties with “Cassation.” 
The presence of a “Madame” in “Cassation” acts as a vehicle for the 
application of madame von Bartmann’s sermon also to that story: 
do not look for one thing, look for everything. The relentless repe-
tition of “everything” in both stories insists on the domain of excess 
and plenty that has been shown to characterize Barnes’s writing: it 
portrays the excess in both pleasure and pain that life offers, tragedy 
and comedy included. Solemn tones are paired with the crisp parody 
of Socratic dialogue: “Do you know this?”; “Yes”; “How do you 
know?”; “I don’t know.”
On a symbolic level, knowledge and “everything” are paired with 
liberation: the young women of both stories are invited out of the 
paternal house to see the world. The functions of the mother figures, 
however, are different. While Madame von Bartmann urges Richter to 
experience everything, pushing her out of the house, as it were, Gaya 
ultimately wants Katya to stay in and content herself with the plea-
sures of a solipsistic nothingness: “there are no swans, no flowers, no 
beasts, no boys—nothing, nothing at all, just as you like it. No mind, 
no thought, nothing whatsoever else. […] no father, no mother no 
sisters, no brothers—only you, only you!” (CS, 391).125 However, Katya 
refuses and moves on to tell her story to a “Madame.” Readers know 
nothing of the inclinations of this silent character, but they might, 
based on the intratextual links, imagine her as more like Madame 
von Bartmann than Gaya; an accepting presence affirming Katya’s 
“things are like that” with a sigh, perhaps. In the symbolic system 
created by these two stories, life equals everything: things, language, 
movement, pain, and pleasure. Its opposite is symbolized by the 
house that may contain things but no freedom or movement. The 
dominating mode of narration in “Cassation” is a gesture of showing 
everything performed by the narrator, but also ultimately by a virtual 
presence of an imaginary, embodied Djuna Barnes as the original 
mover of things (Oulanne 2017b). These gestures are also visible in the 
way embodied and spatial schemas are used across stories. Therefore, 
as a final example, we return briefly to a closer discussion of the 
fictional space, with which this study was begun.
The house of “Cassation” evokes the schema of containment, a 
sense of being shut in. Even the “everything” in it comes across as 
suffocating, as the “massive” furniture towers over the narrator, 
the “oppressive” coats of arms and other things signal “gloom” and 
“importance.” However, at the same time, another schema of lightness 
125  It is not clear whether this passage is addressed to Katya or Valentine, or both, yet its 
performative aim seems to be to make Katya stay and forget the “everything” of the world.
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and openness is evoked by details that are less conspicuously present: 
there always seems to be a window open, and entering the house and 
leaving it appears easy, although at times unconventional. At night, 
coming back to the house for the first time, Katya climbs in through 
a window. In Valentine’s bedroom, the feathers shiver in the wind 
coming “from the open window.” At the end, coming to see Gaya and 
Valentine for the last time, Katya “went in quite easily by the door, for 
all the doors and windows were open” (CS, 392). Katya offers a matter-
of-fact explanation: “perhaps they were sweeping that day” (Ibid..). 
This movement between indoors and outdoors is repeated in many 
other stories, as we have noticed in the discussions of “Spillway,” 
“Aller et Retour,” and “A Night among the Horses.”
As Barnes’s writing has often been linked to the processing of 
trauma (Grobbel 2004; Taylor 2012), the repetition of elements from 
one story to another can also be read in the light of trauma theo-
ries, as compulsory re-enactment. However, for the purposes of this 
chapter and this study, it has been more important to show that the 
repetitions are part of an internal system of meaning, which builds 
on embodied schemas as well as cultural and intertextual references, 
and that the particular aesthetics of these stories rest on the partial 
matching, partial clashing of these schemas. This does not attempt to 
be an interpretive key that would make the stories instantly intelli-
gible and explain them away, as it were; here the intention has been to 
show some shared processes on which meanings can be built in the 
unique encounters between the text and its reader. Therefore, even if 
the “take-home message” of “Cassation” seems to be “this is every-
thing there is,” a reading can never finish with a similar statement.
 
In the analyses of this chapter, embodied cognitive approaches to 
reading and sense-making have been harnessed for the purpose of 
investigating the function of materiality in the production of meaning 
in selected pieces of short fiction. The common denominator of 
Rhys’s and Barnes’s stories has been, firstly, the way the material and 
nonhuman permeates the abstract and the human. In The Left Bank, 
people and things contribute to similar aesthetical, and ultimately also 
ethical aims, as they appeal to similar embodied processes of sense-
making, while in Barnes’s stories, especially “Cassation,” abstract and 
symbolic meanings are built on embodied schemas in combination 
with other areas of meaning. The descriptive focus is different in the 
work of the two writers, and in neither case is it simply attributable 
to modernism or another period or style. However, a prevalence 
of description and material detail links both writers’ work to how 
David Herman was seen to conceive of modernism as the interaction 
between a mind and a world, or, more likely, the enaction of both in 
their encounter. However matter-of-fact the narrators’ description of 
the world, experience and embodiment still permeate the result, if not 
clearly in the fictional world, then as the contribution of the readers’ 
history of being-in-the-world that they draw on when making sense 






This study has examined nonhuman things and materialities in the 
fiction of Djuna Barnes and Jean Rhys as narrative devices contrib-
uting to experientiality and as fictional agents with an affective 
presence and a role in various processes of interpretation and sense-
making. The “livedness” of the things has been present in all these 
discussions. Things are bound to be steeped in their felt materiality, 
be it in the form of fictionalized experience undergone by a character, 
or in the way they interact with the reader’s own experiential back-
ground of a lifetime of being-with-things.
The analyses have shown how the writers’ critical commentary 
on the genderedness of private and public spaces and the intermin-
gled experience of time draws on a production of experientiality in 
relation to the various materialities making up these spaces, and of 
the things used to express the experience of time. In the discussion 
of fetishism in the work of both writers, the lived materiality of things 
has been shown to complicate the notion of fetishism as a disavowal 
of lack and as a male phenomenon. Furthermore, drawing on anthro-
pological and new materialist considerations of agency in communi-
ties and assemblages involving both human and nonhuman bodies, 
it is the materiality of the things as something that can be felt in the 
body of a reader that proves significant for the understanding and 
effect of the fictional passages. The agency of things in the stories can 
be conceptualized as the potential to affect, and the affective impact of 
the stories has been shown to rest on the sense experience they invite 
their reader to undergo. Finally, things have been seen to contribute 
to the production of meanings in the stories on several levels, from the 
appeal to basic embodied schemas to culturally informed, symbolic, 
and aesthetic interpretation and reflective, critical considerations of 
the ethical and political implications of the stories.
To disclose material things as simultaneously independent 
agents and participants in the lived experience of human being-
in-the-world on which fictional texts draw, embodied and enactive 
approaches to cognitive narratology and philosophy of mind have 
been combined with new materialist thinking of things, material-
ities, affectivity and distributed agency. This study exemplifies an 
inescapable interdependence between a phenomenological and 
a materialist outlook: fictional things are approached through the 
means of understanding afforded by the human makings of the 
reader, but these makings are also profoundly entangled in the 
material world of things, from the materialities of human bodies to 
the reliance of human sense-making on the sensorimotor experi-
ence of the material world.
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Despite these sweeping thematics and a broad array of theoretical 
approaches used to address them, the focus of this study has been 
on a small corpus of two writers’ “small” texts, namely short stories. 
This has enabled a detailed focus required by reading fictional detail 
made up of references to materialities. Barnes’s and Rhys’s texts have 
already been read carefully by many researchers, but the analyses 
here have contributed to the understanding of their work from a 
different, two-fold perspective, namely that of material things and the 
specific narrative means of producing experientiality, on which the 
meanings teased out by various researchers often depend. Studying 
the singular can create understanding of broader phenomena, be 
they related to fictional devices or real-world relations with things. 
The analysis of how an interaction between a dress and a character 
in Rhys’s “Let Them Call It Jazz” can be conductive of kinesthetic 
communication and empathy suggests a broadening of the scope of 
narrative empathy; the study of the abundance of things surrounding 
the child on the bed in Barnes’s “Cassation” sheds light on the mutual 
constitution of the embodied, symbolic, aesthetic and cultural levels 
of sense-making involved in reading.
From the point of view of the study of the experientiality of fiction, 
the analyses have shown how the embodiedness of this experienti-
ality relies on the material world of nonhuman bodies as experienced, 
and how it occasionally allows for the blurring of boundaries between 
the human and the nonhuman, by virtue of focalizing structures 
de-centered from fictional human bodies. On the other hand, the 
analyses highlight the multiple levels of consciousness and engage-
ment in reading fiction: the simultaneous possibility of the embodied 
enactment of story-driven experiences afforded and invited by the 
events and existents in the storyworld, and the undergoing of the 
specific experience of reading fiction, with the reflective, aesthetic 
and ethical considerations involved. There is still much to be done in 
this vein of research, and the approaches used and developed in this 
study to examine the use of materialities in literary worldmaking can 
be applied to other fiction from other periods as well.
The analyses have contributed to the study of the writing of Djuna 
Barnes and Jean Rhys by pointing out how affirmative and repara-
tive interpretations, which have arisen only recently in relation to 
their work, rely on basic embodied modes of sense-making, but are 
compatible with critical and ironic modes of reading. The stories of 
both writers use fictional things to create literary affordances for 
slight shifts in the readers’ understanding based on habitual, tacit 
meanings: possibilities to broaden their conceptions of subjectivity, 
empathy, gendered identity, and the family. Experientially, readers 
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may undergo affective experiences of happiness induced by wearing 
nice clothes, moments of belonging built around a specific table-set-
ting, an inkling of the talismanic power evoked by the right kind of 
boots and a cape, or the pleasure involved in a collection of intricate 
things and their cataloguing, while appreciating the gendered prob-
lems of objectification related to fashion, the precarity of happiness 
as a sociocultural phenomenon, the multiple troubling implications 
of modern fetishism and the individual symbolic potential of each 
item in a list.
From the point of view of modernism studies, the readings suggest 
that such embodied, material thematics and means of presenta-
tion are quite central in the work of two writers stylistically and 
spatio-temporally quite near the heart of Anglophone modernism, 
even though the focus on of things and materialities in previous 
studies has been rather marginal. As regards specifically short 
fiction, the readings show these short stories, sketches and vignettes 
as forms of writing in which the lived materiality of the world is 
brought to the fore, while features such as plot, psychological char-
acter study and even symbolism appear as secondary. They display 
a phenomenological interest in the way they tap into human experi-
ence of being-in-the-world and making sense of it with and through 
material things, even in the absence of characters with a “readable” 
mind. Significantly, the analyses reveal that modernist “object-rela-
tions” do not only display alienation; the dehumanizing tendencies of 
the texts suggest a paradoxical connectedness that encompasses the 
nonhuman world. Rhys’s and Barnes’s texts form a fruitful platform 
for experimentation with means of conveying and evoking glimpses 
of lived experience, a central concern in modernist fiction of the 
beginning of the 20th century, while also voicing critical concerns 
of the gendered order of things in the sociocultural context as well 
as in theoretical frameworks such as psychoanalysis. This study 
has shown that gendered experience, as imagined by two central 
modernist writers, is intermingled with the nonhuman, material 
world, and that materialities can afford empowerment and creativity 
as well as objectification and alienation.
Djuna Barnes and Jean Rhys invite the readers of their short 
fiction to live through intense experiences and a variety of fictional 
settings with touching, inviting, repellent, oppressive, intriguing, 
realistic and fantastic furnishings. Readers are dressed in 1920s black 
dresses, corseted, hatted, and veiled, taken on a crawl through thicket 
or a ride, walk or a run through a series of escapes from suffocating 
interiors. Simultaneously, they are provided with skillful organiza-
tions of words on a paper, the experience of holding a book in their 
hands, materially rooted in their own bodies and living-worlds, and 
reflecting on what they read. The fictional world, the real-world being 
of the reader and even the reading consciousness have something in 
common: the way the material and the cultural, the human and the 
nonhuman, the symbolic and the embodied are mutually constituted 
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